Essays in sociological theory

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ESSAYS IN

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Revised Edition

Essays in'

TALCOTT PARSONS

Sociological Theory

REVISED EDITION

THE FREE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS

Copyright 1954 and 1949 by The Free Press

Printed in the United States of America

Designed by Sidney Solomori

Contents

Introduction \ 9

I. The Role of Ideas in Social Action (1938) 19

/II) The Professions and Social Sti^icture (1939)^ 34

III. The Motivation of Economic Activities (1940) 50

IV. An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Strati-

fication (1940) C?^

V. Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United

States (1942) 89

VI. Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany

(1942) 104

VII. Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements

(1942) 124

VIII. Propaganda and Social Control (1942) 142

IX. The Kinship System of the Contemporary United States

(1943) 177

X. The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Re-

ligion (1944) 197

XL The Present Position and Prospects of Systematic

Theory in Sociology (1945) 212

XII. The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change

(1945) 238

XIII. Population and the Social Structure of Japan ( 1946 ) 275

XIV. Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in

the Social Structure of the Western World (1947) 298

XV. Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent

Sociological Theory (1949) 323

XVI. Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure (1950) 336

XVII. The Prospects of Sociological Theory (1950) 348

XVIII. A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession ( 1952 ) 370

XIX. A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social

Sti-atification (1953) 386

Bibliography of Talcott Parsons 440

Index 446

ESSAYS IN

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Revised Edition

Introduction

THE FIRST EDITION of this volume of Essays appeared in 1949. In the
Introduction written at that time it seemed appropriate to say that
it brought together work done by the author since the pubhcation
of his book. The Structure of Social Action in 1937. In preparing a
new edition, the Free Press and the author thought in terms of work
which hes between the aforementioned book and three new pub-
lications in the field of general theory which document a new phase
in the development of the author's theoretical thinking. These are
the monograph. Values, Motives and Systems of Action, written in
collaboration with Edward A. Shils and published in the volume
Toward a General Theory of Action (Harvard University Press,
1951) of which the two of us were co-editors; The Social System
(Free Press, 1951); and the collection entitled Working Papers in
the Theory of Action (Free Press, 1953), written in collaboration
with Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils.

When the Free Press was considering the present new edition of
the Essays, some of the papers printed in the Working Papers were
either written or in process. The question arose as to whether any
of these should be included in a new edition of the Essays, but at
the time it seemed advisable to reserve all theoretical work done
since the completion of The Social System for the separate publi-
cation of Working Papers and thus to confine the new edition of these
Essays to work done before the new theoretical phase was under
way. The present edition therefore was planned to end with the
essay on "The Prospects of Sociological Theory," the author's presi-
dential address before the American Sociological Society at its 1949
meeting, which was written in the midst of the work leading to
Toward A General Theory of Action and points up the transition
between these phases of intellectual development.

Since the Working Papers went to press, however, two other
papers have been written which it has seemed advisable to include
in the present collection. Both are to be published elsewhere but
would through these channels have come to the attention of only
rather restricted groups. Since they belong in the broad field of
"application" of sociological theory and stand in the line of scientific
development documented by these essays, they seemed to belong
in the collection.

JO ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Within this general poHcy, several new items have thus been
included in this new edition which were not part of the original
one, and in order not to allow the volume to grow too large, three
items in the earlier edition have been omitted.

The new additions fall into three classes. First, there are three
papers which had been written before the publication of the first
edition of these essays, but for reasons partly of space, and partly
of balance, were not included in the volume at that time. These all
fall in the "applied" category of essays in theory, dealing with large
problems of the analysis and interpretation of institutional struc-
tures of the modern world, and dynamic processes of social change
in it. The dominant focus of all three is on the political situation, a
focus which is at least partly attributable to the urgencies of the
time.

These three papers are, in order of their writing and placing in
the new volume: (1) Chapter VI, "Democracy and Social Structure
in Pre-Nazi Germany." This was written for and published in the
first issue of the then new Journal of Legal and Political Sociology
in 1942. It reflected the author's long-standing interest in problems
of German society and forms a companion piece to the later paper
on "Controlled Institutional Change." (2) Chapter VII, "Some
Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Movements." This was written
as the presidential address to the Eastern Sociological Society at
its 1942 meeting, and was published in Social Forces, December,
1942. It attempts to generalize some of the insights developed in
relation to Germany about the social background of the fascist
movement, and to state them in terms of their relations to certain
general features of modem Western society. (3) Chapter XIII,
"The Population and Social Structure of Japan." This was published
in the collaborative volume Japans Prospect (D. G. Haring, Ed.,
Harvard University Press, 1946) by members of the faculty of the
Harvard School for Overseas Administration. It is an attempt to
extend to an Oriental society the same order of structural and
dynamic analysis which had previously been developed in connec-
tion with Western countries.

The next three additions are papers written since the appearance
of the first edition of these essays but prior to the general theoretical
work cited above. These are ( 1 ) Chapter XV, "Social Classes and
Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory." This was
read at a meeting of the American Economic Association in De-

INTRODUCTION H

cember, 1948, which was concerned with assessment of the scientific
influence of Marx in economics and sociology on the occasion of
the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Manifesto. It was
pubHshed in Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic
Review, May, 1949. It is an attempt to bring to bear the main lines
of modem sociological analysis on the problems of class conflict as
stated in Marxist theory. (2) Chapter XVI, "Psychoanalysis and
the Social Structure." This paper was read at a meeting of the
American Psychoanalytic Association in May, 1948, and published
in the Psychoanalytic Quarterly, July 1950. It is included because
it states in rather general terms the author's approach to the rela-
tions between psychoanalysis and sociology. This theme has become
a most important one in subsequent work. ( 3 ) The last addition in
this group is the one already mentioned, Chapter XVII, "The Pros-
pects of Sociological Theory," which points the way to the phase of
theoretical work which was just beginning at the time it was
written.

Finally, come the last two papers mentioned above which were
written after those appearing in the Working Papers. The first of
these. Chapter XVIII, is "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Pro-
fession." This paper was read at the 50th Anniversary Symposium
of the University of Chicago Law School in December, 1952. It is
concerned with the similarities and differences between the place
and functions of the legal profession in modern society and the
medical profession which had been the object of considerable
earlier study. It has proved possible in this paper to draw a closer
analogy between the two professions than had at first seemed pos-
sible. The final paper added is "A Revised Analytical Approach to
the Theory of Social Stratification." This paper was written for the
Reader in Social Stratification edited by Bendix and Lipset. It at-
tempts to bring the analysis of Chapter IV (written in 1940) up to
date as a spelling out of general sociological theory in an important
field of its application.

To make room for these additions, three chapters of the first
edition of these essays have been omitted from the new one. The
first of these is Chapter V, there entitled simply "Max Weber." This
was by far the longest chapter in the book, and is omitted largely
because it is readily available elsewhere in book form, not only in
the first edition of these essays, but in its original place of publi-
cation as the Introduction to the translation of Weber's Theory of

12 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Socml and Economic Organization (Oxford University Press, 1947).
The second omission is Chapter I of the first edition, "The Position
of Sociological Theory." A good deal of its content is repeated
elsewhere, and it was felt that it was better to emphasize empirical
applications of theory in the new edition. Finally, Chapter III, "A
Selection from "Toward A Common Language for the Area of Social
Science " has also been omitted. This is largely because the classi-
fication set forth there is now completely obsolete, in the light of
the much more elaborate attempt at classification of institutional
patterns developed in Chapters III and IV of The Social System.
The main interest of the early version is as a first stage of the scheme
which has been much more fully developed in this later publication.

Besides the above changes in content, the new edition of these
Essays also differs in arrangement from the old. The balance be-
tween "pure" and "applied" theory has been altered in favor of the
latter sufficiently to make a separate section of papers with the
former emphasis less appropriate than before. Hence it has been
decided to reprint the papers in the order of their original publi-
cation without regard to subject-matter. This results in a few cases
in separating papers which belong closely together, as for example
that on Age and Sex and that on the American kinship system. But
perhaps this disadvantage is compensated for by giving the reader
a better opportunity to follow consecutively the process of devel-
opment of theoretical thinking.

Karl Mannheim once stated that one of the principal differences
between European and American sociology lay in the concern of
the Europeans, especially on the Continent, with the diagnosis of
the larger social-political problems of their time, a trait of sociology
which connected it with the philosophy of history, while American
sociology had been much more concerned with specific and limited
empirical studies of phases of our own contemporary society. In
this respect the empirical preoccupations of most of these essays
clearly bear the imprint of the author's European training. But in
this empirical respect, as well as in respect to type of theory as
such, it seems legitimate to think of a process of convergence rather
than simply of two separate traditions of thought, and above all I
should like to argue that this interest in the larger social-political
problems does not mean the assimilation of sociology to the phi-
losophy of history, as Alfred Weber above all has advocated and
carried it out. The interest in these broader problems in no way

INTRODUCTION 13

involves the minimization or abandonment of the interest in acquir-
ing for sociology the status of an empirical science with rigorous
operational procedures and standards of validation.

In the recent theoretical work referred to above, my colleagues
and I have strongly emphasized the fact that the theory of action,
including its sociological branch, is applicable over a microscopic-
macroscopic range. Sociologically speaking this reaches all the way
from the analysis of the processes of interaction in temporary small
groups to the processes in the most complex societies considered as
total social systems. In this methodological situation, the study of
the large-scale society, and the broad institutional structure of
societies, of which Max Weber was the great master, has an exceed-
ingly important place in the development of the relations between
theory and empirical work.

If we are correct in our views about the range of applicability,
there is no intrinsic reason why one rather than another "level" of
the use of a conceptual scheme has any priority. It is a question of
interest and of conceptions of the most strategic way to proceed in
the furthering of sociological knowledge. In the light of this fact
I should hke to argue that broad comparative treatment of total
social systems and of large-scale societies has had, in the light of
the general state of sociological science in the last two generations,
an important special place.

This is essentially because of the nature of the problems we
sociologists have faced in making our conceptual schemes opera-
tionally testable according to the canons of the best scientific
methods. The crux of the problem has been how to establish a fit
between categories of data and the central concepts of generalized
theoretical analysis. Broadly speaking we are only now beginning
to get the kind of relation which combines empirical precision and
high theoretical generality of implication in the same statements of
fact. For the most part we have had to rest content with empirical
statements which, as in the case for example of the net reproduc-
tion rate or the correlation between religious affiliation and voting
behavior, might be extremely precise, but in theoretical terms must
be interpreted to state complex resultants of the operation of a con-
siderable and generally unknown number of variables of general
significance to our science. But in physical science such concepts as
temperature, velocity, momentum are both precisely determinable
and are either the values of fundamental variables as such are very

14 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

simple resultants. The great problem of the sciences of action in
working toward empirical precision has been to break through this
impasse of the lack of fit, and to do so in a situation where the fun-
damental variables it was desired to measure, were unknown.
Common sense in this situation is likely to be as deceptive in our
field as it is in physics. For example to common sense, density is
"obviously" a fundamental property of physical objects; what could
be more fundamental than the difference between a lead shot and
a feather? But nevertheless density is, in the fundamental theory of
mechanics, not treated as a fundamental variable, but as a resultant.
There is no question but that many of the variables now thought
to be most fundamental in the social sciences will turn out to be
in the same category as density, not as mass or velocity. They are,
that is to say, empirically crucial for many problems, but theoreti-
cally derivative, or (secondary).

In the light of very recent experience it seems that the very
detailed and meticulous observation of interaction processes in
small groups offered an opportunity to make the kinds of theoretical
discriminations of empirically observable variables of which we
are speaking, but in spite of the fact that such writers as Mead and
Cooley have given us much insight about the problems of intimate
interaction, until the present generation no one has had the imagi-
nation to develop a solid program of detailed research in this field.
At the same time most of the data available on "intermediate" levels,
especially before the development, which is itself recent, of sam-
pling techniques, have been of the character of complex resultants
illustrated by the net reproduction rate. In such a situation, increase
in operational precision, by itself would not advance us toward our
goal of "marrying" theory and operational procedures in the fruit-
ful manner of the physical sciences.

It is in this connection that the macroscopic study of the large-
scale society has acquired a certain special importance. The essential
point is that the degree of precision which is theoretically significant
is relative, relative that is to the theoretical discriminations which it
is important to make.

Looking back, it can be seen that Toennies' famous discrimi-
nation of Gemeinschaft and Gesellscfmft hit upon a quite funda-
mental line of distinction, which was not, to be sure, a distinction
between two major variables in the usual sense, but which, if fur-
ther analyzed, could lead to the definition of such variables as it

INTRODUCTION 15

has in fact, along with other sources, done. Toennies' empirical
work was, however, highly impressionistic and not accompanied
with at all precise conceptual analysis, to say nothing of research
technique.

A much higher level, which represents the best of what is meant
here by broad comparative study is found in two justly famous
programs of research of the last generation, that of Max Weber in
the comparative sociology of religion, and of Durkheim, in the field
of rates of suicide. Weber essentially established certain broad dif-
ferentiations of patterns of value-orientation, as we would now
term them. He showed how these were related to the existential
belief systems of the religious traditions in which they developed,
and that these orientation patterns "corresponded" to the broad lines
of differentiation of the social structures of the societies in which
they had become institutionalized. This was the first major develop-
ment in modern sociology in the systematic discrimination of major
types of value system in terms directly articulated with the com-
parative analysis of social stiuctures, which went well beyond the
impressionistic level of a Toennies.

Weber was well trained in the techniques of historical research
of his day, and was meticulously careful in his statements of fact.
But he covered a range which would, and did, horrify the type of
historian who believes that only establishment of detailed fact has
scientific value. Moreover he necessarily ventured into a number of
fields, such as Sinology and Indology, where in the nature of the
case he could not himself be a competent expert in the detailed
sense. But in exchange for this, using what was, from the point of
view of the tradition of meticulous empirical scholarship a dubious
procedure, he succeeded, as no one had done before him, in estab-
lishing broad lines of empirical differentiation which could be
directly interpreted in terms of the theoretical scheme with which
he had been working. He indeed used theoretical categories of the
order of density, as for example "traditionalism," and much in his
theoretical scheme has proved to need revision in the light of later
developments. But by the use of the comparative method on the
broadest scale, Weber, was carrying on empirical research which
came closer to logic of the crucial experiment, than was the case
for the work of almost any of the "empirical" sociologists whose
coverage of the supposedly important facts of an empirical field was
often much more "adequate" than his. The essential point is that the

16 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

very breadth of the range Weber covered gave him, since he had a
fruitful conceptual scheme, the opportunity to select out what for
him were the theoretically crucial considerations of fact. Many
details might remain unclear, but on the level of the research
techniques he used, the broad contrasts, e.g. as between Chinese
traditionalistic particularism and Western universalistic "rational-
ism," were unmistakable; and these contrasts have proved to be
theoretically crucial.

Durkheim's work on suicide was in a sense intermediate between
the broad comparative method and what might be called the "me-
ticulous" ideal of operational procedure. He had statistical data of
a sort and though his methods were, from the point of view of
modem statistics, exceedingly crude, he showed considerable inge-
nuity in working out the most significant combinations of the data.
But still the focus was the comparative method, the distinctions of
rates of suicide by religious groups which he showed held up inter-
nationally; the differences between rates in armed forces and in the
civil populations of the same countries, the variations of rates as a
function of the business cycle. But Durkheim, as one of the great
theorists of the history of sociology, was able to use these broad
comparative differences to sharpen and refine his theoretical
scheme. It was, crude as it was, empirical validation of highly gen-
eralized theory, and marked from that point of view a most impor-
tant step in the development of the science.

This is the methodological context in which the empirical essays
in this volume can claim to be contributions to empirical sociology
and to the development of theory at the same time. In not a single
case are they products of what, by current standards, would be
called refined research technique; in this sense they can hardly
claim to be "operational." They are, however, called essays in the
"application" of theory in that in every case they represent attempts
to bring to bear theoretical considerations in interpreting the various
broad phenomena with which they are concerned. It matters pro-
foundly to theory whether the theoretically expected relationships
in fact hold up empirically. With respect to such matters as the dis-
tinctive character of the American middle-class urban kinship sys-
tem, as contrasted for instance with that of classical China or of
Japan, or to the major institutional pattern of medical practice in
Western society as contrasted with that normal in "business" it can
be claimed that they do stand up. Then however impressionistically

INTRODUCTION IT

these differences have been established, theory enables us to draw
conclusions from them. We conclude for example that there is a
relation between the specific structure of the American kinship
system and the phenomena of our "y^u^^^* culture," which have so
often been attributed to the biological maturation process, but which
are conspicuously absent in classical China. Or, the differences
between the institutional pattern of medical practice and that of
business can be shown to have a fundamental bearing on the psy-
chotherapeutic component of the functions of medical practice.

The essential point of this discussion is that the gap between the
empirical needs of the type of theory with which the author has
been concerned, in the period represented by most of these essays,
and the possibilities of most of the refined empirical operational
techniques practiced in the same period has been such, that it is at
least questionable whether confining attention to empirical prob-
lems to which the latter were best adapted would have served the
empirical interests of theoretical development as well as the type of
operationally crude empirical generalization represented in this
volume has done. The gain in rehability and precision which such
techniques could yield might well have been balanced by an exor-
bitant cost in the loss of freedom to investigate the empirical prob-
lems which seemed most crucial to the validation of the strategic
theoretical ideas. In that case the distinctive contribution flowing
from some kind of empirical testing of the kind of theoretical ideas
in question might have been greatly diminished in favor of much
better empirical work which was either in general less significant
to theory, or at any rate was significant to a different order of theory.

I have wished to present this argument to the reader of these
essays because the scientific functions of this order of crude empi-
rical observation and generalization often tend to be overlooked
when compared to the much greater sophistication and in one sense
power of "real research." But in no sense do I wish to argue that
this is an ideal or permanent state. Though it may very well prove
to have a permanent place in our repertoire of procedures, it has
its functions above all in the stage in which theory is beginning to
"try its wings," when so7ne kind of empirical guide-posts are abso-
lutely essential. But when theory has developed far enough, its mar-
riage with the sophisticated level of research technique can and
must take place. We are, in my opinion, just beginning to enter the
threshold of that era, with an increasing number of attempts to

18 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

utilize more general theory in direct technical research, and con-
versely, to utilize technical research results for technical theoretical
purposes.*

It is a commonplace that it is not possible to do certain kinds of
things in the field of empirical validation and generalization with-
out the development of the techniques to do them. But in some
quarters there seems still to be a prevalent idea that theory, if it
is in any sense good, cannot help making the connection if the
techniques are available. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Speaking from a good deal of experience in connection with the
attempt to act as a "go-between" in arranging this marriage of
theory and research technique, I can say that the amount of spe-
cifically theoretical work which is necessary is prodigious. The the-
oretical problems must be stated in a form which meets the
operational requirements of the available techniques and at the same
time permits high generality of reasoning about the implications of
findings. For two parties to enter into a successful marriage both
must have reached a certain level of maturity. The marriage, which
we can expect soon to begin to produce offspring far surpassing
the qualities of their parents, is only now becoming possible and
only because the development of both partners has gone through
a long series of preceding stages. This "father" of the new gener-
ation, if the role-designation for the theoretical partner may be
permitted, had to go through his stages of playing cops and robbers
and Indians, before he was ready to do a man's job.

*The paper of Merton and Kit "Contributions to the Theory of Reference
Group Behavior" is one of the best examples. Cf. Continuities in Social Re-
search, Merton and Lazarsfeld, eds., The Free Press; 1950.

The Role of Ideas
in Social Action

THE SUBJECT of this paper has given rise to much controversy which
has, on the whole, turned out to be strikingly inconclusive. It may
be suggested that, in part at least, this is a result of two features of
the discussion. On the one hand, sides have tended to be taken on
the problem in too general terms. Ideas in general have been held
either to have or not to have an important role in the determina-
tion of action. As opposed to this tendency, I shall attempt here
to break the problem down into different parts, each of which
fits differently into the analytical theory of action.

On the other hand, tlie discussion has, for the taste of the pres-
ent writer, been altogetlier too closely linked to philosophical
problems and has seldom been brought fairly into the forum of
factual observation and theoretical analysis on the empirical level.
This paper is to be regarded as a theoretical introduction to
attempts of the latter sort.

I am far from believing that social or any other science can live
in a kind of philosophical vacuum, completely ignoring all philo-
sophical problems, but even though, as I have stated elsewhere,^
scientific and philosophical problems are closely interdependent,
they are nevertheless at the same time independent and can be
treated in relative abstraction from each other. Above all, from
the fact that this paper will maintain that ideas do play an impor-
tant part in the determination of action, it is not to be inferred
that its author is committed to some kind of idealistic metaphysics
of the sort from which it has so often been inferred that ideas must
arise through some process of "immaculate conception" unsullied
by social and economic forces or that they influence action by
some automatic and mysterious process of self-realization or
"emanation" without relation to the other elements of the social
system.

1 The Structure of Social Action, 20 ff, New York, 1937.

20 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The paper, then, will be devoted to the statement of a theo-
retical framework for the analysis of the role of ideas on an
empirical, scientific basis. Without apologies, I shall start with an
explicit definition of my subject matter. Ideas, for the purposes of
this discussion, are "concepts and propositions, capable of intel-
ligible- interpretation in relation to human interests, values and
experience." So far as, qua ideas, they constitute systems, the rela-
tions between these concepts and propositions are capable of being
tested in terms of a certain type of norm, that of logic.

The definition just given is so stated that it can serve as the
definition of a variable in a system of interdependent variables.
That is, it is a combination of logical universals to which many
different particulars, the values of the variable, may be fitted. Since
the present concern is wholly scientific, the sole important ques-
tions to be asked are three: 1. Do differences which are accurately
ascertainable obtain between the specific content of the ideas held
by different individuals or groups in social systems at different
times? 2. Is it possible to establish important relations between
these differences and other observable aspects of, or events within,
the same social systems? 3. Are these relations such that the ideas
cannot be treated as a dependent variable, that is, their specific
content deduced from knowledge of the values of one or more
other observable variables in the same system? If all three of these
questions can be answered in the affirmative, it may be claimed
that ideas play an important role in the determination of social
action in the only sense in which such a claim has meaning in
science. Ideas would be an essential variable in a system of theory
which can be demonstrated to "work," to make intelligible a
complex body of phenomena. Whether in an ultimate, ontological
sense these ideas are real, or only manifestations of some deeper
metaphysical reality is a question outside the scope of this paper.

Ideas obviously could not be treated as a variable in systems
of social action unless their specific content varied from case to
case. But besides the variations of specific content from case to
case, it may be possible, as has been suggested, to divide tliem into
certain broad classes which differ appreciably from one another
in their relations to action. How these classes shall be defined,
and how many there are, are pragmatic questions in the scientific
sense; the justification of making a distinction between any two
classes is that their members behave differently in their relations
to action. Whether this is the case or not is a question of fact. I

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 21

shall outline such a classification and then present an analysis of
the role of each so as to demonstrate the importance of making
the distinctions.

The first class may be termed existential ideas. The concepts
which comprise such ideas are the framework for describing or
analyzing entities, or aspects or properties of them, which pertain
to the external world of the person who entertains the ideas, the
actor. These entities either are or are thought to be existent at the
time, to have existed, or to be likely to exist. The reference is to an
external "reality" in some sense. The ideas involve existential prop-
ositions relative to some phase or phases of this reality, real or
alleged. The most general type of norm governing existential ideas
is that of "truth."

Of existential, as of other ideas, it is convenient to distinguish
two subclasses, the distinction between which is of cardinal impor-
tance. The one are empirical ideas, the concepts and propositions
of which are, or are held to be, capable of verification by the
methods of empirical science. All other existential ideas, on the
other hand, I shall class together as nonempirical, regardless of
the reasons why they are not scientifically verifiable.^

The second main class are what may be called normative ideas.
These refer to states of affairs which may or may not actually exist,
but in either case the reference is not in the indicative but in the
imperative mood. If the state of affairs exists, insofar as the idea
is normative the actor assumes an obligation to attempt to keep it
in existence; if not, he assumes an obligation to attempt its realiza-
tion at some future time. An idea is normative insofar as the main-
tenance or attainment of the state of affairs it describes may be
regarded as an end of the actor. The states of affairs referred to
may also be classified as empirical and nonempirical according to
the above criteria.^

2 This residual category is formulated for the immediate purposes in hand
and its use is not to be held to imply that no distinctions between subclasses of
nonempirical ideas are important for any other purposes.

3 There is a third class of ideas which may be called "imaginative." The
content of these refers to entities which are neither thought to be existent nor
does the actor feel any obhgation to realize them. Examples would be a
Utopia which is not meant as defining a program of action, or the creation of
an entirely fictitious series of situations in a novel. At least the most obvious
significance of such ideas in relation to action is as indices of the sentiments
and attitudes of the actors rather than as themselves playing a positive role.
To inquire whether indirectly they do play a role would raise questions
beyond the scope of this paper and they will be ignored in the subsequent
discussion. They are mentioned here only to complete the classification.

22 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The first set of problems to be discussed concerns the role of
empirical existential ideas. I tliink it fair to say tliat no branch of
social science has been subjected to more thorough and rigorous
analysis than this, so it forms an excellent starting point."* The
context in which this analysis has taken place is the range of prob-
lems surrounding the concept of the rationality of action in the
ordinary sense of the maximization of "efficiency" or "utility" by
the adaptation of means to ends. It is the sense of rationality which
underlies most current analysis of technological processes in
science, industry, medicine, military strategy and many other fields,
which lies at the basis of economic tlieory, and much analysis of
political processes regarded as processes of maintaining, exercis-
ing, and achieving power.

The common feature of all these modes of analysis of action is
its conception as a process of attaining specific and definite ends
by the selection of the "most efficient" means available in the situ-
ation of the actor. This, in turn, implies a standard according to
which the selection among the many possible alternative means is
made. There is almost universal agreement that the relevant basis
of selection in this kind of case involves the actor's knowledge of
his situation, which includes knowledge of the probable eflFects of
various possible alternative ways of altering it which are open to
him. One of the necessary conditions of rationality of his action
is that the knowledge should be scientifically valid.^

Valid empirical knowledge in tliis sense is certainly a system of
ideas. It consists of concepts and propositions and their logical
interrelations. Moreover, in all the above analyses of action, this
knowledge is treated as a variable in the system of action; accord-
ing to variations in its specific content, tlie action will be different.
In explaining, above all, failure for the actual course of action to
conform with a rational norm describing the "best" course, we
continually refer to features of the store of knowledge of the actor.
We say "He did not know ..." with the implication that if he had,
he would have acted differently, and "He supposed erroneously

4 Much of this analysis is discussed in The Structure of Social Action. See
esp. chap. 4, 161 ff.; chap. 5, 180 ff.; chap. 9, 344 ff.

5 "Efficiency" involves choice among two or more alternative ways of at-
taining an end. The validity of knowledge alone is not a sufficient criterion to
determine the relative efficiency of tlie different alternatives. Statement of
the other necessary criteria would involve difficult questions far beyond the
scope of this paper.

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 23

that . . . ," with the corresponding imphcation that if he had not
been in error on the level of knowledge, he would also have acted
difiFerently. Thus, t\vo of the coordinates of variation of knowledge
which are relevant to its role in action are that in the direction of
ignorance and of error. There is, for the attainment of any given
end in any given situation, a certain minimum of valid knowledge
which is adequate. If the knowledge actually falls short of this, if
the actor is ignorant of any important features of the situation, or
if his ideas are invalid, are in error, this is an adequate explanation
of the failure of his action to be rational.

The analytical scheme in which the role of valid empirical knowl-
edge in this sense has been most highly elaborated and conceptu-
ally refined is economic theory. Knowledge is a basically important
variable in the system of economic theory, and he who would
radically deny a role in action to ideas must find a satisfactory
alternative explanation of all the uniformities of human action
which have been established by two centuries of economic anal-
ysis, or demonstrate that the supposed uniformities do not exist.

But exactly the same thing is true of what we ordinarily call
technology. The very processes of technological change to which
many of our "materialists" assign so fundamental a role are in part
a function of knowledge, i.e., of ideas, in exactly the same sense
in which economic processes are. And there, far more than in the
narrowly economic realm, knowledge has become a variable which
we think of as to a high degree autonomous. For it takes, to a
large extent, the form of theoretically systematized scientific knowl-
edge rather than common sense. Surely the development of modern
aniline dyes, the radio, or alloy steels, cannot be understood with-
out reference to the essentially autonomous developments of
science on which they depend.

Marxian theory has, however, classed technology among the
"material" factors in social change, while "ideas" form part of the
superstructure. Whence does this peculiar procedure derive? Two
important sources of it may be noted. In the first place, Marxian
theory has neither a rigorous concept of ideas, nor a classification
of different kinds of ideas. Hence, when those ideas which Marx-
ians habitually term "ideologies" behave differently from the
scientific basis of technology, they tend to ignore the fact that the
latter is also made up of ideas, and generalize the behavior of the
former into that of ideas in general. Secondly, Marxian theory rests

24 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

on an analytical basis essentially different from that which is the
starting point of the present discussion. For it, the total concrete
structure of the industrial enterprise is a "factor," technology, social
organization and all. The present attempt is to break down entities
like this into simpler elements, the classification of which cuts
across the Marxian dichotomy of "ideal" and "material" factors.
There is no inherent reason why the Marxian choice of variables
should be ultimate. The only scientific test as between it and
another, such as that under discussion here, is the pragmatic one:
which is the more illuminating in the understanding of certain
empirical problems.

Every human society possesses a considerable stock of empiri-
cally valid knowledge, both of the nonhuman environment in
which its members act, and of themselves, and of each other. That
this knowledge is empirical and not theoretically systematized in
the sense of modern science does not alter the fact. Moreover, a
very large part of the action of the members of all societies is to
be understood in terms of this knowledge. Levy-Bruhl's theory
that primitive men do not think logically has, so far as it bears
upon this point, been definitely discredited.^

But in addition to ideas which will stand the test of scientific
validity, there are current in every society many ideas which in
one respect or another diverge from this standard. So far as their
reference is existential rather than normative or imaginative, the
question arises as to what is the basis of this divergence. In answer
to this question, a certain positivistic bias is very widely prevalent,
and must be guarded against. It is the view, implicit or explicit,
that divergence from the standard of empirical verifiability is
always and necessarily a matter of empirical shortcomings in the
sense that the ideas in question are not only, negatively, not verifi-
able, but that they can be shown to be positively wrong, that is.
that the basis of their unverifiability is ignorance or error, or both.
This judgment clearly implies that there is available an adequate
positive scientific standard by which to judge them.

At least in the field of empirically known systems of existential
ideas, it can be stated with confidence that this class, which may be
called un-scientific ideas, does not exhaust the departures from
empirical verifiability, but that, in addition, there is a class of con-

*» See especially B. Malinowski, "Magic, Science and Religion," ed. by
Robert Redfield (Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1948).

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 25

cepts and propositions which are unverifiable, not because they
are erroneous, but because, as Pareto put it, they "surpass experi-
ence." Such ideas as that the universe is divided between a good
and an evil principle, that souls go through an unending series of
reincarnations, that the only escape from sin is by divine grace,
are in this category. They are nonscientific rather than unscientific.'^

What, then, can be said about the role of such nonscientific
ideas? So far as they are existential rather than normative or imagi-
native in character, there are certain formal similarities with em-
pirical, scientifically valid ideas. The latter may, in one aspect, be
considered as mechanisms of orientation of the actor to his situ-
ation. Insofar as man is treated as a purposive being, attempting
rationally to attain ends, he cannot be considered as fully oriented
to his situation until, among other things, he has adequate knowl-
edge of the situation in the respects which are relevant to the
attainment of the ends in question, or other functionally equiva-
lent mechanisms.

But the role of existential ideas has so far been considered only
in one context, that of the basis of choice of means to given ends.
There is in addition the necessity of cognitive orientation of
another sort, an answer to the problem of justification of the ends
which are in fact pursued.® If the justifications men give of why
they should pursue their ultimate ends are systematically and
inductively studied, one fact about them stands out. One very
prominent component of all known comprehensive social systems
of such justifications must be classed as nonempirical. The more the

■^ I do not wish to maintain that this distinction possesses ontological sig-
nificance. To do so would be to alter the plane of the discussion of this paper,
which has set out to adhere to the scientific level. Inevitably, the basis of the
distinction must be found in current standards of scientific methodology. From
this point of view, a nonempirical proposition is one, not only which cannot,
because of practical difficulties, be verified with present techniques, but
which involves, in the strict operational sense, "meaningless" questions, ques-
tions which cannot, in the present state of our scientific and methodological
knowledge, be answered by a conceivable operation or combination of them.
Whether, at some future time, a completely positivistic philosophy will be capable
of demonstration is another question. But I should like to point out that objec-
tion to this distinction usually involves the positivistic philosophical position;
it is arbitrarily laid down that all departures from the standard of empirical
verifiability must be in terms of ignorance and error. The position taken here
is such that the burden of proof is on him who would object to the distinc-
tion. It is his task to show empirically that what have here been called un-
scientific and nonscientific ideas in fact do not stand in different relations to
action. This shifts the argument from the methodological to the factual plane.

8 On this problem, see The Structure of Social Action., chap. 5, 205ff.

26 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

attempt is made to state the explicit or implicit major premises of
such arguments clearly and sharply, the more evident it becomes
that they are metaphysical rather than scientific propositions. This,
I maintain, is true of all known social systems; whether it is ulti-
mately possible to eliminate these nonempirical elements is not a
relevant question in the present context.

But the mere demonstration that a certain class of phenomena
exists does not prove that their description involves, for the pur-
poses in hand, important variables. The question is not whether
nonempirical existential ideas are always to be found in social
systems, but whether important features of these social systems
can be shown to be functions of variations in the content of these
ideas. How is this problem to be attacked?

Most attempts in this field have been couched in terms of the
historical or genetic method alone. Of course the only possible
causal factors'^ in the genesis of any particular state of affairs are
components of particular antecedent states of afFairs in the same
sequence. But even then causal relationship can be demonstrated
only by the use of general concepts and generalized knowledge of
uniformities. The question here at issue does not touch the expla-
nation of particular facts, but the establishment of uniformities.
The only possible procedure by which this can be done in our
field is comparative method which permits the isolation of vari-
ables. It is the strict logical counterpart of experiment. One impor-
tant reason for the unsatisfactory character of the discussion of
these problems revolving about Marxism is the fact that it has
been almost uniformly couched in genetic, historical terms, as the
Marxian theory itself is, and analytical generalizations as to the
role of ideas cannot in principle be either proved or disproved by
such a method. Hence the indeterminate issue of the controversy.

By far the most significant empirical studies available in this
particular field are those of Max Weber in the sociology of reli-
gion. ^*^' Weber was interested in a particular problem of historical
imputation, that of the relative role of "material" factors and of

^ "Factors" in the sense of concrete events or states of affairs, or parts or
aspects of them, not of generalized, analytical elements like "mass" or 'ideas."
The two are often confused. See The Structure of Social Action, chap. 16,
610ff.

!•* Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie. 3 vols. The most corrrpre-
hcnsive secondary accounts in English are in L. L. Bennion, Max Weber's
Methodology, and The Structure of Social Action, chaps. 14 and 15.

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 27

the religious ideas of certain branches of Protestantism in the
genesis of what he called rational bourgeois capitalism. But Weber's
methodological insight showed him that, in the absence of well-
established general informities touching the role of ideas, it was
hopeless to attack the problem by more and more elaborate genetic
studies of the immediate historical background of modem capital-
ism. So he turned to the comparative method, the study of the
influence of variations in the content of religious ideas.

A variable cannot, of course, be isolated unless other possibly
important variables can, within a relevant range of variation, either
be held constant or their independence demonstrated. Weber
attempted to deal with this problem by showing that, in the dif-
ferent societies he treated, before the development of religious
ideas in which he is interested, the state of the material factors and
their prospective autonomous trends of development was, in the
relevant respects, essentially similar. That is, for instance, in his
three best worked out cases, those of China, India, and Western
Europe, he attempted to estimate the relative favorableness or
unfavorableness of the economic situations, the "conditions of pro-
duction," to a capitalistic development. The outcome of his studies
in this respect was the judgment that there is a high degree of
similarity in all three societies in this respect, with, if anything, a
balance of favorableness in favor of India and China.^^

But the fact remains that only in Europe did the development of
capitalism actually take place. What accounts for the radically
diJBFerent outcomes in the three civilizations? It is a fact that the
development of religious ideas in the three cases took quite dif-
ferent courses. In relation to this variable, an adequate range of
variation to account for the differentiation is demonstrable, where-
as in the case of the material factors it is not. This places the burden
of proof on him who would advance a materialistic explanation.
He must show that differentiating elements on this level were
present of which Weber did not take account.

However, Weber did not leave his account of the role of reli-
gious ideas at this point. In terms of a more generalized concep-
tual scheme, the "theory of action," or his "verstehende Soziologie"
he analyzed certain mechanisms by which ideas can and do exert an
influence on action. On the basis of this analysis, he worked out

11 This part of Weber's work was not methodologically completely rigorous,
but allowance for this does not affect his general conclusions.

28 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

what is the probable eflFect on certain aspects of secular social life
of adherence to each of the dominant systems of religious ideas,
Confucianism, Hinduism and Protestantism, and found these deduc-
tions verified in that the actual facts corresponded, as seen in
comparative perspective, with expectations in terms of reasoning
from this hypothesis.

He further strengthened his case by working out, in an elaborate
analysis of evidence from various sources in terms of his concep-
tual scheme, an understanding of many of the specific mechanisms
of the process by which this influence has probably been exerted
and verified this analysis in considerable detail.

The result of this very comprehensive comparative study in all
these phases was not only to build up a strong case for his original
historical thesis, that the ideas of ascetic Protestantism actually
did play an important causal role in the genesis of modern capital-
ism. It also resulted in the formulation of a generalized theory of
the role of nonempirical existential ideas in relation to action. It
is this which is of primary interest here.

It was not Weber's view that religious ideas constitute the prin-
cipal driving force in the determination of the relevant kinds of
action. This role is rather played by what he called religious
interests, A typical example is the interest in salvation, an interest
which has in turn a complex derivation from, among other things,
certain stresses and strains to which individuals are sometimes
subjected in social situations where frustration of the worldly ends
seems inevitable and founded in the nature of things. But the mere
interest in salvation alone is not enough. The question arises as to
what kinds of specific action it will motivate. This, Weber's com-
parative analysis shows, will be very different according to the
structure of the existential religious ideas according to which the
individual achieves cognitive orientation to the principal nonem-
pirical problems he faces in his situation.

For example, on the basis of the generally imminent, pantheistic
conception of divinity of Indian philosophy, and more specifically
of the doctrines of Karma and Transmigration, to seek salvation in
a radical sense through concrete achievement in worldly spheres
would be meaningless. If such action contravened the traditional
order, it would be reprehensible for that reason and set the actor
back on his quest for salvation; if not, it could only generate more
Karma and lead to endless rebirths. The only meaning of salvation
is escape from the "wheel of Karma" in completely otherworldly

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 29

mystical and ascetic exercises. For the Calvinist, on the other hand,
mystical union with the divine is entirely excluded by the absolute
transcendentality of God, He has been placed in this world to do
God's will in the building of the Kingdom. His eternal fate is
settled by Predestination, but he can become certain of salvation
through proving his faith by active labor in the vineyard, by doing
God's will.

The function of religious ideas is, in relation to the interest in
salvation, to "define the situation," to use W. I. Thomas' term.
Only by reference to these ideas is it possible to understand, con-
cretely, what specific forms of action are relevant to attainment of
salvation, or certainty of it. Weber succeeded in showing that
rational, systematic, workmanlike labor in a worldly calling has
had this significance to ardent believers in Calvinism and related
religious movements, whereas it would be totally meaningless to
a believer in Karma and Transmigration on a pantheistic back-
ground no matter how strong his interest in salvation. In this sense,
the content of the religious ideas is a significant variable in the
determination of the concrete course of action.

So far discussion has been confined to the role of existential ideas.
These have been dealt with in two quite different contexts. Em-
pirical ideas have been analyzed in their relation to the problem
of selection of means according to the norm of rationality. Non-
empirical ideas, on the other hand, have been treated in relation
to the teleological problem of orientation of the actor, the justifica-
tion of selection of ends to pursue. There is a gap between these
two treatments which must now be filled. Selection of means has
no significance except in relation to ends, while what has been
called teleological orientation is equally meaningless unless there
is, facing actors, a problem of choice between alternative ends.

Indeed the whole analytical procedure which has here been fol-
lowed implies that a fundamental role in action is played by nor-
mative elements. ^^ In the first place, analysis of the underlying
assumptions involved in treatment of empirical knowledge as an
independent variable in the choice of means has shown that both
a positive role of ends, and the existence of determinate relations
of ends in a more or less well-integrated system are essential to
the attribution of causal importance to knowledge. Rational action.

12 The problem of the significance of normative elements in action is
extensively treated throughout The Structure of Social Action.

30 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

in the sense of action guided by valid knowledge, is at the same
time action which is normatively oriented. Similarly, the definition
of the situation with reference to religious interests could have no
meaning apart from the contention that it made a difference to the
course of action what ends, among the various alternatives, were
chosen.

Not only is action normatively oriented in the sense of pursuing
ends, it is also subject to certain normative conditions, to rules
which guide it. For instance, in pursuing the end of closing a
profitable deal, a businessman may consider himself subject to the
condition that it shall be done "honestly." From some points of
view, such rules may be considered themselves as ends, but they
are not the immediate ends of the course of action under analysis.
They appear rather as considerations limiting the acceptable range
of alternative means, choice among which is to be guided by con-
siderations of rational efficiency.

Now both ends and guiding norms involve a cognitive element,
an element of ideas, however little the normative pattern may be
exhausted in these terms. That such an element is involved may be
brought out by considering the implications of the questions which
are inevitably asked when we try to understand action in terms of
such normative elements. "What is the end ..." of a given course
of action;— for instance, what is meant by making a profitable deal;
or "what do you mean ..." by the norm to which a course of
action is subject,— for instance, by honesty in making a deal? It is
obvious tliat the answers to all questions must be in the form of
propositions, that is, of ideas. But in this case, ideas are in some
sense imputed, not only to the sociological observer of action, but
to the actor himself. It is a question not of what honesty means to
the observer, but to the actor. It means, for instance, among other
things, that he should not attempt to get the other party's consent
to the deal by making statements about his product as true which
he knows to be false.

The essential point for present purposes is that, in so far as anal-
ysis of action in terms of orientation to ends and norms is scien-
tifically useful at all, it implies two things: 1. That it is possible to
impute to the actor with adequate precision for the purposes in
hand, not only a "will" to attain certain ends or conform with cer-
tain norms, but a content of those ends and norms which is capable
of formulation as a set of ideas. 2. That variations in this content

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 31

stand in functional relations to the facts of the system of action
other than the system of ideas of the actor.

Whether normative ideas constitute a variable independent of
others in the system of action, is to be tested by essentially the
same kind of procedure which was outlined in the case of Weber's
treatment of religious ideas. Weber himself showed that it is a
variable in part dependent on nonempirical ideas. This would
make it, insofar, relatively independent of "material" factors. But
at the same time, there is no essential reason why an important
range of variability independent in turn of metaphysical and reli-
gious ideas does not exist.

The foregoing analysis of the role of ideas in action has been
presented in general terms, with appeal to generally known facts,
and to two bodies of technically specific evidence, that employed
in economic and technological analyses of rational action, and in
Max Weber's studies of the role of religious ideas. It is impossible
within the limits of such a paper to detail any significant sample
of the enormous mass of empirical evidence, from these and other
sources, which supports the main lines of the analysis. I should
not, however, like to close without mentioning one other set of
considerations which seem to be greatly to strengthen the case
for my thesis.

It has already been remarked that demonstration of causal rela-
tionship in any particular historical sequence cannot be derived
from observation of the facts of that particular sequence alone; it
is necessary to be able to apply to these facts generalized theo-
retical knowledge derived from comparative analysis of a series
of different particular situations. Only by this procedure can vari-
ables be isolated and the functional relationships of their values be
worked out and verified.

Hence the problem of the role of ideas cannot be treated ade-
quately in terms of ad hoc recitation of the facts of certain exam-
ples. It involves systematic theoretical analysis of action, of the
relation of the same variables to many different concrete situations.
In both the two cases which have been most fully analyzed above,
the theorems relative to the role of ideas are not isolated, but are
an integral part of more comprehensive bodies of theory. Thus the
analysis of the role of empirical ideas in rational action may be
regarded as an application to this particular problem of one of the
most highly developed bodies of generalized theoretical knowl-

32 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

edge in the social field, economic theory. This has the efiEect of
greatiy strengthening the evidence for the particular theorem, for
it is verified not only directly with reference to the kind of facts
here discussed, but indirectly in that it is logically interdependent
with all the other theorems of economic science. So far as they are
mutually interdependent, the facts which support any one serve
also to verify the others.

In the case of religious ideas, there is no such generally recog-
nized and used body of theory into which the results of Weber's
empirical studies can be fitted. But it has already been remarked
that Weber himself did in fact develop a body of such theory to a
high degree of systematization in the course of his studies. The
theoretical structm-e he developed is, in his own work, applicable
to, and verified in terms of, many other problems than that of
the role of ideas. But more than this. My own recently published
analysis of certain phases of the development of social theory in
the last generations^ has shown that in these theoretical results
Weber converged with remarkable exactitude and detail on a
structure in all essentials like that developed by other theorists
with quite different starting points and empirical interests. In par-
ticular Durkheim, whose interest was not specifically in the prob-
lem of the role of ideas at all, but in the basis of social solidarity,
arrived at a set of categories in the field of religion which corre-
sponds point for point with that of Weber. Weber's theoretical
analysis of the role of nonempirical ideas is in fact part of a much
broader system of analytical social theory, the emergence of which
can be traced in a number of sources quite independent of Weber.

Moreover not only did Weber, Durkheim, and others converge
on this particular part of a theoretical system, dealing mainly with
rehgion, but as, among other things, very important parts of the
work of both men show, this common scheme of the sociology of
religion is in turn j)art of a still broader theoretical system which
includes the economic and technological analysis of the role of
empirical knowledge in relation to rationality of action. Both sets
of problems belong together, and are part of the same more
generalized analysis of human action.^"*

1^ The Structure of Social Action. See esp. chaps. 17 and 18:
^■* The case of Pareto is particularly interesting in this respect. Pareto has
been very widely heralded as one of the major prophets of anti-intellectualism,
as one of the principal social theorists who radically denied an important role
to ideas. Did he not lay particular emphasis on "nonlogical action"?

To those who have followed the above argument closely, two facts should

ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION 33

To conclude. The actual controversy over the role of ideas has
been much more a battle of the implications of rival philosophical
and other extrascientific points of view than it has been the result
of careful, empirical analysis of the facts. I suggest that leaving
these philosophical considerations aside and embarking on such
careful study will very probably result in much reduction of the
difference of opinion. The thesis put forward in this paper seems
to me not only to fit very important bodies of well established and
carefully analyzed facts. It also fits in with a body of generalized
theoretical knowledge of human social action, which has already
accumulated a heavy weight of scientific authority behind it in a
large number of different factual fields. This seems to me to justify
taking the positive role of ideas as a working hypothesis for further
empirical research. The result of such research will, as always, be
to modify the formulations of the problem, and of theorems which
appear to be verified, from forms which seemed acceptable when
the research process began. But such modification is not "refutation"
of a theory; it is the normal course of scientific progress to which
the superseded theory itself makes an essential contribution.

make one suspicious of this interpretation. First, Pareto was well trained in
economic theory, and insofar as he attributes importance to the elements it
analyzes, to the "interests," he must, ipso facto attribute importance to ideas.
But not only this; he makes the conception of rationality in precisely the
technological-economic sense the starting point of his own broader analysis of
action. Nonlogical action is precisely action insofar as it cannot be understood
in terms of this standard of rationality.

It turns out on analysis that his main theoretical scheme as such involves
no theorem at all as to the role of ideas, except empirical existential ideas. His
actual thesis is, not that other ideas have no role, but that beyond the range of
applicability of this kind of conception of rationality or logical action, the ideas
which do have a role cannot claim empirical scientific validity. But in his actual
treatment there is much evidence that he attributes a very important role to
nonempirical existential and normative ideas. This conclusion is strongly con-
firmed by the circumstances that Pareto's general conceptual scheme converges
in all essential respects with the broader more general theoretical structure of
which I have spoken, which may also be found in the works of Max Weber and
Durkheim. It would indeed be strange, in the light of this fact, if there were a
radical disagreement between them on so basic a theorem as that of the role
of ideas.

The interpretation of Pareto as a radical anti-intellectualist appears to arise
mainly from two sources. On the one hand, there is, in the formulation of his
approach to the analysis of action a source of anti-intellectualistic bias ( The
Structure of Social Action, 272, Note 1), wliich does not however play any sub-
stantive part in the main theoretical structure. This is indicative of the fact that
his own theory was imperfectly integrated; and there are, underlying this, cur-
rents of thought which tend in this direction. But more important than this basis
in Pareto's own work is the fact that the general majority of Pareto's interpreters
have approached his work with an interpretive bias which enormously exagger-
ates the importance of these tendencies. The source of this bias is the fact that
interpretation has been predominantly in terms of a positivistic system of gen-
eral social tlieory. See The Structure of Social Action, chaps. 5-7.

II

The Professions
and Social Structure

COMPARATIVE STUDY of the social structures of the most important
civilizations shows that the professions occupy a position of im-
portance in our society which is, in any comparable degree of
development, unique in history. Perhaps the closest parallel is the
society of the Roman Empire where, notably, the Law was very
highly developed indeed as a profession. But even there the pro-
fessions covered a far narrower scope than in the modem Western
world. There is probably in Rome no case of a particular profession
more highly developed than in our own society, and there was
scarcely a close analogy to modern engineering, medicine or edu-
cation in quantitative importance, though all of tliem were devel-
oped to a considerable degree.

It seems evident that many of the most important features of
our society are to a considerable extent dependent on the smooth
functioning of the professions. Both the pursuit and the applica-
tion of science and liberal learning are predominantly carried out
in a professional context. Their results have become so closely
interwoven in the fabric of modern society that it is difficult to
imagine how it could get along vidthout basic structural changes
if they were seriously impaired.

There is a tendency to think of the development and application
of science and learning as a socially unproblematical process. A
vague sort of "curiosity" and beyond that mere possession of the
requisite knowledge are held to be enough. This is evidenced by
the air of indignant wonder with which technologically minded
people sometimes cite the fact that actual technical performance is
well below the theoretical potentialities of 100 percent efficiency.
Only by extensive comparative study does it become evident that
for even a moderate degree either of the development or the ap-
plication of science there is requisite a complex set of social con-

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 35

ditions which the "technologically minded" seldom think of, but
incline to take for granted as in the nature of things. Study of the
institutional framework within which professional activities are
carried on should help considerably to understand the nature and
functions of some of these social "constants."

The professions do not, however, stand alone as typical or dis-
tinctive features of modern Western civilization. Indeed, if asked
what were the most distinctive features, relatively few social scien-
tists or historians would mention the professions at all. Probably
the majority would unhesitatingly refer to the modem economic
order, to "capitalism," "free enterprise," the "business economy,"
or however else it is denominated, as far more significant. Probably
the only major exception to this would be the relatively prominent
attention given to science and technology, but even these would
not be thought of mainly in relation to the professional framework,
but rather as handmaidens of economic interests.

Not only is there a tendency to empirical concentration on the
business world in characterizing this societ)^ but this is done in
terms which tend to minimize the significance of the professions.
For the dominant keynote of the modern economic system is almost
universally held to be the high degree of free play it gives to the
pursuit of self-interest. It is the "acquisitive society," or the "profit
system" as two of the most common formulas run. But by contrast
with business in this interpretation the professions are marked by
"disinterestedness." The professional man is not thought of as
engaged in the pursuit of his personal profit, but in performing
services to his patients or clients, or to impersonal values like the
advancement of science. Hence the professions in this context
appear to be atypical, to some even a mere survival of the media-
eval guilds. Some think that these spheres are becoming progres-
sively commercialized, so that as distinctive structures they wdll
probably disappear.

There are various reasons for believing that this way of looking
at the "essence" of modern society is a source of serious bias in
the sociological interpretation of the situation. The fact that the
professions have reached a uniquely high level of development in
the same society which is also characterized by a business economy
suggests that the contrast between business and the professions
which has been mainly started in terms of the problem of self-
interest, is not the whole story. Possibly there are elements com-

36 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

mon to both areas, indeed to our whole occupational system, which
are at least as important to their functioning as is self-interest to
business, disinterestedness to the professions. The concrete inter-
penetration of the two, as exemplified in the role of engineers and
lawyers in the conduct of business enterprises would suggest that.
The study of the professions, by eliminating the element of self-
interest in the ordinary sense, would seem to offer a favorable
approach to the analysis of some of these common elements. This
paper will deal with three of them which seem to be of particular
importance to the modem occupational structure as a whole, in-
cluding business, the professions, and government.

But before entering on their discussion a further point may be
noted. In much of traditional thought about human action the most
basic of all differences in types of human motivation has been held
to be that between "egoistic" and "altruistic" motives. Correlative
with this there has been the tendency to identify this classification
with the concrete motives of different spheres of activity: the
business man has been thought of as egoistically pursuing his own
self-interest regardless of the interests of others, while the profes-
sional man was altruistically serving the interests of others regard-
less of his own. Seen in this context the professions appear not only
as empirically somewhat different from business, but the two
fields would seem to exemplify the most radical cleavage conceiv-
able in the field of human behavior.

If it can be shown that the difference wdth respect to self-interest
does not preclude very important institutional similarities in other
respects, a further possibility suggests itself. Perhaps even in this
respect the difference is not so great as our predominantly economic
and utilitarian orientation of thought would lead us to believe.
Perhaps even it is not mainly a difference of typical motive at all,
but one of the different situations in which much the same com-
monly human motives operate. Perhaps the acquisitiveness of
modern business is institutional rather than motivational.

Let us, however, turn first to the elements of the common insti-
tutional pattern of the occupational sphere generally, ignoring for
the moment the problem of self-interest. The empirical promi-
nence of industrial technology calls attention immediately to one
of them. Industrial technology in the modern world has become
to a large extent "applied science." One of the dominant character-
istics of science is its "rationality" in the sense which is opposed to

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

2^

"traditionalism." Scientific investigation, like any other human
activity when viewed in terms of the frame of reference of action,
is oriented to certain normative standards. One of the principal of
these in the case of science is that of "objective truth." Whatever
else may be said of this metliodologically difficult conception, it
is quite clear that the mere fact that a proposition has been held
to be true in the past is not an argument either for or against it
before a scientific forum. The norms of scientific investigation, the
standards by which it is judged whether work is of high scientific
quality, are essentially independent of traditional judgments.

What is true of science as such is in turn true of its practical ap-
plications. Insofar as a judgment of what is the '^best" thing to do
rests on scientific considerations, whether it be in technology or
in medicine, the merely traditional way of doing it as "the fathers"
have done it, fails to carry normative authority. The relevant ques-
tions are, rather, objective,— what are the facts of the situation and
what will be the consequences of various alternative procedures?
Furthermore rationality in this sense extends far beyond the boun-
daries of either pure or applied science in a technical sense. The
business man, the foreman of labor, and not least the non-scientific
professional man such as the lawyer, is enjoined to seek the "best,"
the most "efficient" way of carrying on his function, not to accept
the time-honored mode. Even though the range of such rational
considerations be limited by ends which are institutionally kept
outside discussion, as the financial well-being of the enterprise or,
as in the law, certain accepted principles of the Common Law,
still, within the limits, traditionalism is not authoritative.

It should be noted that rationality in this sense is institutional,
a part of a normative pattern: it is not a mode of orientation which
is simply "natural" to men. On the contrary comparative study
indicates that the present degree of valuation of rationahty as
opposed to traditionalism is rather "unnatural" in the sense that it is
a highly exceptional state. The fact is that we are under continual
and subtle social pressures to be rationally critical, particularly of
ways and means. The crushing force to us of such epithets as
"stupid" and "gullible" is almost sufficient indication of this. The
importance of rationality in the modern professions generally, but
particularly in those important ones concerned with the develop-
ment and application of science serves to emphasize its role in the
society at large. But this is even more impressively the case since

38 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

here it is divorced from the institutionahzed expectation of self-
interest typical of the contractual pattern of business conduct.

In quite a different way the role of the professions serves to
bring out a second widely pervasive aspect of our general occupa-
tional pattern. There is a very important sense in which the pro-
fessional practitioner in our society exercises authority. We speak
of the doctor as issuing "orders" even though we know that the
only "penalty" for not obeying them is possible injury to the pa-
tient's own health. A lawyer generally gives "advice" but if the
client knew just as well what to do it would be unnecessary for
him to consult a lawyer. This professional authority has a peculiar
sociological structure. It is not as such based on a generally
superior status, as is the authority a Southern white man tends to
assume over any Negro, nor is it a manifestation of superior "wis-
dom" in general or of higher moral character. It is rather based on
the superior "technical competence" of the professional man. He
often exercises his authority over people who are, or are reputed
to be, his superiors in social status, in intellectual attainments or
in moral character. This is possible because the area of professional
authority is limited to a particular technically defined sphere. It is
only in matters touching health that the doctor is by definition
more competent than his lay patient, only in matters touching his
academic specialty that the professor is superior, by virtue of his
status, to his student. Professional authority, like other elements of
the professional pattern, is characterized by "specificity of func-
tion." The technical competence which is one of the principal
defining characteristics of the professional status and role is always
limited to a particular "field" of knowledge and skill. This specifi-
city is essential to the professional pattern no matter how difiicult
it may be, in a given case, to draw the exact boundaries of such a
field. As in all similar cases of continuous variation, it is legitimate
to compare widely separated points. In such terms it is obvious
tliat one does not call on the services of an engineer to deal with
persistent epigastric pain, nor on a professor of Semitic languages
to clarify a question about the kinship system of a tribe of Aus-
tralian natives. A professional man is held to be "an authority"
only in his own field.

Functionally specific technical competence is only one type of
case in which functional specificity is an essential element of mod-
ern institutional patterns. Two others of great importance may be

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39

mentioned to give a better idea of the scope of this institutional
element. In the first place, in the classic type of "contractual rela-
tionship," rights and obligations are specifically limited to what
are implicitly or explicitly the "terms of the contract." The burden
of proof that it is really owed, is on him who would exact an obli-
gation, while in many other types of relationship the opposite is
true, the burden of proof that it is not due is on the one who would
evade an obligation. Thus in an ordinary case of commercial
indebtedness, a request for money on the part of one party will be
met by the question, do I owe it? Whether the requester "needs"
the money is irrelevant, as is whether the other can well aflFord to
pay it. If, on the other hand, the two are brothers, any contractual
agreements are at least of secondary importance; the important
questions are, on the one hand, whether and how urgently the one
needs the money, on the other whether the second can "afiFord" it.
In the latter connection it comes down to a question of the pos-
sible conflict of this with what are recognized as higher obligations.
In the commercial case it is not necessary even to cite what other
possible uses for the money may be involved, the question is only
why it should be paid. In the kinship case the question is im-
mediately why the request should not be met, and the only satis-
factory answer is the citing of higher obligations with which it
conflicts. Commercial relations in our society are predominantly
functionally specific, kinship relations, functionally diffuse.

Similarly if a doctor asks a patient a question the relevant reac-
tion is to ask why he should answer it, and the legitimizing reply
is that the answer is necessary for the specific function the doctor
has been called upon to perform, diagnosing an illness for instance.
Questions which cannot be legitimized in this way would normally
be resented by the patient as "prying" into his private affairs. The
patient's wife, on the other hand, would, according to our pre-
dominant sentiments, be entitled to an explanation as to why a
question should not be answered. The area of the marriage rela-
tionship is not functionally specific, but diffuse.

Functional specificity is also essential to another crucial pattern
of our society, that of administrative "office." In an administrative
or bureaucratic hierarchy, authority is distributed and institution-
alized in terms of office. By virtue of his office a man can do things,
particularly in the sense of giving orders to others, which in his
"private capacity" he would not be allowed to do at all. Thus the

40 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

treasurer of a company, in the name of the company, can some-
times sign checks for very large amounts which far exceed his
private resources. But the authority of office in this sense is strictly
limited to the powers of the particular office, as defined in the
structure of the hierarchy in question. Authority in this sense is not
enjoyed by virtue of a technical competence. The treasurer does
not necessarily have a skill in signing checks which is superior to
that of many of his subordinates. But this kind of authority shares
with that based on technical competence the fact that it is func-
tionally specific. The officer of a concern is condemned or penalized
for exceeding his authority in a way similar to that in which a
doctor would be for trying to get his patient to do things not
justified as means of maintaining or improving his health. As in
the case of rationality, the concentration of much of our social
theory on the problem of self-interest has served to obscure the
importance of functional specificity, an institutional feature com-
mon to the professional and the commercial spheres. Again, as in
the case of rationality, this cannot be taken for granted as
"natural" to human action generally. The degree of differentiation
of these specffic spheres of authority and obligation from the more
diffuse types of social relation— like those of kinship and gener-
alized loyalty to "leaders"— which we enjoy, is most unusual in
human societies, and calls for highly specific explanation. It is one
of the most prominent features of the "division of labor."

It is not uncommon in sociological discussions today to distin-
guish between "segmental" and "total" bases in the relationships
of persons. What has above been spoken of as functional specificity
naturally applies only to segmental relationships. But relations
may be segmented without being functionally specific, in that the
separation of contents of the different relations in which a given
person stands need not be carried out primarily on a functional
basis. Friendships are usually segmental in this sense, one does
not share all his life and interests with any one friend. But aside
from structurally fortuitous variations due to the fact that there
may be different areas of common interest, friendships are more
apt to be differentiated on the bases of degrees of "intimacy" than
on that of the specific functional content. Hence the distinction
cuts across the one we have been discussing. But it serves to direct
attention to the third pattern element not taken account of in tlie
discussions of self-interest. The more two people's total personal-

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

41

ities are involved in the basis of their social relationship, the less
it is possible for either of them to abstract from the particular person
of the other in defining its content. It becomes a matter of what A
means to B as a particular person. To a considerable extent in all
three of the types of functionally specific pattern discussed above
it is possible to abstract; to the professional man the other party is
a "case" or a "client," to the business man a "customer," to the
administrative officer a "subordinate." Cases, customers, and subor-
dinates are classified by criteria which do not distinguish persons
or the particular relations of persons as such. Cases are "medical"
or "surgical," customers are "large" and "small," or good and poor
credit risks, subordinates are eflBcient or ineflBcient, quick or slow,
obedient or insubordinate. On the other hand in kinship relations
such "objective" and universal bases of classification cannot be
used. A's father is distinguished from all other males of an older
generation, not by his physiological or pathological characteristics,
not by his financial status, nor by his administrative qualities, but
by virtue of the particular relation in which he stands to A.

The matter may be approached from a slightly different point
of view. A heart specialist, for instance, may have to decide whether
a given person who comes to his office is eligible for a relatively
permanent relation to him as his patient. So far as the decision is
taken on technical professional grounds the relevant questions do
not relate to who the patient is but to what is the matter with him.
The basis of the decision will be "universalistic," the consideration
of whether he has symptoms which indicate a pathological con-
dition of the heart. Whose son, husband, friend he is, is in this
context irrelevant. Of course, if a doctor is too busy to take on all
the new patients who apply, particularistic considerations may
play a part in the selection, he may give special attention to the
friend of a relative. But this is not the organizing principle of the
doctor-patient relationship. Similarly within a relationship once
established it is possible to make the same distinction with respect
to the basis on which rights are claimed or obligations accepted.
A patient's claim on his doctor's time is primarily a matter of the
objective features of the "case" regardless of who the patient is,
while a wife's claim on her husband's time is a matter of the fact
that she is his wife, regardless, within limits, of what the occasion
is. The standards and criteria which are independent of the par-
ticular social relationship to a particular person may be called

42 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

universalistic, those which apply by virtue of such a relationship
on the other hand are particularistic. Like all such analytical dis-
tinctions it does not preclude that both elements may be involved
in the same concrete situation. But nevertheless their relative pre-
dominance is a matter of the greatest importance.

The fact that the central focus of the professional role lies in a
technical competence gives a very great importance to universal-
ism in the institutional pattern governing it. Science is essentially
universalistic,— u;/io states a proposition is as such irrelevant to
the question of its scientific value. The same is true of all applied
science. But the role of universalism is by no means confined to
the professions. It is equally important to the patterns governing
contractual relationships, for instance in the standards of common
honesty, and to administrative office.

It is one of the most sbiking features of our occupational system
that status in it is to a high degree independent of status in kin-
ship groups, the neighborhood and the like, in short from what are
sometimes called primary group relationships. It may be sug-
gested that one of the main reasons for this lies in the dominant
importance of universalistic criteria in the judgment of achieve-
ment in the occupational field. Where technical competence, the
technical impartiality of administration of an ofiice and the like
are of primary functional importance, it is essential that particular-
istic considerations should not enter into the bases of judgment
too much. The institutional insulation from social structures where
particularism is dominant is one way in which this can be accom-
plished.

While there is a variety of reasons^ why disinterestedness is of
great functional significance to the modern professions, there is
equally impressive evidence for the role of rationality, functional
specificity and universalism, as well as, perhaps, other elements
which have not been taken up here. In both respects the impor-
tance of the professions as a peculiar social structure within the
wider society calls attention to the importance of elements other
than the enlightened self-interest of economic and utilitarian the-
ory. On the one hand, it does so in that the institutional pattern
governing professional activity does not, in the same sense, sanc-
tion the pursuit of self-interest as the corresponding one does in
the case of business. On the other hand, the very fact that in spite
of this difference the professions have all three of these other ele-

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

43

ments in common with the business pattern, and with other parts
of our occupational structure, such as government and other ad-
ministration, calls attention to the possibility that the dominant
importance of the problem of self-interest itself has been exag-
gerated. This impression is greatly stiengthened by the results of
extensive comparative study of the relations of our own institu-
tional structure to that of widely different societies which, unfor-
tunately, it is impossible to report on in this paper.

Returning to the professions, however, study of the relation of
social structure to individual action in this field can, as it was sug-
gested earlier, by comparison throw light on certain other theoreti-
cally crucial aspects of the problem of the role of self-interest itself.
In the economic and related utilitarian traditions of thought the
difference between business and the professions in this respect has
strongly tended to be interpreted as mainly a difference in the
typical motives of persons acting in the respective occupations.
The dominance of a business economy has seemed to justify the
view that ours was an "acquisitive society" in which every one was
an "economic man" who cared little for the interests of others.
Professional men, on the other hand, have been thought of as
standing above these sordid considerations, devoting their lives to
"service" of their fellow men.

There is no doubt that there are important concrete differences.
Business men are, for instance, expected to push their financial
interests by such aggressive measures as advertising. They are not
expected to sell to customers regardless of the probability of their
being paid, as doctors are expected to treat patients. In each im-
mediate instance in one sense the doctor could, if he did these
things according to the business pattern, gain financial advantages
which conformity with his own professional pattern denies him.
Is it not then obvious that he is "sacrificing" his self-interest for the
benefit of others?

The situation does not appear to be so simple. It is seldom, even
in business, that the immediate financial advantage to be derived
from a particular transaction is decisive in motivation. Orientation
is rather to a total comprehensive situation extending over a con-
siderable period of time. Seen in these terms the difference may lie
rather in the "definitions of the situation" than in the typical
motives of actors as such.

Perhaps the best single approach to the distinction of these two

44 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

elements is in the question, in what do the goals of ambition con-
sist? There is a sense in which, in both cases, the dominant goal
may be said to be the same, "success." To this there would appear
to be two main aspects. One is a satisfactory modicum of attain-
ment of the technical goals of the respective activities, such as
increasing the size and improving the portion of the business firm
for which the individual is in whole or in part responsible, or at-
taining a good proportion of cures or substantial improvement in
the condition of patients. The other aspect is the attainment of high
standing in one's occupational group, "recognition" in Thomas'
term. In business this will involve official position in the firm, in-
come, and that rather intangible but none the less important thing,
"reputation," as well as perhaps particular "honors" such as elec-
tion to clubs and the like. In medicine it will similarly involve size
and character of practice, income, hospital and possibly medical
school appointments, honors, and again reputation. The essential
' goals in the two cases would appear to be substantially the same,
\ objective achievement and recognition: the difference lies in the
different paths to the similar goals, which are in turn determined
' by the differences in the respective occupational situations.

There are two particularly important empirical qualffications to
what has been said. In the first place certain things are important
not only as symbols of recognition, but in other contexts as well. This
is notably true of money. Money is significant for what it can buy,
as well as in the role of a direct symbol of recognition. Hence in
so far as ways of earning money present themselves in the situation
which are not strictly in the line of institutionally approved
achievement, there may be strong pressure to resort to them so
long as the risk of loss of occupational status is not too great.

This leads to the second consideration. The above sketch applies
literally only to a well-integrated situation. In so far as the actual
state of affairs deviates from this type the two main elements of
success, objective achievement which is institutionally valued, and
acquisition of the various recognition-symbols, may not be well
articulated. Actual achievement may fail to bring recognition in
due proportion, and vice versa achievements either of low quahty
or in unapproved lines may bring disproportionate recognition.
Such lack of integration inevitably places great strains on the
individual placed in such a situation and behavior deviant from
the institutional pattern results on a large scale. It would seem

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 45

that, seen in this perspective, so-called "commercialism" in medi-
cine and "dishonest" and "shady" practices in business have much
in common as reactions to these strains.

Even in these cases, however, it is dubious whether such practices
result primarily from egoistic motivation in the simple sense of
utilitarian theory. The following seems a more adequate account
of the matter: "normally," i.e. in an integrated situation, the
"interests" in self-fulfillment and realization of goals, are integrated
and fused with the normative patterns current in the society, incul-
cated by current attitudes of approval and disapproval and their
various manifestations. The normal individual feels satisfaction in
eflFectively carrying out approved patterns and shame and disap-
pointment in failure. For instance courage in facing physical dan-
ger is often far from "useful" to the individual in any ordinary
egoistic sense. But most normal boys and men feel intense satisfac-
tion in performing courageous acts, and equally intense shame if
they have been afraid. Correlatively they are approved and ap-
plauded for courageous behavior and severely criticized for
cowardice. The smooth functioning of the mechanisms of such
behavior which integrates individual satisfactions and social expec-
tations is dependent upon the close correspondence of objective
achievement and the bases and symbols of recognition. Where this
correspondence is seriously disturbed the individual is placed in a
conflict situation and is hence insecure. If he sticks to the approved
objective achievements his desires for recognition are frustrated;
if on the other hand he sacrifices this to acquisition of the recog-
nition symbols he has guilt-feelings and risks disapproval in some
important quarters. CommerciaUsm and dishonesty are to a large
extent the reactions of normal people to this kind of conflict situ-
ation. The conflict is not generally a simple one between the actor's
self-interest and his altruistic regard for others or for ideals, but
between different components of the normally unified goal of
"success" each of which contains both interested and disinterested
motivation elements.

If this general analysis of the relation of motivation to institu-
tional patterns is correct two important correlative conclusions
follow. On the one hand the typical motivation of professional men
is not in the usual sense "altruistic," nor is that of business men
typically "egoistic." Indeed there is little basis for maintaining
that there is any important broad difference of typical motivation in

46 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the two cases, or at least any of sufficient importance to account for
the broad differences of socially expected behavior. On the other
hand tliere is a clear-cut and definite difference on the institutional
level. The institutional patterns governing the two fields of action
are radically different in this respect. Not only are they different;
it can be shown conclusively that this difference has very impor-
tant functional bases. But it is a difference in definition of the
situation. Doctors are not altruists, and the famous "acquisitive-
ness" of a business economy is not the product of "enlightened
self-interest." The opinion may be hazarded that one of the prin-
cipal reasons why economic thought has failed to see this fimda-
mentally important fact is that it has confined its empirical attention
to the action of the market place and has neglected to study its
relations to other types of action. Only by such comparative
study, the sociological equivalent of experimentation, is the isola-
tion of variables possible.

These are a few of the ways in which a study of the professions
can, indirectly and directly, throw light on some of the essential
features of the occupational structure of modern society. In con-
clusion two further related lines of analysis may be suggested,
though there is no space to follow them out. Naturally the occu-
pational structure of any social system does not stand alone, but
is involved in complex interrelationships, structural and functional,
with other parts of the same social system. Above all most or at
least many of these other structures involve quite different struc-
tural patterns from those dominant in the occupational sphere. In
the case of the modern liberal state and the universalistic Christian
churches there is a relatively high degree of structural congruence
with the occupational system; hence the elements of conflict are
more those of scope and concrete content of interests than of
structural disharmony as such. But certain other parts of the sys-
tem have structurally quite different institutional patterns. Among
these notably are family and kinship, friendship, class loyalties and
identifications so far as they are bound up with birth and the dif-
fuse "community" of common styles of life, and loyalty to partic-
ular leaders and organizations as such, independently of what they
"stand for." In all these cases though in different ways and degrees,
particularism tends to replace universalism, and functional diffuse-
ness, specificity. To a lesser degree they have tendencies to tradi-
tionalism. Absolute insulation of these other structures from that

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 47

of the occupational sphere is impossible since the same concrete
individuals participate in both classes. But much depends on the
degree of relative insulation which it is possible to attain. In par-
ticular the kind of deviation from the norms of institutional inte-
gration in the occupational sphere which was discussed above
creates a situation in which a breakdown of the institutional pat-
tern itself in favor of one structurally similar to these other types
can readily take place.

This danger is generally accentuated by the fact that the main-
tenance of the dominant pattern in the occupational sphere is sub-
ject to many severe strains. The reference is not to the problem of
"enforcement" as such. There is much deviant behavior in violation
of normative patterns which does not significantly involve the
emergence of alternative normative patterns. The problem of
keeping down the murder rate does not involve in any serious
way a conflict of values in which one group stands out for the
right to murder. But in certain situations such conflicts of values
and resultant loyalties become of great importance. One prominent
example may be cited.

Our administrative hierarchies, for instance, in a business corpo-
ration or a government agency, involve an institutional pattern
which is predominantly universalistic and functionally specific.
Authority is distributed and legitimized only within the limited
sphere of the "office" and the claim to it is regulated by universal-
istic standards. But such a pattern is never fully descriptive of the
concrete structure. The various offices are occupied by concrete
individuals with concrete personalities who have particular con-
crete social relations to other individuals. The institutionally en-
joined rigid distinction between the sphere, powers and obligation
of office and those which are "personal" to the particular individuals
is difficult to maintain. In fact in every concrete structure of this
sort there is to a greater or less degree a system of "chques." That
is, certain groups are more closely solidary than the strict institu-
tional definition of their statuses calls for and correspondingly, as
between such groups there is a degree of antagonism which is not
institutionally sanctioned. The existence of such clique structures
places the individual in a conflict situation. He is for instance
pulled between the "impartial," "objective" loyalty to his superior
as the incumbent of an office, and the loyalty to a person whom he
likes, who has treated him well, etc. Since in the society generally

48 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the patterns of personal loyalty and friendship are prominent and
deeply ingrained, it is easy for these considerations gradually to
come to predominate over the main pattern. Obligation to the
duties of ofBce, including submission to authority, is replaced by
loyalty to an individual, that is, a particularistic is substituted for
a universalistic basis. Similarly a superior in the clique structure
may feel entitled to ask "favors" of his subordinates which go well
beyond the strictly defined boundaries of their official duties, hence
tending to break down the specificity of function. The processes
involved are highly complex, but it is by no means impossible
that they should be cumulative in one direction and lead to a
serious impairment of the older occupational pattern. Indeed the
evidence generally points to the conclusion that the main occu-
pational pattern is upheld as well as it is by a rather precarious
balance of social forces, and that any at all considerable change
in this balance may have far-reaching consequences.

The importance of the professions to social structure may be
summed up as follows: The professional type is the institutional
frame work in which many of our most important social functions
are carried on, notably the pursuit of science and liberal learning
and its practical application in medicine, technology, law and
teaching. This depends on an institutional structure the mainte-
nance of which is not an automatic consequence of belief in the
importance of the functions as such, but involves a complex balance
of diverse social forces. Certain features of this pattern are pecul-
iar to professional activities, but others, and not the least important
ones, are shared by this field with the other most important
branches of our occupational structure, notably business and
bureaucratic administration. Certain features of our received
traditions of thought, notably concentration of attention on the
problem of self-interest with its related false dichotomy of con-
crete egoistic and altruistic motives, has served seriously to obscure
the importance of these other elements, notably rationality, speci-
ficity of function and universalism. Comparison of the professional
and business structure in their relations to the problem of individual
motivation is furthermore a very promising avenue of approach to
certain more general problems of the relations of individual motiva-
tion to institutional structures with particular reference to the
problem of egoism and altruism. Finally, the often rather unstable
relation of the institutional structures of the occupational sphere.

PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE '^Q

including the professions, to other structurally difiFerent patterns,
can throw much light on important strains and instabilities of the
social system, and through them on certain of its possibilities of
dynamic change.

Ill

The Motivation

of Economic Activities

SPECIALIZATION IS, without doubt, one of the most important
factors in the development of modem science, since beyond a
certain level of technicality it is possible, even with intensive ap-
plication, to master only a limited sector of the total of human
knowledge. But some modes of specialization are, at the same
time, under certain circumstances, an impediment to the adequate
treatment of some ranges of problems.

The principal reason for this limitation of the fruitfulness of at
least some kinds of specialization lies in the fact that the special-
ized sciences involve a kind of abstraction. They constitute sys-
tematically organized bodies of knowledge, and their organization
revolves about relatively definite and therefore Hmited conceptual
schemes. They do not treat the concrete phenomena they study
"in general" but only so far as they are directly relevant to the con-
ceptual scheme which has become established in the science. In
relation to certain limited ranges of problems and phenomena
this is often adequate. But it is seldom, after such a conceptual
scheme has become well worked out, that its abstractness does
not sooner or later become a crucial source of difficulty in relation
to some empirical problems. This is apt to be especially true on
the peripheries of what has been the central field of interest of
the science, in fields to which some of the broader implications of
its conceptual scheme and its broader generalizations are applied,
or in which the logically necessary premises of certain of these
generalizations must be sought.

This has been notably the case with economics, precisely
because, of all the sciences dealing with human behavior in soci-
ety, it was the earliest to develop a well-integrated conceptual
scheme and even today has brought this aspect of its science to a
higher level of formal perfection than has any other social disci-

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 51

pline. More than a century ago, however, economists began to be
interested in the broader impHcations of their system and of the
facts it had succeeded in systematizing. Perhaps more than in any
other direction these "speculations" have concentrated on the
range of problems which have been involved in the idea af "laissez-
faire," of the functioning of a total economic system of "free-
enterprise" untrammelled by controls imposed from without and
without important relations to elements of human action which
played no explicit part in the conceptual armory of economic
theory.

Once the attention of the economist has extended to problems as
broad as this, the problem of the motivation of economic activities,
whether explicitly recognized or not, has inevitably become involved
by implication. The equilibrating process of a free economy was
a matter of responsiveness to certain types of changes in the
situation of action, to the prices, the supplies, and the conditions
of demand for goods. The key individual in the system, the busi-
ness man, was placed in a position where money calculations of
profit and loss necessarily played a dominant part in the processes
of adjustment, when they were analyzed from the point of view
of why the individual acted as he did. In a certain empirical sense
it has seemed a wholly justifiable procedure to assume that he
acted to maximize his "self-interest," interpreted as the financial
returns of the enterprise, or more broadly, he could be trusted to
prefer a higher financial return to a lower, a smaller financial loss
to a greater.

From these apparently obvious facts it was easy to generalize
that what kept the system going was the "rational pursuit of self-
interest" on the part of all the individuals concerned, and to sup-
pose that this formula constituted a sufficient key to a generalized
theory of the motivation of human behavior, at least in the eco-
nomic and occupational spheres. It is important to note that this
formula and the various interpretations that were put upon it was
not the result of intensive technical economic observation and
analysis in the sense in which the theory of value and of distribu-
tion have been, but of finding a plausible formula for filling a
logical gap in the closure of a system. This gap had to be filled if
a certain order of broad generalization were to be upheld. Such
current doctrines, outside the strictly economic sphere, as psycho-
logical hedonism, seemed to support this formula and to increase

52 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

confidence in the universal applicability of the economic concep-
tual scheme.

In the meantime a good deal of work has been going on in other
fields of the study of human behavior which has for the most part
been rather rigidly insulated from the work of economists, but
which bears on the problem of motivation, in ways which are
applicable, among others, to the economic sphere. This has been
true of social anthropology, and of parts of sociology and of
psychology. Though there have been some notable examples of
individual writers who, like Pareto, Durkheim, and Max Weber,
have brought out various aspects of the interrelations of these
fields with the problems of economics directly,^ on the whole they
seem to have remained insulated, so that it can scarcely be said
that a well-rounded analysis of the problem, which takes account
of the knowledge available on both sides, is, even in outline, well
established as the common property of the social sciences. An at-
tempt to present the outline of such an analysis is the principal
object of the present paper.

On the economic side the impression has been widespread that
a predominantly "self-interested" or "egotistic" theory of the moti-
vation of economic activities was a logical necessity of economic
theory. It can be said with confidence that careful analysis of the
methodological status of economic theory as an analytical scheme
demonstrates conclusively that this is not the case. There are, to
be sure, certain necessary assumptions on this level. They are, I
think, two. On the one hand, economic analysis is empirically
significant only in so far as there is scope for a certain land of
"rationality" of action, for the weighing of advantages and disad-
vantages, of "utility" and "cost," with a view to maximizing the
difference between them. In so far, for instance, as behavior is
purely instinctive or traditional it is not susceptible of such anal-
ysis. On the other hand, its significance rests on there being an
appreciable scope for the treatment of things and other people,
that is of resources, in a "utilitarian" spirit, that is, within limits, as
morally and emotionally neutral means to the ends of economic
activity rather than only as ends in themselves. In both respects
there is probably considerable variation between individuals and
between societies.

1 See the author's The Structure of Social Action ( New York, 1937 ) for an
analysis of this aspect of the work of these men.

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 53

But this does not necessarily have anything to do with "egoism"
in the usual sense. It has already been pointed out that the im-
mediate goal of economic action in a market economy is the
maximization of net money advantages or more generally of the dif-
ference between utility and cost. Choices, so far as they are, in
the immediate sense, "economically motivated" are, in the first
instance, oriented to this immediate goal. It certainly is not legiti-
mate to assume that this immediate goal is a simple and direct
expression of the ultimate motivational forces of human behavior.
On the contrary, to a large extent its pursuit is probably compatible
with a considerable range of variation in more ultimate motiva-
tions. Indeed, it will be the principal thesis of the subsequent
analysis that "economic motivation" is not a category of motivation
on the deeper level at all, but is rather a point at which many
difiFerent motives may be brought to bear on a certain type of
situation. Its remarkable constancy and generality is not a result
of a corresponding uniformity in "human nature" such as egoism
or hedonism, but of certain features of the structure of social
systems of action which, however, are not entirely constant but
subject to institutional variation.

The theoretical analysis of economics is abstract, probably in
several different senses. This is crucial to the argument because it
is precisely within the area of its "constant" data or assumptions
that the problems of the present discussion arise. To describe the
kind of abstractness which is relevant here, perhaps the best start-
ing point is a formula which has been much discussed in eco-
nomics, but which can be given a much more specific meaning in
modern sociological terms than it has generally had in economic
discussions. It is that economic activity takes place within the
"institutional" framework of a society; economic behavior is con-
cretely a phase of institutional behavior.

Institutions, or institutional patterns, in the terms which will
be employed here, are a principal aspect of what is, in a general-
ized sense, the social structure. They are normative patterns which
define what are felt to be, in the given society, proper, legitimate,
or expected modes of action or of social relationship. Among the
various types of normative patterns which govern action there are
two primary criteria which distinguish those of institutional sig-
nificance. In the first place, they are patterns which are supported
by common moral sentiments; conformity with them is not only a

54 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

matter of expediency, but of moral duty. In the second place,
they are not "utopian" patterns which, however highly desirable
they may be regarded, are not lived up to except by a few, or by
others in exceptional circumstances. Thus the extreme altruism of
the Sermon of the Mount or extreme heroism are very widely
approved but the ordinary individual is not expected to live up to
them. When, on the other hand, a pattern is institutionalized, con-
formity with it is part of the legitimate expectations of the society,
and of the individual himself. The typical reaction to infraction
of an institutional rule is moral indignation of the sort which involves
a feeling of being "let down." A person in a fiduciary position who
embezzles funds, or a soldier who deserts is not doing what others
feel they have a right to expect them to do.

Institutional patterns in this sense are part of the social struc-
ture in that, so far as the patterns are effectively institutionalized,
action in social relationships is not random, but is guided and
canalized by the requirements of the institutional patterns. So far
as they are mandatory they in a sense directly "determine" action,
otherwise they set limits beyond which variation is not permissible
and sets up corrective forces.

Seen from this point of view, institutional structure is a mode
of the "integration" of the actions of the component individuals.
There are, it may be suggested, three principal ways in which it
is functionally necessary that such a social system should be inte-
grated if it is to remain stable and avoid internal conflicts which
would be fatal to it. In the first place, the different possible modes
of action and of relationship become differentiated. Some are
socially acceptable and approved, others reprehensible and disap-
proved or even directly prohibited. But in any case this system of
differentiated actions and relationships needs to be organized.
Stability is possible only if within limits people do the right thing
at the right time and place. It is furthermore exceedingly impor-
tant that others should know what to expect of a given individual.
Thus in all societies we find institutional definitions of roles, of
the things given people are expected to do in different contexts
and relationships. Each individual usually has a number of dif-
ferent roles, but the combinations of different roles vary with
different "social types" of individuals.

Secondly, it is inherent in the nature of society that some indi-
viduals should be in a position to exercise influence over others.

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIYITIES 55

Again it is necessary that there should be a difiFerentiation between
those modes of influence which are held permissible or desirable,
and those which should be discouraged or even forbidden. Where
the lines will be drawn will differ with the social roles of the
persons concerned. The compulsion exercised by police officers
will not be permitted to private individuals, for instance. Certain
modes of influencing others, often regardless of the willingness of
the others to be influenced, are often necessary to the performance
of certain roles. Where such modes of influence are institutionally
legitimized they may be called "authority." On the other hand, it
is often socially necessary or desirable that some or all individuals
should be protected from modes of influence which others would
otherwise be in a position to exert. Such institutionalized protection
against undesirable or unwanted influence may be called "rights."
An institutionalized structure of authority and rights is a feature
of every integrated social system.^

Finally, action generally is teleologically oriented to the attain-
ment of goals and to conformity with norms. It is inherent in its
structure that acts, qualities, achievements, etc., should be valued.
It makes a difference on a scale of evaluation what a person is and
what he does. This necessity of evaluation implies in turn the
necessity of ranking, in the first place, qualities and achievements
which are directly comparable; thus, if physical strength is valued,
persons will in so far be ranked in order of their physical strength.
Secondarily, this means that persons, as such, will be evaluated,
and that where a plurality of persons are involved, they will, how-
ever roughly, be ranked. It is of crucial importance that the stand-
ards of ranking and their modes of application should, in the same
social system, be relatively well integrated. This third aspect of
institutional structure, then, is stratification. Every social system
will have an institutionalized scale of stratification by which the
different individuals in the system are ranked.

This institutional structure is found in social relationships gen-
erally and is as important in the sphere of economic activities as
in any other. Every function at all well established in the economic
division of labor comes to involve institutionally defined roles such
as those of 'Taanker," "business executive," "craftsman," "farmer," or
what not. In connection with such a role there is a pattern of insti-
tutionally defined expectations, both positive and negative. Certain

^ Whether they are legally enforceable is secondary for present purposes.

56 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

of these economic roles involve institutional authority such as that
of an employer in the role of supervisor over his workers. Again,
in various respects, persons in economic roles are subject to the
authority of others, notably of public oflBcials in matters of taxation,
labor legislation, and many other fields. They are institutionally
expected to obey and usually recognize this authority. Persons in
economic roles, further, enjoy certain institutionally protected
rights, notably those we sum up as the institution of property, and
in turn are institutionally expected to respect certain rights of
others, to refrain, for instance, from coercing others or perpetrating
fraud upon them. Finally, each of them has a place in the system
of stratification of the community. By virtue of his occupation and
his status in it, of his income, of his "reputation," and various other
things, he is ranked high or low as the case may be.

So far an institutional structure has been described as an "objec-
tive" entity which as such would seem to have little to do with
motivation. The terms in which it has been described, however,
clearly imply a very close relation. Such a structure is, indeed,
essentially a relatively stable mode of the organization of human
activities, and of the motivational forces underlying them. Any
considerable alteration in tlie latter or in their mutual relations
would greatly alter it.

When we turn to the subjective side it turns out that one prin-
cipal set of elements consists in a system of moral sentiments. In-
stitutional patterns depend, for their maintenance in force, on the
support of the moral sentiments of the majority of the members of
the society. These sentiments are above all manifested in the
reaction of spontaneous moral indignation when another seriously
violates an institutional pattern. It may indeed be suggested that
punishment and sanctions are to a considerable extent important
as expressions of these sentiments, and as symbolizing their sig-
nificance. The corresponding reaction to violation on the actor's own
part is a feeling of guilt or shame which, it is important to note,
may often be largely repressed. On the positive side the corre-
sponding phenomenon is the sense of obligation. The well-integrated
personality feels an obligation to live up to expectations in his
variously defined roles, to be a "good boy" to be a "good student,"
an "efficient worker," and so on. He similarly has and feels obliga-
tions to respect legitimate authority in others, and to exercise it
properly in his own case. He is obligated to respect the rights of

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACnVITIES 57

others, and on occasion it may be a positive obligation from moral
motives to insist on respect for his own rights. Finally, he is
obligated to recognize the status of others with respect to strati-
fication, especially, but by no means wholly, of those superior to
himself. The element of obligation in this sense is properly treated
as "disinterested." It is a matter of "identification" with a general-
ized pattern, conformity with which is "right." Within compara-
tively wide limits his personal interests in the matter in other
respects are irrelevant.

The prevailing evidence is that the deeper moral sentiments are
inculcated in early childhood and are deeply built into the struc-
ture of personality itself. They are, in the deeper senses, beyond
the range of conscious decision and control, except perhaps, in
certain critical situations, and even when consciously repudiated,
still continue to exert their influence through repressed guilt feel-
ings and the like. In situations of strain these may well come to be
in radical opposition to the self-interested impulses of the actor;
he is the victim of difficult conflicts and problems of conscience.
But there is evidence of a strong tendency, the more that people
are integrated with an institutional system, for these moral senti-
ments to be closely integrated with the self-interested elements,
to which we must now turn.

If the above analysis is correct, the fact that concretely eco-
nomic activities take place in a framework of institutional patterns
would imply that, typically, such disinterested elements of moti-
vation play a role in the determination of their course. This is not
in the least incompatible with the strict requirements of economic
theory for that requires only that, as between certain alternatives,
choice will be made in such a way as to maximize net money
advantages to the actor, or to the social unit on behalf of which he
acts. Both in the ultimate goals to which the proceeds will be ap-
plied, and in the choice of means there is no reason why disinter-
ested moral sentiments should not be involved. But there is equally
no reason why, on a comparable level, elements of self-interest
should not be involved also. Indeed, the distinction is not one of
classes of concrete motives, but of types of element in concrete
motives. In the usual case these elements are intimately inter-
twined.

There is, furthermore, no general reason to assume that "self-
interest" is a simple and obvious thing. On the contrary, it appears

58 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

to be a distinctly complex phenomenon, and probably the analyti-
cal distinctions to be made respecting it are relative to the level of
analysis undertaken, hence to the problems in hand. Only such
distinctions will here be made as seem essential to the main out-
line of a theory of motivation of economic activity.

The most general term which can be applied to this phase of
motivation is, perhaps, "satisfaction." There is an interest in things
and modes of behavior which yields satisfactions. One of die im-
portant components of this is undoubtedly "self-respect." So far,
that is, as moral norms are genuinely built into the structure of
personality the individual's own state of satisfaction is dependent
on the extent to which he lives up to them. This is above all true
with respect to the standards of his various roles, particularly, in
our context, the occupational role, and to the place he feels he
"deserves" in the scale of stratification.

Closely related to self-respect, indeed in a sense its complement,
is what may, following W. I. Thomas, be called "recognition." To
have recognition in this sense is to be the object of moral respect
on the part of others whose opinion is valued. To be approved of,
admired, or even envied, are flattering and satisfying to any ego.
As the works of Mead and others have shown, the relations of self-
respect and recognition are extremely intimate and reciprocally
related. The loss of respect on the part of those from whom it is
expected is one of the severest possible blows to the state of satis-
faction of the individual.

Third, there is the element which lies closest to the pattern of
economic analysis, the fact that we have an interest in a given
complex of activities or relationships for "what we can get out of
them." That is, they are, to a certain extent, treated as a means to
something altogether outside themselves. This is the classic pattern
for the interpretation of the significance of money returns. The
pattern involves the assumption that there are certain "wants"
which exist altogether independently of the activities by which the
means to satisfy them are acquired. Though unjustified as a gen-
eral interpretation of economic motivation, such a dissociation
does, on a relative level, exist and is of considerable importance.
In this, as in many other respects, the prevailing economic scheme
is not simply wrong, but has not been properly related to other
elements.

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 59

Fourth, there is another element which has played a prominent
part in the history of economic thought—pleasure." This may be
conceived as a relatively specific feeling-tone which is subject to
interpretation as a manifestation primarily of particular organic
states. Of course pleasure may be one of the "ulterior" ends to
which economic activities are means— it is certainly not, as the
hedonists would have it, the sole one. It may also be present, and
often is, in the actual activities performed in the pursuance of
economically significant roles; most of us actually enjoy a good
deal of om- work. One fact, however, is of crucial significance.
Pleasure, or its sources, is not, as the classical hedonists assumed,
a biologically given constant, but is a function of the total personal
equilibrium of the individual. It does seem to have a particularly
close connection with organic states, but undoubtedly these in turn
are greatly influenced by the emotional states of the individual,
and through these, by the total complex of his social relationships
and situation. Hence pleasure, as an element of motivation, can
only in a highly relative sense be treated as an independent focus
of the orientation of action.

Finally, there is still a fifth element in "satisfactions" which,
though perhaps less directly associated with the economic field
than with others, should be mentioned. Men have attitudes of
"affection" toward other human beings, and somewhat similar at-
titudes toward certain kinds of inanimate objects. The "aesthetic
emotion" very likely contains in this sense a component which is
distinguishable from pleasure, by which one, for instance, can say
"I am exceedingly fond of that picture." In the case of other
human beings, however, this affectional attitude is often reciprocal
and we may speak of a genuine egotistic interest in the affectional
"response" of another, again to use Thomas's term. It is true tliat
the institutional patterns governing economic relationships are, in
our society, largely "impersonal" in a sense which excludes
response from direct institutional sanction. It does, however, come
in in at least two important ways. On the one hand, it is very
prominent in the uses to which the proceeds of economic activity
are put, constituting for one thing a prominent element of family
relationships. On the other hand, on a non-institutional level, re-
sponse relationships are often of great importance, concretely in
the occupational situation and motivation of individuals. Thus a

60 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

very important motive in doing "good work" may be its bearing on
friendship with certain occupational associates.

In all these respects there is a further fundamental aspect of
the motivational significance of a great many things which the
traditional economic analysis does not take into account. Many of
the most important relations of things to action lie in the fact that
they are associated with one or more of these elements as symbols.
An excellent example is that of money income. From the point of
view of valuation it is probably fair to say that the most funda-
mental basis of ranking and status in the economic world is
occupational achievement and the underlying ability. But for a
variety of reasons it is difficult to judge people directly in these
terms alone. Above all, in view of the technical heterogeneity of
achievements it is difficult to compare achievements in different
fields. But in a business economy it is almost inevitable that to
a large extent money earnings should come to be accepted as
a measure of such achievements and hence money income is, to a
large extent, effectually accepted as a symbol of occupational
status. It is hence of great importance in the context of recognition.

Once the institutional pattern in question comes to be thoroughly
established, though it continues to be in part dependent on the
moral sentiments underlying it, its maintenance by no means
depends exclusively on these. There is, rather, a process of com-
plex interaction on two levels at once, on the one hand between the
disinterested and self-interested elements in the motivation of any
given individual, on the other between the different individuals.
The first aspect of interaction has already been outlined in dis-
cussing the content of the concept "self-interest." The general
tendency of the second process, so far as the institutional system
is integrated, is to reinforce conformity with the main institutional
patterns through mechanisms which work out in such a way that,
in his relations with others, the self-interest of any one individual
is promoted by adhering to the institutional patterns.

It has already been pointed out that the normal reaction of a
well-integrated individual to an infraction of an institutional rule
is one of moral indignation. The effect of this is to change an other-
wise or potentially favorable attitude toward the individual in
question to an unfavorable one. There are, of course, many differ-
ent variations of degree between the various possible effects of
this. It may be a matter simply of lessened willingness to "co-
operate" in the achievement of the first person's ends in ways in

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 61

which the second is useful or necessary as a means. In the more
extreme instances it may involve positive obstruction of his activi-
ties. It will certainly mean a lessening of the respect which is
involved in recognition; again in the more extreme cases it may
mean positive action to belittle and run down the ofiFender's repu-
tation and standing, dismissal from positions, withdrawal of honors,
and the like.

It would be unusual, except in very extreme cases for direct
pleasures to be involved, certainly in a physical sense. But in
various subtle ways the disapproval of others, especially when it
is intense enough to be translated into direct action, afiFects the
sources of pleasure to which an individual has become accustomed.
Finally, so far as people on whom he counts for response share
the moral sentiments he has offended, this response, notably in
"friendship," is likely to be lessened. In the extreme case again a
friendly attitude may be transformed into a directly unfriendly
one, indeed on occasion into bitter hatred.

Thus, even without taking account of the possible internal con-
flicts which violation of his own moral sentiments brings about, it
can be seen that a very substantial component of the individual's
own self-interest is directly dependent on his enjoying the favor-
able attitudes of others with whom he comes into contact in his
situation. Even if he continues to "make money" as before, his loss
from the point of view particularly of recognition and respect may
be of crucial importance, and in the long run probably his income
is (the better integrated the situation the more so) bound up with
his maintenance of good relations with others in this sense.

It is now possible to bring out what is, in many respects, the
most crucial point of the whole analysis. It is true that it has been
argued that it is impossible to treat the self-interested elements of
human motivation as alone decisive in influencing behavior, in the
economic sphere or any other. But it is not this thesis which con-
stitutes the most radical departure from a kind of common-sense
view which is widely accepted among economists, as among other
normal human beings. It is rather that the content of self-inter-
ested motivation itself, the specific objects of human "interests,"
cannot, for the purposes of any broad level of generalization in
social science, be treated as a constant. That is, not only must the
fact that people have interests be taken into account in explaining
their behavior, but the fact that there are variations in their spe-
cific content as well. And these variations cannot, as economic

62 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

theory has tended to do, be treated at random relative to the social
structure, inckiding in a very important sense that of the economic
sphere of society itself. For it is precisely around social institutions
that, to a very large extent, the content of self-interest is organ-
ized. Indeed, this organization of what are the otherwise, within
broad limits, almost random potentialities of the self-interested
tendencies of human action into a coherent system, may be said,
in broad terms, to be one of the most important functions of insti-
tutions. Without it, society could scarcely be an order, in the
sense in which we know it, at all. It thus depends on the standards
according to which recognition is accorded, on the specific lines
of action to which pleasure has become attached, on what have
come to be generally accepted symbols of prestige and status,
what, in concrete terms, will be the direction taken by self-inter-
ested activity and hence what its social consequences will be.
Again this applies to what are ordinarily thought of as "economic"
interests just as it does to any others.

The most convincing evidence in support of this thesis is to be
derived from a broad comparative study of different institutional
structures. Such a comparative study can go far to explain why,
for instance, such a large proportion of Indian Brahmans have been
interested in certain kinds of mystical and ascetic religious behavior,
why so many of the upper classes in China have devoted them-
selves to education in the Confucian classics looking toward an
official career as a Mandarin, or why the members of European
aristocracies have looked down upon "trade" and been concerned,
if they have followed an occupational career at all, so much with
the armed forces of the state, which have counted specifically as
"gentlemen's" occupations. There is, unfortunately, no space to
go into this evidence.

It may be useful, however, to cite one conspicuous example
from our own society, that of the difference between business and
the learned professions. There are important differences between
the institutional patterns governing these two sectors of the higher
part of our occupational sphere, and perhaps the most conspicuous
of these touches precisely the question of self-interest. The com-
monest formula in terms of which the difference is popularly
expressed is the distinction between "professionalism" and "com-
mercialism." Now in the immediately obvious sense the essence
of professionalism consists in a series of limitations on the aggres-
sive pursuit of self-interest. Thus medical men are forbidden, in

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTlVrilES 63

the codes of medical ethics, to advertise their services. They are
expected, in any individual case, to treat a patient regardless of
the probability that he will pay, that he is a good "credit risk."
They are forbidden to enter into direct and explicit price compe-
tition with other physicians, to urge patients to come to them on
the ground that they will provide the same service at a cheaper
rate. It is true that, in all this, infraction of the professional code
would, in general, permit the physician to reap an immediate
financial advantage which adherence to the code deprives him of.
But it does not follow that, in adhering to the code as well as they
do, medical men are actually acting contrary to their self-interest
in a sense in which business men habitually do not.

On the contrary, the evidence which has been accumulated in
the course of a study of medical practice^ points to a quite differ-
ent conclusion, which is that a principal component of the differ-
ence is a difference on the level of the institutional pattern, rather
than, as is usually thought, a difference of typical motivation.* In
both cases the self-interest of the typical individual is on the whole
harnessed to keeping the institutional code which is dominant in
his own occupational sphere. It is true that by advertising, by
refusing to treat indigent patients, or in certain circumstances by
cutting prices, the individual physician could reap an immediate
financial advantage. But it is doubtful whether, where the institu-
tional structure is working at all well, it is from a broader point
of view to his self-interest to do so. For this would provoke a
reaction, in the first instance among his professional colleagues,
secondarily among the public, which would be injurious to his
professional standing. If he persisted in such practices his profes-
sional status would suffer, and in all probability various more tan-
gible advantages, such as habitual recommendations of patients
by other physicians, would disappear or be greatly lessened. It is
not suggested that the average physician thinks of it in these
terms; for the most part it probably never occurs to him that he

3 As yet unpublished.

* This is by no means meant to imply that there are no differences of typical
motivation. Such differences could be accounted for either on the ground that
the two occupational groups operated selectively on personality types within
the population, or that they influenced the motivation of people in them. The
essential point is that the treatment of the concrete differences of behavior
as direct manifestations of differences of ultimate motivation alone is clearly
illegitimate in that it fails to take account of the institutional factor. It is quite
possible that the institutionalization of financial self-interest does, however, tend
to cultivate a kind of egoism and aggressiveness in the typical business man
which is less likely to be created in a professional environment.

64 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

might consider deviating from the code. But the underlying control
mechanisms are present none the less.

In business the "definition of the situation" is quite different.
Advertising, credit rating, and price competition are, for the most
part, institutionally accepted and approved practices. It is not only
not considered reprehensible to engage in them, but it is part of
the institutional definition of the role of the "good" business man
to do so.

It is true that in the professions money income is one of the
important symbols of high professional standing. The more
successful physicians both charge higher fees and receive larger
total incomes. But there is still an important difference. There are
in the first place important exceptions to the regularity of this
relationship. There is probably nothing in the business world to
correspond to the very high professional prestige of the "full-time"
staff of the most eminent medical schools, even though their aver-
age income is markedly lower than that of the comparably distin-
guished men in private practice. There are probably very few
resident physicians or surgeons in the teaching hospitals associated
with such institutions as the Harvard Medical School who would
refuse an opportimity to go on the full-time staff in order to enter
private practice, even though the latter promised much larger
financial returns.

But, beyond this, in business money returns are not only a
symbol of status, they are to a considerable extent a direct measure
of the success of business activities, indeed, in view of the extreme
heterogeneity of the technical content of these, the only common
measure. This situation is, however, being rapidly modified by the
large-scale corporate organization of the business world. There
"profit" applies only to the firm as a whole, for the individual it is
primarily his office and his salary which count. This development
is greatly narrowing the gap, in these respects, between business
and the professions.^

It is thus suggested that the much talked of "acquisitiveness" of
a capitalistic economic system is not primarily, or even to any very
large extent a matter of the peculiar incidence of self-interested
elements in the motivation of the typical individual, but of a

5 This development involves a major change in the institutional setting of
the problem of self-interest. Even though, as will be noted presently, in indi-
vidual market competition, profit is an institutionally defined goal rather than a
motive, it makes a considerable difference whether, as the older economists as-

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 65

peculiar institutional structure which has grown up in the Western
world. There is reason to believe that the situation with respect to
motivation is a great deal more similar in this area to that in other
parts of our occupational structure which are not marked by this
kind of acquisitiveness than is generally supposed.

Our occupational structure is above all one in which status is
accorded, to a high degree, on the basis of achievement, and of
the abilities which promise achievement, in a specialized function or
group of functions. One may, then, perhaps say that the whole
occupational sphere is dominated by a single fundamental goal,
that of "success." The content of this common goal will, of course,
vary with the specific character of the functional role. But what-
ever this may be, it will involve both interested and disinterested
elements. On the disinterested side will be above all two compo-
nents, a disinterested devotion to "good work" which must be
defined according to the relevant technical criteria, and a disinter-
ested acceptance of the moral patterns which govern this activity
with respect to such matters as respecting the rights of others. On
the side of self-interest in most cases the dominant interest is
probably that in recognition, in high standing in the individual's
occupational group. This will be sought both directly and through
various more or less indirect symbols of status, among which money
income occupies a prominent place. Part of the prominence of its
place is undoubtedly a result of the fact that a business economy
has become institutionalized in our society.^

surned, the consequences of a business decision will react directly on the personal
pocketbook of the person making the decision, or only on that of the organiza-
tion on behalf of which he decides. The position of the business executive thus
becomes to a very large extent a fiduciary position. There is little difference be-
tween the considerations which will influence the manager of an investment
trust, especially of a conservative type, and the treasurer of a university or a
hospital, even though one is engaged in profit-making business, the other is a
trustee of an "altruistic" foundation. In both cases the individual concerned has
certain obUgations and responsibilities, and unless the situation is badly inte-
grated institutionally, it will on the whole, though perhaps in somewhat different
ways, be to his self-interest to live up to them relatively well.

6 To avoid all possible misunderstanding it may be noted again that no
claim is made that there are no important differences of motivation, above all
that the business situation may not cultivate certain types of "mercenary"
orientation. The sole important purpose of the present argument is to show
that the older type of discussion which jiunped directly from economic analysis
to ultimate motivation is no longer tenable. The institutional patterns always
constitute one crucial element of the problem, and the more ultimate problems
of motivation can only be approached through an analysis of their role, not by
ignoring it.

66 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The traditional doctrine of economics that action in a business
economy was primarily motivated by the "rational pursuit of self-
interest" has been shown, in part to be wrong, in part to cover up
a complexity of elements and their relationships of which the
people who have used this formulation have for the most part
been unaware. It may be hoped that the above exposition has,
schematic as it has been, laid the foundations, in broad outline, of
an account of the matter which will both do better justice to some
of the empirical problems which confront the economist and will
enable him to co-operate more fruitfully with the neighboring
sciences of human behavior instead of, as has been too much the
tendency in the past, insulating himself from them in a kind of
hermetically sealed, closed system of his own.

It would, however, be unfortunate to give the impression that
this account is by any means a complete one, suitable for all pur-
poses, In closing, a further aspect of the problem which is of great
empirical importance, but could not receive full discussion in the
space available, may be briefly mentioned. The above analysis is
couched in terms of the conception of an institutionally integrated
social system. It is only in such a case that the essential identity
of the direction in which the disinterested and the self-interested
elements of motivation impel human action, of which so much has
been made in this discussion, holds. Actual social systems are, in
this sense, integrated to widely varying degrees; in some cases the
integrated type is a fair approximation to reality, in others it is
very wide of the mark. But even in developing a theory which is
more adequate to the latter type of situation the integrated type
is a most important analytical starting point.

There is a very wide range of possible circumstances which may
lead individuals, in pursuing their self-interest, to deviate from
institutionally approved patterns to a greater or less degree. Some-
times in the course of his life-history a far from perfect integration
of personality is achieved, and the individual has tendencies of
self-interest which conflict with his institutional status and role.
Sometimes the social structure itself is poorly integrated so that
essentially incompatible things are expected of the same individual.
One of the commonest types of this structural malintegration is
the case where the symbols of recognition become detached from
the institutionally approved achievements, where people receive
recognition without the requisite achievements and conversely, those

MOTIVATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES Q7

with the achievements to their credit fail of the appropriate recog-
nition. The result of all these various failures of integration is to
place the individual in a conflict situation. He is, on the one hand,
in conflict with himself. He feels urged to pursue his self-interest
in ways which are incompatible with tlie standards of behavior in
which he himself was brought up and which have been too deeply
inculcated for him ever to throw ofiF completely. On the other
hand, objectively he is placed in a dilemma. For instance, he may
live up to standards he values and face the loss of recognition and
its symbols. Or he may seek external "success" but only by violating
his own standards and those of the people he most respects. Usually
both internal and external conflicts are involved, and there is no
really happy solution.

The usual psychological reaction to such conflict situations is
a state of psychological "insecurity." Such a state of insecurity in
turn is well known to produce a variety of different more or less
"neurotic" reactions by which the individual seeks to solve his con-
flicts and re-establish his security. One of the commonest of these
is an increased aggressiveness in the pursuit of personal ambitions
and self-interest generally.

It has been maintained that the institutionalization of self-
interest accounts for one very important element of what is usually
called the "acquisitiveness" of a capitalistic society. But it is far
from accounting for all of it. Ours is a society which in a number
of respects is far from being perfectly integrated. A very large
proportion of the population is in this sense insecure to an impor-
tant degree. It is hence suggested that another component of this
acquisitiveness, especially of the kind which is most offensive to
our moral sentiments, is essentially an expression of this widespread
insecurity. Elton Mayo^ coined an appropriate phrase for this
aspect of the situation when he inverted Tawney's famous title and
spoke of the "Acquisitiveness of a Sick Society." But it should be
noted that this is an element which, along with the institutional-
ization of self-interest, is not adequately taken account of by the
formula of the "rational pursuit of self-interest."

Many other points could doubtless be raised to show the incom-
pleteness of the above outline of this problem. There is no doubt
that in a great many respects its formulation will have to be altered

■J^ In his Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York, 1933).
This type of element is probably prominently involved in the widespread com-
plaints about the prevalence of "commercialism" in medicine.

68 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

as well as refined as our knowledge of the phenomena accumulates,
as is the fate of all scientific conceptual schemes. In addition to
whatever merit it may possess as a solution of this particular range
of empirical problems, it is important for another reason. So far as
it is substantiated it will help to demonstrate that many problems
can be more fruitfully attacked by collaboration between the
various social disciplines on a theoretical level than they can by
any one of them working alone, no matter how well established
its theoretical scheme may be for a certain range of problems.

IV

An Analytical Approach to the
Theory of Social Stratification

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IS regarded here as the differential ranking
o£-theJimnan individuals who compose a given social system and
their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one another in
Qertain socially important respects. Our first task is to discuss why
such differential ranking is considered a really fundamental phe-
nomenon of social systems and what are the respects in which
such ranking is important. Ranking is one of many possible bases
on which individuals may be differentiated.^ It is only in so far as
differences are treated as involving or related to particular kinds
of social superiority and inferiority that they are relevant to the
theory of stratification.

1 Some writers (cf. P. A. Sorokin, Social Mobility [New York, 1927] ) have
distinguished what is here referred to as stratification as the "vertical" axis of
differentiation of individuals from the "horizontal" axis. Correspondingly, when
individuals change their status in the differentiated system, reference is made
to vertical and horizontal mobility. This usage is dangerous. It states the
analytical problem in terms of a two-dimensional spatial analogy. On the one
hand, because stratification constitutes one important range of differentiation,
it does not follow that all others can be satisfactorily treated as a single residual
category. Thus sex differentiation, occupational differences apart from their
relation to stratification, and differences of religious affiliation should not on a
priori grounds be treated as if tliey all involved only values of a single variable
with a common unit of variation, "horizontal distance." On the other hand, it is
equally dangerous to assume a priori that stratification itself can be adequately
described as variation on a single quantitative continuum, as the analogy of a
dimension of rectilinear space suggests. There is a quantitative element involved
in stratification as in most other social phenomena. This is inherent in its concep-
tion as a matter of ranking. But to assume that this exhausted the matter would
be to assume that only the numbers and intervals were significant, which is by no
means the case. As will appear below, there are also variations in the content
of the criteria by which ranks are assigned which cannot, in the present state
of knowledge, be reduced to points on a single quantitative continuum.

While of particular concern at present in relation to stratification, it may be
pointed out that these considerations apply at the same time to any uncritical
use of such concepts as "social space" and "social distance." The burden of
proof in cases of their use should always be placed on their relevance to social
facts and analytical schemes verified in the social field, not on the logic of
deductions from analogies to physical space and distance.

70 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Central for the purposes of this discussion is the differential
evaluation in the moral sense of individuals as units. Moral superi-
ority is the object of a certain empirically specific attitude quality
of "respect," while its antithesis is the object of a peculiar attitude
of "disapproval" or even, in the more extreme cases, of "indig-
nation."^

In one sense, perhaps, the selection of moral evaluation as the
central criterion of the ranking involved in stratification might be
considered arbitrary. It is, however, no more and no less arbitrary
than, for instance, the selection of distance as a basic category for
describing the relations of bodies in a mechanical system. Its selec-
tion is determined by the place which moral evaluation holds in
a generalized conceptual scheme, the "theory of action." The only
necessary justification of such a selection at the outset is to show
that the categories are applicable. In our ordinary treatment of
social rank, moral evaluations are in fact prominently involved. The
normal reaction to a conspicuous error in ranking is at least in part
one of moral indignation,— either a person thinks he is "unjustly"
disparaged by being put on a level with those who are really his
inferiors, or his real superiors feel "insulted" by having him, in the
relevant respects, treated as their equal.^

Consideration of certain aspects of social systems described in
terms of the theory of action shows readily why stratification is a
fundamental phenomenon. In the first place, moral evaluation is a
crucial aspect of action in social systems. It is a main aspect of
the broader phenomenon of "normative orientation," since not all
normative patterns which are relevant to action are the object of
moral sentiments. The second crucial fact is the importance of the
human individual as a unit of concrete social systems. If both
human individuals as units and moral evaluation are essential to
social systems, it follows that these individuals will be evaluated
as units and not merely with respect to their particular qualities,

2 Perhaps Durkheim has done more than any other social theorist to make
this phenomenon clear and to analyze its implications (see especially L'Edu-
cation morale [Paris: F. Alcan, 1925], I, and Les Formes elementaires do la
vie religieuse [Paris: F. Alcan, 1912; 2d ed., 1925], chap, iii): It is also in-
volved in Max Weber's concept ol legitimacy {Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
[Tubingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1925], chap, i, sees. 5, 6, 7). It is
discussed and analyzed in Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), esp. Chaps. ,x, xi, and xvii.

3 An excellent recent example of tliis is found in the results reported by
F. J. Roethlisberger and W. A. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1939), Part III, chap. xv.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 71

acts, etc. Furthermore, this cannot merely be a matter of any given
individual A's having moral attitudes toward any other given
individual B, but it implies ranking. Unless there is to be a func-
tionally impossible state of lack of integration of the social system,
the evaluations by A and B of their associate C must come some-
where near agreeing; and their relative ranking of C and D must
broadly agree where the necessity for comparison arises.^ The
theoretical possibility exists that not only any two individuals but
all those in the system should be ranked as exact equals. This pos-
sibility, however, has never been very closely approached in any
known large-scale social system. And, even if it were, that would
not disprove the fundamental character of stratification, since it
would not be a case of "lack" of stratification but of a particular
limiting type. Stratification, as here treated, is an aspect of the
concept of the structure of a generalized social system.^

There is, in any given social system, an actual system of ranking
in terms of moral evaluation But this implies in some sense an
integrated set of standards according to which the evaluations are,
or are supposed to be, made. Since a set of standards constitutes
a normative pattern, the actual system will not correspond exactly
to the pattern. The actual system of effective superiority and in-
feriority relationships, as far as moral sanction is claimed for it,
will hence be called the system of social stratification. The norma-
tive pattern, on the other hand, will be called the scale of strati-
fication.

Since the scale of stratification is a pattern characterized by
moral authority which is integrated in terms of common moral
sentiments, it is normally part of the institutional pattern of the
social system. Its general status and analysis falls into the theory
of social institutions, and it is in these terms that it will be analyzed
here.*

^ The concept "integration" is a fundamental one in the theory of action.
It is a mode of relation of the units of a system by virtue of which, on the one
hand, they act so as collectively to avoid disrupting the system and making it im-
possible to maintain its stability, and, on the other hand, to "co-operate" to
promote its functioning as a unity (cf. Parsons, op. cit.)

5 A generalized social system is a conceptual scheme, not an empirical
phenomenon. It is a logically integrated system of generalized concepts of em-
pirical reference in terms of which an indefinite number of concretely differing
empirical systems can be described and analyzed (see L. J. Henderson, Pareto's
General Sociology [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935], chap, iv and
n. 3).

^ The concept of institutions, like that of stratification, is central to the
theory of action but cannot be analyzed here ( cf. Parsons, op. cit., chaps, x and
xvii).

72 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Before following out the problem of the structural difiFerentiation
of systems and scales of stratification, and some of the bases and
functional consequences of such variations, it is well to discuss
certain aspects of the relation of the individual actor to the scale
of stratification. The main factual references will be to the type of
system of stratification where, as in our own, there is a rather wide
scope for, in Linton's term, the "achievement" of status.

From the point of view of the theory of action the actor is in part
a "goal-directed" entity. One important aspect of this orientation
is to be found in his sentiments as to the moral desirability of these
goals, though they may, of course, at the same time have other
sorts of significance. Not only are goals as such the objects of moral
sentiments but this status is also occupied by persons and their
attitudes to the actor, by things and their relations to the actor,
and by social relationships. Many of the most important goals
cluster about these things.

Second, any or all of these may have other types of significance
to the actor than the moral. They may be sources of hedonic satis-
faction or objects of affectional attitudes. The normal actor is, to
a significant degree, an "integrated" personality. In general, the
things he values morally are also the things he "desires" as sources
of hedonic satisfaction or objects of his aflFection. To be sure, there
are, concretely, often serious conflicts in this respect, but they
must be regarded mainly as instances of "deviation" from the
integrated type.

Finally, the importance of moral sentiments in action, together
with the fact that action is directed toward goals, generally implies
that the normal actor has moral sentiments toward himself and his
acts. He either has a rather high degree of "self-respect" or in
some sense or other feels "guilt" or "shame."

But this actor does not stand alone. He is, to a greater or less
degree, integrated with other actors in a social system. This means,
on the one hand, that there is a tendency for the basic moral senti-
ments to be shared by the different actors in a system in the sense
that they approve the same basic normative patterns of conduct,
while on the other, the other individuals become important to
anyone; what they do, say, or even subjectively think and feel
cannot be merely indifferent to him.

Through the differentiation of roles there is a differentiation in
the specific goals which are morally approved for different indi-

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCL\L STRATIFICATION 73

viduals. But, so far as the society is morally and hence institu-
tionally integrated, they are all governed by the same more
generalized pattern. This common pattern is applied on the judg-
ments of higher and lower as applied to individuals which thus
form a convenient point of reference for systematizing the norma-
tive pattern itself. Self-respect, which, it may be said, is in the first
instance a matter of living up to the moral norms the individual
himself approves, becomes secondarily a matter of attaining or
maintaining a position in terms of the scale of stratification.

This connection is reinforced by the interplay, in an institution-
ally integrated situation, between moral patterns and the self-
interested elements of motivation. The actor has interests in the
attainment of diverse goals, in hedonic satisfactions, in affectional
response, and also in the recognition or respect of others. It is a
simple corollary of the integration of moral sentiments that recog-
nition, or moral respect on the part of others, is dependent on the
actor on the whole living up to the moral expectations of these
others. There is, furthermore, an important tendency for recog-
nition and affectional response to go together. Loss of moral respect
for a person makes it at least difficult to maintain a high level of
aflFection for him. Loss of either or both tends also to entail with-
drawal of sources of hedonic satisfaction as far as these are
dependent on the actions of others. Failure to conform with insti-
tutionalized norms thus injures the individual's self-interest by
leading to withdrawal of help and satisfactions; it can easily lead
further into the "negative" reactions. Instead of merely refusing
to be helpful, others may positively obstruct the attainment of
one's goals. They may actively run down the individual's reputa-
tion, positively hate him, and seek to hurt him. All this is further
accentuated by the fact that there is a need to "manifest sentiments
by external acts,"^ to pass over from hostile sentiments to overt
action which is detrimental to the interests of the actors. Such
overt action is all the more likely where the norms in question are
solidly institutionalized. For, then, other actors have built up
definite "expectations" of behavior on which they count; and,
when these expectations are frustrated, they not merely "disap-
prove" but are directly "injured" and "let down."

Finally, there is much evidence that the more important moral
patterns are not simply something which we rationally "accept."

■^ The title of Class III of Pareto's "residues."

74 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

They have been inculcated from early childhood and are deeply
"introjected" to form part of the basic structure of the personality
itself. Violation of them brings with it the risk not only of external
sanctions but of internal conflict which is often of a really disabling
magnitude.
|s.^ It is thus not a question of whether institutional behavior is or is

not self-interested. Indeed, if any given individual can be said to
seek his own "selfoiiterest" in this sense, it follows that he can do
so onlv by conforming in some degree to the institutionalized
definition of the situation. Rntthis in turn jneans that he must to"
a large degree be oriented to the scale of stratification. Thus hjs
motivation almost certainly becomes focused to a considerable
^ extenton the attainment of "distinction" or recognition by com-

\ panson with his fello^^s. This becomes a most important symbol,

\ both to h''"^g'=^^f ^^f^ ^f^ ntViprg, of the success or lack of success of

his efforts in living up to his own and others' expectations in his
attempts to conform with valu£_jiatterns. With particular reference
to self-interest^^istinctiori "itself in this sense may and often does
\ become an important direct goal of action. Thus stratification is

\ one central focus of the^structurali/ation of action in social svsteips.^
That action in a social system should, to a large extent, be
oriented to a scale of stratification is inherent in the structure of
social systems of action. But, though this fact is constant, the
content of the scale, the specific standards and criteria by which
individuals are ranked, is not uniform for all social systems but
varies within a wide range. It follows from the definition of a
scale of stratification adopted here that this variation will be a
function of the more general variations of value orientation which
can be shown empirically to exist as between widely differing
social systems.^ That there are wide variations in values is an
established fact. In certain particular cases and respects it has also
been established in what these variations consist. It can, however,
scarcely be said that knowledge in this field is sufficiently far
advanced for us to have available a generalized classification of
possible value orientations which can simply be taken over and

^ In the degree of its generality, "success" or "distinction" is a goal which
is comparable with that of wealth or of power.

'•* For an empirical demonstration of this range of variation of fundamental
value orientations see especially Max Weber's comparative studies in the soci-
ology of religion {Gesammelte Aufsatze ztir Rcligionssoziologie [3 vols.];
Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1934). A brief summary of certain aspects of these
studies is given in Parsons, op. cit., chaps, xiv and xv.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 75

applied to the special features of the field of stratification. Start-
ing with the implications of the fact of differential ranking of indi-
viduals in value terms, it is, however, possible to build up a
classification of certain of the socially significant respects in which
they are differentially valued. This classification in turn can be
related to the classification of value systems in that the latter will
supply the justifications of why discrimination in each of the re-
spects treated here (or lack of it) is considered legitimate. The fol-
lowing is a classification of bases of differential valuation, which
though by no means final and exhaustive, has been found to be
relatively concrete and useful.

1. Membership in a kinship unit.— There is an aspect of differen-
tial status which is shared with other members of whatever in the
society in question is an effective kinship unit. Membership in the
unit may be held by virtue of birth, but it may also be by other
criteria, as in the case of marriage by personal choice in our own
society.

2. Personal qualities.— Personal qualities are any of those features
of an individual which differentiate him from another individual,
and which may be referred to as a reason for "rating" him higher
than the other: sex, age, personal beauty, intelligence, strength,
etc. In so far as personal effort may have an influence on these
qualities, as in the case of "attractiveness" of women, it tends to
overlap the next category, "achievements." From the present point
of view, a quality is what for the purposes in hand is best treated
as an aspect of what a person "is," not a result of what he "does."
Concrete qualities range all the way from certain basic things
altogether beyond personal control, such as the facts of sex and
age, to those which are mainly achievements.

3. Achievements.— Achiewements are the valued results of the
actions of individuals. They may or may not be embodied in
material objects. It is that which can be ascribed to an individual's
action or agency in a morally responsible sense. Just as at one
point achievements shade over into personal qualities, so at
another they shade into the fourth category.

4. Po^se^^ions.— Possessions are things, not necessarily material
objects, "belonging" to an individual which are distinguished by
the criterion of transferability. Qualities and achievements as such
are not necessarily transferable, though sometimes, and to a certain
extent, they may be. Of course, concrete possessions may be the

76 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

results of one's own or another's achievements, and control over
the qualities of persons may be a possession.

5. Awf/jorj7f/.— Authority is an institutionally recognized right to
influence the actions of others, regardless of their immediate per-
sonal attitudes to the direction of influence. It is exercised by the
incumbent of an office or other socially defined status such as that
of parent, doctor, prophet. The kind and degree of authority
exercised is clearly one of the most important bases of the diflFer-
ential valuation of individuals.

6. Power.— It is useful to consider a sixth residual category of
"power." For this purpose a person possesses power only in so far
as his ability to influence others and his ability to achieve or to
secure possessions are not institutionally sanctioned. Persons who
have power in this sense, however, often do in practice secure a
certain kind of direct recognition. Furthermore, power may be,
and generally is, used to acquire legitimized status and symbols
of recognition.

The status of any given individual in the system of stratification
in a society may be regarded as a resultant of the common valu-
ations underlying the attribution of status to him in each of these
six respects. ^"^ A classification of types of scales, or rather several
of them, can then be derived by a consideration of the variation in
the emphasis placed on each of these categories by a given value
system, and also of variations in the particular content of each
category. Attention here will be confined to a very few cases which
have been of great historical importance.

One of the most general distinctions which can be easily applied
to stratification in terms of this scheme is that employed by Linton
between "achieved" and "ascribed" status.^ ^ The relation of this
very important dichotomy to this scheme is not simple. In general
the criteria of ascribed status must be birth or biologically hereditary
qualities like sex and age. But, in the socially defined role which
accompanies such a status, there may be very important elements
of expected achievement and resulting possessions. Other posses-
sions, of course, may be associated with an ascribed status through

^0 It is clearly recognized that this proposition constitutes a statement of the
problem, not a solution of it.

11 R. Linton, The Study of Man (New York, 1936), chap. vii. "Status"
is a term referring to any institutionally defined position of an individual in the
social structure. Position in a scale of stratification is only one aspect of status.
There is a certain loose tendency to make them coterminous.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 77

the inheritance of property and the perquisites of office if the latter
is filled by ascription rather than by achievement. The same is true
of authority which may, at times, be directly inherited or may be
attached to an office.

There is, however, another general relation between the six ele-
ments of stratificatory status which partly overlaps with the dis-
tinction of ascribed and achieved status but partly cuts across it.
That is, in every known society membership in a solidary kinship
unit is one fundamental element of the place of an individual in a
system of stratification. There are, however, great variations in
the way in which this takes place in the relation of kinship to the
other elements. The basic elements of all kinship structure are
birth and sexual union. ^- An individual becomes a member of a
kinship group either by birth in one or by entering into a socially
legitimized sexual union, a marriage.

The kinship groups centered about birth and sexual union are
always to a certain extent "solidary" not only in the sense of mutual
aid and support but also in the sense that they form units in the
system of stratification of the society; their members are in certain
respects treated as "equals" regardless of the fact that by definition
they must differ in sex and age, and very generally do in other
qualities, and in achievements, authority, and possessions. Even
though for these latter reasons they are differently valued to a
high degree, there is still an element of status which they share
equally and in respect of which the only differentiation tolerated
is that involved in the socially approved differences of the sex
and age status. But as actually used, the term "social class" cer-
tainly covers a great deal of the ground involved in this basic
phenomenon— the treatment of kinship groups as solidary units in
the system of stratification. It is, therefore, proposed to define a
social class here as consisting of the group of persons who are
members of effective kinship units which, as units, are approxi-
mately equally valued. According to this definition, the class struc-
ture of social systems may differ both in the composition or
structure of the effective kinship unit or units which are units of
class structure and in the criteria by which such units are differ-
entiated from one another. The class status of an individual is
that rank in the system of stratification which can be ascribed to

12 See Kingsley Davis and W. L. Warner, "Structural Analysis of Kinship,'
Amencan Anthropologist, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2.

78 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

him by virtue of those of his kinship ties which bind him to a unit
in the class structure. Kinship afRhation is thus always a basic
aspect of the class status of an individual. It does not follow that
his class status has always been determined by his kinship ties.
Nor does it follow that the system of ranking of kinship units can
be explained as derived from factors peculiarly associated with
kinship.

There is a type of class structure in which class of birth is a
suflRcient criterion of an individual's rank in the scale of stratifi-
cation throughout his life. Because of the close approach to its full
realization in India, it is convenient to refer to this type as "caste.'*
It is the case where the only relevant criterion of class status is
birth and where the structure is one of hierarchically arranged
hereditary groups, and no acquisition of authority, no qualities,
achievements, or possessions can change an individual's rank. All
hierarchical status is ascribed. From this type there is a gradual
transition to an opposite pole— that in which birth is completely
irrelevant to class status, the level being determined by some
combination of the other elements. ^^

It is perhaps permissible to refer to this antithetical type as that
of "equality of opportunity." But it should be noted how very
formal this conception is. It says nothing whatever about either
the combination of the other five elements of hierarchical status
involved or the concrete content of any one. Groups of equals
must, under a caste system, in the nature of the case be rigidly
endogamous, for husband and wife are necessarily of the same
class status. But in a system not resembling the caste type, husband
and wife need not be rigidly equal by birth, although they become
so by marriage, and a married couple and their children, even
though equals at birth, may change their class status during their
lifetimes. Generally speaking, of course, the more effectively
solidary the extended kinship groups, especially as between the
generations, the more closely the total class system will approach
the caste pole.

This approach to the analysis of social class may help to throw
light on some aspects of the class structure of contemporary Ameri-
can society. Broadly speaking there are two fundamental elements
in the dominant American scale of stratification. We determine
status very largely on the basis of achievement witliin an occupa-

13 This is the limiting type where "class" disappears.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 79

tional system which is in turn organized primarily in terms of
universahstic criteria of performance and status within functionally
specialized fields.^* This dominant pattern of the occupational
sphere requires at least a relatively high degree of "equality of
opportunity" which in turn means that status cannot be deter-
mined primarily by birth or membership in kinship units.

But this occupational system with its crucial significance in the
system of stratification coexists in our society with a strong institu-
tional emphasis on the ties of kinship. The values associated with
the family, notably the marriage bond and the parent-child rela-
tionship, are among the most strongly emphasized in our society.

Absolute equality of opportunity is, as Plato clearly saw, incom-
patible with any positive solidarity of the family. But such a rela-
tive equality of opportunity as we have is compatible not with all
kinds of kinship systems but with certain kinds. There is much
evidence that our kinship structure has developed in such a direc-
tion as to leave wide scope for the mobility which our occupation-
al system requires while protecting the solidarity of the primary
kinship unit.

The conjugal family vAXh dependent children, which is the domi-
nant unit in our society, is, of all types of kinship unit, the one
which is probably the least exposed to strain and possible break-
ing-up by the dispersion of its members both geographically and
with respect to stratification in the modem type of occupational
hierarchy. Dependent children are not involved in competition for
status in the occupational system, and hence their achievements
or lack of them are not likely to be of primary importance to the
status of the family group as a whole. This reduces the problem
to that of possible competitive comparison of the two parents. If
both were equally in competition for occupational status, there
might indeed be a very serious strain on the solidarity of the fam-
ily unit, for there is no general reason why they would be likely
to come out very nearly equally, while, in their capacity of husband
and wife, it is very important that they should be treated as equals.

One mechanism which can serve to prevent the kind of "invid-
ious comparison" between husband and wife which might be dis-
ruptive of family solidarity is a clear separation of the sex roles
such as to insure that they do not come into competition with each

14 For an explanation of these terms in their appHcation to the modem oc-
cupational system see Talcott Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure,"
Social Forces, XVII (May, 1939), 457-67, included in tlie present volume.

80 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

other. On the whole, this separation exists in our society, and per-
haps the above considerations provide part of the explanation of
why the feminist movement has had such diflBculty in breaking it
down.

The separation of the sex roles in our society is such as, for the
most part, to remove women from the kind of occupational status
which is important for the determination of the status of a family.
Where married women are employed outside the home, it is, for
the great majority, in occupations which are not in direct compe-
tition for status with those of men of their own class.

Women's interests, and the standards of judgment applied to
them, run, in our society, far more in the direction of personal
adornment and the related qualities of personal charm than is the
case with men. Men's dress is practically a uniform, admitting of
very slight play for differentiating taste, in marked contrast with
that of women. This serves to concentrate the judgment and
valuation of men on their occupational achievements, while the
valuation of women is diverted into realms outside the occupation-
ally relevant sphere. This difference appears particularly conspicu-
ous in the urban middle classes where competition for class status is
most severe. It is suggested that this phenomenon is functionally
related to maintaining family solidarity in our class structure.

The probability of this hypothesis is increased by two sets of
contrasting facts. On the one hand, in such a society as that of
eighteenth-century France, where the tone was set by a hereditary
aristocracy, both sexes were greatly concerned with personal adorn-
ment and charm. This may in part be due to the fact that, since
status was mainly hereditary, neither was in severe competition
for status in such fields as the modern occupations. On the other
hand, in many rural and peasant societies neither sex seems to be
oriented in this direction. This suggests that, in our urban society
with its competitive atmosphere, the qualities and achievements of
the feminine role have come to be significant as symbols of the
status of the family, as parts of its "standard of living" which
reflect credit on it. The man's role, on the other hand, is primarily
to determine the status of his family by "finding his level" in the
occupational sphere.^^

1^' Thorstein Veblen in The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1899) called attention to some of the relevant features of the role
of women but did not relate it in this way to the functional equilibrium of the
social structure. Moreover, what Veblen means by "conspicuous consumption"
is only one aspect of the feminine role and one which is associated more with
certain elements of malintegration than with the basic structure itself.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 81

From the fact that kinship affiHation is the primary criterion of
the class status of an individual it does not, however, follow that
the class structure of a society is to be biologically explained.
Rather, all the factors involved in social phenomena generally are
prima facie important in the determination of concrete kinship
structures. The same is true of class. In a caste system no indi-
vidual can change his status of birth, but it does not follow that
elements other than birth are not important in the maintenance of
a concrete caste system, that any great change in any one or more
would not result in a change of the system. When there is a more
or less open class system, on the other hand, it is to some combina-
tion of these other elements that one must look for the factors
which lead to change of the class status of kinship groups.

There is a very complex system of mutual symbolic references
by virtue of which primary criteria of status are reinforced by
secondary criteria and symbols in various ways.^* For the primary
criteria one must look to the general common value system of the
society and its history. The secondary criteria or symbols are often
much more adventitious, the result of associations formed in
particular historical circumstances which have come to be tradi-
tionally upheld. The primary criteria are those things which in
relation to the dominant value system are "status-determining"
attributes of the individual and which are valued for their own
sake. The secondary criteria are those things which are regarded
as normal accompaniments of the primary criteria or as normal
effects of them.

Birth, of course, plays a prominent role among the primary cri-
teria of class status in any system approaching the caste type. But
birth is probably never alone adequate to define the social role, and
hence the expected qualities, possessions, achievements, or author-
ity of the occupant of a given hereditary status. There is, rather,
a complex combination of these things ascribed to the occupant
of such a status. An excellent example is the senatorial aristocracy
of Republican Rome. Though not formally so, in effect this was a
hereditary group, only members of the senatorial families being
eligible for the kind of career which led to the higher magistracies

^^ The present distinction between primary and secondary criteria is a rough
one. For many purposes it may well be necessary to refine the classification fur-
ther. Besides their significance as criteria, many of the same elements may also
have significance as causal factors in the distribution of individuals among
statuses and in shifts in the system of stratification. It is impossible, within the
limits of this paper, to enter into these complex problems.

82 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

and finally membership in the Senate. "New men," though not
completely unknown, were very rare. But the young Roman of this
class had to live up to a very rigorously defined pattern. He went
through a career including military service and the holding of
office. To be a good soldier, to run for office, to have the Roman
aristocratic virtues, was compulsory for such a young man. Wealth
was partly hereditary, partly an acquisition of office-holding. Far
from being in a position simply to rest on the laurels of his birth
the Roman aristocrat was subjected to a very severe discipline and
was expected to live up to a high level of achievement. That none
of the generals who led the earlier Roman conquests, first of Italy,
then of Carthage, and in part of Greece and the East, was a pro-
fessional soldier in our sense but an aristocratic amateur who was
a soldier as part of his ascribed role as an aristocrat attests to the
great power of such ascribed patterns. In certain respects the extra-
ordinary discipline to which the Spartiates were subjected is an
even more striking example. The essence of the matter is that a
combination of elements other than birth becomes part of the
ascribed pattern to which the incumbent of the status is socially
expected to "live up."

Though birth is certainly in these circumstances a primary cri-
terion of status, the basic "virtues" emphasized by the ascribed
pattern are equally primary, and, once an individual is eligible by
virtue of birth, these are the main points at which social pressure
to maintain the pattern is applied. Wealth, however, is seldom a
primary criterion. It may, however, play an important secondary
role in that a certain "style of living" comes to be expected of the
members of an aristocracy. A minimum of wealth is a necessary
means of keeping this up, while unusual wealth may be a source
of extra prestige, by enabling its holder to excel in many symboli-
cally important respects. Sometimes an economic system may change
so as seriously to endanger the position of such an aristocracy, by
enabling persons not qualified by birth to take on many of the
symbols of aristocratic status and at the same time making it im-
possible for members of the aristocracy to maintain them. The
steady process by which Spartiate families dropped out because
of inability to make their contributions to the mess is an excellent
example.

Where status is mainly achieved, the situation is quite diflPerent.
Birth cannot be a primary criterion but only a practical advantage

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 83

in securing a differential access to opportunities, though in this
respect it is of fundamental significance in our society and one of
the main mechanisms by which a relative stability of the system of
stratification is maintained.

But in our own society, apart from hereditary groups at the top
in certain sections of the country, the main criteria of class status
are to be found in the occupational achievements of men, the
normal case being the married man with immature children.
Authority is significant partly as a necessary means of carrying on
occupational functions, but in turn the authority exercised is one
of the main criteria of the prestige of an occupational status.
Authority, especially that of office,^'^ is again important as a reward
of past achievements, the general structure of the pattern being a
progressive rise to greater achievements and greater rewards con-
comitantly. Being permitted to perform the 'liigher" functions and
being given the authority to do so constitute recognition of past
achievements and of the ability necessary for further ones. Thus
authority and office become secondary, symbolic criteria of status,
because of their traditional association with achievement. But,
once they have gained this significance as criteria, the incumbent
of an office can enjoy its prestige independently of whether he
actually has the requisite achievements to his credit or not.

The case of wealth as a criterion of status in our society is some-
what more complex. In spite of much opinion to the contrary, it is
not a primary criterion, seen in terms of the common value system.
Like office, its primary significance is as a symbol of achievement.
But it owes its special prominence in that respect to certain pecul-
iar features of our social system. That is, with a basic ethic which
emphasizes individual achievement as the primary criterion of
stratification, we have developed an economic system which to a
hitherto unprecedented degree rests on a "business" or "capital-
istic" basis. Our society is very highly specialized occupationally.
The measures of achievement are technical and specific for each
particular field. Hence it is difficult to compare relative achieve-
ments in different fields with one another. To be sure, there is a
very rough general scale of prestige occupations which is at least
relatively independent of income. Skilled labor ranks higher than
unskilled labor; functions with an important intellectual com-

17 Not only political office but, even more, offices held in business corpora-
tions and other "private"associations.

84 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ponent which require "higher education" rank high. In particular,
authority over others, in proportion to its extent, ranks high.

But in a business economy the immediate end of business poHcy
must, in the nature of the case, be to improve the financial status
of the enterprise. Regardless of the technical content of its opera-
tions, the earnings of a business have become the principal criterion
of its success. It is not surprising that the same has, to a relatively
high degree, come to be true of individuals in business. Hence,
within the broad framework of the direct differential valuation of
occupations and achievements as managerial, professional, skilled,
unskilled, etc., there is an income hierarchy which, on the whole,
corresponds to that of direct valuation. ^^ This income hierarchy
forms a most convenient point of reference for the determination
of the status of an individual or of a family. Furthermore, within
any particular closely knit group, it is fairly adequate as a criterion,
since the more highly valued jobs are also the best paid. But in
such a complex system as our own its adequacy is much more
dubious. In particular, it is complicated by the inheritance of prop-
erty, by the availability of means of making money which are of
doubtful legitimacy in terms of the value system, and by the many
relatively adventitious opportunities for money-making opened up
by the rapid changes and fluctuations of a business system in a
society which is to a high degree emancipated from the rigidities
of traditionalism. Hence the same thing happens as with the case
of authority. Wealth, which owes its place as a criterion of status
mainly to its being an effect of business achievement, gains a cer-
tain independence so that the possessor of wealth comes to claim
a status and to have it recognized, regardless of whether or not
he has the corresponding approved achievements to his credit. In
our society this is further complicated by the fact that there is a
tradition of respect for inherited wealth which has never quite
been extinguished, and where the status is ascribed and the wealth
naturally never regarded as an effect of its possessors' achievements.

There is a further respect in which wealth has a peculiar signifi-
cance in an "individualistic" society. Where status is ascribed,
there is usually a fairly well-defined standard to which people are
expected to live up. For the group in question there is something

18 How this correspondence comes about is an interesting sociological prob-
lem. The one thing which can be said here with certainty is that an ordinary
•economic explanation, though true within certain limits, is quite inadequate to
the general problem. The explanation is to a large extent institutional.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCL\L STRATIFICATION 85

like a "ceiling" of adequate achievement, even though there are
naturally different degrees of attainment. With respect to achieved
status, on the other hand, the situation is different. Achievement
is in a different sense competitive. There is a more or less indefinite
scale of degrees of excellence in any one line. Even though for a
professional group, like the medical, there is a fairly well-defined
minimum of competence, from this minimum upward there is a
gradual transition through a widely dispersed pyramid to the
"top" of the profession. The fact that money is an infinitely divisi-
ble, quantitative medium of measurement makes it a peculiarly
convenient criterion to designate the various steps in such a
gradual pyramidal structure, particularly where other common
measures such as direct technical criteria or hierarchy of office in
directly comparable organizations are not readily available. It is,
in fact, quite common to speak of "$5,000 men" or "$25,000 men,"
although it is realized that this is not alone an adequate measure
of their status.

As in the case of ascribed status the role of money as a criterion
of status is here strongly reinforced by the fact that its expenditure
is largely for other symbols of status in turn. Though the "standard
of living" of any group must cover their intrinsically significant
needs, such as food, shelter, and the like, there can be no doubt
that an exceedingly large component of standards of living every-
where is to be found in the symbolic significance of many of its
items in relation to status. Indeed it may be said that there are
two types of situations in which this is likely to be more impor-
tant than otherwise— the case of an aristocracy the members of
which maintain a conspicuously different style of life from that
of the rest of the population and the case of a group who are
involved in a highly competitive struggle for achieved status, where
the status of a large proportion of them at any given time is
either newly acquired or relatively insecure or both. Perhaps at
no time in history have such a large proportion of a great popula-
tion been "on the make" as in the United States of the early
twentieth century.

One further important point is that the various items of a stand-
ard of living which are symbolic of status necessarily play their pri-
mary role in relation to class status, not to the other aspects of the
status of the members of a family. This follows from the fact that
income is allocated on a basis of the family as a unit. A very inter-

86 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

esting point of view from which to conduct budget studies would
be to determine the various different things which were thought
necessary for each member of a family in order to maintain or to
improve the class status of the family as a whole.

The difficulty of finding common measures of status when the
primary criterion is occupational achievement has already been
mentioned. To a certain extent we do, of course, have such com-
mon measures, above all the relatively vague scales of direct
valuations and of income. But to a considerable extent this situ-
ation is met by a certain vagueness in the actual scale of stratifi-
cation, so that it is only in a relatively rough and broad sense, not
a precise and definite one, that a given individual or family is
placed relative to others. There is a relatively broad range of the
standard of living where anyone with a certain minimum of income
can participate without having the question of his relative status
raised. This is, for instance, true of many of the facilities open to
the "public." In hotels, restaurants, theaters, etc., a certain min-
imum of dress and manners is required beyond the mere fact of
being able to pay the direct charges. But this minimum is, for
a certain class of facilities, possessed by people belonging to a
rather wide range of class status. This is really an instance of a
broader class of phenomena, those involved in the fact that very
many social contacts in our society are "partial" or "segmental"
and cover only an area of interests and values which can, to a
relative degree, be isolated from class status. Another instance is
the relative lack of integration as between different structures
within the broader society, each of which involves a pretty definite
stratification within itself, such as occupational groups of persons
in regular daily contact, and "communities" of people whose
mutual relations are very precisely defined.

This indefiniteness, among other things, makes possible two
very important things for the functioning of an individualistic
social system. In the first place, when the relatively adventitious
circumstances of the economic and social situation lead to dis-
crejjancies between income and occupational status as otherwise
judged, within certain limits too great a strain is not placed on the
system. For example, it would be generally agreed that the differ-
ence between the top range of incomes earned, on the one hand,
in business and the law, on the other, in university teaching and
the ministry does not accurately measure the relative prestige of

ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION ^7

their incumbents. A world-famous scientist who is a university
professor on a ten-thousand-dollar salary is not only at the top
of his own profession but may be the full equal in status of a
corporation lawyer whose income is ten times his own. But so long
as the scientist is able to maintain a "respectable" standard of
living, entertain his friends well, dress his family adequately, and
educate his children well, the fact that he cannot afford the luxuries
of a hundred-thousand-dollar income is a matter of relative indif-
ference. He simply does not compete on the plane of "conspicuous
consumption" which is open to the lawyer but closed to him.^^

There is also another respect in which this vagueness is function-
ally important in our system. If the institutional pattern which bases
class status on the occupational achievements of a man is not to be
severely discredited, there must be considerable room for class
mobility. But this means that there will inevitably be a process of
"dispersion" of the members of the same kinship groups in the
class structure. In particular, there will be dispersion as between
parents and children and as between siblings. A son, for instance,
may rise well above his father's status, or two brothers may fare
very unequally. To be sure, this is partly taken care of by the
weakening of at least parts of the kinship structure itself, in that
the primary unit of kinship has become the immediate family of
parents and immature children. The ties of independent children
to their parents and of independent siblings to one another are
greatly weakened. Above all, these are not any longer normally
the day-to-day "community" ties which are inevitable as between
those who share the life of a common household. But, of course,
this does not mean that such ties have become of negligible im-
portance. It is difficult to see how such powerful sentiments as
those developed between parents and children during the depend-
ent period could be simply dropped at maturity without serious
effects.

The fact is that they are not. The vagueness of our class struc-
ture provides a kind of cushioning mechanism. For the fact that
mature children ordinarily live in independent households is
associated with the further fact that they are usually, to a large
extent, members of independent "communities." Their mutual

19 This is not to say that the discrepancy does not give rise to some strains
which, however, are more Ukely to be felt by the scientist's wife and/ or children
than himself.

88 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

relations become highly segmental. When one visits the other, he
is, from the point of view of the latter's community relationships,
an "outsider," a stranger. So long as the discrepancy is not too
great, it is then unnecessary for there to be any very exact determi-
nation of relatives class status, as there would have to be if both
were permanent members of the same set of immediate community
relationships, of the same "particular nexus." There will naturally
be gossip which compares the relative status of the two, but this
does not assume the same importance in the two cases. For instance,
if two brothers are on the faculty of the same university, the
question of their relative status is very acute. But if one is a
physician in Boston and the other is in business in Chicago, such
questions hardly arise at all unless the discrepancy of their relative
"success" is very marked. One may say, then, that the vagueness
of our class structure over relatively wide areas serves to protect
the important residue of the more extended kinship relations from
disruption in a society where class mobility is of fundamental
functional importance. It would be expected that, wherever, in
any particular situation, technical criteria of achievement were of
particular importance in an occupational hierarchy, this vagueness
of class status would tend to be especially marked, with even cases
of what, from another point of view, would appear to be strange
inhibitions on intimacy of social contact.

V

Age and Sex in the Social Structure
of the United States

IN OUR SOCIETY age grading does not to any great extent, except
for the educational system, involve formal age categorization, but
is interwoven with other structural elements. In relation to these,
however, it constitutes an important connecting link and organiz-
ing point of reference in many respects. The most important of
these for present purposes are kinship structure, formal education,
occupation and community participation. In most cases the age
lines are not rigidly specific, but approximate; this does not, how-
ever, necessarily lessen their structural significance.^

In all societies the initial status of every normal individual is
that of child in a given kinship unit. In our society, however, this
universal starting point is used in distinctive ways. Although in
early childhood the sexes are not usually sharply diflFerentiated, in
many kinship systems a relatively sharp segregation of children
begins very early. Our own society is conspicuous for the extent
to which children of both sexes are in many fundamental respects
treated alike. This is particularly true of both privileges and re-
sponsibilities. The primary distinctions within the group of depend-
ent siblings are those of age. Birth order as such is notably
neglected as a basis of discrimination; a child of eight and a child
of five have essentially the privileges and responsibilities appro-
priate to their respective age levels without regard to what older,
intermediate, or younger siblings there may be. The preferential

1 The problem of organization of this material for systematic presentation
is, in view of this fact, particularly difficult. It would be possible to discuss the
subject in terms of the above four principal structures with which age and sex
are most closely interwoven, but there are serious disadvantages involved in this
procedure. Age and sex categories constitute one of the main links of structural
continuity in terms of which structures which are differentiated in other respects
are articulated with each other; and in isolating the treatment of these categories
there is danger that this extremely important aspect of the problem will be lost
sight of. The least objectionable method, at least within the limits of space of
such a paper, seems to be to follow the sequence of the life cycle.

90 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

treatment of an older child is not to any significant extent differ-
entiated if and because he happens to be the first born.

There are, of course, important sex differences in dress and in
approved play interest and the like, but if anything, it may be
surmised that in the urban upper middle classes these are tending
to diminish. Thus, for instance, play overalls are essentially similar
for both sexes. What is perhaps the most important sex discrimi-
nation is more than anything else a reflection of the differentiation
of adult sex roles. It seems to be a definite fact that girls are more
apt to be relatively docile, to conform in general according to
adult expectations, to be "good," whereas boys are more apt to be
recalcitrant to discipline and defiant of adult authority and expec-
tations. There is really no feminine equivalent of the expression
"bad boy." It may be suggested that this is at least partially ex-
plained by the fact that it is possible from an early age to initiate
girls directly into many important aspects of the adult feminine
role. Their mothers are continually about the house and the mean-
ing of many of the things they are doing is relatively tangible
and easily understandable to a child. It is also possible for the
daughter to participate actively and usefully in many of these ac-
tivities. Especially in the urban middle classes, however, the father
does not work in the home and his son is not able to observe his
work or to participate in it from an early age. Furthermore many of
the masculine functions are of a relatively abstract and intangible
character, such that their meaning must remain almost wholly inac-
cessible to a child. This leaves the boy without a tangible meaning-
ful model to emulate and without the possibility of a gradual
initiation into the activities of the adult male role. An important
verification of this analysis could be provided through the study in
our own society of the rural situation. It is my impression that farm
boys tend to be "good" in a sense in which that is not typical
of their urban brothers.

The equality of privileges and responsibilities, graded only by age
but not by birth order, is extended to a certain degree throughout
the whole range of the life cycle. In full adult status, however, it is
seriously modified by the asymmetrical relation of the sexes to the
occupational structure. One of the most conspicuous expressions and
symbols of the underlying equality, however, is the lack of sex dif-
ferentiation in the process of formal education, so far, at least, as it
is not explicitly vocational. Up through college, differentiation seems
to be primarily a matter on the one hand of individual ability, on

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 91

the other hand of class status, and only to a secondary degree of sex
differentiation. One can certainly speak of a strongly established
pattern that all children of the family have a "right" to a good edu-
cation, rights which are graduated according to the class status of
the family but also to individual ability. It is only in post-graduate
professional education, with its direct connection with future occu-
pational careers, that sex discrimination becomes conspicuous. It is
particularly important that this equality of treatment exists in the
sphere of liberal education since throughout the social structure of
our society there is a strong tendency to segregate the occupational
sphere from one in which certain more generally human patterns
and values are dominant, particularly in informal social life and the
realm of what will here be called community participation.

Although this pattern of equality of treatment is present in certain
fundamental respects at all age levels, at the transition from child-
hood to adolescence new features appear which disturb the sym-
metry of sex roles, while still a second set of factors appears with
marriage and the acquisition of full adult status and responsibilities.

An indication of the change is the practice of chaperonage, through
which girls are given a kind of protection and supervision by adults
to which boys of the same age group are not subjected. Boys, that
is, are chaperoned only in their relations with girls of their own
class. This modification of equality of treatment has been extended
to the control of the private lives of women students in boarding
schools and colleges. Of undoubted significance is the fact that it
has been rapidly declining not only in actual effectiveness but as an
ideal pattern. Its prominence in our recent past, however, is an im-
portant manifestation of the importance of sex role differentiation.
Important light might be thrown upon its functions by systematic
comparison with the related phenomena in Latin countries where
this type of asymmetry has been far more accentuated than in this
country in the more modern period.

It is at the point of emergence into adolescence that there first
begins to develop a set of patterns and behavior phenomena which
involve a highly complex combination of age grading and sex role
elements. These may be referred to together as the phenomena of
the "youth culture." Certain of its elements are present in pre-ado-
lescence and others in the adult culture. But the peculiar combina-
tion in connection with this partciular age level is unique and high-
ly distinctive for American society.

92 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Perhaps the best single point of reference for characterizing the
youth culture lies in its contrast with the dominant pattern of the
adult male role. By contrast with the emphasis on responsibility in
this role, the orientation of the youtli culture is more or less speci-
fically irresponsible. One of its dominant features themes is "having
a good time" in relation to which there is a particularly strong em-
phasis on social activities in company with the opposite sex. A sec-
ond predominant characteristic on the male side lies in the
prominence of athletics, which is an avenue of achievement and
competition which stands in sharp contrast to the primary stand-
ards of adult achievement in professional and executive capacities.
Negatively, there is a strong tendency to repudiate interest in adult
things and to feel at least a certain recalcitrance to the pressure of
adult expectations and discipline. In addition to, but including, ath-
letic prowess the typical pattern of the male youth culture seems to
lay emphasis on the value of certain qualities of attractiveness, espe-
cially in relation to the opposite sex. It is very definitely a rounded
humanistic pattern rather than one of competence in the perform-
ance of specified functions. Such stereotypes as the "swell guy" are
significant of this. On the feminine side there is correspondingly a
strong tendency to accentuate sexual attractiveness in terms of vari-
ous versions of what may be called the "glamor girl" pattern.^ Al-
though these patterns defining roles tend to polarize sexually— for
instance, as between star athlete and socially popular girl— yet on a
certain level they are complementary, both emphasizing certain
features of a total personality in terms of the direct expression of
certain values rather than of instrumental significance.

^' Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this tendency lies in the
prominence of the patterns of "dating," for instance among college women. As
shown by an unpublished participant-observer study made at one of the Eastern
women's colleges, perhaps the most important single basis of informal prestige
rating among the residents of a dormitory lies in their relative dating success—
though this is by no means the only basis. One of the most striking features of
the pattern is the high publicity given to the "achievements" of the individual
in a sphere where traditionally in the culture a rather high level of privacy is
sanctioned — it is interesting that once an engagement has occurred a far
greater amount of privacy is granted. The standards of rating cannot be said to
be well integrated, though there is an underlying consistency in that being in
demand by what the group regards as desirable men is perhaps the main standard.

It is true that the "dating" complex need not be exclusively bound up with
the "glamor girl" stereotype of ideal feminine personality — the "good com-
panion" type may also have a place. Precisely, however, where the competitive
aspect of dating is most prominent the glamor pattern seems heavily to pre-
dominate, as does, on the masculine side, a somewhat comparable glamorous
type. On each side at the same time there is room for considerable differences
as to just where the emphasis is placed — for example as between "voluptuous"
sexuality and more decorous "charm."

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 93

One further feature of this situation is the extent to which it is
crystallized about the system of formal education.^ One might say
that the principal centers of prestige dissemination are the colleges,
but that many of the most distinctive phenomena are to be found
in high schools throughout the country. It is of course of great im-
portance that liberal education is not primarily a matter of voca-
tional training in the United States. The individual status on the
curricular side of formal education is, however, in fundamental ways
linked up with adult expectations, and doing "good work" is one of
the most important sources of parental approval. Because of second-
ary institutionalization this approval is extended into various spheres
distinctive of the youth culture. But it is notable that the youth
culture has a strong tendency to develop in directions which are
either on the borderline of parental approval or beyond the pale, in
such matters as sex behavior, drinking and various forms of frivol-
ous and irresponsible behavior. The fact that adults have attitudes
toward these things which are often deeply ambivalent and that on
such occasions as college reunions they may outdo the younger
generation, in drinking, for instance, is of great significance, but
probably structurally secondary to the youth-versus-adult differ-
ential aspect. Thus the youth culture is not only, as is true of the
curricular aspect of formal education, a matter of age status as such
but also shows strong signs of being a product of tensions in the
relationship of younger people and adults.

From the point of view of age grading, perhaps the most notable
fact about this situation is the existence oi definite pattern distinc-
tions from the periods coming both before and after. At the line be-
tween childhood and adolescence "growing up" consists precisely in
ability to participate in youth culture patterns, which are not, for
either sex, the same as the adult patterns practiced by the parental
generation. In both sexes the transition to full adulthood means loss
of a certain "glamorous" element. From being the athletic hero or
the lion of college dances, the young man becomes a prosaic busi-
ness executive or lawyer. The more successful adults participate in
an important order of prestige symbols but these are of a very dif-

3 A central aspect of this focus of crystallization lies in the element of ten-
sion, sometimes of direct conflict, between the youth culture patterns of college
and school life, and the "serious" interests in and obligations toward curricular
work. It is of course the latter which defines some at least of the most important
foci of adult expectations of doing "good" work and justifying the privileges
granted. It is not possible here to attempt to analyze the interesting ambivalent
attitudes of youth toward curricular work and achievement.

94 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ferent order from those of the youth culture. The contrast in the
case of the feminine role is perhaps equally sharp, with at least a
strong tendency to take on a "domestic" pattern with marriage and
the arrival of young children.

The symmetry in this respect must, however, not be exaggerated.
It is of fundamental significance to the sex role structure of the
adult age levels that the normal man has a "job," which is funda-
mental to his social status in general. It is perhaps not too much to
say that only in very exceptional cases can an adult man be genu-
inely self-respecting and enjoy a respected status in the eyes of
others if he does not "earn a living" in an approved occupational
role. Not only is this a matter of his own economic support but,
generally speaking, his occupational status is the primary source of
the income and class status of his wife and children.

In the case of the feminine role the situation is radically different.
The majority of married women, of course, are not employed, but
even of those that are a very large proportion do not have jobs
which are in basic competition for status with those of their hus-
bands.^ The majority of "career" women whose occupational status
is comparable with that of men in their own class, at least in the
upper middle and upper classes, are unmarried, and in the small
proportion of cases where they are married the result is a profound
alteration in family structure.

This pattern, which is central to the urban middle classes, should
not be misunderstood. In rural society, for instance, the operation
of the farm and the attendant status in the community may be said
to be a matter of the joint status of both parties to a marriage.
Whereas a farm is operated by a family, an urban job is held by an
individual and does not involve other members of the family in a
comparable sense. One convenient expression of the difference lies
in the question of what would happen in case of death. In the case
of a farm it would at least be not at all unusual for the widow to

^ The above statement, even more than most in the present paper, needs to
be qualified in relation to the problem of class. It is above all to the upper mid-
dle class that it applies. Here probably the great majority of "working vi'ives"
are engaged in some form of secretarial work which would, on an independent
basis, generally be classed as a lower middle class occupation. The situation at
lower levels of the class structure is quite different since the prestige of the jobs
of husband and wife is then much more likely to be nearly equivalent. It is quite
possible that this fact is closely related to the relative instability of marriage
which Davis and Gardner (Deep South) find, at least for the community they
studied, to be typical of lower class groups. The relation is one which deserves
careful study.

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 95

continue operating the farm with the help of a son or even of hired
men. In the urban situation the widow would cease to have any
connection with the organization which had employed her husband
and he would be replaced by another man without reference to
family aflBliations.

In this urban situation the primary status-carrying role is in a
sense that of housewife. The woman's fundamental status is that of
her husband's wife, the mother of his children, and traditionally
the person responsible for a complex of activities in connection with
the management of the household, care of children, etc.

For the structuring of sex roles in the adult phase the most fun-
damental considerations seem to be those involved in the inter-
relations of the occupational system and the conjugal family. In a
certain sense the most fundamental basis of the family's status is
the occupational status of the husband and father. As has been
pointed out, this is a status occupied by an individual by virtue of
his individual qualities and achievements. But both directly and
indirectly, more than any other single factor, it determines the
status of the family in the social structure, directly because of the
symbolic significance of the ofiice or occupation as a symbol of
prestige, indirectly because as the principal source of family income
it determines the standard of living of the family. From one point
of view the emergence of occupational status into this primary
position can be regarded as the principal source of strain in the sex
role structure of our society since it deprives the wife of her role as
a partner in a common enterprise. The common enterprise is re-
duced to the life of the family itself and to the informal social
activities in which husband and wife participate together. This
leaves the wife a set of utilitarian functions in the management of
the household which may be considered a kind of "pseudo-" occupa-
tion. Since the present interest is primarily in the middle classes,
the relatively unstable character of the role of housewife as the
principal content of the feminine role is strongly illustrated by the
tendency to employ domestic servants wherever financially possible.
It is true that there is an American tendency to accept tasks of drudg-
ery with relative willingness, but it is notable that in middle class
families there tends to be a dissociation of the essential personality
from the performance of these tasks. Thus, advertising continually
appeals to such desires as to have hands which one could never tell

96 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

had washed dishes or scrubbed floors.'' Organization about the func-
tion of housewife, however, with the addition of strong affectional
devotion to husband and children, is the primary focus of one of
the principal patterns governing the adult feminine role— what may
be called the "domestic" pattern. It is, however, a conspicuous fact
that strict adherence to this pattern has become progressively less
common and has a strong tendency to a residual status— that is, to
be followed most closely by those who are unsuccessful in competi-
tion for prestige in other directions.

It is, of course, possible for the adult woman to follow the mascu-
line pattern and seek a career in fields of occupational achievement
in direct competition with men of her own class. It is, however,
notable that in spite of the very great progress of the emancipation
of women from the traditional domestic pattern only a very small
fraction have gone very far in this direction. It is also clear that its
generalization would only be possible with profound alterations in
the structure of the family.

Hence it seems that concomitant with the alteration in the basic
masculine role in the direction of occupation there have appeared
two important tendencies in the feminine role which are alternative
to that of simple domesticity on the one hand, and to a full-fledged
career on the other. In the older situation there tended to be a very
rigid distinction between respectable married women and those
who were "no better than they should be." The rigidity of this line
has progressively broken down through the infiltration into the
respectable sphere of elements of what may be called again the
glamor pattern, with the emphasis on a specifically feminine form
of attractiveness which on occasion involves directly sexual patterns
of appeal. One important expression of this trend lies in die fact
that many of the symbols of feminine attractiveness have been
taken over direcdy from the practices of social types previously
beyond the pale of respectable society. This would seem to be sub-
stantially true of the practice of women smoking and of at least the
modern version of the use of cosmetics. The same would seem to
be true of many of the modern versions of women's dress. "Eman-

^ This type of advertising appeal undoubtedly contains an element of "snob
appeal" in the sense of an invitation to the individual by her appearance and
ways to identify herself with a higher social class than that of her actual status.
But it is almost certainly not wholly explained by this element. A glamorously
feminine appearance which is specificalfy dissociated from physical work is un-
doubtedly a genuine part of an authentic personality ideal of the middle class,
and not only evidence of a desire to belong to the upper class.

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 97

cipation" in this connection means primarily emancipation from
traditional and conventional restrictions on the free expression of
sexual attraction and impulses, but in a direction which tends to
segregate the elements of sexual interest and attraction from the
total personality and in so doing tends to emphasize the segrega-
tion of sex roles. It is particularly notable that there has been no
corresponding tendency to emphasize masculine attraction in terms
of dress and other such aids. One might perhaps say that in a situ-
ation which strongly inhibits competition between the sexes on the
same plane the feminine glamor pattern has appeared as an offset
to masculine occupational status and to its attendant symbols of
prestige. It is perhaps significant that there is a common stereotype
of the association of physically beautiful, expensively and elabo-
rately dressed women with physically unattractive but rich and
powerful men.

The other principal direction of emancipation from domesticity
seems to lie in emphasis on what has been called the common
humanistic element. This takes a wide variety of forms. One of them
lies in a relatively mature appreciation and systematic cultivation
of cultural interests and educated tastes, extending all the way
from the intellectual sphere to matters of art, music and house
furnishings. A second consists in cultivation of serious interests and
humanitarian obligations in community welfare situations and the
like. It is understandable that many of these orientations are most
conspicuous in fields where through some kind of tradition there
is an element of particular suitability for feminine participation.
Thus, a woman who takes obligations to social welfare particularly
seriously will find opportunities in various forms of activity which
traditionally tie up with women's relation to children, to sickness
and so on. But this may be regarded as secondary to the underly-
ing orientation which would seek an outlet in work useful to the
community following the most favorable opportunities which hap-
pen to be available.

This pattern, which with reference to the character of relation-
ship to men may be called that of the "good companion," is distin-
guished from the others in that it lays far less stress on the
exploitation of sex role as such and more on that which is essentially
common to both sexes. There are reasons, however, why cultural
interests, interest in social welfare and community activities are
particularly prominent in the activities of women in our urban

95 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

communities. On the one side the mascuHne occupational role tends
to absorb a very large proportion of the man's time and energy and
to leave him relatively little for other interests. Furthermore, unless
his position is such as to make him particularly prominent his pri-
mary orientation is to those elements of the social structure which
divide the community into occupational groups rather than those
which unite it in common interests and activities. The utilitarian
aspect of the role of housewife, on the other hand, has declined in
importance to the point where it scarcely approaches a full-time
occupation for a vigorous person. Hence the resort to other interests
to fill up tlie gap. In addition, women, being more closely tied to
the local residential community, are more apt to be involved in
matters of common concern to the members of that community.
This peculiar role of women becomes particularly conspicuous in
middle age. The younger married woman is apt to be relatively high-
ly absorbed in the care of young children. With their growing up,
however, her absorption in the household is greatly lessened, often
just at the time when the husband is approaching the apex of his
career and is most heavily involved in its obligations. Since to a
high degree this humanistic aspect of the feminine role is only
partially institutionalized it is not surprising that its patterns often
bear the marks of strain and insecurity, as perhaps has been classi-
cally depicted by Helen Hokinson's cartoons of women's clubs.

The adult roles of both sexes involve important elements of strain
which are both in certain dynamic relationships, especially to the
youth culture. In the case of the feminine role, marriage is the
single event toward which a selective process, in which personal
qualities and effort can play a decisive part, has pointed. That de-
termines a woman's fundamental status, and after that her role
patterning is not so much status determining as a matter of living
up to expectations and finding satisfying interests and activities. In
a society where such strong emphasis is placed upon individual
achievement it is not surprising that there should be a certain ro-
mantic nostalgia for the time when the fundamental choices were
still open. This element of strain is added to by the lack of clear-cut
definition of the adult feminine role. Once the possibility of a
career has been eliminated there still tends to be a rather unstable
oscillation between emphasis in the direction of domesticity or gla-
mor or good companionship. According to situational pressures and
individual character the tendency will be to emphasize one or

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 99

another of these more strongly. But it is a situation Hkely to produce
a rather high level of insecurity. In this state the pattern of domes-
ticity must be ranked lowest in terms of prestige but also, because
of the strong emphasis in community sentiment on the virtues of
fidelity and devotion to husband and children, it offers perhaps the
highest level of a certain kind of security. It is no wonder that such
an important symbol as Whistler's mother concentrates primarily on
this pattern.

The glamor pattern has certain obvious attractions since to the
woman who is excluded from the struggle for power and prestige
in the occupational sphere it is the most direct path to a sense of
superiority and importance. It has, however, two obvious limita-
tions. In the first place, many of its manifestations encounter the
resistance of patterns of moral conduct and engender conflicts not
only with community opinion but also with the individual's own
moral standards. In the second place, it is a pattern the highest
manifestations of which are inevitably associated with a rather
early age level— in fact, overwhelmingly with the courtship period.
Hence, if strongly entered upon serious strains result from the
problem of adaptation to increasing age.

The one pattern which would seem to offer the greatest possi-
bilities for able, intelligent, and emotionally mature women is the
third— the good companion pattern. This, however, suffers from a
lack of fully institutionalized status and from the multiplicity of
choices of channels of expression. It is only those with the strongest
initiative and intelligence who achieve fully satisfactory adapta-
tions in this direction. It is quite clear that in the adult feminine
role there is quite sufficient strain and insecurity so that widespread
manifestations are to be expected in the form of neurotic behavior.

The masculine role at the same time is itself by no means devoid
of corresponding elements of strain. It carries with it to be sure the
primary prestige of achievement, responsibility and authority. By
comparison with the role of the youth culture, however, there are
at least two important types of limitations. In the first place, the
modern occupational system has led to increasing specialization of
the role. The job absorbs an extraordinarily large proportion of the
individual's energy and emotional interests in a role the content of
which is often relatively narrow. This in particular restricts the
area within which he can share common interests and experiences
with others not in the same occupational specialty. It is perhaps of

100 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

considerable significance that so many of the highest prestige sta-
tuses of our society are of this speciaHzed character. There is in
the definition of roles little to bind the individual to others in his
community on a comparable status level. By contrast with this
situation, it is notable that in the youth culture common human
elements are far more strongly emphasized. Leadership and emi-
nence are more in the role of total individuals and less of com-
petent specialists. This perhaps has something to do v^^ith the
significant tendency in our society for all age levels to idealize youth
and for the older age groups to attempt to imitate the patterns of
youth behavior.

It is perhaps as one phase of this situation that the relation of
the adult man to persons of the opposite sex should be treated. The
efiFect of the specialization of occupational role is to narrow the
range in which the sharing of common human interests can play a
large part. In relation to his wife the tendency of this narrowness
would seem to be to encourage on her part either the domestic or
the glamorous role, or community participation somewhat unrelated
to the marriage relationship. This relationship between sex roles
presumably introduces a certain amount of strain into the marriage
relationship itself since this is of such overwhelming importance
to the family and hence to a woman's status and yet so relatively
difficult to maintain on a level of human companionship. Outside
the marriage relationship, however, there seems to be a notable
inhibition against easy social intercourse, particularly in mixed
company.*' The man's close personal intimacy with other women is
checked by the danger of the situation being defined as one of ri-
valry with the wife, and easy friendship without sexual-emotional
involvement seems to be inhibited by the specialization of interests
in the occupational sphere. It is notable that brilliance of conversa-
tion of the "salon" type seems to be associated with aristocratic
society and is not prominent in ours.

Along with all this goes a certain tendency for middle-aged men,

as symbolized by the "bald-headed row," to be interested in the

physical aspects of sex— that is, in women precisely as dissociated

from those personal considerations which are important to relation-

'' In the informal social life of academic circles with which tlie writer i*
famihar there seems to be a strong tendency in mixed gatherings — as after din-
ner — for the sexes to segregate. In such groups the men are apt to talk either
shop subjects or pohtics wliereas the women are apt to talk about domestic af-
fairs, schools, their children, etc., or personalities. It is perhaps on personalities
tliat mixed conversation is apt to flow most freely.

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 101

ships of companionship or friendship, to say nothing of marriage.
In so far as it does not take this physical form, however, there seems
to be a strong tendency for middle-aged men to ideahze youth
patterns— that is, to think of the ideal inter-sex friendship as that of
their pre-marital period.'

In so far as the idealization of the youth culture by adults is an
expression of elements of strain and insecurity in the adult roles it
would be expected that the patterns thus idealized would contain
an element of romantic unrealism. The patterns of youthful behavior
thus idealized are not those of actual youth so much as those which
older people wish their own youth might have been. This romantic
element seems to coalesce with a similar element derived from cer-
tain strains in the situation of young people themselves.

The period of youth in our society is one of considerable strain
and insecurity. Above all, it means turning one's back on the security
both of status and of emotional attachment which is engaged in the
family of orientation. It is structurally essential to transfer one's
primary emotional attachment to a marriage partner who is entirely
unrelated to the previous family situation. In a system of free mar-
riage choice this applies to women as well as men. For the man
there is in addition the necessity to face the hazards of occupational
competition in the determination of a career. There is reason to
believe that the youth culture has important positive functions in
easing the transition from the security of childhood in the family of
orientation to that of full adult in marriage and occupational status.
But precisely because the transition is a period of strain it is to be
expected that it involves elements of unrealistic romanticism. Thus
significant features of youth patterns in our society would seem to
derive from the coincidence of the emotional needs of adolescents
with those derived from the strains of the situation of adults.

A tendency to the romantic idealization of youth patterns seems
in different ways to be characteristic of modern Western society as
a whole.^ It is not possible in the present context to enter into any
extended comparative analysis, but it may be illuminating to call
attention to a striking difference between the patterns associated
with this phenomenon in Germany and in the United States. The
German "youth movement," starting before the first World War,

"^ This, to be sure, often contains an element of romanticization. It is more
nearly what he wishes these relations had been than what they actually were.

8 Cf. E. Y. Hartshome, "German Youth and the Nazi Dream of Victory,"
America in a World at War, Pamphlet, No. 12, New York, 1941.

102 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

has occasioned a great deal of comment and has in various respects
been treated as the most notable instance of the revolt of youth. It
is generally believed that the youth movement has an important
relation to the background of National Socialism, and this fact as
much as any suggests the important difiFerence. While in Germany
as everywhere there has been a generalized revolt against conven-
tion and restrictions on individual freedom as embodied in the
traditional adult culture, in Germany particular emphasis has ap-
peared on the community of male youth. "Comradeship" in a sense
which strongly suggests that of soldiers in the field has from the
beginning been strongly emphasized as the ideal social relationship.
By contrast with this, in the American youth culture and its adult
romanticization a much stronger emphasis has been placed on the
cross-sex relationship. It would seem that this fact, with the struc-
tural factors which underlie it, have much to do with the failure of
the youth culture to develop any considerable political significance
in this country. Its predominant pattern has been that of the ideal-
ization of the isolated couple in romantic love. There have, to be
sure, been certain tendencies among radical youth to a political
orientation but in this case there has been a notable absence of em-
phasis on the solidarity of the members of one sex. The tendency
has been rather to ignore the relevance of sex difference in the
interest of common ideals.

The importance of youth patterns in contemporary American
culture throws into particularly strong relief the status in our social
structure of the most advanced age groups. By comparison with
other societies the United States assumes an extreme position in
the isolation of old age from participation in the most important
social structures and interests. Structurally speaking, there seem to
be two primary bases of this situation. In the first place, the most
important single distinctive feature of our family structure is the
isolation of the individual conjugal family. It is impossible to say
that with us it is "natural" for any other group than husband and
wife and their dependent children to maintain a common house-
hold. Hence, when the children of a couple have become independ-
ent through marriage and occupational status the parental couple
is left without attachment to any continuous kinship group. It is, of
course, common for other relatives to share a household with the
conjugal family but this scarcely ever occurs without some impor-
tant elements of strain. For independence is certainly the preferred

AGE AND SEX IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES 103

pattern for an elderly couple, particularly from the point of view
of the children.

The second basis of the situation lies in the occupational struc-
ture. In such fields as fanning and maintenance of small indepen-
dent enterprises there is frequently no such thing as abrupt
"retirement," rather a gradual relinquishment of the main responsi-
bilities and functions with advancing age. So far, however, as an
individual's occupational status centers in a specific "job," he either
holds the job or does not, and the tendency is to maintain the full
level of functions up to a given point and then abruptly to retire. In
view of the very great significance of occupational status and its
psychological correlates, retirement leaves the older man in a pecu-
liarly functionless situation, cut oflF from participation in the most
important interests and activities of the society. There is a further
important aspect of this situation. Not only status in the commu-
nity but actual place of residence is to a very high degree a func-
tion of the specific job held. Retirement not only cuts the ties to the
job itself but also greatly loosens those to the community of resi-
dence. Perhaps in no other society is there observable a phenome-
non corresponding to the accumulation of retired elderly people in
such areas as Florida and Southern California in the winter. It may
be surmised that this structural isolation from kinship, occupational,
and community ties is the fundamental basis of the recent political
agitation for help to the old. It is suggested that it is far less the
financial hardship^ of the position of elderly people than their social
isolation which makes old age a "problem." As in other connections
we are very prone to rationalize generalized insecurity in financial
and economic terms. The problem is obviously of particularly great
significance in view of the changing age distribution of the popula-
tion with the prospect of a far greater proportion in the older age
groups than in previous generations. It may also be suggested that,
through well-known psychosomatic mechanisms, the increased in-
cidence of the disabilities of older people, such as heart disease,
cancer, etc., may be at least in part attributed to this structural
situation.

^ That the financial difficulties of older people in a very large proportion
of cases are real is not to be doubted. This, however, is at least to a very large
extent a consequence rather than a determinant of the structural situation.
Except where it is fully taken care of by pension schemes, the income of older
people is apt to be seriously reduced, but, even more important, the younger
conjugal family does not feel an obligation to contribute to the support of
aged parents. Where as a matter of course both generations shared a common
household, this problem did not exist.

VI

Democracy and Social Structure
in Pre-Nazi Germany

FROM A SOCIOLOGICAL point of vicw, the "democratic," or better
"liberal-democratic" type of society which has reached its highest
degree of large-scale realization in such countries as England
and the United States, has developed from a complex combination
of structural elements. Some of these elements have been common
to the Western world as a whole, while others have played a part
particularly in these two countries. By contrast Germany pre-
sents a rather bewildering array both of similarities and of dif-
ferences. This comparison will provide the main starting point
of the present analysis of German social structure.^

On a common sense level, perhaps Germany's most conspicuous
similarity especially with the United States, lies in the high devel-
opment of industrialism, under the aegis of "big business." In
particular this involves in the economy a high development of
large scale organization, with a large, propertyless industrial class,
a high concentration of executive authority and control of indus-
trial property, and an important element of highly trained tech-
nical personnel, especially in engineering, but also in relation to
legal and administrative functions. Certainly in no other country
except the United States has the economy been so highly "bureau-
cratized" as in Germany.

In Germany, as in other industrial countries, this structure of

modern industrial enterprise has been imbedded in a complex of

other institutional features which in many ways are very similar.

It has had a highly developed money economy. Only a relatively

small fraction of the jDopulation has even approached self-suflB-

1 In broad historical perspective, of course, France has a strong claim to
be considered at least as important to "democracy" as the modern Anglo-
Saxon countries. There are, liowever, notable diiierences the discussion of
which would introduce too many complications to be dealt with in the limited
space available. On another level, many of the smaller European countries
and the British Dominions must be neglected for the same reason.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 105

ciency. The great majority, on the contrary, have been mainly
dependent on money income from salaries, wages or the profits
of enterprise or disposal of services. To a high degree occupational
status has been institutionally segregated from other not strictly
functional bases of total status, though in this important respect
there has certainly been a notable difference of degree especially
from the United States. We have had no landed nobility, hardly an
important class closely approaching the European peasantry, and
a considerably smaller class of independent artisans and shop-
keepers, whose status has in certain respects been similar to that
of peasants.

Pre-Nazi Germany was also notable for the high development
of the one-price system with its consequent restriction of the
bargaining process to the larger-scale, hence often relatively highly
organized, market situations. Indeed, by means of the develop-
ment of cartels and collective bargaining through trade unions,
Germany went further, at an earlier time, than any other country
in the regulation of the exchange process. All this was backed
by a firm and, on the whole, technically and impartially admin-
istered legal system in the fields of contract, monetary transactions
and the like.

The similarity, in spite of certain differences, between Roman
and Common Law, extends to the basic structure of the institution
of property, especially by contrast with the feudal background of
European society. There was full institutional segregation between
ownership and either political authority or social status in other
respects, combined with full alienability and centralization of all
property rights in a single ownership— a condition which is an
essential prerequisite of "capitalism" as well as of certain elements
of personal freedom and of the mobility of resources, both human
and non-human, which underlie the "liberal" type of industrial
economy.

These similarities in the structure of the economy and of its
more immediate institutional penumbra go so far that many
writers, especially those inclined to Marxism, have strongly tended
to treat the social structures of Germany and the United States
as for most practical purposes identical. For them the appearance
and political success of the Nazi movement in Germany would then
indicate only relatively superficial differences perhaps of external
conditions, or of the constitution in the formal, legal sense. It will,

106 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

by contrast with that view, be the thesis of the present analysis
that a divergence of pohtical orientation so fundamental as that
at present developing between the fascist and the liberal-democratic
societies must go back to deeper structural sources than this view
would indicate. On subtler institutional levels, important dif-
ferences can be discerned even in the economy, but they can be
more clearly brought out by noting their association with elements
which contrast more obviously with our own.

It has thus long been clear to competent scholars that the
German state differed markedly from its British or American
counterparts. This difference may in the main be characterized
in terms of its interdependent "feudal," militaristic, bureaucratic,
and authoritarian features. The predominant impress of these
elements came from Prussia, but the position of Prussia was suflB-
ciently central strongly to color the whole of Germany.

Prussia, like England, has had a well-established "ruling class"
even though the two have developed radically different patterns
of life. In Prussia it has been a landed nobility with families
settled on ancestral estates.. Their status has involved complete
local dominance over a subordinated rural population, with control
of local government, with the lower classes kept in a state of
economic dependency, and the enjoyment of a position of high
social prestige enforced by rigid conventions. In the state itself,
however, the primary mode of participation of this class has
not been in the civil administration but in the armed forces.
Members of the Prussian Junker families have, over a considerable
period, set the "tone" of the officers' corps even though a majority
of its members in recent times have not come from these families.
The status of oflBcer was that of maximum social prestige although
not of impressive wealth or political influence in ordinary times—
indeed there was a strong tradition of neutrality in ordinary
political affairs.

Thus by virtue of its connection with the Junker nobihty the
German, especially the Prussian, ofiicers' corps did not constitute
an ordinary "professional" military force in the sense in which that
is true of our regular army. This situation was further bolstered
by two other circumstances. In the first place, the armed forces
under the old German constitution were not under the control of
the civil administration but were responsible directly to the Kaiser.
This fact was not merely of constitutional significance but was

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 107

indicative of the solidarity of social status between nobility and
royalty, the two elements of the traditional "ruling class." The
reciprocal solidarity is strongly indicated by the tendency of Euro-
pean royalty to emphasize their status as military commanders,
for instance by making most public appearances in uniform even
in peace time. Secondly, the oflBcers' corps, in continuity with the
whole Junker class, carried on a highly distinctive "style of life"
which was in sharp contrast with everything "bourgeois," involv-
ing a strong contempt of industry and trade, of the bourgeois
virtues, even of liberal and humane culture. Perhaps the most
conspicuous symbol of this difference is the part played by the duel
and its attendant code of honor. The most important criterion of
eligibility to belong as a social equal was Satisfaktionsfaehigkeit,
acceptability as an adversary in an "affair of honor," To be an
officer one had also to be a "gentleman" in a technical sense which
hardly included many elements of the population which we would
consider high up in the middle class.

It has been remarked that toward the time of the first World
War considerable bourgeois elements had penetrated into the
officers' corps. They were, however, in Germany, predominantly
what was called the "feudalized" bourgeoisie. That is, though
sons of civil servants, professional men, even on occasion bankers
or industrialists, they tended to take on the style of Iffe of the
Junker group rather than vice versa, and to be acceptable in
proportion as they did so. One conspicuous phenomenon in this
category was the place of the duelling "corps" in the universities.

Thus the "feudal-militaristic" elements have played a prominent
role in the structure of the German state. Though not in any
simple sense involved in "politics," they have been integral to
the structure especially through their close connection with the
monarchy and their position at the top of the scale of social
prestige. The deposition of the monarchy and great reduction
of the peace-time army after 1918 went far to remove this element
from its central position on the formal level, but the process was
not sufficiently thorough to break up its social identity nor to
destroy its traditional prestige, especially in view of its close
integration witli other "conservative" elements in the social struc-
ture.

Along with the position of the Junker military element, the
German state has been famous for the high development of its

108 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

civilian administrative bureaucracy. As in the case of the Junkers
the main outhnes of this structural element ante-date, and are
independent of, the development of industrialism in Germany. The
bureaucracy does not, however, have the same continuity with
"feudal" traditions, but developed as an aspect of the growth of
centralized territorial monarchies in post-mediaeval times. It has
been closely integrated with the adoption of Roman law and its
teaching in the universities so that the bulk of administrative
civil servants have had a university legal training. The judiciary
has also, although a special branch, still been much more closely
involved with this tradition than in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Indeed in Germany the legal profession as a whole has been far
less independent of the state.

This famous German civil service has constituted a highly pro-
fessionalized group, with a very high degree of formalization of
status and of the operation of the organization. Specificity of
status and powers in terms of formal legal definition have been
carried very far. Impartiality and scrupulous precision in applica-
tion of the law in meticulous detail has been the keynote. Again
not only has impartial application of the law been called for, but
there has been a strong tradition of aloofness from politics, of
duty to carry out the legislation and decrees of the supreme
authority without question.

Generally speaking the civil service has constituted for Prussia
in particular the highest prestige element in the bourgeoisie. At
court and in other "social" respects they have not been the equals
of the nobility, but their sons could often become officers and even
intermarriages with the nobility were not uncommon. A very
strong sense of social superiority to most other bourgeois elements,
particularly of a "capitalistic" tenor, except for the old "patricians"
of the Hanseatic and other free cities, and latterly the most promi-
nent business magnates, was conspicuous. University professors
and the highest reaches of the independent liberal professions, as
medicine and law, would be the closest below them in social
prestige.

Unlike the Junker military element, the higher civil service was
not, in the Weimar Republic, displaced from formal participation
in the operation of Government. If anything their power was
probably on the whole increased because short of really radical
revolution their knowledge and competence in administrative

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 109

affairs was indispensable for keeping the essential governmental
services in operation in a time of crisis.

These two elements which were most closely involved in power
and responsibility in the structure of the old German state were
for the most part integrated together by the ideology vv'hich is
perhaps best called "Prvissian conservatism." It might be charac-
terized as a combination of a patriarchal type of authoritarianism
with a highly developed formal legalism. Government has con-
stituted an Ohrigkcit. Its role was by no means defined as "abso-
lutism" in the sense of an unlimited right of those in authority
to promote their own self-interest or indulge their personal whims.
On the contrary, the pattern of "duty" as classically formulated by
Kant was one of its keynotes. But this devotion to duty was com-
bined with a strong sense of prerogative and authority which
would not brook the "democratic" type of control by persons
without authority, or any presumption, of elements not authorized
by their formal status to interfere in the functions of duly con-
stituted authority. Legitimacy and order were very strongly em-
phasized. At the same time it was a system of authority under
law, and one principal keynote of the pattern of duty was scrupu-
lous adherence to the law. The obverse of what seems to many
Anglo-Saxons the petty proliferation of minor regulations, the
ubiquitous notice that such and such is Verboten, was the meticu-
lous incorruptibility of the administration.

Perhaps the master complex of ideological symbols of this sys-
tem lay in Lutheranism. The ultimate legitimation of authority
was the divine ordination of government and princes. Organiza-
tionally the Lutheran church and clergy were more closely bound
up with the regime than perhaps any other major branch of
Christianity in modem times— not only was it in Prussia the estab-
lished church, but the pastor was directly a civil servant and the
principal supervisor of the system of public education. But more
on the ideological level, the realm of idealism and genuine wish-
fulfillment is for the Lutheran exclusively subjective and spiritual.
This world is dominated by sin, mitigated only by the restraining
influence of ordained authority. Society is not and can never be a
Kingdom of God on Earth, but is fundamentally a vale of tears.
In its application to the role of authority, this pattern favors a
certain realism, for instance with respect to the advisability of
adequate military protection of one's territory but its benevolent

110 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

patriarchalism readily slips over into a kind of harsh authoritarian-
ism and even into a cynical pursuit of power in defiance of the
welfare of the masses of people. Government is to it a grim
business, of which war is a very typical and essential part.

It should not, of course, be forgotten that parliamentary govern-
ment had developed in Imperial Germany to a considerable degree.
But it is the above two elements in the state which were dis-
tinctive of Germany by contrast with the Western democracies,
and which very greatly limited the decisiveness of the influence of
the parliamentary element. This situation would seem to have a
good deal to do with the tendency of German parliamentarianism,
certainly more conspicuously than in either England or the United
States, to become structured as a system of representation of rather
specific interest groups such as agrarian interests, big business,
labor unions, the Catholic Church, a tendency which came to full
flower under the Weimar Republic and had a good deal to do
with its instability.

The fact that a modem industrial economy developed in Ger-
many in a society already to a large extent structured about the
Prussian state and in the context of the pervasive configurational
patterns of Prussian conservatism, undoubtedly colored the total
development in many different respects. In the first place, "eco-
nomic individualism" was never so prominent as in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. Greater government participation in the affairs
of the economy was taken for granted or not resisted, whether it
was a question of government ownership and operation of the
railways, or the fact that it was Germany which first introduced a
comprehensive system of social insurance. It is undoubtedly sig-
nificant that the "classical economics" never took real root in the
German universities; for since it was never only a technical dis-
cipline but was also an ideology, it expressed an ideal of inde-
pendence of 'l)usiness" from the state and other "social" interests
which was on the whole uncongenial to German mentality.

The same circumstances, however, favored the rapid growth of
large-scale organization in the German economy, and its relatively
close assimilation to the pattern of government bureaucracy. Par-
ticularly conspicuous in this respect is what to Anglo-Saxons
appears to be a peculiar tendency towards the formalization of
status in Germany, both in the economy and in other aspects
of the society. Perhaps the best indication of this is the ubiquity

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 111

of the use of titles. We give titles to high government officials, and
various other persons in positions of dignity such as physicians,
ministers and priests, sometimes officials of large organizations.
But at least three differences are conspicuous as compared with
pre-Nazi Germany. First, the system of titles is far less extensive.
One could almost say that the prominence of formal rank and
titles which we feel to be appropriate to armed services applies
in Germany to the whole occupational world, reaching down even
to statuses on the skilled labor level such as Eisenbahneamter, etc.
The number of people who are plain Herr Braun or Herr Schmidt
is relatively small. Secondly, titles are continuously used, so that
in addressing a letter, or even in personal address it is a definite
discourtesy to omit the full title. Thus anyone with any kind of a
doctor's degree is always addressed as Herr Doktor— or so referred
to— while we reserve this usage almost entirely for physicians. We
often refer to, and even address titled people without the title-
it would in Germany be disrespectful to refer to the Chancellor
as Herr . . ., whereas speaking of "Mr. Roosevelt" instead of
President Roosevelt is certainly not disrespectful. In Germany it
would have had to be Herr Reichskanzler Dr. Bruening, or at least
Reicliskanzler Bruening. Closely related is the German tendency
to use an accumulation of titles. Thus where on a letter we would
write Professor John Smith, there it would have to be Herr Pro-
fessor Doktor Johann Schmidt. Our tendency to ignore titles on
occasion is related to the usage with other symbols of formal status
such as uniforms. In peace time a military officer generally appears
in civilian clothes, even at work, unless he is on military post or,
for a naval officer, on shipboard. Even when the nation was
imminently threatened by war we had the spectacle of the Army's
Chief of Staff on an eminently official occasion, testffying before
a Senate Committee, in civilian clothes. That would be completely
unthinkable in Germany. Even in war time the President, though
he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, never wears a uni-
form. Finally, German titles are far more highly differentiated, both
with respect to rank and to field of competence, than are ours.
We have the one honorific title of "honorable" for high govern-
mental officials; in Germany there are many graduations. The
honorific title of Rat is differentiated into an indefinite number of
subclasses according to the particular occupation of the incumbent
Kommerzienrat, Justizrat, Sanitaestsrat, Rechnungsrat, etc. Finally

112 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

there is, in general, a far greater insistence on meticulous observ-
ance of correct titles.-

Except for the status of nobility— including the title "von"— the
primary content of this formalized status system in Germany was
occupational. But the tendency to emphasize titles and other
aspects of formal status even on what we would treat as "informal"
occasions seems to indicate a difference from the predominant
American pattern. With us, occupational status is to a relatively
high degree segregated from the individual's "private life," while
in Germany this seems to be considerably less the case; his specific
formal status as it were follows him everywhere he goes. In social
life generally he is less significant as a person, as John Smith,
than he is as the incumbent of a formal status, as an official, an
officer, a physician, a professor, or a worker.

Another aspect of this formalism is worthy of note. To an Ameri-
can the continual German insistence on titles connotes not only
emphasis on formal status rather than individualit>% it connotes
also "formality" in the sense which is antithetical to the informality
of intimacy or of friendship. To an American it is surprising that
German students may associate for months and never speak to each
other at all, or when they do, address each other as Herr and
Fraeulein, when their American counterparts would be addressing
each other by their first names. Similarly with us, colleagues of
about the same age, especially if relatively young, almost always
address each other by their first names; they do so in Germany only
if they have a specifically intimate friendship. These differences
of usage may be said to symbolize that to American sentiments,
at all close association in common activities should include an
element of friendship— he is not only my fellow student or col-
league, but also my friend— while in Germany occupational associa-
tion and friendship are specifically segregated. It is most untactful
to "presume" a level of intimacy to which one is not entitled.^

^ To relate an amusing instance:— as an official exchange student at a
German university, I was formally received by the Rector of the University.
After the interview a German student friend said, "I hope you addressed
him correctly as Euer Magnifizetiz." When the reply was, "No, I said Herr
Professor," my student friend was genuinely shocked. To an American, how-
e\er, the idea of addressing a rather seedy-looking elderly professor as
"Your Magnificence" seemed more than a little ridiculous.

3 From a superficial point of view the above two points might seem to
be contradictory. This, however, is not the case. The Gennan pattern seems
to extend assimilation of other elements of status to formal occupational status
considerably farther than ours does, and hence greatly to narrow dovra the

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 113

The above considerations suggest that differences which are
perhaps most conspicuous to the social scientist in terms of the
broader status-groupings of the state and the economy can be
followed into the realm of the more intimate personal relation-
ships. It surely would be remarkable if the order of difference
which has been discussed did not extend into the realm of family
structure, of the definition of sex roles, and the patterning of the
relations of the sexes, within marriage and outside it.

In the first place, there would clearly seem to be in Germany
a pattern of masculine superiority and a tendency to assume
authority and prerogatives on the part of husbands and fathers
which is much less pronounced in the United States. From the
American point of view, particularly of women, German men tend
to be dominating and authoritarian, and, conversely, to expect sub-
missiveness and dependency on the part of their wives. This is
perhaps particularly true in the middle classes. The "typical"
German woman, especially if married, is thought of as a Hatisfrau
—significantly a word taken over untranslated into English to
denote a social type, while "housewife" suggests rather a census
classification. The Hausfrau is, perhaps, the antithesis of the
"emancipated" woman— emancipated in any one of several direc-
tions. To the former applies the old adage of the three K's Kinder,
Kirche, Kueche. Her life is concentrated on the home, on husband
and children, and she participates little in the outside world, in
community affairs, or even in cultural life. She tends to lack
both "sex appeal" and other elements of "attractiveness." From the
American point of view she does not dress well but is more
"dowdy" than is accountable for in terms of lack of financial
resources.

sphere of private individuality relative to the American pattern. But then a
point is reached where matters concern a restricted sphere which is highly
"private"— one's relations to one's true "friends." When this point is reached
the segregation is far sharper than in the American case. The American
pattern, on the other hand, does not go so far in extending the pattern of
formal status beyond the immediate occupational context. Indeed, it mini-
mizes it even there by admitting elements of "informality" which are struc-
turally related to the friendship pattern in a way which would seem improper
and undignified to most Germans. But there is a gradual transition, not
marked by symbols of rigid distinction, between casual acquaintance with an
occupational colleague through various degrees of intimacy to the most inti-
mate friendship, which may or may not be with occupational associates, but
certainly are not structurally required to be. In a sense the German system
is more favorable to strict universalistic impartiality and less open to nepotism
and other clique-like disturbances, but at the same time probably involves
other elements of instability.

114 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The diflFerence is, of course, relative. Solid, conservative domes-
ticity is very much a live ideal in the United States, but relatively
less prominent. In Germany there has been "high society" with a
great deal of aristocratic emancipation from moralistic domesticity,
but one can say confidently that it has never been capable of
really competing with its French counterpart. In the upper middle
classes there have, especially in recent times, been many highly
educated and cultured women, many of them leaders in the
Fraiienbewegung. Finally, gainful employment of married women
outside the home has been as conspicuous in Germany as in other
industrial countries, and has greatly modified this pattern for
the working classes. But the quantitative difference of emphasis
remains: more German women are Hausfrauen than American,
and even the American woman who has no career or job, has
on the average a different style of life, is more concerned with
her personal appearance, with men other than her husband, and
with impersonal interests outside her home. Above all on the
ideological level there is, perhaps outside Catholic circles, a con-
siderably more favorable attitude toward the non-domestic virtues
in women. There is less tendency to encourage submissiveness and
psychological dependency, less resentment at women "intruding"
in the world of masculine affairs. The principal exception is
probably in the areas of greatest intellectual, cultural, and "bohe-
mian" emancipation which have probably been more extreme in
Europe generally, including Germany, than in the United States
at least until quite recently.

Closely related to this difference in feminine roles is a far lower
development in Germany of the "romantic love" pattern. The love
relationships of youth have been as it were "sentimentalized" in
Germany to a considerable extent, but with a different emphasis.
The Maedchen is more simple, sweet, and submissive, and less
glamorous than her American counterpart. It is less a relation of
equality. She is more apt, in the middle classes, to marry an
established, somewhat older man. Related to this is another usage
of titles, the fact that the German married woman takes not only
her husband's surname, as with us, but also his title. She is
addressed as Frau Doktor, Frau Justizrat, or Frau Professor. Would
it not be legitimate to infer that while with us the primary emphasis
is put on marriage to a particular man as an individual, in
Germany it is put rather on his formal status. The significant

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 115

thing is not that she is the wife of John Smith, but of a professor.
The impression further is that the marriage relationship typically
involves more impersonal attitudes, less emphasis on being "in
love," as well as greater inequality so that to a certain extent the
wife is classed with her children by contrast with the authority
of the husband.

Rather generally speaking, there seems to be in Germany a good
deal sharper segregation of the roles of the sexes than in the
United States. With this, however, goes as a significant counter-
part a strong tendency to emphasize, indeed to romanticize, the
relationship of men to one another. On one level Bruederschaft,
with its ritual oath and its symbolic use of Du as the form of
address, is much more sharply emphasized than any particular
form of masculine friendship with us, and seems to be invested
with a very intense emotional significance. On another, comrade-
ship, of which the relation of soldiers in the field is perhaps the
prototype, is particularly idealized. Thus the main emphasis in
the German Youth Movement was a romantic idealization of
solidary groups of young men— sometimes with at least an under-
current of homosexualit)\ The closest counterpart in our society
is the romantization of the cross-sex love relationship.

The reader may quite reasonably ask what is gained by dwell-
ing at such length on all these features of pre-Nazi German social
structure, all of which are very well known, and a good many
of which seem to have little to do with the issue of Germany's
relation to democracy. The justification lies in the fact that they
need to be brought to mind because of their bearing on what is
doubtless still to many a very puzzling problem. We have seen
that in many fundamental respects the social structure of Germany
has been very similar to that of other Western industrial societies.
Until 1918, to be sure, it did not have a democratic constitution
politically, but surely it has become a commonplace of social
science that the mere formal provisions of the constitution are
quite secondary to the deeper-lying social structure. In that respect
perhaps the most important feature of the German state, its
administrative bureaucracy, was very far from being in radical
conflict with at least liberal if not democratic patterns. Indeed,
by contrast particularly with the American spoils system of the
same era it might be considered to be in closer line with our own
idealistic values because of its scrupulous adherence to the im-

116 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

partial "rule of law." Moreover, the collectivistic, if somewhat
paternalistic, social welfare tendencies of the German state could
go far to mitigate the more extreme consequences of rampant
individualistic capitalism as it was found particularly in the
United States. Then the one important thing would seem to have
been the removal from power of the "feudal" elements of the old
regime, an end which for all practical purposes was achieved with
the revolution of 1918. The question is, why did this solution fail
to stick, why did not Germany continue in what many have thought
to be the main line of the evolution of Western society, the pro-
gressive approach to the realization of "liberal-democratic" patterns
and values?

There can be no doubt that various kinds of external factors
such as the treatment of Germany by the Allies after the last war,
economic difficulties both in international trade and finance and
internally to Germany and the like, played an important part.
Perhaps these factors were even decisive in the sense that a more
favorable set of circumstances in these respects would have tipped
the total balance of forces so as to permit the democratic trend of
evolution to continue uninterrupted. No doubt also the develop-
ment of the relations of capital and labor, in the sense in which
that tension is structurally inherent in all capitalistic industrial
economies, played an important part. The Weimar regime put the
Trade Unions and the parties of the left in a position of greatly
enhanced power; wages were continually pushed up; and un-
doubtedly many business people became frightened and were
ready to accept almost anything which would protect them from
the danger of expropriation. Their fear was greatly enhanced by
the ideological appeal to the danger of Gommunism which has
been to a considerable degree effective in all the capitalistic
countries.

But German National Socialism is a grand scale movement of a
very particular type. It is, to be sure, nationalistic in opposition
to the national humiliation and alleged submission to the enemies
of Germany for which it purports to hold the men of Versailles
and Weimar responsible. Tt is also anti-Gommunistic in that it
purports to lead a great cnisade against Bolshevism and to purge
Europe forever from this "disease." But it is more than either or
both of these. It is a revolutionary movement which, both in
ideology and in actual policy, has already done much to alter

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 117

fundamentally the broader social structure not only of the Weimar
Republic but of the Germany which preceded and underlay it.
National Socialism arose in a situation which quite understandably
could have produced a strong nationalistic and conservative re-
action, a reaction toward social patterns which, though in conflict
with the leftward elements of the "liberal-democratic" tradition
of the Western world, need not have removed Germany from the
general sphere of Western civilization. But Nazi Germany is even
today not a strong, national community with conservative leanings,
as distinguished from the leftward leanings of British Labor or of
the American New Deal. It is a radically new type of society which,
if not interfered with, promises to depart progressively more
radically from the main line of Western social development since
the Renaissance. It is in the sources of this element of revolution-
ary radicalism in the Nazi movement that the interest of the
present analysis is focussed.

In our common-sense thinking about social matters we probably
tend greatly to exaggerate the integration of social systems, to
think of them as neatly "exemplifying" a pattern type. For purposes
of sheer comparative structural study this need not lead to serious
difficulty, but when dynamic problems of directions and processes
of change are at issue, it is essential to give specific attention to
the elements of malintegration, tension and strain in the social
structure.

In the first place, all Western societies have been subjected in
their recent history to the disorganizing effects of many kinds of
rapid social change. It has been a period of rapid technological
change, industrialization, urbanization, migration of population,
occupational mobility, cultural, political and religious change. As
a function of sheer rapidity of change which does not allow suffi-
cient time to "settle down," the result is the widespread insecurity
—in the psychological, not only the economic sense— of a large
proportion of the population, with the well-known consequences
of anxiety, a good deal of free-floating aggression, a tendency to un-
stable emotionalism and susceptibility to emotionalized propaganda
appeals and mobilization of affect around various kinds of symbols.
If anything, this factor has been more prominent in Germany than
elsewhere in that the processes of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion were particularly rapid there. In addition, the strain and
social upset of the last war were probably more severe than in

118 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the case of any other belhgerent except Russia. On top of that
came the poHtical difficulties after 1918 and the inflation, finally
exceedingly severe economic depression in the early thirties. Such
a situation predisposes to radical emotional dissociation from the
principal institutional statuses and roles of the existing order,
but does not of itself give any clue to the direction which the
structuring of definitions will take.

A second element of the situation is also common to all Western
countries, but also perhaps somewhat more intense in Germany
than elsewhere. A major aspect of the dynamic process of develop-
ment in Western society ever since the Middle Ages has been a
particular form of what Max Weber called the "process of rational-
ization." One of its central foci has been the continual development
of science and the technologies derived from it in industry, in
medicine, and in other fields. Closely related has been the develop-
ment of bureaucratic organization, of economic exchange, and of
the orientation of economic activity to capitalistic monetary cal-
culation. Various aspects of the cultural tradition have also been
affected in the form of the secularization of religious values,
emancipation from traditional patterns of morality, especially in
Christian form, and the general tendency of rational criticism to
undermine traditional and conservative systems of symbols.

This process, looked at from the point of view of its dynamic
impact on the social system, rather than the absolute significance
of rationalistic patterns, has an uneven incidence on different
elements in the social structure. In the first place, it tends to
divide elements of the population according to whether they
tend toward what are, in rationalistic terms, the more "progres-
sive" or "emancipated" values of patterns of conduct, or the more
conservative "backward," or traditional patterns. This introduces a
basis of fundamental structuring in the differentiation of attitudes.
It is a basis which also tends to coincide with other bases of
strain in the structuring of interests, especially in that "capitalism"
tends to be predominantly a phenomenon of emancipation which
grows up at the expense of the "good old ways" and sound estab-
lished values.

But not only does the process of rationalization structure atti-
tudes. It is precisely the further effects of the dynamic process
of change which are most important in this connection. In part
this process is a principal source of the disorganization and inse-

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTUBE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 119

curity discussed above as involved in anomie. In so far, however,
as such disorganization is not specifically structured in other ways,
it and its behavioral manisfestations tend to become structured in
terms of their relation to this process. Hence manisfestations of
these polar attitude patterns tend to bear the marks of psycho-
logical insecurity, to be "overdetermined." This is true on both
sides: on the emancipated side in the form of a tendency to a
compulsive "debunking" and denial of any elements of legitimacy
to all traditional patterns, on the traditional side of a "fundamental-
ist" obstruction to all progress, a traditionalist literalism with
strongly emotional attitudes.*

Though general to the Western world this situation has probably
been more extreme in Germany because, relative to Western
Europe and the United States, it has been more "conservative."
Hence the impact of science, industrialism and such phenomena
has been more unsettling and has led to more drastic extremes
of attitudes. One significant symptom of this fact is to be found
in the conspicuously greater tendency of German social thought
to repudiate the primary rationalistic and emancipated ideological
structures which have dominated the intellectual traditions of
France and England. There has been conspicuously less intellec-
tual "liberalism" in Germany— the obverse of the predominant
"conservative" tendencies being the extreme of rationalistic radi-
calism found in Marxism.

One conspicuous tendency in this connection is for "fundamental-
ist" sentiments to crystallize about phenomena symbolic of the
extremer forms of emancipation in defining what was dangerous to
society. The coincidence in Nazi ideology of the Jews, capitalism,
bolshevism, anti-religious secularism, internationalism, moral laxity,
and emancipation of women as a single class of things to be
energetically combatted is strongly indicative of this structuring.

In combination with certain peculiarities of the German cultural
tradition, this situation helps to account for the fact that the
German labor movement was considerably more extreme in the
radical rationalistic direction than its counterparts in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. Long before the British movement it was com-
mitted to a political socialist program, and this came to be
formulated in terms of the strict Marxist ideology which, above all.

^ This is, in the sense of Bateson, a particularly good example of the
process of "Schismogenesis." See Gregory Bateson, Naven.

120 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

required drastic repudiation of traditional religious values. This
undoubtedly made it easier for the labor movement to be defined
as "dangerously radical" to the rest of the population, even apart
from the growth of the Communist element during the later
Weimar years.

One of the most important reactions to elements of strain of
the sort just discussed, and certain more specific ones which will
be taken up presently, is the formation of patterns of wishes or
idealized hopes which, in the majority of cases, the established
institutional patterns and their attendant situations do not permit
to be fully realized. They hence tend to be projected outside the
immediate social situation into some form of "idealized" life or
existence. Since they are the results of certain emotional tensions
which develop only in so far as people are imperfectly integrated
with an institutionalized situation, they tend to involve a con-
spicuous element of "irrealism." They are associated with a nega-
tive valuation of the existing situation and, instead of a "realistic"
orientation to its alteration in the direction of greater conformity
with an ideal, involve an element of "escape." This phenomenon
may be called "romanticism"— its essence is the dissociation of the
strongest emotional values from established life situations— in the
past or the future or altogether outside ordinary social life.^ A
most important question about any social system is that of its
general predisposition to romanticism, and of the specific ways
in which this tendency is structured.

In the Anglo-Saxon world it is probably true that there is on
the whole a smaller predisposition to romanticism than in Germany
because patterns which, in important respects, go back to Puritan-
ism, canalize the orientation of action more in the direction of
taking active responsibility for translating ideal patterns into reality.
Associated with this, however, is a marked tendency to a kind of
"utopianism," an attraction for many sorts of unrealistic blueprints
for the "ideal society" where there will be perpetual peace, an
elimination of all inequalities, of all irrationality or superstition,
etc. This is a kind of romanticism which helps explain the appeal
of the rationalistic movements of the left in these countries. In
addition to that, however, there are two very important patterns
of "individualistic" romanticism, the romanticism of personal "suc-
cess" and romantic love. A very prevalent theme of American

5 Perhaps only when the content of the "dream pattern" is secular should
the term ' romanticism" be used. Certain elements of other— worldly religious
ideals are, however, closely related in psychological significance.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 121

fiction is the boy whose abihties were such that he was bound
to succeed. Its prevalence suggests a very high level of emotional
investment in occupational functions. It is a pattern which, by
contrast with the German, is also associated with the relative
lack of formalism in our occupational system. Occupational func-
tions are treated— however unrealistically— more as a matter of
ability and achievement, and less as a matter of status for its
own sake. The prominence of the pattern of romantic love, again
however unrealistic it is, seems to indicate a particularly strong
emphasis on the fusion of the sex relationship with the strongest
bonds of personal intimacy and loyalty. That this is made the
dominant ideal precisely of marriage, again relatively disregarding
status as such, is striking. Both these romantic tendencies of Ameri-
can society, it may be noted, are not closely related to any form
of political radicalism but tend, except in so far as their lack of
realism leads to disillusionment, to reinforce the dominant insti-
tutional structure— or at least not to undermine it in a politcial
direction.

The element of formalism in the patterning of the basic insti-
tutional system of Germany, which was discussed at some length
above, seems to indicate a stronger general tendency to romanti-
cism than exists in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in that institution-
alized status tends to absorb less of the individual's emotional
attachment. It is as if it were said: status is only form.al; after all
the most important things lie elsewhere. This impression is con-
firmed by the fact that Germany, precisely in the time when she
was not dominated by a radical political movement, was known
as the land of poets, philosophers and dreamers, of religious mysti-
cism, of music. It has also been a land of peculiarly strong reaction
against "bourgeois" values, an attitude which socialists and radicals,
bohemian artists and intellectuals, and the Youth Movement have
all had in common. Surely in recent times precisely the world of
formal status structure has been the core of these bourgeois values.®

6 Though there is no space available here to develop the point, it may be
noted that there is strong evidence of a close connection between this com-
bination of formalism and a tendency to romanticism, and the heritage of
Lutheran Protestantism, precisely as distinguished from Calvinistic. For the
Lutheran the true spiritual values could not be embodied in secular life,
but only in the individual's completely intimate and personal communion
with God. Secular duties were divinely ordained and conscientiously to be
performed, above all the duty of submission to authority, but secular achieve-
ment was in no sense the real business of life, even in the service of the
most exalted ideals. The world was essentially evil and could not be made
a "Kingdom of God on Earth."

122 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

At the same time there were important structural reasons why
two of the most important manifestations of romanticism in the
Anglo-Saxon world could not be so important in Germany. A
dominance of the personal success ideal was in conflict with the
formalism of the status structure, as well as with the dominant
position in the prestige scale of hereditary status groups. A corres-
ponding role of the romantic love pattern was in part blocked
by the connection of marriage with the formal status system, in
part by the related difference in the definition of sex roles which
made it difficult for a man and woman to be treated as equals in
respect to the most profound emotional commitments of life. The
kind of attachment to a woman which we idealize in the romantic
pattern would, to most Germans, seem possible only to a soft,
effeminate type of man, certainly not to the heroic type.

By virtue of its industrialization and urbanization, however, and
of the impact in other respects of the rationalization process, the
actual social life of Germany had developed for much of its popu-
lation to a point where the older conservative patterns, especially
in defining the role of youth, of sex relationships, and of women,
could not serve as an adequate basis of institutional integration.
"Leftist" radicalism appealed to organized industrial labor and to
some intellectuals, but it had too narrow a base in the social
structure to be stable. Sheer "emancipation," as practiced in bohem-
ian circles, was not adequate and was too unstable, apart from the
fact that both these phenomena inflamed conservative sentiment.
At the same time among the middle class youth, among large
numbers of women, and elsewhere in the society there were acute
strains which strongly predisposed to romantic forms of expression.
The other side of the picture lies in the fact that the German
situation presented possibilities for a structuring of these elements
in a radically different direction from that predominant in most
democratic societies. The traditions of national glory were bound
up with conservative tendencies which were generally speaking
stronger in the German social structure than elsewhere. An aspect
of this was the appeal of military values with a strong tradition
behind them which could become romanticized in terms of a
"heroic" ideaP of the fighting man who could be propagandistically

'' Dr. E. Y. Hartshorne has particularly called my attention to the possi-
bility that romantization among Nazi Youth of the heroic life— and of the
Fuehrer— might have functions similar to those of the pattern of romantic
love in the United States.

DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PRE-NAZI GERMANY 123

contrasted with the money-grabbing capitalist of the "plutocracies."
The whole appeal of nationalism could be mobilized in the same
direction and combined with the reaction against all forms of
dangerous radicahsm. The military ideal forms in the nature of
the case a strong contrast to the bourgeois stuffiness and safety-
mindedness against which young people tended to react. Finally
from the point of view of German women, a heroic ideal could
mobilize their romantic idealization of men in a pattern which
adequately fitted the German segregation of the sex roles, as the
man in the role to which, of all roles, women were by tradition
least suited, that of fighter.

To recapitulate: The Revolution of 1918 had the immediate
efiFect of "Democratizing" Germany, of removing the "feudal"
element and apparently bringing Germany at last into line with
the other "progressive" industrial nations of the Western world.
Why this result proved to be so unstable, so abruptly to overturn
in favor of the most radical anti-liberal and anti-democratic move-
ment of modem history, is certainly one of the most critical ques-
tions of the interpretation of social events of our time. Certainly
political pressures on defeated Germany, economic dislocation,
and such factors as the class struggle must be conceded to be
highly important. The above analysis has, however, attempted to
indicate, if only in a highly schematic way, that an equally im-
portant part has probably been played by factors distinctive to
the social structure of Germany, in dynamic interrelation with the
general processes of social development in Western civilization.
From this point of view at least one critically important aspect of
the National Socialist movement lies in the fact that it constitutes
a mobilization of the extremely deep-seated romantic tendencies
of German society in the service of a violently aggressive political
movement, incorporating a "fundamentalist" revolt against the
whole tendency of rationalization in the Western world, and at the
same time against its deepest institutionalized foundations. The
existence of such romantic elements is inherent in the nature of
modern society. That, however, their manifestations should become
structured in such a pattern and placed in the service of such a
movement is understandable only in terms of specific features of
the social structure of Pre-Nazi Germany which differentiated it
from that of other Western countries.

VII

Some Sociological Aspects of the
Fascist Movements

THE OLDER TYPE, especially of European, social theory was, very
largely, oriented to the understanding, in broad terms, of the social
situation of the writer's own time. Whatever was sound in these
older attempts, as of a Comte, a Spencer or a Marx, tended to be so
intimately bound up with scientifically dubious elements of grandi-
ose speculative construction and methodological assumption and
dogma that the whole genus of analysis has tended to become dis-
credited as a result of the general reaction against speculative
theories.

In the course of such reactions it is not uncommon for the baby
to be thrown out with the bath, for elements of sound insight and
analysis to be lost sight of tlirough their seemingly inseparable in-
volvement with these other elements. Perhaps in the last few years
more strongly than at any other time have there been signs that
warrant the hope of an ability in the social sciences to apply gen-
eralized theoretical analysis to such problems in a thoroughly em-
pirical, tentative spirit which will make possible a cumulative
development of understanding, relatively unmarred by scientifically
irrelevant or untenable elements. The very breadth of the problem
of diagnosis of the state of a great civilization creates a strong
demand for such a method.

Perhaps the most dramatic single development in the society of
the Western world in its most recent phase has been the emergence
of the great political movements usually referred to as "Fascist." In
spite of their uneven incidence, with Germany and Italy by far the
most prominent centers, and their varying character in different
countries, there is sufficient similarity to justify the hypothesis that
the broad phenomenon is deeply rooted in the structure of Western
society as a whole and its internal strains and conflicts. However
much my own approach may turn out to differ from the Marxian

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 125

this much must certainly be granted the latter— that it does relate
Fascism to fundamental and generalized aspects of Western society.

As a starting point for the present analysis perhaps the common
formula of characterization as the "radicalism of the right" is as
satisfactory as any. It has at least the virtue of calling attention to
two important points. In the first place Fascism is not "old conserva-
tism" of the sort especially familiar before 1914, although elements
which were once conservative in that sense have often been drawn
into the Fascist movements. Secondly, it is definitely of the "right"
in that it is specifically oriented in opposition to the political move-
ments of the "left," notably of course communism.

Perhaps the most important reason why we are justified in speak-
ing of "radicalism" lies in the existence of a popvilar mass move-
ment in which large masses of the "common people" have become
imbued with a highly emotional, indeed often fanatical, zeal tor a
cause. These mass movements, which are in an important sense
revolutionary movements, are above all what distinguishes Fascism
from ordinary conservatism. They are movements which, though
their primary orientation is political, have many features in com-
mon with great religious movements in history, a fact which may
serve as a guide to the sociological analysis of their origins and
character.

A second important feature is the role played by privileged
elite groups, groups with a "vested interest" in their position. While
from some points of view the combination of these two elements in
the same movement is paradoxical, it will be argued here that it is
of the very essence of the phenomenon and perhaps more than any-
thing else throws light on the social forces at work.

It has come to be a well-known fact that movements of religious
proselytism tend to develop in situations involving a certain type
of social disorganization, primarily that early though only roughly
characterized by Durkheim as "anomie." Anomie may perhaps most
briefly be characterized as the state where large numbers of indi-
viduals are to a serious degree lacking in tlie kind of integration
with stable institutional patterns which is essential to their own
personal stability and to the smooth functioning of the social sys-
tem. Of this there are in turn perhaps two principal aspects. In the
first place there seems to be a deep-seated need for a relative stabil-
ity of the expectations to which action is oriented. The aspect of
this on which Durkheim lays primary stress is the sufficiently clear

126 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

definition of the goals of action— there can, he says, be no sense of
achievement in progress toward the reahzation of an infinite goal.
But goals are, to a very large extent defined by institutionalized
expectations. This Durkheim illustrated by the inability of indefinite
increase of wealtli, once cut loose from definite standards, to satisfy
ambition.

Similar considerations apply to other aspects of conduct. Expecta-
tions cannot be stable if the standards with which conformity is
demanded are left so vague as not to be a real guide, or if the indi-
vidual is subjected, in the same situation, to two or more conflicting
expectations each of which advances claims to legitimacy which
cannot be ignored.

The second, it would seem somewhat more difficult and complex
aspect, lies in the need for a sufficiently concrete and stable system
of symbols around which the sentiments of the individual can crys-
tallize. In many diflFerent aspects of life highly concrete associations
are formed which perhaps in many cases have no great intrinsic
importance in themselves, but in that they become stabilized and
perpetuated through a living social tradition perform a highly im-
portant function in integrating social groups and in stabilizing the
orientation of individuals within them.

The general character of the typical reaction of the individual to
anomie is that usually referred to in psychological terms as a state
of insecurity. The personality is not stably organized about a coher-
ent system of values, goals, and expectations. Attitudes tend to
vacillate between indecision which paralyzes action— and all man-
ner of scruples and inhibitions— and on the other hand compulsively
"overdetermined" reactions which endow particular goals and sym-
bols with an excess of hatred, devotion or enthusiasm over what is
appropriate to the given situation. Generalized insecurity is com-
monly associated with high levels of anxiety and aggression, both
of which are to an important extent "free-floating" in that they are
not merely aroused in appropriate form and intensity by fear or
anger-provoking situations but may be displaced onto situations or
symbols only remotely connected with their original sources.

The present formulation of the psychological correlates of anomie
has consciously adhered to the level closest to the more general
character of social situations— lack of definition of goals and stand-
ards, conflicting expectations, inadequately concrete and stable
symbolization. I am well aware that many psychologists find the

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 127

deepest sources of insecurity to lie in the relations of the individual
to his parents and others in the family in early childhood. The two
approaches are by no means necessarily in conflict. There is much
evidence that insecurity developed in adults from the sources here
indicated affects their relations to their children and in turn the
character formation of the latter, so that a cumulative vicious circle
may work itself out.

An increase in anomie may be a consequence of almost any
change in the social situation which upsets previous established
definitions of the situation, or routines of life, or symbolic associa-
tions. To be sure, the members of some societies have average char-
acter types which are better able to withstand and adapt to rapid
changes than are others— but in any case there is a limit to the ex-
tent and rapidity of change which can take place without engender-
ing anomie on a large scale. There is ample evidence that the period
immediately preceding our own time was, throughout the Western
world, one of such rapid and fundamental change as to make this
inevitable.

It was, in the first place, the period of the Industrial Revolution
which, though going much farther back in history, tended cumula-
tively to gain in force throughout the nineteenth century and well
into the twentieth. Though in widely differing degrees, most West-
ern countries changed from predominantly agricultural to industrial
and commercial societies, a change impinging not only on occupa-
tion but on the life of very large numbers of the population in many
different aspects, especially in the tremendous growth of cities and
the continual introduction of new elements into the standard of
Living.

Secondly, and intimately connected with this, the society has been
subjected to many other influences adversely affecting situational
stability. Migration of population from the rural areas to the grow-
ing urban concentrations has been only one phase of a tremendous
and complex migration process which has necessitated the complex
process of adaptation to new social environments— sometimes, as in
the great bulk of immigration into the United States, assimilation
to a drastically different cultural tradition with exposure to con-
flicting expectations and discrimination on ethnic lines. A somewhat
different source of strain lies in the instability of the new economy—
the exposure to cyclical fluctuations with unemployment and rapid
and drastic changes in the standard of living. Inflation and many of

128 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the social and economic e£Fects of war fit into the same general
pattern.

Though it is perhaps more significant as a consequence of than
as a causal factor in anomie, the fact is relevant that not only in
women's dress but in any number of other fields our society is to a
very high degree subject to rapid and violent changes of fad and
fashion. No sooner have we become attached to a pattern than its
social prestige melts away leaving the necessity to form a new
orientation. This is especially true in the recreational and other
expressional fields, but applies also to political and cultural ideas,
and to many fields of consumption patterns.

Finally, the cultural development of the period has been preemi-
nently one to undermine simplicity and stability of orientation. It
has been to an extraordinary extent a period of the "debunking" of
traditional values and ideas, and one in which for previously stable
cultural patterns in such fields as religion, ethics, and philosophy,
no comparably stable substitutes have appeared— rather a conspicu-
ously unstable factionalism and tendency to faddistic fluctuation.
Part of the situation is an inevitable consequence of the enormous
development of popular education, and of the development of mass
means of communication so that cultural influences which in an
earlier time reached only relatively small "sophisticated" minorities
now impinge upon a very large proportion of the total population.

Returning for a moment to the psychological level of considera-
tion, one of the most conspicuous features of the present situation
lies in the extent to which patterns of orientation which the indi-
vidual can be expected to take completely for granted have disap-
peared. The complexity of the influences which impinge upon him
has increased enormously, in many or most situations the society
does not provide him with only one socially sanctioned definition of
the situation and approved pattern of behavior but with a consid-
erable number of possible alternatives, the order of preference be-
tween which is by no means clear. The "burden of decision" is
enormously great. In such a situation it is not surprising that large
numbers of people should, to quote a recent unpublished study,^
be attracted to movements which can offer them "membership in a
group with a vigorous esprit de corps with submission to some
strong authority and rigid system of belief, the individual thus find-

1 Theodore W. Sprague, "J<^hova's Witnesses: a Study in Group Integra-
tion." Dissertation, Harvard University, 1942.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 129

ing a measure of escape from painful perplexities or from a situ-
ation of anomie."

Thus the large-scale incidence of anomie in Western society in
recent times is hardly open to doubt. This fact alone, however,
demonstrates only susceptibility to the appeal of movements of the
general sociological type of fascism but it is far from being adequate
to the explanation of the actual appearance of such movements or
above all the specific patterns in terms of which they have become
structured. It is this latter problem which must next be approached.

The state of anomie in Western society is not primarily a conse-
quence of the impingement on it of structurally fortuitous disor-
ganizing forces though these have certainly contributed. It has,
rather, involved a very central dynamic process of its own about
which a crucially important complex of factors of change may be
grouped, what, following Max Weber, may be called the "process
of rationalization." The main outline of its character and influence
is too familiar to need to be discussed in detail— but it must be
kept clearly in mind as a basis for the subsequent analysis.

Undoubtedly the most convenient single point of reference is to
be found in the patterns of science. The development of science is
of course inherently dynamic and has a certain immediate effect in
progressively modifying traditional conceptions of the empirical
world. It is, however, its application in technology which provides
the most striking source of cumulative social change, profoundly
affecting the concrete circumstances of men's lives in a multitude
of ways. Again it is not only that the explicit formal content of occu-
pational roles is affected— this is the center from which many com-
plex ramifications of change radiate into the informal and symbolic
areas of men's working lives, and into their private lives through
changes in their patterns of consumption, recreation, etc. Whatever
the positive value of the changes, they always involve an abandon-
ment of traditional orientation patterns, circumstances and defini-
tions of the situation which necessitates a process of readjustment.

Though by no means simply an aspect of science and its applica-
tion in technology a second dynamic complex is intimately related
to it. It may be characterized as the treatment of a wide range of
action patterns and contexts of human relationship in terms of
orientation to relatively specific and limited goals. Perhaps the
classic center of the complex is the field of "contractual" relation-
ships, and its formulation at the hands of such theorists as Spencer

J 30 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

and Tonnies provides the classic sociological characterization. Con-
tractualism overlaps widely with the use of money and the wide
extension of market relationships. This involves the enormous ex-
tension of the mobility of elements essential to coordinated human
action and the extension of the possibility of focussing elements
from many sources on the realization of a single goal. Codification
and systematization of personal rights and individual liberties is
another essential aspect as is the clear development of the modem
institution of ownership in the sphere of property. The question of
where ownership is lodged is not the primary issue— but rather the
concentration of the various rights which taken together we call
ownership into a single bundle rather than their dispersion; and by
the same token their segregation from the other elements of the
status of their holder.

By no means the least important element of this complex is the
patterning of functional roles primarily about their functional con-
tent itself with clear segregation from other elements of the total
social status of the individual— in kinship, local ties, even to a con-
siderable extent social class and ethnic adherence. Though promi-
nent in the case of independent roles such as those of private pro-
fessional practice this patterning of functional roles is most
prominent in the field of large-scale organization, indeed without it
the latter as we know it would scarcely be conceivable at all.

The interdependence between the complex of science and tech-
nology on the one hand, and that just discussed on the other is
exceedingly close. Some schools of thought, as of Veblen and
Ogburn, give the former unquestioned primacy. This is at least
open to serious question since it is only in relatively highly develop-
ed stages of the patterning of functionally specialized roles that
the most favorable situation for the functioning of scientific investi-
gation and technological application is attained. Less directly the
mobility of resources through property and market relations, and
the institutions of personal freedom all greatly facilitate the influ-
ence of science on social life.

Finally, science itself is a central part of die cultural ti-adition of
our society. As such it is perhaps the most conspicuous embodiment
of the more general pattern which may be called that of "critical
rationality," differing from others primarily in the place accorded
to the canons of empirical observation and verification. This same
spirit of critical rationality has to an increasing extent ramified into
many or even most other areas of the cultural tradition.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS J 31

Notably of course it has permeated philosophical thought and the
religious traditions of the various branches of Christianity. In this
direction two consequences above all have appeared— the ques-
tioning of the cognitive status of the "non-empirical" elements of
philosophical and religious thought, and the tendency to eliminate
patterns and entities of primarily symbolic significance. The use of
the categories of "ignorance" and "superstition" as sufficient char-
acterizations of all thought not in conformity with the particular
rational or pseudo-rational standards of the moment is an indica-
tion of the basic attitude.

The present concern is not whether the patterns of rationality in
these difiFerent areas are in some sense superior to those they have
tended to supplant, but rather the relation of their relatively rapid
process of development to the functioning of the social system. It
should be clear that their development is in itself perhaps the most
important single source of anomie. Its significance in this respect
is by no means simple and cannot be adequately analyzed here. It
is partly a matter of the sheer rapidity of the process, which does
not provide an opportunity for stable reorientation. Another aspect
is the unevenness and incompleteness of its incidence so that it
engenders conflicts in the social pressures impinging on the same
groups and as between different groups. There is also the question
whether, to balance its underminding effect on traditional patterns
and values, it succeeds in providing even for the groups most thor-
oughly permeated, functionally adequate substitutes.

But beyond the significance as a source of temporary or perma-
nent anomie, the process of rationalization has a further significance
of crucial interest here. It is to it that we must look for the primary
explanation of tlie structuring of attitudes and social organization
so far as it can be treated as a response to the generalized condition
of anomie. This question will have to be discussed on two primary
levels, first that of the cognitive definition of the situation, second
that of the differential affective appeal of the competing definitions
of the situation which have come to be available.

The process of rationalization would scarcely have been of pro-
found social importance if it had not affected large numbers of
people in the immediate circumstances of their daily lives. But as
an essential part of the same general cultural movement there has
developed a tradition of "social thought" which, in a sufficiently
broad perspective, can be seen to be highly distinctive in spite of
its internal complexity. It has provided, above all, two interrelated

132 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

things, a diagnosis of the status of the society— particularly in rela-
tion to the traditional patterns and structures with which the proc-
ess of rationalization has stood in conflict, and a frame of reference
for determining the proper attitudes of "reasonable" men toward
the social problems of the day. Its functioning as the "ideology" of
social and political movements is a natural consequence. In a very
broad sense it is the ideological patterns of the movements of the
"left" which are in question.

Such a tradition of thought is inevitably compounded of various
different elements which today we find it convenient to distin-
guish. In the first place, there are certain elements of genuine scien-
tific insight which by contrast with previous stages may be con-
sidered new. Undoubtedly the "utilitarian" pattern of analysis of
the division of labor and exchange and the corresponding analysis
of the functioning of a system of competitive market relationships
—in short the "classical economics"— is largely in this category. With
the shift on this level from "economic individualism" in the direc-
tion of socialism, especially Marxism, certain changes of emphasis
on different factors have occurred but a fundamental constancy of
cognitive pattern, the "utilitarian," has remainded.

From the perspective of a later vantage point we can now see
that in si)ite of the undoubtedly sound elements there have from a
scientific point of view been certain shortcomings in this scheme of
thought. Attention has been concentrated on one sector of the total
structure of a social system— that of contract, exchange, monetary
transactions— and others such as family life have been neglected.
But even within the area of focussed attention the "fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness" has, understandably enough, played a promi-
nent role. The prominent patterns of thought have, that is, been
inadequately placed in perspective and integrated with other ele-
ments of a total social system.

The scientifically relevant element has, at the same time, been
closely related to certain patterns of value orientation— with both a
positive and a negative aspect. In one connection the new social
thought expressed a revolt against the old order and a rationaliza-
tion or justification of the changes introduced by the process of
rationalization. Its primary targets of attack have been traditionally
established statuses of prestige, authority and privilege and the
traditionalizcd patterns themselves which have been integrated
with these. Positively, the rights of the individual both as against

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 133

other human agencies and as against tradition itself have provided
the main focus. A fundamental trend toward egalitarianism has also
been prominent. Broadly the pattern can be described as one of
"emancipation" from the control of forces without rational sanction,
from unjust authority, from monopoly and competitive privilege,
from the "tyranny" of ignorance and superstition.

Finally, apart both from questions of science and of ethical value
the tendency has, it has been noted, been to extend patterns of
rationality into the metaphysical realm. Science has been taken as
the prototype of all sound cognitive orientation and all elements of
tradition not scientifically defensive have tended to be "debunked."
Here of course traditional religion has been the primary object of
attack.

In the earlier phases of its development this scheme of thought
overwhelmingly embodied positive value attitudes. It defined the
situation for the emergence and establishment of a new and magnifi-
cent social order, for freedom against tyranny, for enlightenment
against ignorance and superstition, for equality and justice against
privilege, for free enterprise against monopoly and the irrational
restrictions of custom.

Gradually, however, with the growing ascendancy of the associ-
ated patterns, in certain directions certain elements of the scheme
of thought have with altered emphasis and formulation come to be
built into a pattern embodying quite difiFerent value attitudes. This
has centered primarily on the developed system of emancipated and
rationalized economic organization. The liberation of free enter-
prise from the tyranny of monopoly and custom has, it is said, led
only to the system of capitalistic exploitation. The "profit motive"
has become the object of deep reproach. Inequality, unemployment,
and new forms of unjust privilege have been brought into the lime-
light. Political liberation from the tyrannical Bourbons has led only
to a new enslavement under the "executive Committee of the Bour-
geoisie."

This new negative orientation to certain primary aspects of the
maturing modern social order has above all centered on the symbol
of "capitalism," which in certain circles has come to be considered
as all-embracing a key to the understanding of all human ills as
Original Sin once was. But it is important to note that the main in-
tellectual movements within which this has developed have retained,
even in an extreme form, the rationalized patterns in other con-

134 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

nections, particularly in attitudes toward ignorance and supersti-
tion— lurking behind which economic interests are often seen— and
many other symbolic and unrationalized patterns of thought and
social behavior. What in terms of the recent situation is "leftist"
social thought is overwhelmingly "positivistic" as well as utilitarian.

With the wisdom of hindsight, it can now be clearly seen that
this rationalistic scheme of thought has not been adequate to pro-
vide a stably institutionalized diagnosis of even a "modern" social
system as a whole, nor has it been adequate to formulate all of the
important values of our society, nor its cognitive orientation to the
world. It has been guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness in
neglecting or underestimating the role of what Pareto has called the
"non-logical" aspects of human behavior in society, of the senti-
ments and traditions of family and informal social relationships, of
the refinements of social stratification, of the peculiarities of regional,
ethnic or national culture— perhaps above all of religion. On this
level it has indeed helped to provoke a most important "anti-intel-
lectualist" reaction.

On another level it has "debunked" many of the older values of
our cultural tradition, and above all the cognitive patterns of reli-
gion, to a point well beyond that to which common values and
symbols in the society had moved. Even apart from questions of its
metaphysical validity it cannot be said adequately to have expressed
the common orientations of the members of the society.

But on top of these inherent strains a crucial role has been played
by the emergence within the rationalized cultural tradition itself
of a definition of the situation which has thoroughly "debunked"
many of the institutionalized products of the process of rationaliza-
tion itself. Surely the stage was set for a combination of this defi-
nition of the situation with a reassertion of all the patterns which the
utilitarian scheme had omitted or slighted— an acceptance of its
own indictment but a generalization of the diagnosis to make "capi-
talism" appear a logical outcome of the whole process of rationaliza-
tion itself, not merely of its perversion, and the fact that in certain
directions it had not been carried far enough. By the same token it
is possible to treat both capitalism and its leftist antagonists, espe-
cially communism, not as genuine antagonists but as brothers under
the skin, the common enemy. The Jew serves as a convenient sym-
bolic link between them.

This reaction against the "ideology" of the rationalization of
society is one principal aspect at least of the ideology of fascism.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 135

It characteristically accepts in essentials the socialist indictment of
the existing order described as capitalism, but extends it to include
leftist radicalism and the whole penumbra of scientific and philo-
sophical rationalism.-

The ideological definition of the situation in terms of which the
orientation of a social movement becomes structured is of great
importance but it never stands alone. It is necessarily in the closest
interdependence with the psychological states and the social situa-
tions of the people to whom it appeals. We must now turn to the
analysis of certain eflFects of the process of rationalization on this
level.

The fundamental fact is that the incidence of the process within
the social structure is highly uneven— different elements of a pop-
ulation become "rationalized" in different degrees, at different rates,
and in different aspects of their personalities and orientations.

It may be said that both traditional and rationalized patterns are-,
to a high degree, genuinely institutionalized in our society. Indeed
the distinction is itself largely relative and dynamic rather than
absolute, and both are functionally essential to an even relatively
stable society. Some elements of the population are relatively se-
curely integrated but with varying emphasis in one direction or the
other. Thus the best integrated professional groups would lean in
the rational direction, certain rural elements in the traditional.

This difference of incidence has important consequences on both
the structural and the psychological levels. Structurally it differ-
entiates the social system broadly along a continuum of variation
from the most highly traditionalized areas which have been least
touched by the more recent phases of the process of rationalization
to the most "emancipated" areas which tend at least partly to insti-
tutionalize the most "advanced" of the rationalized patterns or those
which are otherwise most thoroughly emancipated from the tradi-
tional background.

For these and other reasons certain areas of the social structure
have come to stand out conspicuously. In the first place is the area
of "intellectualism" emancipated from the patterns and symbols of
traditional thought, secondly of urbanism particularly on the metro-
politan scale with its freedom from particularistic controls, its cos-
mopolitanism and general disrespect for traditional ties. Third is the

- I am aware of the importance of other aspects of the total fascist pattern
such as its romanticism and a tendency to etliical nihihsm, but cannot stop
to analyze them here.

136 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

area of economic, technological, and administrative rationalization
in the market system and large-scale organization, especially toward
the top, with its responsiveness to ad hoc situations and its relation
to conflicting codes. Fourth is the area of "cultiu-al" emancipation in
literature and the arts with its high susceptibility^ to unstable fad-
dism, and its association with bohemianism. Finally there is the
moral emancipation of "Society" with its partial permeation of the
upper middle class, the adoption of manners and folkways not in
keeping with various traditional canons of respectability, all the
way from women smoking to polite adultery.

The uneven incidence of these various forms of emancipation
results in an imperfect structural integration with latent or overt
elements of conflict and antagonism. These conflicts in turn readily
become associated with the tensions involved in other structural
strains in the society. In particular may be mentioned here first, the
difficult competitive position of the lower middle class, near enough
to the realization of success goals to feel their attraction keenly but
the great majority, by the sheer relation of their numbers to the
relatively few prizes, doomed to frustration. Secondly, the particu-
lar strains in the situation of youth engendered by the necessity of
emancipation from the family of orientation and exposure to the
insecurities of competitive occupational adjustment at about the
same stage of the life cycle, and third, the insecurity of the adult
feminine role in our urban society.^

An element of at least latent antagonism between relatively eman-
cipated and relatively traditionalized elements of the society would
exist even if all its members were perfectly integrated with institu-
tional patterns, if there were no anomie. But we have seen that
anomie exists on a large scale. In relation to the above discussion,
however, two principal foci, each with a tendency to a different
structuring of attitudes need to be distinguished. On the one hand
certain of the population elements involved in the spearheads of
the processes of emancipation and rationalization are subject to a
high incidence of it with its attendant insecurity. These elements
tend to find the main points of reference of their orientations in the
relatively well institutionalized rational and emancipated patterns

3 A colleague (E. Y. Hartshorne in an unpublished paper) has noted
that in Germany the most conspicuous support of the Nazis came from the
lower middle class, from youth, and from women. On the two latter factors
see the author's paper "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United
States," (American Sociological Review, Vol. 7, October, 1942) reprinted
in this volume.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 137

—in science, liberalism, democracy, humanitarianism, individual
freedom. But being insecure they tend to "overreact" and both posi-
tively and negatively to be susceptible to symbolizations and defi-
nitions of the situation which are more or less distorted caricatures
of reality and which are overloaded with affect. Thus negatively
the traditional order from which emancipation has been taking
place is characterized overwhelmingly as embodying ignorance,
superstition, narrow-mindedness, privilege, or in the later stages,
acquisitive capitalistic exploitation. On the positive side there has
been not only a marked abstractness but also some form of naive
rationalistic utopianism. The pattern tends to bear conspicuous
marks of the psychology of compulsion. It is held that if only cer-
tain symbolic sources of evil, superstition, or privilege or capitalism
were removed "everything would be all right" automatically and
for all time. Indeed there is every reason to believe that the psychol-
ogy of this type of insecurity has had much to do with the cogni-
tive biases and inadequacies of utilitarian thought as sketched
above. It has contributed largely to the currency of a definition of
the situation which contains conspicuous elements of utopianism
and of distorted caricature.

The other type of reaction has been prominent in those areas of
the society where traditional elements have formed the institution-
alized points of reference for orientation. There the principal sources
of anomie have often been derived from situational factors such as
technological change, mobility and ethnic assimilation with rela-
tively little direct relation to rationalized ideological patterns. There
insecurity has tended to be structured in terms of a felt threat to
the traditionalized values. The typical reaction has been of an over-
determined "fundamentalist" type. Aggression has turned toward
symbols of the rationalizing and emancipated areas which are felt
to be "subversive" of the values. Naturally there has at the same
time been an exaggerated assertion of and loyalty to those tradi-
tional values. The availability of ready-made caricatured defini-
tions of the situation and extreme symbols has of course greatly
facilitated this structuring. The use of such slogans as "capitalism,"
has made it possible to exaggerate the "rottenness" of the whole
modern society so far as it has departed from the good old values.

In the complex process of interaction in Western society between
imperfectly integrated institutional structures, ideological defini-
tions of the situation, and the psychological reaction patterns typi-

138 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

cal of anomie, at a certain stage in the dynamic process of its
development this new structured mass movement has come upon the
scene and at certain points in the Western world has gained as-
cendancy. It is perhaps safe to conclude from the above analysis
that its possibility is at least as deeply rooted in the social structure
and dynamics of our society as was socialism at an earlier stage.

Before turning to another phase of the problem a word may be
said about the role of nationalism in the present context. Though
not, in terms of the "old regime," itself strictly a traditional value,
the complex of sentiments focussing on national cultures has in-
volved many of these traditionalistic elements— varying in specific
content from one case to another. Ever since the French Revolu-
tion a functional relationship between the rise of nationalism and
the process of rationalization has been evident— they have develop-
ed concurrently.

For a variety of reasons nationalistic sentiment has been perhaps
the readiest channel for the fundamentalist reaction to flow into.
The national state assumed great actual importance. The actual or
potential enemy in the power system of states, differing in national
tradition, has formed a convenient target for the projection of many
aggressive affects. At the same time many of the emancipated areas
of the social structure have been defined as "international" and
could be regarded as subversive of national interest, honor, and
solidarity. Finally, nationalism has been a kind of lowest common
denominator of traditionalistic sentiments. Above all, the humblest
insecure citizen, whatever his frustrations in other connections,
could not be deprived of his sense of "belonging" to the great
national community.

Undoubtedly one of the most important reasons for the different
degrees of success of the fascist movement in different countries has
lain in the differing degrees in which national traditions and with
them pride and honor, have been integrated with the symbols of
the rationalized patterns of Western culture. In the United States,
on the one hand, the great national tradition stems from the En-
lightenment of the eighteenth century — liberty, democracy, the
rights of the individual are our great slogans. A radically funda-
mentalist revolt would have to overcome the enormous power of
these symbols. In Germany on the other hand the political symbols
of a liberal democratic regime could be treated as having been
ruthlessly imposed on a defeated and humiliated Germany by the

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 139

alien enemy. National sentiments instead of being closely inte-
grated with the existing regime could readily be mobilized against it.

The second important element of the fascist movements, that of
"vested interests" can be much more briefly treated. It is one of the
most fundamental theorems of the theory of institutions that in pro-
portion to the institutionalization of any pattern a self-interest in
conformity with it develops. Self-interest and moral sentiments are
not necessarily antithetical, but may, and often do, motivate con-
duct in the same direction. Though this is tiue generally, it has a
particularly important application to statuses involving prestige and
authority in the social system. There, on top of the broader mean-
ing of an interest in conformity, there is an interest in defending
higher status and its perquisites against challenge from less privi-
leged elements. For this reason the reaction of privileged elements
to insecurity is almost inevitably structured in the direction of an
attitude of defense of their privileges against challenge. For the
same reason any movement which undermines the legitimacy of
an established order tends to become particularly structured about
an overt or implied challenge to the legitimacy of privileged stat-
uses within it.

Western society has in all its recent history been relatively highly
stratified, involving institutionalized positions of power, privilege,
and prestige for certain elements. In the nature of the case the sen-
timents and symbols associated with these prestige elements have
been integrated with those institutionalized in the society as a
whole. In so far, then, as the process of rationalization and other
disorganizing forces have undermined the security of traditional
patterns the status and the bases of the legitimacy of privileged ele-
ments have inevitably been involved. But in addition to this they
have been affected by threats to the legitimacy and security of their
own position in the social structure. This situation tends to be par-
ticularly acute since the process of more general change is regularly
accompanied by a process of the "circulation of the elite."

It is in the nature of a highly differentiated social structure that
such privileged elements should be in a position to exercise influ-
ence on the power relations of the society through channels other
than those open to the masses, through political intrigue, financial
influence, and so on. Hence, with the progressive increase in the
acuteness of a generalized state of anomie it is to be expected that
such elements, which have been privileged in relation to a tradi-

140 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ditional social order should, within the limits provided by the
particular situation, develop forms of activity, sometimes approach-
ing conspiratorial patterns, which in these terms may be regarded
as a defense of their vested interests. Exactly what groups are in-
volved in this phenomenon is a matter of the particular structural
situation in the society in question.

The general phenomenon would seem to be clear enough. It is
also not difficult to understand the tendency for elite elements whose
main patterns go far back into the older traditional society to become
susceptible to the fascist type of appeal— such as the landed nobil-
ity and higher clergy in Spain, or the Junker class in Germany. But
there is a further complication which requires some comment.

The process of institutional change in the recent history of our
society has brought to the fore elite elements whose position has
been institutionalized primarily about the newer rationalized pat-
terns. The most important are the business and professional elites.
The latter are, except where radical fascist movements have im-
mediately threatened to gain the ascendancy, perhaps the securest
elite elements in the modern West.

The position of the business elite has, however, been much more
complex. It gained for a time a position of great ascendancy, but
for various reasons this rested on insecure foundations. With the
"leftward" turn in the movement of ideology its position came under
strong attack as the key element of capitalism. With its position
thus threatened by the leftward sweep of the process of rational-
ization the legitimacy, the moral validity of its position was under
attack, and its actual vested interests became less and less secure.
From this point of view Fascism has constituted in one respect a
continuation, even an intensification of the same threat. The threat
has been made concrete by the rise to power of a new political
elite with the means in hand to implement tlicir threat.

At the same time fascism has seemed to stand, in the logic of
the sentiments, for "sound" traditional values and to constitute a
bulwark against subversive radicalism. Very concretely it has been
instrumental in breaking the power of organized labor. At the same
time on the level of power politics there has been a distinct area of
potential mutual usefulness as between a political movement of the
fascist type and entrenched business interests. This has been espe-
cially true because of the fascist tendency immediately to mobilize
the economy in preparation for war.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FASCIST MOVEMENTS 141

The relation between fascism and vested interests in general may
thus be regarded as a constant. In the case of the older traditional
interests it is relatively unequivocal, but in that of business it is
highly ambivalent. Especially where, as in Germany, business in-
terests have not been closely integrated with strong liberal institu-
tions the relationship has tended to be very close. But even there
the movement can by no means be considered a simple expression
of these vested interests and there are elements in the Nazi move-
ment which may, in a certain state of the internal balance of power,
turn out to be highly subversive of business.

In such brief space it has been possible to analyze only a few
aspects of the very complex sociological problem presented by the
fascist movement— the analysis is in no sense complete. But perhaps
it will serve in a humble way to illustrate a direction in which it
seems possible to utilize the conceptual tools of sociology in orient-
ing ourselves, at least intellectually, to some of the larger aspects
of the tragic social world we live in. To consider the possibility of
going farther, of predicting the probable social consequences, of
possible outcomes of the war and considering what we can do
about fascism in other than a strictly military sense would raise such
complex issues even on the scientific level, that it is better not even
to attempt to touch upon them here.

VIII

Propaganda and Social Control

PROPAGANDA IS ONE kind of attempt to influence attitudes, and hence
directly or indirectly the actions of people, by linguistic stimuli,
by the written or spoken word. It is specifically contrasted with
rational "enlightenment," with the imparting of information from
which a person is left to "draw his own conclusions," and is thus a
mode of influence mainly through "non-rational" mechanisms of
behavior. Hence the apparent justification of treating it as a psycho-
logical problem, since psychology is the science of the mechanisms
of behavior. But the same mechanisms operate in very different
situations, cultures and social structures and in people with very
different character or personality structures. While most psycholo-
gists would readily admit the existence of such variations they
would tend to treat them as matters of common sense. To the sociol-
ogist, however, explicit analysis of these states of the social system
provides precisely the problems he is interested in investigating.
Why, for instance, have Germany and Japan become militantly ag-
gressive powers while the United States has not? This is surely not
in any ordinary sense a problem of psychology.

Even in a single person the "social" component of his situation
and personality cannot be ignored, although for some purposes it
need not be treated as a set of variables. But most propaganda is
oriented to the influencing not of single persons, but of large num-
bers in such a way that its effectiveness will lead to an appreciable
alteration of the "state of the social system" of which they are a
part. On this level the structure of that social system is decidedly
in tlie category of variables, and since there is every reason to
believe that analysis of the dynamics of social systems is beyond
the resources of psychology alone, scientific help from other quar-
ters becomes indispensable.

The first problem then, is that of outlining the principal elements
of a social system, other than the psychological mechanisms of its
component persons, so as to provide a systematic setting for study-

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 143

ing the operation of these mechanisms and their concrete conse-
quences, especially on a mass level. The essential components from
this point of view may be said to be three, the institutional struc-
ture, the concrete situation of action, and the cultural tradition.

Institutions in tiie present sense are patterns governing behavior
and social relationships which have become interwoven with a
system of common moral sentiments which in turn define what one
has a "right to expect" of a person in a certain position. The sim-
plest way of treating the institutional significance of these senti-
ments and expectations is to conceive them as applying to the
definition of the statuses and roles of persons, that is, the "positions"
in the social system, relative to other persons, to which they are
treated as legitimately entitled, and the legitimate expectations of
performance— including abstention— on the part of the persons
occupying the given status. The institutional structure of a social
system then, is the totality of morally sanctioned statuses and roles
which regulate the relations of persons to one another through
"locating" them in the structure and defining legitimate expectations
of their attitude and behavior.

Every social system is a functioning entity. That is, it is a system
of interdependent structures and processes such that it tends to
maintain a relative stability and distinctiveness of pattern and be-
havior as an entity by contrast with its— social or other— environ-
ment, and with it a relative independence from environmental
forces. It "responds," to be sure, to the environmental stimuli, but
is not completely assimilated to its environment, maintaining rather
an element of distinctiveness in the face of variations in environ-
mental conditions. To this extent it is analogous to an organism.

Since institutional patterns form the focal structural element of

social systems,^ it is of fundamental importance that in any given

case the basic institutional patterns constitute a relatively integrated

system and not a mere agglomeration of distinct elements or

"traits." The structural interrelations of the different parts of an

institutional system are closely interdependent with the "functional

needs" of the social system as a whole which include, of course,

the biological and psychological needs of its component persons,

but also those structures and mechanisms necessary for the aggre-

^ This proposition of course cannot be justified in the scope of a brief
article. For an extended treatment of the problem see Parsons, Talcott, The
Structure of Social Action; New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937 (.\ii and 817 pp) —
especially Chapters X and XV.

144 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

gate to function as a unit in terms of its own distinctive patterns
and situations. Institutions are not independent entities— from a
certain point of view they are rather relatively stable crystalizations
of uniformities in the processes of action and interaction of human
personalities. But in the present state of social science, knowledge
of the institutional structure of a social system is as essential to the
understanding of its functioning as is knowledge of anatomy essen-
tial to understanding the physiological functioning of an organism.
In neither case can the structure be derived, and especially its vari-
ations from system to system, from dynamic analytical consider-
ations alone. At best there is only fragmentary insight on this level.

Implicitiy or explicitly then, sociological analysis must operate
with a generalized system of institutional structure such that it
supplies generalized categories adequate to the complete'- descrip-
tion of a functioning institutional system. Although there is much
difficulty in detail, it may be said that this possibility exists in cur-
rent sociology, and it is most important to make systematic and
explicit use of it. One of the commonest sources of fallacious con-
clusions lies in the tendency to treat certain aspects of a social
structure without taking account of their interdependence. Whether
or not this abstraction is legitimate depends of course on the par-
ticular case, but often, while plausible, it is not.

Just as it is dangerous to ignore the interdependence of institu-
tional patterns with each other, so is it also dangerous to ignore
their interdependence with the other elements of the social system,
with the situation of action and the cultural tradition. From the
point of view of any given person the institutionalized patterns of
his own society constitute one of the most fundamental aspects of
the concrete situation in which he acts. In his role of son, husband,
father, doctor, citizen or church member, institutional patterns
define the goals he is expected to pursue, the means among which
he may choose, and the sentiments and attitudes he should manifest.
Conversely they also go far to define the behavior and attitudes he
can expect from others with whom he stands in social relationships,
whether they are previously known to him as persons or not. From
the point of view of the social system, the institutional patterns are,
in one principal respect, agencies of the "control" of the behavior
of its members, in that they keep it in line with the established
structure and functional requirements of the social system.

^ Not in detail, but in terms of functionally essential aspects.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 145

Although institutional patterns thus involve very important ele-
ments of orientation to the situations which people face, they are
by no means exhaustive. With respect to the action of persons they
fail to include certain factors. In the first place there is generally,
although in widely varying degree, a range of toleration within
which action, within an institutionalized status and role, can vary
without being treated as "deviant," within which the specific details
are contingent on particular personalities and circumstances. Sec-
ondly, the existence of deviant behavior itself is a fact of paramount
importance which is part of the situation others must face, although
appropriate reactions to it, as will be seen, may be institutionalized
to a greater or lesser extent. In relation to the non-human situation
there is likewise a range of detailed variation, and of elements of
change and uncertainty. Hence it is not possible to understand the
concrete behavior of persons in a social system without reference to
the concrete situations faced by its members. It should also be ob-
vious that, since institutional patterns and situations are inter-
dependent, situational pressure may constitute one important factor
in the modification of institutions.

Finally, it should be noted that institutionalization of patterns is
a matter of degree and that hence there may be an indistinct bor-
derline where orientation to particular situations is only partially
determined by institutional norms even within the realm where
this is intrinsically possible.

As distinct from its normative aspects, in relation to the situation
of action, the principal function of institutional patterns may, fol-
lowing W. I. Thomas, be said to be to "define the situation." The
significance of a situation is never simply given in its intrinsic
"nature"; rather a selection is made of those aspects which are func-
tionally related to the particular orientations, values, interests, and
sentiments of the person. A tract of land, for example, represents
an aspect of the physical environment which would be quite differ-
ently "defined" by a geologist surveying the topography of the
region, by a farmer whose produce is grown upon it, and by a
military officer interested in making the area secure against enemy
attack, and these differing definitions would lead to correspondingly
different actions on the part of each. Insofar as one plays an institu-
tionalized role in interaction with other institutionalized roles, the
alternatives for action are presented to him in terms of an institu-
tional definition of the situation.

146 ESSAYS IN SOCTOLOGICAL THEORY

There is, however, no rigid hne between what is given in the
situation and what is imputed to it by the person, although if his
definition of the situation is sufficiently seriously "unrealistic," it
will entail pragmatic consequences. There is, however, a continuum
between empirically correct, altliough selective, definitions, through
various kinds and degrees of "distortions" to completely erroneous
definitions. In the field of social relationships a still further factor of
flexibility comes in because here action is itself a function of insti-
tutionalized definitions of social situations, so that the definitions
are, within considerable limits, not anchored in empirical realities
which are independent of the social system itself. Hence, there is
an important area of "socially^ arbitrary" variation in the definition
of situations. It is probably true that elements of unrealistic distor-
tion of non-social empirical reality can become relatively stably
institutionalized. Although imposing a functional handicap on the
social system, this may well be counterbalanced by other aspects of
their functional significance.'^ But if this is true where there are
external empirical checks, it is doubly so within the sphere of social
arbitrariness. What is, in terms of a previous set of institutional
patterns, a seriously distorted definition .of the situation may well
become very thoroughly institutionalized through an important
change in the social system.

The function of institutional patterns in defining the situation of
action provides a convenient link between them and the cultural
tradition, as well as between them and the situation itself. The
cultural tradition is an exceedingly heterogeneous category includ-
ing science, common-sense knowledge, religious and philosophical
ideas, value patterns, art and other expressional forms which
have an important degree of general acceptance and continuity in
a social system, even though the acceptance is uneven, and the
continuity involves continual change, so long as it is not mere ran-
dom variation. What they have in common is their "ideal" existence,
the fact that they are "eternal" objects, as such neither physi-

3 Although not in the same sense or degree individually arbitrary.

4 For example, there is reason to believe that the attitudes toward health
and disease ofTicially held by the Christian Science church are not merely "one
view" but in the hght of medical science contains important elements of posi-
tive error and distortion of established truth. But it does not follow from this,
if true, that Christian Scientists as a group are in the same proportion an
"unhealtliy" or disturbing element in the social system. Orientation to health
and disease is only one of many factors which would have to be taken into
account in arriving at a judgment on such a question. And certainly their
position is quite firmly institutionalized within their own group.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 147

cal nor social, which stand in relation to systems of human action.
The functional relation of the different elements of a cultural tra-
dition to social action is exceedingly varied, but there is always
some degree of integration both as between themselves and with
the other elements of action.

Since institutional patterns consist of norms defining what action
and attitudes are legitimately expected of people, they are, in one
aspect, actually part of the cultural tradition. In the aspect of in-
stitutionalized patterns they have, to quote Durkheim, a "constrain-
ing" or controlling influence on action, while in the role of part of
the cultural tradition they are involved in the different standards
by which its elements are evaluated and subject to selective pres-
sures, in terms of cognitive validity, moral judgment and conformity
with human interests and sentiments. It is primarily through their
involvement in the cultural tradition that institutional patterns are
interwoven with the primary orientation systems of the members
of a society, with their empirical and non-empirical "beliefs," their
moral values and the specific structuring of their goals and wishes.

The primary focus of institutions is the definition of expectations
with respect to action in concrete human social relationships. Only
a small part, however, of the total cultural tradition bears directly
on this field. Other elements are primarily significant in orientation
to the empirical situation, or to the problems of meaning in relation
to basic frustrations and uncertainties. Still others are primarily
significant in symbolic and other expressional roles. Even these
elements, are, however, subject to a kind of "secondary" institu-
tionalization in that conformity with certain beliefs, or acceptance
and admiration of certain expressional forms, comes to be obliga-
tory and a test of full participation in certain social statuses. Hence,
no part of the cultural tradition is completely indifferent to the
balance of interdependent forces in a social system.

A particularly crucial role is, however, played by those elements
which are most closely involved in the definition of the situation of
action. Of these, in turn, three important classes may be analytically
distinguished, even though they merge into each other. First are
the primary institutionalized patterns and values which, in the
nature of the case, are close to typical action and social relationship
situations, but often are not explicitly formulated at all, while in
any case questions of "interpretation" and application to particular
concrete situations are left open in an important degree. Second is

148 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the system of beliefs and orientations which give these primary
institutionahzed values their "meaning," which, on appropriate
levels, help to make holders of them psychologically secure. Finally,
third, is the set of explicit diagnoses of particular situations and
justification of actual or projected courses of action in them, espe-
cially in those of critical significance to the social system as a whole,
such as revolutions, wars and great religious movements. It should
be abundantly clear that with respect to all of these there is, in any
complex and dynamically changing social system, room for a large
variety of factors of uncertainty and flexibility in many different
directions.

Clarity and definiteness as well as integration of the different
elements on both cultural and action levels, are, for a variety of
reasons, of very great functional importance for the stability of
social systems. They are, for equally important reasons, exceedingly
difficult to obtain. Rigid enforcement of "official" definitions
always sets up serious strains because of the difficulty of adapting
to changes both in situations and in the cultural tradition, many of
the elements of which are inherently dynamic, and almost always
involves serious strains in the social structure itself.

Every social system, functionally regarded, faces a control prob-
lem on the level of overt behavior. Even a moderate level of the
integration of the complex elements of a system of social action is
no more to be taken for granted as in the "nature" of the human
material which makes it up than is the analogous integration of one
of the higher organisms in the physio-chemical nature of the pro-
teins, carbohydrates, and other chemical substances which make up
the body. In both cases highly specific mechanisms are functionally
essential to the maintenance of the equilibrium of the system. The
direct obverse of the functional necessity of integration is the exist-
ence of many important tendencies and seeds of deviant behavior.^

5 It is impossible to take space here to go into the analysis of these seeds.
One of them undoubtedly lies in the inevitable lack of full congruence between
the distribution of hereditary constitutional tendencies in a population and the
functional requirements to the institutionalized system of statuses and roles—
any population and any institutionalized system. Compare Davis, Kingsley,
"The Child and the Social Structure." ]. Educational Social. ( 1940) 14:217-229:
Another lies in the fact that any institutional structure at certain points imposes
strains on a person which are too severe to be adequately counteracted by the
existing control mechanisms, but lead to deviant behavior by some persons. Still
another lies in the fact that socialization at one stage of the life cycle probably
sometimes positively unfits the person for the roles he must assume in a later
stage. There are doubtless various others.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 149

From what is now very well known of the types of systems most
closely analogous to the social, the physiological system of the
organism and the psychological system of the personality, it would
be surprising indeed if a highly important functional role were not
played by control mechanisms, and if these were perfectly obvious
to the "naked eye" of common sense.

It seems to be inherent in the structure of human action that
there are, fundamentally, two kinds of channels through which
"pressure" to control behavior may be exerted— whether "deliber-
ately" by any controlling agency or unconsciously is indifferent for
present purposes. On the one hand, the appeal may be to what
psychoanalysts call the "reality principle," and the mechanism will
then operate through the actual or potential alteration of the situ-
ation in which people act. It will consist either in revealing previ-
ously unknown aspects of the situation, or in actually or potentially
altering it to the actor's advantage or disadvantage through the
imposition of positive or negative "sanctions." This mode of control
is of course effective only to the extent that action is actually moti-
vated in reality terms, is integrated, that is, in particular ways. On
the other hand, appeal may be made to the "state of mind" or the
"sentiments" of the actor relatively independently of potential alter-
ations in the situation in which he acts. This in turn may take the
form of an attempt, whether or not it is clear to the person what is
being done, to change his "attitudes" or to influence his definition of
the situation.^ It is in this latter category that propaganda falls, as
one important mechanism for controlling action— not of course nec-
essarily in the interest of checking deviant tendencies, quite possibly
of promoting them— through appeal to the "subjective" non-situ-
ational aspects of action.

Further progress in the analysis of the actual and potential roles
of propaganda would, in view of the preceding considerations, seem
to be involved with analysis of the functional mechanisms which,
apart from any deliberate process of propagandizing, operate in

•> For reasons which cannot be gone into here it may be assumed that defini-
tions of the situation which are markedly deviant from either empirical reality
or institutionalized patterns or both cannot be "gotten across" through mechan-
isms of cognitive "persuasion" alone, but must link up somewhere with senti-
ments tlirough non-rational mechanisms.

Underlying tliis whole problem is the very fundmanetal one of the modes
and mechanisms of the "introjection" of institutional patterns, both norms and
definitions of the situation, and their relation to the problems of integration both
of personality and of social systems.

150 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

any relatively smoothly functioning social system to control deviant
tendencies, through acting upon the sentiments of actors. Before
explicitly taking up the potential role of propaganda it will prove
illuminating to discuss certain critical points in the social system
at which it seems possible to impute rather specific controlling func-
tions to aspects of the institutionalized patterns.

Attention may first be called to the fact that control functions may
reasonably be attributed to the most ordinary patterns of interaction
between persons. Two primary facts seem to underlie this, that there
is an essential factor of "resistance" to the fulfillment of normative
expectations and obligations, so that stimulus from the actual or
anticipated reactions of others has an important functional signifi-
cance and, secondly, that the incidence of "neurotic" mechanisms
and reaction patterns is universal although varying enormously in
degree. In the first context tendencies to "laxity," to letting down
standards, are checked by the fact that the actor is involved in social
relationships in such a way that, usually both through situational
and subjective channels, the tendency is at an early stage subject
to check. For each person this situation is above all brought about
through the complex of introjected moral sentiments which are
interwoven with what is usually called his "self-respect." There are
usually also important concrete connections with affectional ties
and with other elements of sentiment and interest. This complex of
mechanisms may in broad terms be said to operate successfully
short of two main types of limits. On the one hand, one's deviant
tendencies to laxity may become extreme enough and suflSciently
interwoven with his character structure so that he ceases without
unbearable conflict to "care" enough and is no longer adequately
responsive to the explicit or implicit disapproval of others. On the
other hand, there may be a more or less cumulative vicious circle
so that the same tendencies are at work in a whole group of persons
in such a way that the deviant tendencies of each reinforce those
of the others, instead of performing the normal function of "bring-
ing back into line."

There seems to be much evidence that all the principal psycho-
logical mechanisms which play the predominant role in "neurotic"
character patterns constitute in an important sense exaggerations of
"normal" reactions to situations of emotional strain. Neurotic "ag-
gressiveness" in an exaggeration of normal anger at an interference
with legitimate expectations, neurotic anxiety an exaggeration of

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 151

fear in the face of real danger. What characterizes the neurotic
pattern is, above all, an element of cognitive distortion in the defi-
nition of the situation and, emotionally, "over-reaction," an intensity
of afiFect which is out of proportion to what would be appropriate
to the real situation,"^ But elements of this distortion and exaggera-
tion are the most commonplace phenomena in the behavior of all
"normal" people under various kinds of stress. What seems to char-
acterize the normal person as distinguished from the neurotic is
the relative absence or far smaller degree of rigidity in the relation
of his reaction pattern to the situation. He is relatively speaking
responsive to the "reality" situation. Hence, on the cognitive level,
his rationalizations do not tend to build up cumulatively into more
and more logically elaborated and "watertight" systems which are
increasingly impervious to facts or institutionalized patterns, but
tend to be corrected by reference to them. Emotionally, in a similar
way, the over-reaction tends to subside, to fall into line with what
is treated as a normal reaction to the type of situation in question.
Now from the psychological point of view a vital criterion of
normality is sensitiveness to the reality principle, or responsiveness
to situational influences. But from the sociological point of view it
is essential to keep in mind that one of the most fundamental
aspects of reality of the situation consists in the actual and antici-
pated reactions of other persons. On occasion these other people
doubtless do "diagnose" the neurotically deviant tendency of the
actor and act dehberately to counteract it. But it is safe to say that
far more frequently they quite automatically and without premedi-
tation—in so far as they are not neurotic themselves— react in the
right way in order to help bring the potential deviant back "into
line." The exact psychological mechanisms by which this takes
place cannot be elaborated here, and are in any refined sense
beyond the competence of a sociologist. But the fact that such a
process of reciprocal control reaction is continually going on in ordi-
nary social relationships, especially the more intimate ones such as
marriage, friendship and close occupational collaboration, undoubt-
edly has prime functional significance to the social system. It is
one of the most important channels by which, as a dynamic process,
the functional integration of the social system is maintained. Insti-
tutionally established behavior and reaction patterns undoubtedly

■^ In a very large proportion of cases these reactions result in significant part
from the operation of the mechanisms of "projection" or "displacement" so tliat
the affect is not really "appropriate" to the manifest object or situation.

152 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

have, among others, this latent function, that they provide the right
stimuH to other persons to prevent them from embarking on too
widely deviant trends of behavior.*

It is known, however, that the working of these mechanisms is,
in any complex society, highly imperfect. A great deal of deviant
behavior actually occurs— what then? There is evidence that every
social system possesses more or less well-developed "secondary"
defenses against deviance, with either or both of two immediate
functions: either to bring a person back into line by processes
inaccessible to ordinary social relationships, or where this fails to
insulate him from reciprocal influence on others so that he becomes
at least relatively harmless. It is in this light that a brief discussion
of certain aspects of modern medical practice will be entered upon.

The ostensible character of medical practice, its manifest func-
tion, is as that of a machinery for harnessing deliberate rational
action, through the knowledge and skill of highly trained experts,
to the practical problem of cure, or sometimes prevention, of
"disease" in the person, of restoring or maintaining his "health."
The knowledge and skill of the modern physician have, moreover,
consisted, at least until very recently, overwhelmingly in knowledge
of "organic medicine," of aspects of the biological sciences and
techniques based upon them. There can be no doubt of the real
importance of these elements to the problem of health nor of the
very striking achievements of modern medicine in such fields as
the control of infectious diseases tlirough application to them of the
findings of bacteriology and immunology— and more recently cer-
tain forms of chemotherapy— and aseptic surgery, in considerable
part also a result of bacteriological discoveries.

The only question is that of the exhaustiveness of the conception
of medical practice as "applied biological science," whether it is
adequate to the total concrete significance of the relation of a pa-
tient to a physician in its bearing on his health. There can be little
doubt that there is a great deal more to it than that.

On one level, recognition that this is so has been clearly implied

in a formula which has been widely current in the medical profes-

8 Functional analysis of this situation is relatively easy where it concerns
the maintenance of patterns essential to the functioning of the particular con-
crete reciprocal relationships — such as in a marriage, although even here there
is much actual deviance. It becomes much more difficult when it concerns the
maintenance of sentiments essential to a large-scale social system in situations
outside the immediate experience of most of its individual members; for in-
stance in a peaceable society, willingness— and actual emotional capacity—
to risk life and limb in fighting for national interests.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 153

sion at least ever since the rise to prominence of "scientific medi-
cine"—the formula that in addition to the "science of medicine,"
which may be taken to include the practical application of exact
biological and biochemical knowledge, there has always been, in a
position of great importance, something called the "art of medi-
cine." This might most specifically be described as all those "intan-
gibles" in the function of the doctor which were most important to
the "human" problems of practice,— regard for the personal prob-
lems and idiosyncrasies of the patient, the famous "bedside man-
ner," and various things of that sort. The use of the term "art" has
suggested that these functions are not subject to scientific "codifi-
cation" and that they are most effectually carried out through the
"personality" of the physician.

The first of these presumptions has, for at least a considerable
part of the area, been questioned by one of the most conspicuous
developments of medicine in the past generation, that of psychiatry
and the psychological aspects of the problems of disease. It had, of
course, long been known that there was such a thing as "mental
disease" where the pathology was not so much organic as behav-
ioral; that is, people did not think or act according to social expecta-
tions. But even here, with relatively little success except in a few
cases such as syphilitic paresis and brain tumors, there has been a
strong tendency to attempt to reduce mental diseases to manifes-
tations of organic pathological states. But more recently much
attention has been devoted to two other very large fields where
what in some sense were considered "pathological" phenomena in
a person have been treated as "psychogenic," the "psychoneuroses"
and psychosomatic disorders. In the former group there existed for
the most part— except in conversion hysteria— neither somatic symp-
toms nor evidence of somatic aetiological factors. In the latter in
one group, the so-called "functional" disorders, the symptoms were
somatic in the form of pain or disturbance of function, but no or-
ganic lesions to account for them could be found. In another group,
however, it was found that very definite organic lesions could be
made to respond to psychotherapeutic measures and aetiologically
a crucial influence could be attributed to psychic factors. Thus the
"psychic factor in disease"— an exceedingly wide variety of diseases
—has come, in what are on the whole scientifically the most
advaaced medical circles, to play a central part in their whole
orientation to the care of patients.

J 54 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The fact that in all these respects both mental patients and those
with functional or organic disabilities are, in a large range of cases,
open to deliberate psychotherapeutic influence, not only opens up
a very large field for the present practice but also for the future
development of medicine. It also strongly suggests, and the sug-
gestion is confirmed by much other evidence, that a very important
part has been played in previous and also current medical practice
by what may be called "unconscious" psychotherapy, that the way
in which doctors have in fact handled patients has had an impor-
tant effect on their states of health through their mental and emo-
tional states as well as acting directly on the physiological systems
of their bodies. Much of the art of medicine has consisted in this
kind of unconscious psychotherapy. The same considerations also
go far to explain the undoubted therapeutic success in considerable
degree, of much, from the point of view of modern scientific medi-
cine, "unsound" treatment of health problems, all the way from
some of the current medical "cults" through Christian Science heal-
ing to primitive health magic.

The emergence of the importance of the psychic factor further
throws into relief the fact, which has been more or less clear to
many practitioners for a long time, that "health" is not simply a
state of the biological organism, but is a matter of a person's total
adjustment to his life situation. Not the least important among the
aspects of this situation are his social relations, and at least one
aspect of lack of adequate adjustment to others in the social system
is its bearing on various forms of ill health.

This further suggests that the conscious or unconscious psycho-
therapeutic significance of the role of the physician is not confined
to what, in the ordinary sense, the doctor "does" to or for his
patient, but involves the specific structure of the kind of social rela-
tions in which the latter is placed when he turns to medical aid in
his difficulties. In other words, even if what the doctor "does" is
therapeutically useless or even in not too great a degree positively
harmful, the net effect on the patient may be therapeutically bene-
ficial. How can this be?

There are certain striking differences between the patterning of
the role of the physician and that of most other roles with which
the normal person is brought into ordinary interpersonal relations
in life. The latter tend to be, like the "job" situation, either highly
impersonal and very strictly functional, often involving an element

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 155

of impersonal authority, or, if they are intimate they are, like the
relations of kinship and friendship, highly particularistic and in-
volved with a reciprocity of moral judgment and personal sentiment.

The doctor is analogous to the patient's most intimate kin and
friends in that he is a person who can almost without limit be
trusted, both in the sense that his disinterestedness is assured, and
in the sense that, often beyond even the level of personal intimacies,
he can be taken into confidence in matters touching the most private
and intimate affairs and sentiments of the patient. To a consider-
able degree this "trustworthiness " rests on his reputation for tech-
nical competence, as a person who can be relied upon to "help"
someone who is in need of help.

But at the same time there are very striking differences from
the more intimate ordinary social relations. It is an essentially
asymmetrical relationship in that the doctor does not admit his
patient to intimacies with himself, does not "reveal" himself to the
patient, physically or mentally. He is a person of a specific "dignity"
who is "aloof" from the network of the personal relations of the
patient, who does not participate in reciprocities with him.^

Although enjoying, indeed needing, this particular dignity, he
specifically does not turn it into a certain kind of authoritarian role,
above all he generally does not manifest moral judgments of his
patient, but treats the case as a "problem" to be diagnosed and
treated in a "scientific" spirit. The patient need not be afraid that
he will be blamed or punished for his shortcomings; he will rather
be understood and helped. Conversely, he will often fail to find
approval or sympathy where in ordinary relations he would be
entitled to expect them.

Although the physician does not in the ordinary sense assume an
authoritarian role, these aspects of the pattern of medical practice
do endow him with a very important kind of authority. He is in a
position to exercise great influence even though his "orders" are
not, in the usual sense, backed by coercive sanctions. He has great
prestige resting on the reputation that members of his profession
possess high levels both of technical competence and of moral
integrity.

One of the focal patterns on which this professional prestige and
its resulting authority rest is that of responsibility. As a technical

8 Where he is also a personal friend there is generally a marked tendency to
segregation of the two roles.

156 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

expert he must assume responsibility in relation to all laymen since
they are not competent to have a reliable judgment of his diagnoses,
decisions, or therapeutic procedures. But the technical aspect of his
responsibility is heightened in significance by its relation to the
moral aspect. For his very technical superiority to the layman, in
combination with the seriousness of the interests which depend
upon his action, means that he holds enormous potential power to
exploit the patient.

A very notable fact about medical practice is the small extent
to which enforcement of the responsible use of the prestige and
power of the role is achieved by a system of formal controls and
sanctions. Neither the law of the state nor the disciplinary machinery
of medical societies plays a major role. Indeed what impresses the
outside observer most forcibly is the ineflFectiveness of these controls
and the lack of reliance upon them. On this level the medical man
enjoys an extraordinary range of freedom. But the potentialities of
abuse are so great that the existence of a ramified system of infor-
mal control of the practitioner himself as well as the patient is
strongly indicated.

Acceptance of authority without coercive sanctions is under-
standable only in terms of a fundamental trust in the person in the
position of authority— what physicians call "confidence." This is
true for any case of technical competence but is doubly important
in the medical case because all schools of psychiatry seem to be
agreed that it is essential to psychotherapy, in any form, conscious
or unconscious. When one adds to this the very formidable element
of uncertainty which renders the physician in a very large propor-
tion of cases unable to guarantee success and in fact often exposes
him to failure, the average effectiveness of his authority becomes
very impressive indeed. It is highly improbable that the high degree
of average confidence in physicians actually found in our society
can be adequately explained either by realistic appreciation of the
technical achievements of medicine or by the impression made by
particular personalities as such. The institutionalization of the
role is evidently of paramount importance.

Returning to the case of the relationship between the patient
and doctor, in by far the most sophisticated form this factor of
"confidence" has been analyzed and consciously made use of by
psychoanalysts, especially in their treatment of the phenomena of
transference." Apart from specific interpretations and other positive

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 157

therapeutic measures taken, a major factor in the therapeutic re-
sults of analytic treatment is held to lie in the fact that the analyst
is, so far as possible, a "neutral screen" on which the patient pro-
jects his affects and definitions of situations in human relations. The
very discrepancy between the attitudes the patient manifests
toward his analyst, and what the analyst actually is to him, is a
major factor in forcing the patient to analyze his own reactions and
investigate the deeper sources of his failure to adapt to reality more
generally. This "neutrality" of the analyst is aided by various de-
vices such as keeping out of the patient's sight so that gesture and
facial expression cannot supply clues to react to, and confining the
relationship to stated appointments of stated length so that it is
subject to a minimum of manipulation in terms of the patient's im-
mediate feelings and rationalizations.

Underlying all this is a most important consideration. In ordinary
social relations it can be said that there is a mutual obligation to
take the other party at his face value, to "take him seriously" as it
were. It is this very obligation, and its reciprocal expectations, which
creates a primary opening for the operation of the vicious circles
which may eventuate in neuroses, for by distorting the cognitive
definition of the situation by rationalization, by concealing— usually
unconsciously— actual motives and putting up an acceptable front,
one forces others into the fulfillment of the obligations of their
statuses and roles although one is not "really" in terms of actual
social values entitled to this fulfillment. The striking thing here
about the role of the physician is his ability to avoid being put in
this position. He does not "argue" with his patient about his ration-
alizations and his motives; to do so would grant a status of reci-
procity which he cannot grant. But neither does he accept the
patient's rationalizations at their face value, and while he does not
"refute" them, it is quite clear to the patient from his behavior that
he does not accept them. This again forces the patient to further
analysis of his own motives.

It is clear that it is only in terms of a certain form of definition
of roles that such a situation becomes possible. The physician must
have some kind of authority which justifies to the patient his failure
to treat him as ordinary people would, and along with this he must
secure acceptance of his refusal to be drawn into the particular
nexus of the patient, to become an intimate friend, a parent, a
lover, or a personal enemy. On the patient's side the predominant

158 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

element seems to be the definition of his own role as a "patho-
logical case," and hence as in need of help. In so far as he has "put
himself in tlie hands" of a physician he implicitly accepts the latter's
authority, based on his competence and integrity and, however
much at times he may rebel, accepts the obligation to re-examine
his own rationalizations and underlying motives again and again.

The therapeutic essence of the definition of role of the psychia-
trist or psychoanalyst seems to be the ability to break through the
vicious circle of rationalization and deviance of the neurotic mech-
anisms. This in turn has two aspects. On the one hand it relieves
the patient of certain pressures to which he is subject in ordinary
life, notably perhaps the pressure of moral responsibility, but also
more broadly of the normal consequences of expressing himself
with complete freedom, either in the form of moral blame or pun-
ishment or aggressive reactions, or of the acceptance of respon-
sibility for maintaining and living up to the obligations of an
institutionally defined relation in the case of positive relations. The
price he pays for this extraordinary freedom, which need not be
pleasurable, is the acceptance of a status of dependency, the admis-
sion he is "sick" and in need of help. It is, of course, of fundamental
social significance that it is essential to the pattern of medical prac-
tice that this dependency should not be permanently maintained,
but should be eliminated as rapidly as possible and the patient put
"back on his own feet."

The other side of the picture is the steady discipline to which the
patient is subjected in the course of his treatment. While the fact
that he is required and allowed to express himself freely may pro-
vide some immediate satisfactions, he is not really allowed to "get
away" with their implications for the permanent patterning of his
life and social relations, but is made, on progressively deeper levels,
conscious of the fact that he cannot "get away" with them. The
physician places him in a kind of "experimental situation" where
this is demonstrated over and over again. In both respects the
therapeutic effect would not be possible without the institutional
patterning of the physician's role which has become established in
the Western world. There is probably more than either historical
connection or intrinsic relatedness to the technical tradition of
medicine in the fact that psychoanalysis has insisted so strongly that
the analyst assume formally the role of the physician.

What is true of psychoanalysis at one extreme is, with various
modifications and many differences of degree, apparently true of

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 159

medical practice as a whole, though of course in merely binding up
a cut finger this aspect of the physician's role is for minor significance.

This situation in medical practice has two types of significance
for the broader problems of this paper. In the first place it is a
particularly striking case of the existence of relatively unconscious
automatic control mechanisms in society which tend to counteract
the vicious-circle mechanisms of at least one broad class of deviant
tendencies on the behavioral level. Psychoanalysts have tended to
become relatively self-conscious about the positive therapeutic
significance of the patterning of the analyst's role, and to use this
quite deliberately, though even they are probably far from having
exhausted the subject. But even in much practice of psychiatry
there is relatively little self-consciousness of this and even less in
most of organic medicine. Indeed at one stage the very efiPective-
ness of the control mechanisms seemed to be dependent on their
latent functions remaining unrecognized, on both physician and
patient thinking the former was concerned solely with acting on
the physiological equilibrium of the patient's body, through bio-
logical techniques.

Secondly, for the treatment of patients, as the case of psychoanal-
ysis most completely and dramatically shows, the institutionalized
role of physician provides a particularly strategic vantage point
from which to apply deliberate psychotherapeutic techniques. The
question then arises whether for mass tendencies to deviance,
rather than individual pathology, there is any analogous vantage
point or set of them which can be used for deliberate propagan-
distic control. If there is it would seem likely that, like the role of
physician, it— or they— would involve a considerable measure of
latent, unconscious control function apart from deliberate control
policies. It is, furthermore, reasonable to suppose that systematic
recognition of the mechanisms by which unconscious control
operates on the social level might contribute significantly to the
formulation of propaganda policies.

It has become clear from the foregoing analysis that the institu-
tional patterns of society perform important automatic control func-
tions on at least two different levels, that of ordinary "personal"
social relations and of the institutionalization of medical practice.
In the latter case it should be kept clearly in mind that not only
does the physician "control" his patient but, in order to be in a
position to do so, he must himself be controlled, he must adhere
suflBciently closely to an institutionalized definition of his role, and

160 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

to a situation which is enforced overwhelmingly by automatic, in-
formal mechanisms.

While the first type of control is broadly common to all social
systems the second is, in an at all comparable level of development,
peculiar to the modern Western world. In view of this fact it would
be surprising if the fundamental structural and functional aspects
of it should be confined to the one relatively narrow functional
sphere of medical practice.

By contrast with the area of "personal" relations, that of medical
practice is particularly characterized by three broad institutional
features. It is "functionally specific" as opposed to "diffuse" in that
it defines the role with reference to a specific content of function
and segregates this "area," that of the professional relations, from
any other of potential relation between the parties. A physician's
peculiar "rights" in relation to his patient, as to confidential infor-
mation and of access to the body, are defined and limited by the
relevance to the performance of his professional role, dealing with
matters of health. The same is true of authority, which does not
involve a generalized superiority of status, bvit is limited to the
health context. Finally the physician's obligations to his patient are
equally defined and limited by this context. He is not, for instance,
under obligation to help the patient financially except in so far as
it concerns making adequate treatment of his health problems pos-
sible. This functional specificity is one of tlie principal conditions
for "insulating" the physician from involvement in the patient's
"particular nexus" or set of personal relations, which makes the
previously mentioned "aloofness" possible.

Secondly, the professional pattern is "affectively neutral" as con-
trasted with a positively affective pattern. That is, in his profes-
sional capacity the physician is expected to avoid emotional
involvements with his patient, either affection or hatred, moral ap-
proval or disapproval. He should be "objective" and "impersonal,"
treat the patient's condition as a problem, a "case." This again is
essential to insulation from the patient's system of personal relations
and plays an important role in making conscious and unconscious
psychotherapy possible.

Finally the professional pattern is "universalistic" as opposed to
"particularistic." The patient is again significant in a technical con-
text rather as a "case" than as a "person." it is not the significance
of that patient as a person, either in terms of personal relations or

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 161

of institutionalized social status, not "who" he is, but "what is the
matter" with him, which defines the relationship. All cases of ty-
phoid, or schizophrenia should be treated alike, subject to tech-
nically founded variations, regardless of "who" they are. This
universalism is an essential element of scientific objectivity and
without it a high development of medicine as applied science
would not be possible.

The combination of these broad features of institutional patterns
is, as shown by comparative study of different societies, very un-
evenly distributed both historically and geographically. The exten-
sity of the area of the social structure in which the combination is
highly developed is, indeed, one of the most conspicuous features
of modern Western society. It underlies traditions of civil rights
before the law, of the freedom of the person, of contract and market
relations, of large-scale organization in general and the structure of
political and other authority as well as the development and appli-
cation of science. Its functional significance is manifold and by no
means confined to the type of control function which is relevant to
this paper. It is, for instance, difficult to suppose that the institu-
tional regulation of marked relations connected with the "one-price
system" and the control of tendencies to force and fraud are very
directly related to the "psychological" level which is most relevant
to the propaganda problem in the sense in which the patterns gov-
erning medical practice are.

For certain rough purposes the pathological patterns in the per-
son in relation to which psychotherapy has significance may be
classified in terms of two elements, "rationalizations" and "atti-
tudes." The first is the individual counterpart of definitions of the
situation, or an important aspect of them, on the social level. The
second formulates the "emotional" or "affective" element. From this
distinction it is possible, in making the transition from the personal
to the social level, to investigate what are rough functional equiva-
lents in the social system of the control functions of the physician
in his relation to the patient. Very great care must, however, be
taken to avoid misleading analogies, and to base conclusions only
on the actual nature of the respective systems.

There is probably no such thing as deviance without some im-
portant element of institutionalized definition of the situation. To be
"sick" and thus an appropriate person to be the patient of a physi-
cian is to be placed in an institutionally defined role. Two important

162 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

things are, however, to be noticed about this. In the first place the
sick person by the very fact of being defined as such is in a certain
sense insulated from normal interaction with the rest of the social
system. His role is by definition an undesirable one to be escaped
from as rapidly as possible. Although he is generally not, like the
criminal, morally blamed for his condition, it is not a 'legitimate"
one. Above all— in so far as he is defined as pathological he is de-
prived in the relevant respects of any claim to be a source of in-
fluence or a model to emulate. Hence, deviance which takes this
form is prevented from influencing the structure of the social sys-
tem. In the second place, sick people do not compose a "group"
or a "movement" but only a statistical class. It is in the nature of
the role that its incumbents cannot become integrated into a struc-
turally significant group.

It should, however, be quite clear that the same fundamental
psychological processes and reaction patterns are involved in types
of deviance from an established set of institutionalized roles and
definitions of the situation which lead to structural innovation, to
the acceptance of shifts in the established definitions of the situation
by large numbers of people which are definitely structured depar-
tures from the norm, and similarly to inappropriate attitudes. The
differences from the individual level here are two. Negatively there
is successful avoidance of being placed in a social category such as
the "pathological" which would deprive the innovation of a claim
to legitimacy. Positively, attitudes and definitions of the situation
become structured for large numbers in a sufficiently uniform way
so that, relative to the existing social structure, the adherents of
the new patterns form a definitely structured group. In addition to
these mass reaction phenomena come others for which there is no
counterpart on the individual level, namely leadership and social
organization of groups, which perform important functions in crys-
tallizing more or less diffuse deviant tendencies in specific directions.

The existence of these possibilities of deviant structuring on the
social level implies, to one familiar with the functional approach,
the corresponding existence in the social system of automatic con-
trol mechanisms which, however imperfectly they function, in
normal circumstances somehow serve to keep the amount of devi-
ance down to a relatively low level, whereas the elements of strain
and disorganization present in all complex social systems would,
without them, lead to far more serious instability.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 163

In the case of individual pathologies the subject matter of the
rationalizations which are of greatest importance to the mainte-
nance of symptoms tends to be focused primarily about the "per-
sonal" problems of the patient. Problems of the definition of the
situation for the social system as a whole are relatively remote from
the more immediate preoccupations of the person and from his most
concrete emotionally significant experience. On this account they
are probably on the whole less rigidly determined by emotional
compulsions, but at the same time both because of the complexity
of the issues and the relative remoteness are less subject to effective
control in terms of the reality principle. The combination of these
two factors^*^ would indicate a relative fluidity in many aspects of
the cultural tradition of a society which heightens the significance
of the control problem. Moreover, in our own society, the promi-
nence of the element of "rationality," of freedom from traditional-
istic stereotyping, works in the same direction in that it deprives
cultural tradition to a considerable extent of the influence of power-
ful stabilizing forces.

An approach to the problem of what sort of mechanisms operate
to stabilize the cultviral tradition may be made by recalling the
fact that the medical profession itself owes a very important part
of its institutionalized status and thus of its direct and indirect
therapeutic effectiveness to its integration with one fundamentally
important part of the cultural tradition, namely certain branches of
science. The prominence of magical healing in place of even rela-
tively primitive "medical science" in most societies, and the place
in our own of the health "cults," of innumerable health superstitions,
and of such phenomena as Christian Science, strongly suggests that
"heliei" in the efiicacy and superiority of scientific medicine is by
no means to be taken for granted. Informally the degree of stability
is associated with the fact that medical science is a part of the whole
tradition of scientific culture, and of the associated fields of rational-
liberal learning which is characteristic of Western society as a
whole, and which has tremendous social prestige, especially in that
it has become so strongly integrated with the way of life of the
principal prestige classes in society.

On the more formal side it is of very great importance that medi-
cal training is placed under the auspices of the universities. This

1^ That is provided there are not "watertight" technical criteria by which
to keep "behefs" in Hne. Relative weakness in this respect is characteristic of
almost all cultural fields, even of science.

164 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

fact not only articulates the "applied" side of medical knowledge
and skill formally with more or less "pure" scientific research in
medical fields, the bulk of which is carried on in the laboratories
of university medical schools and teaching hospitals affiliated with
them. It also articulates the medical sciences with the other sci-
ences which do not have primarily medical fields of application, and
finally with other fields of learning, such as humanities, which are
not ordinarily thought of as scientific. The universities, in short,
are the primary formal carriers of the great Western rational-liberal
cultural tradition. Direct affiliation of the medical profession with
them— which is true of the other principal professions as well— inte-
grates it directly with this cultural tradition. Medical practice is by
no means a matter simply of intelligent men using their general
intelhgence to deal with a certain type of practical problems.

But perhaps even more important than this formal affiliation with
universities is the informal integration, largely within the academic
framework, with the general patterns governing the perpetuation,
advancement, and transmission of science and liberal learning. Just
as in the case of medicine, it is quite clear for this broader field
that the integration of the broader cultural tradition is not brought
about automatically by the intrinsic nature of the subject matter.
There are many areas and elements of uncertainty in practically all
fields. Even within the academically formal rubrics there is a very
high degree of specialism which makes exact appraisal of achieve-
ment difficult, even if it is intrinsically possible, and finally in the
university faculty as a whole there is a very great heterogeneity of
fields. One of the conspicuous symptoms of the need for control in
this area is the chronic tendency for academic disciplines in almost
all fields to split up into "schools." Careful study of these shows
that they bear in large measure and to a very important extent the
marks of operating psychologically as rationalizations. Although
generally by no means without important elements of technical
justification, the doctrines of a given school always show elements
of bias which can be related to complex affective backgrounds.

At the same time that this need for control is so conspicuous, it
seems quite clear that it is not primarily accomplished by the
informal control system any more than is true of the medical case.
For instance the pattern of academic freedom gives the university
professor a range of freedom in the conduct of his professional func-
tion which is hardly exceeded by any group whose work is carried

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 165

out in the context of large organizations. This freedom undoubtedly
has important functions in lending him dignity and encouraging a
high sense of professional responsibility, but it is also directly in-
compatible with stringent control through the machinery of formal
organization. Closely related to this is the institution of tenure.
Once in the status of a permanent position, a university teacher
can only be dismissed for "cause," which means gross malfeasance
in office. In fact this sanction is very seldom invoked— perhaps one
might say that there is as great a reluctance on the part of univer-
sity administrations to resort to it as there is of medical societies to
take formal disciplinary action against their members.

The importance of the institutional patterning of the academic
role for the present paper lies in the fact that included in the sub-
jects of professional competence of academic men are precisely
those fields of the cultural tradition which, in Western society, have
been most central to the definitions of the situation which have, on
the one hand, been institutionalized in the social structure, and
which are, on the other hand, the necessary starting points for any
deviant definitions which could conceivably help to crystallize im-
portant processes of structural change. In this connection three
groups of disciplines are of primary importance. Philosophy and
theology have tended to be the places in which the more abstract
and generalized formulations of basic orientations have taken place,
including both intellectual ideas as to "man's place in the universe"
and the fundamental ethical ideas. Secondly, law has the longest
and most sophisticated tradition of tliinking with respect to the
embodiment of common values in practical social relations. Finally,
much more recently than the others, the social sciences, with vary-
ing emphasis in different cases have been particularly important in
the diagnosis of the situation of society, the meanings of various
phases of its history and of tendencies to change.^ ^

Of course definitions of the situation on all of these levels are by
no means in any simple sense a creation of the academic disciplines.
They are far more deeply rooted in the institutional structure itself
and in the related popular ideas and sentiments. But it is precisely
one of the most important facts about modern Western society
that to a very great extent the primary institutionalized bearers of
its main cultural traditions and leaders of its thought are highly

11 Specific cases of the relevance of these disciplines to the problems of
"ideology" will be taken up in the second paper.

166 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

professionalized groups without whose role the distinctive charac-
teristics of cultural traditions would be very greatly altered. Hence,
short of a very profound revolution, any important changes must
articulate with them, especially with the universities, and con-
versely through both obvious and obscure channels they undoubt-
edly exert an enormous influence on the functioning of the social
system in this context. Furthermore, this field provides a particular-
ly striking illustration of the working of automatic control mechan-
isms which are built into the institutional structure.

The academic structure would at the present time seem to be
significant overwhelmingly in relation to definitions of the situation
rather than to the direct control of attitudes, though the segrega-
tion is never anywhere nearly absolute. Historically, however, two
great professional groups, the clergy and the law, have conspicu-
ously combined these two functions in a sense somewhat compar-
able to the medical case, although in relation to very difiFerent
social functions. In the case of the clergy this was far more con-
spicuously true than it is now in the time when the clergy had a
far stronger position of leadership in the community as a whole.
But even now it is undoubtedly of considerable importance. It is
notable that in the critical situation in Europe in recent years where
the government structure has come under the control of revolution-
ary elements, the clergy have tended to become leading symbolic
spokesmen of the historic values of the society, as in the case of
both Protestant and Catholic clergy in Germany who have made
by far the most effective protests against the Nazi regime, and just
recently, in France, the clerical protests against the deportation of
Jews.

A particularly interesting feature of the role of the clergy lies in
its transitional character between the medical case and others the
influence of which is significant primarily on the social level. In his
role as a personal adviser and spiritual guide to the parishioner the
clergyman has long been known to perform functions which have
at least an element of unconscious psychotherapy— most conspicu-
ously of course in the Catholic confessional. But unlike the medical
man he does it in a way which attempts directly to influence his
parishioner to conformity with a system of values and religious
ideas which define the situation for an organized social group as a
whole if not the whole society. The medical man is using both the
cultural tradition and the institutional patterning of his own role

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 167

—more or less consciously— to influence the patient in a direction
established as a goal by common values. The clergyman, on the
other hand, is directly seeking to bring— or keep— his parishioner in
conformity with a normative tradition, both to get him to accept
the definition of the situation current in his denomination and to
have the proper attitudes.

In this connection it is highly significant that ever since a decisive
point in the early history of Catholic Christianity the status of
the religious professional has been defined as an "office." The
sacramental authority of the priest did not inhere in any personal
quality of his own, such as saintliness, but was derived from ordi-
nation. It was an "impersonal" authority resting on integration with
a universalistically defined tradition. Moreover, it applied only
within the sphere of religious aflFairs and did not extend into secular
spheres; it was, that is, functionally specific. Although the Refor-
mation brought about important changes in the organization of
religion, it did not disturb this fundamental pattern.

It can be seen that this pattern of office with its segregation of
the sphere of religious authority from the "personal" character and
aflFairs of the incumbent has important similarities with the role of
the physician. It is a role of a specific dignity and prestige so struc-
tured as to insulate its performer from personal involvement with
those with whom he has to deal. It lends him this dignity by virtue
of the legitimation of a universalistic social tradition which, how-
ever different in content from medical science, is still in many
respects similar as a source of impersonal authority.

In more detail it would be extremely illuminating, if space per-
mitted, to analyze the similarities in the ways in which the medical,
the academic, and the clerical roles exert a steady discipline on the
people to whom they are subjected. The church service, it may be
suggested, exerts an important influence in this way. By the doc-
trinal content of sermons and scriptural readings it serves to stabil-
ize the definition of the situation, while at the same time through
the collective ritual observance in hymn-singing, prayer, and in
other ways, it has an important influence on attitudes. ^^ The im-

1- See Durkheim, Emile, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life; The Free
Press, Glencoe, 111., 1947 (xi and 456 pp.), for what is probably the classic analysis
of the social functions of religious ritual. Durkheim, by his concentration on
primitive society seems to have neglected the importance of the definition of the
situation. The analogy to psychotherapy, and the psychological mechanisms in-
volved in the "integrating" influence of ritual would repay far more careful
study than they have received.

168 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

portance of the minister or priest as the focal center of this system
of social interaction is clear.

Both the service itself, and more broadly, it seems certain, the
particular mode of definition of the clerical role, have an important
bearing on the integrating functions of religion in society. In par-
ticular its form in Western Christianity has immense importance for
the influence of the Western type of cultural tradition.

For two reasons a few brief words may now be said about certain
aspects of the institutionalization of government, with special refer-
ence to the problem of attitudes. On the one hand, it is the primary
focus, in certain fundamental respects, of the integration of the
national social system as a whole, and is hence of key importance
to any consideration of the state of the system. On the other hand,
for the same reasons it provides the most important single strategic
vantage point for implementing any deliberate policy of control.

The functional problem is particularly clear in this case, espe-
cially to certain modern trends of thinking about politics. The posi-
tion of government in the social structure is such that it more or less
inevitably becomes the principal focus of whatever more general
struggle for power is going on in the society, almost regardless of
the particular content of the interest or "cause" which any group
promotes. This is true of any complex society, but in addition our
particular form of democratic government would seem to accentu-
ate the situation in that it formally structuralizes the conflict of
interests into a struggle of "partisan" groups for "power," that is,
control of the machinery of government, and, short of that, "influ-
ence," the ability to get governmental agencies to serve the inter-
ests'^ of their particular groups. Thus the "administration" always
consists of the spokesmen of some combination of interests, and
various branches of government, especially Congress, are very
much open to pressure. Finally, the intrinsic pressure of interest
groups is accentuated by a furtlier factor. All structures or person-
ahties with an institutionalized prestige status are to a prominent

!•* The essentials of this phenomenon are independent of the quaUty of mo-
tivation of the members and leaders of the group in question. For instance large
elements of the backing of the prohibition movement may well have been singu-
larly free from "self-interest" in the usual sense, overwhelmingly concerned with
an application of pure religious ethics. The Anti-Saloon League was not on that
account any less a "pressure" group.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 169

degree symbols on which affects are projected or displaced which
are generated in connection with other aspects of a person's life.^*
This phenomenon is particularly important in a complex, rapidly
changing society where there is a great deal of personal insecurity.
Its immediate effect is to accentuate the divisive tendencies of the
formal recognition of partisanship. Prominent political leaders are
not only supported or opposed realistically according to the eflFec-
tiveness with which they promote or obstruct the interests and
causes with which the citizen is identified. They are also unreal-
istically inflated into heroes or bogeymen as the case may be, and
hence ideologically the opposition between conflicting partisan
groups and their leaders tends to be defined as far deeper than it
really is.

In view of all this it may seem remarkable that this system of
government can function at all. The answer must clearly be that
there is another side to the picture, that there are patterns vdth
positively integrating functions. Informally there is much in the
"democratic tradition" which has this significance. There is the
acceptance of the results of an election as expressing the popular
will and hence as being binding on the nation as a whole. Con-
versely there are the formal constitutional and informal restraints
which prevent those in power from using their power too much in
a partisan interest, or from promoting that interest by illegitimate
means, such as abridging the constitutional freedoms of opponents.

There are also, besides the constitution itself, structures and pat-
terns which embody and symbolize integrating functions for the
nation as a whole. The Federal judiciary, especially the Supreme
Court, is to a considerable extent kept out of partisan politics. Fur-
thermore, elective oflBcers, such as the president, have a double
character. On the one hand the incumbent is a party leader with a
partisan mandate. But on the other hand his office is institutionally
representative of the nation as a whole and its common traditions.
In many ways this integral character is emphasized. To take one

!■* The phenomena of transference illustrate this phenomenon in classic form
in relation to the physician. The same thing, is pre-eminently true of universities
which are everywhere the object of deeply ambivalent attitudes which are con-
spicuously unrealistic on both sides— the prominence of "town and gown"
feeling and the ease with which charges of ' radicalism" can be brought against
academic institutions are illustrations of the negative aspect. A corresponding
pohtical example of projection of negative affect was the "hate Roosevelt" pat-
tern so prominent in the business classes a few years ago— surely not simply an
objective appraisal of the New Deal.

170 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

example, when Mr. Roosevelt made a radio address he was not
introduced as Mr. or even President Roosevelt, certainly not as the
Leader of the Democratic Party, but "Ladies and Gentlemen, the
President of the United States" is the accepted formula. Similarly
even in cases of the most bitter partisan hostility to the particular
incumbent, a certain respect for the dignity of the ofBce is generally
clearly discernible.^"^ The same can be said of many lesser offices of
the government. In connection with many of its administrative
agencies the element of partisanship is much less conspicuous. Even
though originally established by partisan administrations, they have
for all practical purposes come to be accepted by the public as
a whole.

Perhaps the most conspicuous phenomenon in this whole field,
which relates it to the cases already discussed, is the tendency to
the segregation of the two aspects of the government structure. If
this did not exist there would be danger that the whole structure
would be drawn into the partisan struggle and there would be no
adequate structure of symbols on which to form sentiments of com-
mon loyalty and integration. It is closely parallel to the impersonal
components of the role of the physician on which "confidence" in
him is focused, and to the academic and clerical roles as "repre-
sentative" of an objectively impersonal cultural tradition.

These examples are perhaps sufficient to establish in a general
way that control mechanisms, the operation of which is not a mat-
ter of the deliberate "policy" of any group, or even of their manifest
functions, pervade the whole structure, and play an essential role
in the functioning of the social system. In particular, in conformity
with the character of its institutions and peculiar cultural tradition,
society has evolved a complex of mechanisms of a particular sort
centering in roles of high prestige characterized by universalism,
functional specificity and aflFective neutrality. Medical practice
represents one particular type of a much larger class of roles which
is specialized in the direction of exerting a particular kind of influ-

15 For example, at the time of the Harvard Tercentenary celebration some
Harvard alumni of the bitterly anti-Roosevelt school would even go so far as to
say the whole thing would be spoiled if "that man" were permitted to be present.
But one very quickly also had occasion to hear the reaction, "After all, he is
President of the United States," and for any academic institution to have the
President, regardless of "who" he might be, as an alumnus and a guest could
scarcely be treated as anything but an honor. On the same occasion a similar but
for many perhaps an even more acute conflict arose over the official role of
Governor James M. Cur ley.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 171

ence upon persons. The others in different ways suggest how analo-
gous modes of influence on the social structure might be exerted
by deliberately working "along with" existing control mechanisms
as conscious psychotherapy takes advantage of the patterning of
the physician's role.

What has previously been called "propaganda" is essentially a
technique which is capable of use in the service of any goal. From
the point of view of the present paper, that of relevance to the state
of integration of a social system, three kinds of propaganda may be
differentiated according to their orientation to different goals. One
type is "revolutionary" in that it is oriented to the "conversion" of
people to a pattern of values and definition of the situation which
is specifically in conflict with fundamental aspects of the existing
basic institutional structure and its attendant values and definitions.
The "propaganda" of a strictly otherworldly religious movement
which wishes to wean its adherents from all emotional attachment
to "worldly" things, including performance of the obligations of
their institutionalized social roles, is revolutionary in the present
sense just as much as is that of a social or political movement whose
goal is revolutionary change in the social structure.

A second fundamental type of propaganda is the "disruptive." Its
goal is not winning people over to an alternative set of values and
definitions of the situation, but undermining their attachment to
the existing institutional system as such. There is of course a dis-
ruptive aspect in any system of revolutionary propaganda, but the
relatively pure disruptive type was developed on a grand scale in
Nazi propaganda toward the democracies. There was relatively
little attempt to convert Americans to Nazi values. It was rather an
attempt to weaken them by playing systematically and deliberately
on the elements of tension, conflict and lack of clear and confident
orientation in their society. It tried to foment conflict, to undermine
confidence in authority and leadership, to play upon latent feehngs
of anxiety and guilt so as generally to paralyze capacity for deci-
sion and action. Indeed this has, to a very considerable extent,
come to be regarded as the type case of propaganda in general.

But the same basic insights are applicable in a very different
orientation of policy, that of "reinforcement," of strengthening at-
tachment to the basic institutional patterns and cultural traditions
of the society and deliberately and systematically counteracting the

172 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

very important existing deviant tendencies.^*' Few would question
that this is the direction that propaganda should take in relation to
the internal situation since, in this great crisis, it is fundamentally
preservation of continuity with the great traditions and institutional
patterns of Western society which is at stake.

Shaping the basic orientation of propaganda policy as one of
reinforcement means not only in the most general sense directing ft
to support of the sentiments and definitions of the situation which
connect Americans with the continuity of their institutional and
cultural heritage. It must take account of certain particular features
of that heritage which are essential to its connection with the kind
of social control mechanisms which have previously been discussed.

The findings of sociology and anthropology with respect to the
importance of cultural relativit)' are such that any proposition with
respect to the more universal significance of the institutionalized
patterns of any particular social system should be put forward with
great caution. Yet it is highly probable that the findings of modern
psychology with respect to what constitutes psychological "maturity"
will not come to be completely relativized as applicable only to this
society. This is particularly true of what psychoanalysts have called
the "reality principle," a maximization of which is a principal cri-
terion of strong "ego development," and what may be called
"affective reciprocity," the ability affectively to take account of the

i** Perhaps two principal objections will be raised to a deliberate propaganda
policy of the "reinforcement" type directed toward the home front. One is that
such a policy would tend to freeze the status quo and perpetuate the evils of tlie
existing social order. One's attitude on this question will depend on the degree
of radicalism with which he interprets those evils. If it is sufficiently great, if
society is to him fundamentally corrupt, the only acceptable propaganda policy
will be a frankly revolutionary one. But general support of a reinforcement pro-
gram does not commit one to freezing the stats quo. On the contrary, by con-
trast with the fascist alternative, all the main potentialities of reform in society,
of a more "democratic" way of life, are bound up with the maintenance of a basic
continuity with tlie fundamentals of Western institutional and cultural tradition.

The other objection is that propaganda, "fooling" and "working on" people
is incompatible with our basic values— the public must be taken fully into gov-
ernment's confidence and treated as responsible adults. This view is largely a
compound of utopianism and rationalistic bias. In a certain sense by the same
token medical practice should be abolished since it is incompatible with the
human dignity of a sick person to submit to being helped by someone more com-
petent than himself— or the teaching function should be completely de-institu-
tionalized to permit students to "stand on their own feet." Realistically the
alternatives are not "paternalism" versus complete independence of all persons,
but a conscientious exercise of power in fiduciary terms in conformity with the
basic patterns of the society or a]:)nse of power in some direction. Deliberate
"propaganda" is only an extension of the general use of the power of government.
It is not whether it should be used but hoio which is the problem for serious dis-
cussion. Unconscious propaganda influence on a considerable scale is in any
case inevitable.

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 173

feelings of others and not to define situations in a grossly "one-sided"
manner. Certainly the high incidence of science and rational tech-
niques in a society tend to indicate a peculiarly high development
of the "reality principle" in one direction. Hence its predominance
may be said to transcend the element common to all social struc-
tures, realistic adaptation to the existing institutionalized structure,
whatever it may be. But the elements of universalism and function-
al specificity found in all of the cases previously analyzed are all
cases of a specifically high degree of institutionalization of pattern
elements which play a fundamental role in encouraging reactions
of emotional maturity.

Whatever there may be of any more generalized significance in
the institutionalization of these patterns, there can be no doubt that
reinforcement of them is fundamental to the cultivation of matur-
ity in our society— psychotherapy which consisted in "conversion"
of the person to drastically otherworldly cults would, however
much it solved his practical problems, be something drastically
different from that of modern medicine. It is, conversely, clear that
the psychology of most movements which tend to a drastic break
with this same institutional heritage, especially perhaps those of the
fascist type, is one which exploits precisely the opposite elements
of character structure, those most closely bound up with "neurotic"
types of reaction pattern, ideological distortion and affective over-
reaction.

It is the principal thesis of this paper that the structure of West-
ern society in its relation to the functions of social control provides
an extraordinary opening for the deliberate propaganda of rein-
forcement as an agency of control. Just as deliberate psychotherapy
in the medical relationship is in a sense simply an extension of
functional elements inherent in the structure of the role of physi-
cian, so, on the social level, the propaganda of reinforcement would
be simply an extension of many of the automatic but latent func-
tions of existing institutional patterns.

Indeed, as a result of the above analysis it can safely be said tliat
consideration of the role of the propaganda agency as analogous to
that of the psychotherapist is more than a mere analogy. Social
control in the sense of this discussion is after all in the last analysis
a process of influencing, through psychological mechanisms, first
the behavior, more deeply, through the process of socialization
especially, the character structure of humans. In its non-deliberate
functional significance the institution of medical practice is an inte-

174 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

gral part of a far more generalized institutional structure and sys-
tem of social control. The fundamental orientations inherent in its
patterning, especially the role of the reality principle and psycho-
logical maturity form an aspect, an "application" in one context, of
configurational principles common to the institutional structure as
a whole. With proper precautions for taking account of the differ-
ence of level, to treat propaganda policy as a kind of "social psy-
chotherapy" is to act directly in accordance with the essential
nature of this social system.

The first maxim is that, quite apart from what it deliberately does
in dealing with particular tendencies to deviance which arise, the
agency or agencies should assume a role as closely analogous to
that of physician as is possible in the circumstances. Specifically it
should so far as possible identify itself witli those elements of the
institutional patterning of government and other structures in the
society which are symbolic of the integration of the society as a
whole. In relation to government this means above all that it should
avoid involvement in any of the internal struggles for power of
partisan groups; both in its constitution and publicly conspicuous
personnel it should be as close as possible to the ideal of an impar-
tial judiciary.

It should also take advantage of other formally institutionalized
elements in the society which fit into the same general type of pat-
tern, perhaps especially the academic and the religious, although
on account of the element of ambivalence in public attitudes to
academic persons and institutions here great caution is called for—
it would be unfortunate to allow a symbol like that of the early
New Deal "brain trust" to become current.

Also more informally it is essential to establish a position of im-
personal authority. This, in the medical case, involves primarily two
elements, technical competence and moral integrity in relation to
the fundamental goals of medical practice. Since there is as yet in
society no professional group which has come to be defined to the
public in general as possessing technical competence in "social psy-
chiatry"—perhaps someday some of the social sciences will achieve
this— the next best seems to be the deliberate cultivation of a repu-
tation for scrupulously truthful reporting of information, the sources
of which the public cannot have direct access to. Information is of
great intrinsic importance in itself. But what is involved here is its
indirect importance, as establishing the authority of the propaganda
agency, and a disposition to turn to it for "help" in matters where a

PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL CONTROL 175

person is necessarily incompetent. Exercising judgment as to
whether or not information needs to be withheld for mihtary rea-
sons is by no means incompatible with effective use of this pos-
sibility.

The analogy to the moral integrity of the physician is somewhat
more complex. It is true the physician avoids expressing moral judg-
ments of much of his patient's conduct and this is one primary
source of his ability to "get at" his patient. But he does not assume
a morally nihilistic attitude. Above all in relation to the definition
of his own role certain moral fundamentals are taken for granted,
especially his obligation to do his best for the patient and converse-
ly the patient's obligation to give him full "cooperation," including
complete truthfulness in relevant subjects. More broadly this pat-
tern implicity assumes agreement on certain moral fundamentals
of our institutionalized patterns, especially those involved in the
acceptance of "mature adjustment" as a goal of therapy. Similarly
a propaganda agency can quite self-consciously take for granted
what are in the first instance moral fundamentals about its own
role, its fiduciary position on behalf of the national welfare and its
moral integrity in fulfilling its obligations. Implicitly this would
carry with it acceptance of the fundamental orientation of national
policy toward the war, above all, and acceptance of the principal
fundamentals of the historic institutionalized values and cultural
tradition.

It can probably be said with confidence that it is generally best
not to "argue" these things explicitly, but rather to take them for
granted. This is not, however, to evade the moral questions in-
volved. Rather, when occasion arises, it is quite legitimate to react
strongly in the assertion of the relevant values. Generally speaking
a good physician does not permit a patient to "get away" with a
challenge to his moral integrity. He has no hesitation in reacting
strongly.

A few words may be said about the technique of handling par-
ticular problems once the requisite generalized role has been estab-
lished. Above all such an agency would not be an organ of "in-
struction" of the public in the ordinary rationalistic sense. Its func-
tion especially would not be to "refute" undesirable opinions and
definitions of the situation. Its main function would rather be to
keep the central definitions of the situations and symbols continual-
ly, but not too obtrusively, before the public. Just how it should be
worked out in detail is a very complicated and technical subject.

176 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Whether and in what circumstances and ways it should emulate
the deliberate psychotherapist by, at strategic moments, offering
"interpretations" of "pathological" behavior, is a most interesting
question, but surely not one to be settled without much analysis
and experience.

Finally, it should be clear that one main index of whether or not
such an agency were effectively performing its functions would be
that it would become the object of "transferences," of the projection
of affects which were not appropriate to what it had actually done,
both positive and negative. This should provide positive opportuni-
ties for extending its usefulness.

The intention of this last discussion has not been to work out a
blueprint of a propaganda agency, or to deliver or imply any judg-
ment on the adequacy of existing agencies of our government. ^'^ It
has been possible only to draw certain broad implications from the
very general analysis of the problem which has occupied the main
part of the paper. In relation to practical policy, the most it can do
is to point a general direction.

As in all such cases, getting closer to detailed practical policy
would involve further analysis of the particular problems that have
to be faced. A psychiatrist does not deal with neuroses in general,
but with a particular patient with particular problems. It is pro-
posed in a subsequent article to analyze certain salient features of
the contemporary American social system in so far as they bear
upon the problem of possible deliberate control by propaganda
methods. This will raise the questions of what are the principal
deviant tendencies in this situation, how are they rooted in the
conflicts, strains, and malfunctioning of the social system, and in
what ways and how far are they accessible to control by this kind
of technique.

1'^ It should be clear that, consciously or unconsciously, a good many of these
functions have in fact been to a considerable extent performed by government
agencies, most conspicuously by the presidency. Surely one of the main bases for
referring to Mr. Roosevelt as an exceptionally good "politician" has been his
ability to assume this type of role. Above all he must be conscious of often having
been the object of "negative transference" and it would seem, has on the whole
acted in the proper way to deal with such phenomena. An analysis of his public
reactions to the various waves of public opinion toward the war from the fall
of France to Pearl Harbor would be extremely illuminating. One of the most
interesting phases is tliat of the timing as well as the content of major
speeches, which are, in a sense, analogous to the interpretations of a psycho-
analyst. Perhaps one of the most important things for a very high executive
to learn is not to speak publicly too much, too often, or at the wrong times.

IX

The Kinship System of the
Contemporary United States

ms A REMAEKABLE fact that, in spite of the important interrelations
between sociology and social anthropology, no attempt to describe
and analyze the kinship system of the United States in the struc-
tural terms current in the literature of anthropological field studies
exists. This is probably mainly accounted for by two facts; on the
sociological side, family studies have overwhelmingly been oriented
to problems of individual adjustment rather than comparative struc-
tural perspective; while from the anthropological side, a barrier
has grown out of the fact that a major structural aspect of a large-
scale society cannot be observed in a single program of field re-
search. To a considerable extent the material must come from the
kind of common sense and general experience which have been
widely held to be of dubious scientific standing.

There are two particularly cogent reasons why an attempt to fill
this gap is highly desirable. In the first place, an understanding
of the kinship system on precisely this structural level is of the
greatest importance to the understanding of the American family,
its place in the more general social structure, and the strains and
psychological patterning to which it is subject.^ Secondly, our kin-
ship system is of a structural type which is of extraordinary interest

1 Probably the most significant contribution to this field thus far has been
made by Kingsley Davis in a series of articles starting with his "Structural
Analysis of Kinship" (America Anthropologist, April, 1937), in collaboration
with W. Lloyd Warner, and going on to "Jealousy and Sexual Property" ( Social
Forces, March, 1936 ), "The Sociology of Prostitution" ( American Sociological Re-
view, October, 1937), "The Child and the Social Structure" (Journal of Educa-
tional Sociology, December, 1940), "The Sociology of Parent- Youth Conflict"
{American Sociological Review, August, 1940.)

I am greatly indebted to Dr. Davis's work, starting with the significance of
his first article, for the systematic relating of the biological and the social
levels of kinship structure. Much of the present analysis is implicit in his later
articles, which have pro\'ed to be very suggestive in working out the somewhat
more explicit formulations of the present study.

17 S ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

in relation to the broader problems of typology and systematic
functional d\namics of kinship generally. As a type which, to the
writer's knowledge, is not closely approached in any known non-
literate society, its incorporation in the range dealt with by students
of kinship should significantly enrich their comparative perspective.^

It can perhaps be regarded as established that, with proper pre-
cautions, analysis of kinship terminology can serve as a highly
useful approach to the study of the functioning social structure.
In the case of the English language two precautions in particular,
over and above those commonly observed, need to be explicitly
mentioned. Such analysis alone cannot serve to bring out what is
distinctively American because the terminology has been essentially
stable since before the settlement of America, and today there is no
significant terminological difference between England and the
United States. Moreover, the differences in this respect between
English and the other modern European languages are minor. Hence
all analysis of terminology can do is indicate a very broad type
within which the more distinctively American system falls.

As shown in the accompanying diagram^ the American family is
perhaps best characterized as an "open, multilineal, conjugal
system."

The conjugal family unit of parents and children is one of basic
significance in any kinship system. What is distinctive about our
system is the absence of any important terminologically recognized

~ It is proposed in a later article to enter into certain of these comparative
problems of kinship structure in an attempt to arrive at a higher level of dynamic
generahzation about kinship than has yet come to be current in the sociological
or even the anthropological literature.

■^ The diagramming conventions adopted in this paper [see note in second
paragraph, above] are somewhat different from those commonly used by anthro-
pologists. They are imposed by the peculiar structural features of our system,
especially—

a) Its "openness," i.e., absence of preferential mating. Hence the two
spouses of any given conjugal family are not structurally related by
family of orientation and it is not possible to portray "the" system in
terms of a limited number of lines of descent. Each marriage links
ego's kinship system to a complete system.

b) The consequent indefinite "dispersion" of the lines of descent.

The best that can be done in two dimensions is to take ego as a point of
reference and show his significant kin. It is strictly impossible to diagram the
system as a whole— that would require a space of n-dimensions. Similarly,
"vertical" and "horizontal" or "lateral" "axes' have only a very limited mean-
ing. "Lines of descent" and "generations" are significant. But there is a geo-
metrically progressive increase in the number of lines of descent with each
f feneration away from ego and the distinctions cannot be made in terms of a
inear continuum. I am indebted to Miss Ai-li Sung of Radcliffe College for
assistance in drafting the diagram.

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORAEY UNITED STATES

179

Figure 1
The American Kinship System

LEGEND

Marriage
»• Descent

Sibling Relationship

Q r — "] Conjugal Families

_.— ._^ Name Line

— --— Family of Procreation

iWculitioo
with distinct

ego's spouse

Types of Families:

1. Ego's family of orientation (1 only)

2. Ego's family of procreation (1 only)

3. First-degree ascendant families (2)
{continued on foot of page ISO)

ISO ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

units which cut across conjugal famihes, including some members
and excluding others. The only instances of such units are pairs
of conjugal families each with one common number. Terminologi-
cally, in common speech, it is significant that we have only the
words "family," which generally* refers to the conjugal unit, and
"relatives," which does not refer to any solidarity unit at all, but
only to anyone who is a kinsman.

Ours then is a "conjugal"-'' system in that it is made up exclusively
of interlocking conjugal families. The principle of structural rela-
tion of these families is founded on the fact that, as a consequence
of the incest tabu, ego is always in the structurally normaF' case
a member not of one but of two conjugal families, those which
Warner usefully distinguishes as the "family of orientation," into
which he is born as a child, and the "family of procreation," which
is founded by his marriage. Moreover, he is the only"^ common
member of the two families.

From ego's point of view, then, the core, of the kinship system
is constituted by families 1 and 2 in the diagram, in the one case
his father, mother, brothers and sisters, in the other his spouse

•* The most important exception is its usage in upper class circles to denote
what Warner calls a "lineage," i.e., a group possessing continuity over several
generations, usually follovdng the "name line," e.g., the "Adams family." See
W. L. Warner and Lunt, Social Life of a Modern Community. The significance
of tliis exception will be commented upon below.

5 See Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, Ch. VIII, for the very useful dis-
tinction between "conjugal" and "consanguine" kinship types.

*» Excluding, af course, those who do not marry. But failure to marry has no
positive structural consequences in relation to kinship— only negative.

"> It is of course possible for two pairs— or even more— of siblings to
intermarry. This case is, however, without structural significance.

4. First-degree collateral families (number indefinite, 2 types)

5. First-degree descendant families (number indefinite, 2 types)

6. In-law family (1 only)

7. Second-degree ascendant and descendant families (4 ascendant, descendant
indefinite, 4 types)

8. Second-degree collateral families (all children ego's cousins)

Structural Groupings of Families:

I. 1 -f 2 — Inner circle
II. 3, 4, 5 -f 6 — Outer circle

III. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 — Families in line of descent

IV. 4, 8 — Collateral families

V. 2, 6 — Articulation of consanguine systems

No difl^erence according to sex of ego, except in the term for spouse and
the fact that, if ego is female, name line does not extend below ego in line
of descent.

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 181

(wife or husband according to eiS.o's sex), sons and daughters. Mon-
ogamy is reflected in the fact that parent and other parent's spouse
are terminologically identical, modified only by the prefix "step"
to take account of second or later marriages, and in the fact that
the terms "father" and "mother," "husband" and "wife" can each
apply to only one person at a time. It is also notable that no dis-
tinction on the basis of birth order is made— all brothers are termi-
nologically alike. But most notable of all is the fact that none of
these seven kinship personalities is terminologically identified with
any relative outside the particular conjugal family in which he is
placed. A brother is specifically distinguished from any male
cousin, the father from any uncle, the mother from any aunt, etc.
These two conjugal families may conveniently be treated as con-
stituting the 'inner circle" of the kinship structure. Relative prior-
ities within them will be discussed below.

Now each member of ego's inner kinship circle is the connecting
link with one other terminologically recognized conjugal family.
Moreover he links the family of orientation or procreation, as the
case may be, with onhj one farther conjugal family, and each indi-
vidual with a separate one. The kinship personalities of this "outer
circle" are not, however, always terminologically separate, a fact
which will be shown to be of paramount importance.

The first pair of outer circle families, which may be called the
"first ascendant," are the families of orientation of ego's parents.
Besides the articulating personality, each consists of the four
kinship personalities of grandfather, grandmother, uncle, and aunt.
The most significant fact is the lack of terminological distinction
between the paternal and the maternal families of orientation-
grandparents, uncles and aunts are alike regardless of which "side"
they are on. The only important exception to this lies, not in kin-
ship terminology as such but in the patrilineal inheritance of the
family name, giving rise to a unilateral "name line" (9). Since the
same principle of lack of distinction by sex of intervening relative
applies to still higher ascendant generations— the four great-and
eight great-great-grandfathers— it is perhaps more accurate to speak
of a "multilinear' than a "bilateral" system. Anyone of an indefinite
number of lines of descent may be treated as significant. Above all,
the extension from the principle of foilaterality, as applied to the
first ascendant (and descendant) families, to that of mw/^ilineality
in succeeding generations is completely incompatible with any tend-
ency to bifurcate the kin group on the basis of lines of descent.

182 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The same fundamental principles govern the terminology of the
first collateral families (4), the families of procreation of ego's
siblings; and the first descendant families (5), the families of pro-
creation of his children. It is noteworthy that siblings' spouses are
terminologically assimilated to sibling status with the suffix "in-
law"—generally not used in address or the more intimate occasions
of reference— and that nephews and nieces are the same whether
they are brothers' or sisters' children and regardless of the sex of
ego. Similarly spouses of children are assimilated to the status of
children by the same terminological device and sons' and daughters'
children are all indiscriminately grandchildren. Finally, both sib-
lings-in-law and children-in-law are terminologically segregated
from any kinship status relative to ego except that in the particular
conjugal family which is under consideration.

The last outer circle family, the "in-law" family (6), has a very
particular significance. It is the only one of those to which ego's
inner circle is linked to which he is not bound by descent and con-
sanguinity but only by affinity, and this fact is a paramount
importance, signalizing as it does the openness of our system.
Preferential mating on a kinship basis, that is, is completely without
structural significance, and every marriage in founding a new con-
jugal family brings together (in the type case) two completely un-
related kinship groups which are articulated on a kinship basis
only in this one particular marriage. Seen from a somewhat more
generalized point of view, if we take the total inner and outer
circle group of ego's kin as a "system," it is articulated to another
entirely distinct system of the same structure by every peripheral
relative (i.e., who is not a connecting link between the inner and
outer circles), except in tlie direct lines of descent. The conse-
quence is a maximum of dispersion of the lines of descent and the
prevention of the structuring of kinship groups on any other prin-
ciple than the "onion" principle, which implies proportionately in-
creasing "distantness" with each "circle" of linked conjugal families.*

Another way of throwing the significance of this basic open-multi-
lineal structure into relief is to recall the fact that ego's family of
orientation and his in-law family are, from the point of view of his

** In any finite population, lines of descent are bound to cross somewhere,
and in our society the marriage of fairly close relatives is not infrequent. But
there is no consistent pattern in this intermarriage, and it is hence without
structural consequences.

Most of the essentials of an open conjugal system can be maintained,
while a high level of generation continuity in at least one line is also main-

KINSmP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 183

children, both first ascendant families whose members are equally
grandparents, aunts and uncles.

In principle it is possible to distinguish, beyond the outer circle,
further layers of the "onion" indefinitely. It is, however, significant
that our kinship terminology ceases at this point to apply at all
specific terms, fundamentally recognizing only two elements. First
is the line of descent (8) designated by the ascendant and descend-
ant family terms with the addition of the reduplicating prefix "great
—e.g., great-grandfather and great-grandson. Second is the indis-
criminate category "cousins" into which all "collaterals" are thrown,
with only the descriptive^ devices of "first," "third," "once removed,"
etc., to distinguish them by.

How far can this distinctive terminology be said to "reflect" the
actual institutional structure of kinship? In a broad way it certainly
does. We clearly have none of the "extended" kin groupings so
prevalent among non-literate peoples, such as patrilineal or matri-
lineal clans. We have no exogamy except that based on "degree" of
relationship. We have no preferential mating— all these are a matter
of the simplest common knowledge. But to get a clearer conception
of the more specific structure it is essential to turn to a different
order of evidence.

In the first place, the importance of the isolated conjugal family
is brought out by the fact that it is the normal "household" unit.
This means it is the unit of residence and the unit whose members
as a matter of course pool a common basis of economic support,
especially with us, money income. Moreover, in the typical case
neither the household arrangements nor the source of income bear
any specific relation to the family of orientation of either spouse,
or, if there is any, it is about as likely to be to the one as to the
other. But the typical conjugal family lives in a home segregated
from those of both pairs of parents (if living) and is economically

tained, by a systematic discrimination between lines of descent— especially
through primogeniture. The extent to which this has and has not occurred is
the most important range of variation within the basic pattern and will have
to be discussed in some detail below.

^ It should perhaps be explicitly stated that though sometimes called a
"descriptive" system by some or the older anthropologists, our terminology is by
no means literally descriptive of exact biological relationships. Above all it fails
to distinguish relatives whose relation to ego is traced through diflFerent hues of
descent. But it also fails to distinguish by birth order, or to distinguish siblings'
spouses from spouses' siblings— both are brothers- or sisters-in-law. Finally,
as just noted, it stops making distinctions very soon, treating all collaterals as

184 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

independent of both. In a very large proportion of cases the geo-
graphical separation is considerable. Furthermore, the primary
basis of economic support and of many other elements of social
status lies t>qoically in the husband's occupational status, his "job,"
which he typically holds independently of any particularistic rela-
tion to kinsmen.

The isolation of the conjugal unit in this country is in strong con-
trast to much of the historic structure of European society where a
much larger and more important element have inherited home,
source of economic support, and specific occupational status (espe-
cially a farm or family enterprise) from their fathers. This of course
has had to involve discrimination between siblings since the whole
complex of property and status had to be inherited intact.^**

Hence considerable significance attaches to our patterns of in-
heritance of property. Here the important thing is the absence of
any specific favoring of any particular line of descent. Formally,
subject to protection of the interests of widows, complete testa-
mentary freedom exists. The American law of intestacy, however,
in specific contrast to the older English Common Law tradition,
gives all children, regardless of birth order or sex, equal shares.
But even more important, the actual practice of wills overwhelm-
ingly conforms to this pattern. Where deviations exist they are not
bound up with the kinship structure as such but are determined by
particular relationships or situations of need. There is also notice-
able in our society a relative weakness of pressure to leave all or
even most property to kin.^^

It is probably safe to assume that an essentially open system, with
a primary stress on the conjugal family and corresponding absence
of groupings of collaterals cutting across conjugal families, has ex-
isted in Western society since the period when the kinship termin-
ology of the European languages took shape. The above evidence,
however, is sufficient to show that within this broad type the Ameri-
can system has, by contrast with its European forbears, developed
far in the direction of a symfnetricaUy multilineal type. This rela-
tive absence of any structural bias in favor of solidarity with the
ascendant and descendant families in any one line of descent has

1*^ Though perhaps the commonest pattern, primogeniture has by no means
been universal. Cf. Arensberg and Kimball, Family and Society in Ireland, and
G. C. Homans, English Villagers of the I3th Century.

^1 Indeed a wealthy man who completely neglected philanthropies in his
will would be criticized.

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 185

enormously increased the structural isolation of the individual
conjugal family. This isolation, the almost symmetrical "onion"
structure, is the most distinctive feature of the American kinship
system and underlies most of its peculiar functional and dynamic
problems.

Before entering into a few of these, it should be made clear that
the incidence of the fully developed type in the American social
structure is uneven and important tendencies to deviation from it
are found in certain structural areas. In the first place, in spite of
the extent to which American agriculture has become "commercial-
ized," the economic and social conditions of rural life place more
of a premium on continuity of occupation and status from genera-
tion to generation than do urban conditions, and hence, especially
perhaps among the more solidly established rural population, some-
thing approaching Le Play's famille souche is not unusual.

Secondly, there are important upper class elements in this country
for which elite status is closely bound up with the status of ancestry,
hence the continuity of kinship solidarity in a— mainly patrilineal—
line of descent, in "lineages. "^^ Therefore in these "family elite"
elements the symmetry of the multilineal kinship structure is sharply
skewed in the direction of a patrilineal system with a tendency
to primogeniture— one in many respects resembling that histori-
cally prevalent among European aristocracies, though considerably
looser. There is a tendency for this in turn to be bound up with
family property, especially an ancestral home, and continuity of
status in a particular local community.

Finally, third, there is evidence that in lower class situations, in
diflFerent ways both rural and urban, there is another type of devi-
ance from this main kinship pattern. This type is connected with
a strong tendency to instability of marriage and a "mother-centered"
type of family structure— found both in Negro and white population
elements.^^ It would not disturb the multilineal symmetry of the

1- Cf. Warner and Lunt, op. cit., and A Davis and Gardner, Deep South:
1-^ Cf. Davis and Gardner, op. cit., Ch. VI, E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro
Family in the United States, and Lynd, Middletown in Transition. Mrs. Florence
Kluckhohn of Wellesley College has called my attention to a fourth deviant
type which she calls the "suburban matriarchy." In certain suburban areas,
especially with upper-middle class population, the husband and father is out
of the home a very large proportion of the time. He tends to leave by far the
greater part of responsibility for children to his wife and also either not to par-
ticipate in the afiFairs of the local community at all or only at the instance of
his wife. This would apply to informal social relationships where both enter-
taining and acceptances of invitations are primarily arranged by the wife or on
her initiative.

1S6 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

system but would favor a very different type of conjugal family,
even if it tended to be as nearly isolated as tlie main type from
other kinship groups. This situation has not, however, been at all
adequately studied from a functional point of view.

Thus what is here treated as the focal American type of kinship
structure is most conspicuously developed in the urban middle
class areas of the society. This fact is strong evidence of the inter-
dependence of kinship structure with other structural aspects of
the same society, some of which will be briefly discussed below.

In approaching the functional analysis of the central American
kinship type, the focal point of departure must lie in the crucial
fact that ego is a member not of one but of two conjugal families.
This fact is of course of central significance in all kinship systems,
but in our own it acquires a special importance because of the struc-
tural prominence of the conjugal family and its peculiar isolation.
In most kinship systems many persons retain throughout the life
cycle a fundamentally stable— though changing— status in one or
more extended kinship units.^^ In our system this is not the case
for anyone.

The most immediate consequences he in the structural signifi-
cance of the marriage relationship, especially in relation to the lines
of descent and to the sibling tie. Ego, by marriage, that is, is by
comparison with other kinship systems drastically segregated from
his family of orientation, both from his parents— and their forbears
—and from his siblings. His first kinship loyalty is unequivocally
to his spouse and then to their children if and when any are born.
Moreover, his family of procreation, by virtue of a common house-
hold, income, and community status, becomes a solidarity unit in
the sense in which the segregation of the interests of individuals
is relatively meaningless, whereas the segregation of these interests
of ego from those of the family of orientation tends relatively to
minimize solidarity with the latter.

The strong emphasis for ego as an adult on the marriage rela-
tionship at the expense of those to parents and siblings is directly
correlative with the symmetrical multilineality of the system. From
the point of view of the marriage pair, that is, neither family of
orientation, particularly neither parental couple, has structurally
sanctioned priority of status. It is thus in a sense a balance of

1"* This is conspicuously true, for example, in a unilateral clan system, of
the members of the sex group on which tiie continuity of tlie clan rests. The
situation of the other, the "out-marrying," sex, is, on the other hand, quite
difFerent.

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 187

power situation in which independence of the family of procreation
is favored by the necessity of maintaining impartiahty as between
the two famihes of orientation.'^

From this it seems legitimate to conclude that in a peculiar sense
which is not equally applicable to other systems the marriage bond
is, in our society, the main structural keystone of the kinship sys-
tem. This results from the structural isolation of the conjugal
family and the fact that the married couple are not supported by
comparably strong kinship ties to other adults. Closely related to
this situation is that of choice of marriage partner. It is not only
an open system in that there is no preferential mating on a kinship
basis, but since the new marriage is not typically "incorporated"
into an already existing kinship unit, the primary structural reasons
for an important influence on marriage choice being exerted by
the kin of the prospective partners are missing or at least minimized.

It is true that something approaching a system of "arranged"
marriages does persist in some situations, especially where couples
brought up in the same local community marry and expect to settle
down there— or where there are other particularistic elements pres-
ent as in cases of "marrying the boss's daughter." Our open system,
however, tends very strongly to a pattern of purely personal choice
of marriage partner without important parental influence. With
increasing social mobility, residential, occupational and other, it
has clearly become the dominant pattern. Though not positively
required by the kinship structure, freedom of choice is not im-
peded by it, and the structure is probably, in various ways, con-
nected with the motivation of this freedom, an important aspect of
the "romantic love" complex.

A closely related functional problem touches the character of the
marriage relationship itself. Social systems in which a considerable
number of individuals are in a complex and delicate state of mutual
interdependence tend greatly to limit the scope of "personal" emo-
tional feeling or, at least, its direct expression in action. Any con-
siderable range of affective spontaneity would tend to impinge on

^^ See Simmel's well-known essay on the significance of number in social
relationships. ( Soziologie, Ch. II ) . This is an illuminating case of the triadic"
group. It is not, however, institutionally that of tertius gaudens since that im-
plies one "playing off the other two against each other," though informally it
may sometimes approach that. Institutionally, however, what is most unportant
is the requirement of impartiality between the two families of orientation.
Essentially the same considerations apply as between an older couple and two
or more of their married children's families of procreation— impartiality ir-
respective of sex or birth order is expected.

188 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the statuses and interests of too many others, with disequihbrating
consequences for the system as a whole. This need to hmit affec-
tive spontaneity is fundamentally why arranged marriages tend to
be found in kinship systems where the newly married couple is
incorporated into a larger kin group, but it also strongly colors the
character of the marriage relationship itself, tending to place the
primary institutional sanctions upon matters of objective status and
obligations to other kin, not on subjective sentiment. ^^ Thus the
structural isolation of the conjugal family tends to free the affec-
tive inclinations of the couple from a whole series of hampering
restrictions.

These restrictive forces, which in other kinship systems inhibit
affective expression, have, however, positive functional significance
in maintaining tlie solidarity of the effective kinship unit. Very
definite expectations in the definition of role, combined with a
complex system of interrelated sanctions, both positive and nega-
tive, go far to guarantee stability and the maintenance of standards
of performance. In the American kinship system this kind of in-
stitutionalized support of the role of marriage partner through its
interlocking with other kinship roles is, if not entirely lacking, at
least very much weaker. A functionally equivalent substitute in
motivation to conformity with the expectations of the role is clearly
needed. It may hence be suggested that the institutional sanction
placed on the proper subjective sentiments of spouses, in short the
expectation that they have an obligation to be "in love," has this
significance. This in turn is related to personal choice of marriage
partner, since affective devotion is, particularly in our culture,
linked to a presumption of the absence of any element of coercion.
This would seem to be a second important basis of the prominence
of the "romantic complex,"

Much evidence has accumulated to show that conformity with
the expectations of socially structured roles is not to be taken as a
matter of course, but that often there are typically structured sources
of psychological strain which underlie socially structured mani-

1" This tendency for miiltiple-mcmbcred social systems to repress spon-
taneous manifestations of sentiment should not be taken too absolutely. In such
phenomena as cliques, there is room for the following of personal inclinations
within the framework of institutionalized statuses. It is, however, probable that
it is more restrictive in groups where, as in kinship, the institutionalized rela-
tionships are iiarticularistic and functionally diffuse than in universalistic and
functionally specific systems such as modern occupational organizations. In the
latter case personal affective relationships can, within considerable limits, be
institutionally ignored as belonging to the sphere of "private affairs."

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 189

festations of the kind which Kardiner has called "secondary insti-
tutions."^'^

Much psychological research has suggested the very great im-
portance to the individual of his affective ties, established in early
childhood, to other members of his family of orientation. When
strong affective ties have been formed, it seems reasonable to
believe that situational pressures which force their drastic modi-
fication will impose important strains upon the individual.

Since all known kinship systems impose an incest tabu, the transi-
tion from asexual intrafamilial relationships to the sexual relation
of marriage— generally to a previously relatively unknown person
—is general. But with us this transition is accompanied by a process
of "emancipation" from the ties both to parents and to siblings,
which is considerably more drastic than in most kinship systems,
especially in that it applies to both sexes about equally, and in-
cludes emancipation from solidarity with all members of the family
of orientation about equally, so that there is relatively little con-
tinuity with any kinship ties established by birth for anyone.

The effect of these factors is reinforced by two others. Since the
effective kinship unit is normally the small conjugal family, the
child's emotional attachments to kin are confined to relatively few
persons instead of being distributed more widely. Especially im-
portant, perhaps, is the fact that no other adult woman has a role
remotely similar to that of the mother. Hence the average intensity
of affective involvement in family relations is likely to be high.
Secondly, the child's relations outside the family are only to a
small extent ascribed. Both in the play group and in the school he
must to a large extent "find his own level" in competition with
others. Hence the psychological significance of his security within
the family is heightened.

We have then a situation where at the same time the inevitable
importance of family ties is intensified and a necessity to become
emancipated from them is imposed. This situation would seem to
have a good deal to do with the fact that with us adolescence— and
beyond— is, as has been frequently noted, a "difiicult" period in
the life cycle.^^ In particular, associated with this situation is the
prominence in our society of what has been called a "youth cul-
ture," a distinctive pattern of values and attitudes of the age groups

1^ See Abraham Kardiner, The Individual and His Society.
^^ Cf. the various writings of Margaret Mead, especially her Coming of Age
in Samoa and Sex and Temperament.

190 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

between childhood and the assumption of full adult responsibilities.
This youth culture, with its irresponsibility, its pleasure-seeking, its
"rating and dating," and its intensification of the romantic love
pattern, is not a simple matter of "apprenticeship" in adult values
and responsibilities. It bears many of the marks of reaction to
emotional tension and insecurity, and in all probability has among
its functions that of easing the difficult process of adjustment from
childhood emotional dependency to full "maturity."^ ^ In it we
find still a third element underlying the prominence of the romantic
love complex in American society.

The emphasis which has here been placed on the multilineal
symmetry of our kinship structure might be taken to imply that
our society was characterized by a correspondingly striking assimi-
lation of the roles of the sexes to each other. It is true that Ameri-
can society manifests a high level of the "emancipation" of women,
which in important respects involves relative assimilation to mas-
culine roles, in accessibility to occupational opportunity, in legal
rights relative to property holding, and in various other respects.
Undoubtedly the kinship system constitutes one of the important
sets of factors underlying this emancipation since it does not, as
do so many kinship systems, place a structural premium on the
role of either sex in the maintenance of the continuity of kinship
relations.

But the elements of sex-role assimilation in our society are con-
spicuously combined with elements of segregation which in many
respects are even more striking than in other societies, as for in-
stance in the matter of the much greater attention given by women
to st>'le and refinement of taste in dress and personal appearance.
This and other aspects of segregation are connected with the struc-
ture of kinship, but not so much by itself as in its interrelations
with the occupational system.

The members of the conjugal family in our urban society normally
share a common basis of economic support in the form of money
income, but this income is not derived from the co-operative efforts
of the family as a unit— its principal source lies in the remuneration
of occupational roles performed by individual members of the
family. Status in an occupational role is generally, however, speci-
fically segregated from kinship status— a person holds a "job" as an
individual, not by virtue of his status in a family.

1® Cf. N. J. Demerath, Schizophrenia and the Sociology of Adolescence.

Dissertation, Harvard University, 1942, (unpub.)

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 191

Among the occupational statuses of members of a family, if there
is more than one, much the most important is that of the husband.
and father, not only because it is usually the primary source of
family income, but also because it is the most important single
basis of the status of the family in the community at large. To be
the main "breadwinner" of his family is a primary role of the normal
adult man in our society. The corollary of this role is his far
smaller participation than that of his wife in the internal afiFairs of
the household. Consequently, "housekeeping" and the care of
children is still the primary functional content of the adult feminine
role in the "utilitarian" division of labor. Even if the married
woman has a job, it is, at least in the middle classes, in the great
majority of cases not one which in status or remuneration competes
closely with those held by men of her own class. Hence there is a
typically asymmetrical relation of the marriage pair to the occu-
pational structure.

This asymmetrical relation apparently both has exceedingly im-
portant positive functional significance and is at the same time an
important source of strain in relation to the patterning of sex roles.-^

On the positive functional side, a high incidence of certain types
of patterns is essential to our occupational system and to the insti-
tutional complex in such fields as property and exchange which
more immediately surround this system. In relatively common-
sense terms it requires scope for the valuation of personal achieve-
ment, for equality of opportunity, for mobility in response to
technical requirements, for devotion to occupational goals and
interests relatively unhampered by "personal" considerations. In
more technical terms it requires a high incidence of technical
competence, of rationality, of universalistic norms, and of functional
specificity.^^ All these are drastically different from the patterns
which are dominant in the area of kinship relations, where ascrip-
tion of status by birth plays a prominent part, and where roles are
defined primarily in particularistic and functionally diffuse terms.

It is quite clear that the type of occupational structure which
is so essential to our society requires a far-reaching structural
segregation of occupational roles from the kinship roles of the

20 Cf. Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social
Stratification" ( American Journal of Sociology, May, 1940 ) ; and "Age and Sex
in the Social Structure of the United States" {American Sociological Review,
October, 1942). Both reprinted in this volume.

21 For the meaning of these technical terms, see Talcott Parsons, "The Pro-
fessions and Social Structure" {Social Forces, May 1939), reprinted in this vol-

J 92 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

same individuals. They must, in the occupational system, be
treated primarily as individuals. This is a situation drastically dif-
ferent from that found in practically all non-literate societies and
in many that are literate.

At the same time, it cannot be doubted that a solidary kinship
unit has functional significance of the highest order, especially in
relation to the socialization of individuals and to the deeper aspects
of their psychological security. What would appear to have hap-
pened is a process of mutual accommodation between these two
fundamental aspects of our social structure. On the one hand our
kinship system is of a structural type which, broadly speaking,
interferes least with the functional needs of the occupational sys-
tem, above all in that it exerts relatively little pressure for the
ascription of an individual's social status— through class affiliation,
property, and of course particular "jobs"— by virtue of his kinship
status. The conjugal unit can be mobile in status independently
of the other kinship ties of its members, that is, those of the spouses
to tlie members of their families of orientation.

But at the same time this small conjugal unit can be a strongly
solidary unit. This is facilitated by the prevalence of the pattern
that normally only one of its members has an occupational role
which is of determinate significance for the status of the family
as a whole. Minor children, that is, as a rule do not "work," and
when they do, it is already a major step in the process of emanci-
pation from the family of orientation. The wife and mother is
either exclusively a "housewife" or at most has a "job" rather than
a "career."

There are perhaps two primary functional aspects of this situa-
tion. In the first place, by confining the number of status-giving
occupational roles of the members of the eflFective conjugal unit
to one, it eliminates any competition for status, especially as be-
tween husband and wife, which might be disruptive of the solidarity
of marriage. So long as lines of achievement are segregated and
not directly comparable, there is less opportunity for jealousy, a
sense of inferiority, etc., to develop. Secondly, it aids in clarity of
definition of the situation by making the status of the family in
the community relatively definite and unequivocal. There is much
evidence that this relative definiteness of status is an important
factor in psychological security.^^

-- An example of disturbing indeterminacy of family status without occupa-
tional competition between husband and wife is the case where inherited wealth
and family connections of a wife involve the couple in a standard of living and

KINSHIP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 193

The same structural arrangements which have this positive func-
tional significance also give rise to important strains. What has
been said above about the pressure for thoroughgoing emancipa-
tion from the family of orientation is a case in point. But in con-
nection with the sex-role problem there is another important source
of strain.

Historically, in Western culture, it may perhaps be fairly said
that there has been a strong tendency to define the feminine role
psychologically as one strongly marked by elements of dependency.
One of the best symbols perhaps was the fact that until rather
recently the married woman was not sui juris, could not hold
property, make contracts, or sue in her own right. But in the mod-
ern American kinship system, to say nothing of other aspects of
the culture and social structure, there are at least two pressures
which tend to counteract this dependency and have undoubtedly
played a part in the movement for feminine emancipation.

The first, already much discussed, is the multilineal symmetry
of the kinship system which gives no basis of sex discrimination,
and which in kinship terms favors equal rights and responsibilities
for both parties to a marriage. The second is the character of the
marriage relationship. Resting as it does primarily on affective
attachment for the other person as a concrete human individual,
a "personality," rather than on more objective considerations of
status, it puts a premium on a certain kind of mutuality and equal-
ity. There is no clearly structured superordination-subordination
pattern. Each is a fully responsible "partner" with a claim to a
voice in decisions, to a certain human dignity, to be "taken seriously."
Surely the pattern of romantic love which makes his relation
to the "woman he loves" the most important single thing in a man's
life, is incompatible with the view that she is an inferior creature,
fit only for dependency on him.

In our society, however, occupational status has tremendous
weight in the scale of prestige values. The fact that the normal
married woman is debarred from testing or demonstrating her
fundamental equality with her husband in competitive occupational
achievement, creates a demand for a functional equivalent. At
least in the middle classes, however, this cannot be found in the
utilitarian functions of the role of housewife since these are treated
as relatively menial functions. To be, for instance, an excellent

social relations to which the husband's occupational status and income would
not give access. Such a situation is usually uncomfortable for the husband, but
also very likely for the wife.

194 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

cook, does not give a hired maid a moral claim to a higher status
than that of domestic servant.

This situation helps perhaps to account for a conspicuous tend-
ency for the feminine role to emphasize broadly humanistic rather
than technically specialized achievement values. One of the key
patterns is that of "good taste," in personal appearance, house
furnishings, cultural things like literature and music. To a large
and perhaps increasing extent the more humanistic cultural tradi-
tions and amenities of life are carried on by women. Since these things
are of high intrinsic importance in the scale of values of our cul-
ture, and since by virtue of the system of occupational specializa-
tion even many highly superior men are greatly handicapped in
respect to them, there is some genuine redressing of the balance
between the sexes.

There is also, however, a good deal of direct evidence of tension
in the feminine role. In the "glamor girl" pattern, use of specifically
feminine devices as an instrument of compulsive search for power
and exclusive attention are conspicuous. Many women succumb
to their dependency cravings through such channels as neurotic
illness or compulsive domesticity and thereby abdicate both their
responsibilities and their opportunities for genuine independence.
Many of the attempts to excel in approved channels of achieve-
ment are marred by garishness of taste, by instability in response
to fad and fashion, by a seriousness in community or club activities
which is out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the task.
In all these and other fields there are conspicuous signs of inse-
curity and ambivalence. Hence it may be concluded that the
feminine role is a conspicuous focus of the strains inherent in our
social structure, and not the least of the sources of these strains
is to be found in the functional difiBculties in the integration of our
kinship system with the rest of the social structure.^^

Finally, a word may be said about one further problem of Amer-
ican society in which kinship plays a prominent part, the situation
of the aged. In various ways our society is oriented to values par-
ticularly appropriate to the younger age groups so that there is a
tendency for older people to be "left out of it." The abruptness
of "retirement" from occupational roles also contributes. But a

23 There is no intention to imply that the adult masculine role in American
society is devoid of comparably severe strains. They are not, however, prima
facie so intimately connected with the structure of kinship as are those of the
feminine role.

KINSmP SYSTEM OF CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 195

primary present concern is one implication of the structural isola-
tion of the conjugal family. The obverse of the emancipation, upon
marriage and occupational independence, of children from their
families of orientation is the depletion of that family until the
older couple is finally left alone. This situation is in strong con-
trast to kinship systems in which membership in a kinship unit is
continuous throughout the life cycle. There, very frequently, it is
the oldest members who are treated with the most respect and
have the greatest responsibility and authority. But with us there
is no one left to respect them, for them to take responsibility for or
have authority over.

For young people not to break away from their parental families
at the proper time is a failure to live up to expectations, an unwar-
ranted expression of dependency. But just as they have a duty to
break away, they also have a right to independence. Hence for an
older couple— or a widow or widower— to join the household of a
married child is not, in the terms of the kinship structure, a "na-
tural" arrangement. This is proved by the fact that it is seldom
done at all except under pressure, either for economic support or
to mitigate extreme loneliness and social isolation.^^ Even though
in such situations it may be the best solution of a difficult problem
it very frequently involves considerable strain, which is by no
means confined to one side. The whole situation would be radically
different in a different kind of kinship structure. It may be sur-
mised that this situation, as well as "purely economic" questions,
underlies much of the current agitation for old age pensions and
the appeal of such apparently fantastic schemes as the Townsend
Plan.

In this brief paper there can be no pretense of anything approach-
ing an exhaustive functional analysis of the American kinship sys-
tem or of its structural interdependence with other aspects of our
social structure. A few problems of this order have been presented,
beyond a direct descriptive analysis of the kinship structure as
such, to illustrate the importance of a clear and thorough grasp of
this structure in the understanding of many problems of the func-

24 These pressures are, of course, likely to be by far most acute in the case
of widows and widowers, especially the former. They are also considerably the
more numerous, and often there is no other at all tolerable solution than to live
in the family of a married child. Being joined and cared for by an unmarried
child, especially a daughter, is another way out for the aged which often involves
acute tragedies for the younger person.

196 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

tioning of American society, including its specific pathology. This,
by and large, sociological students of the Amercian family have
failed to provide or use systematically. It is as a contribution
toward filling the gap in our working analytical equipment that
the present paper has been conceived.

X

The Theoretical Development of
the Sociology of Religion

A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN
SOCIAL SCIENCE

THE PRESENT PAPER will attempt to present in broad outline what
seems to the writer one of the most significant chapters in the re-
cent history of sociological theory, that dealing with the broader
structure of the conceptual scheme for the analysis of religious
phenomena as part of a social system. Its principal significance
would seem to lie on two levels. In the first place, the development
to be outlined represents a notable advance in the adequacy of our
tlieoretical equipment to deal with a critically important range of
scientific problems. Secondly, however, it is at the same time a
particularly good illustration of the kind of process by which major
theoretical developments in the field of social theory can be ex-
pected to take place.

Every important tradition of scientific thought involves a broad
framework of theoretical propositions at any given stage of its
development. Generally speaking, differences will be found only
in the degree to which this framework is logically integrated and
to which it is explicitly and self-consciously acknowledged and
analyzed. About the middle of the last century or shortly there-
after, it is perhaps fair to say, generalized thinking about the sig-
nificance of religion to human life tended to fall into one of two
main categories. The first is the body of thought anchored in the
doctrinal positions of one or another specific religious group, pre-
dominantly of course the various Christian denominations. For
understandable reasons, the main tenor of such thought tended to
be normative rather than empirical and analytical, to assure its own
religious position and to expose the errors of opponents. It is di£B-
cult to see that in any direct sense important contributions to the

198 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

sociology of religion as an empirical science could come from tliis
source.^ The other main category may be broadly referred to as
that of positivistic thinking. The great stream of thought which
culminated in the various branches of utilitarianism, had, of course,
long been much concerned with some of tlie problems of religion.
In its concern with contemporary society, however, the strong
tendency had been to minimize the importance of religion, to treat
it as a matter of "superstition" which had no place in the enlight-
ened thinking of modern civilized man. The result of this tendency
was, in the search for the important forces activating human be-
havior, to direct attention to other fields, such as the economic
and the political. In certain phases the same tendency may be
observed in the trend of positivistic thought toward emphasis on
biology and psychology, which gathered force in the latter part of
the nineteenth century and has continued well into our own.

Perhaps the first important change in this definition of problems,
which was highly unfavorable to a serious scientific interest in the
phenomena of religion, came with the application of the idea of
evolution to human society. Once evidence from non-literate so-
cieties, not to speak of many others, was at all carefully studied,
the observation was inescapable that the life of these so-called
"primitive" men was to an enormous degree dominated by beliefs
and practices which would ordinarily be classified according to the
common-sense thinking of our time as magical and religious. Con-
temporary non-literate peoples, however, were in that generation
predominantly interpreted as the living prototypes of our own
prehistorical ancestors, and hence it was only natural that these
striking phenomena should have been treated as "primitive" in a
strictly evolutionary sense, as belonging to the early stages of the
process of social development. This is the broad situation of the
first really serious treatment of comparative religion in a sociolog-
ical context, especially in the work of the founder of modern
social-anthropology, Tylor,- and of Spencer,-^ perhaps the most pene-
trating theorist of this movement of thought. Though there was
here a basis for serious scientific interest, the positivistic scheme
of thought imposed severe limitations on the kind of significance

1 It was far less unfavorable to historical contributions than to those affect-
ing the analytical framework of the subject.

2 Primitive Culture.

3 Esp. Principles of Suciulogy, Vol. I.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION J99

which could be attributed to the observed phenomena. Within the
positivistic schema, the most obvious directions of theoretical inter-
pretation were two. On the one hand, religious phenomena could
be treated as the manifestations of underlying biological or psycho-
logical factors beyond the reach of rational control, or interpreta-
tions in terms of subjective categories. [ Most generally this pattern
led to some version of the instinct theory, which has suffered,
however, some very serious scientific handicaps in that it has never
proved possible to relate the detailed variations in the behavioral [^
phenomena to any corresponding variations in the structure of
instinctual drives. /The whole scheme has on the level of social
theory never successfully avoided the pitfalls of reasoning in a
circle.

The other principal alternative was what may be called the
"rationalistic" variation of positivism,"* the tendency to treat the
actor as if he were a rational, scientific investigator, acting "reason-
ably" in the light of the knowledge available to him. This was the
path taken by Tylor and Spencer with the general thesis that
primitive magical and religious ideas were ideas which in the situa-
tion of primitive men, considering the lack of accumulated knowl-
edge and the limitations of the technique and opportunities of
observation, it would reasonably be expected they would arrive at.
With beliefs like that in a soul separable from the body, ritual
practices in turn are held to be readily understandable^^ It is, how-
ever, a basic assumption of this pattern of thinking that the only
critical standards to which religious ideas can be referred are those
of empirical validity!^ It almost goes without saying that no enlight-
ened modem could entertain such beliefs, that hence what we
think of as distinctively religious and magical beliefs, and hence
also the accompanying practices, will naturally disappear as an
automatic consequence of the advance in scientific knowledge.

Inadequate as it is in the light of modern knowledge, this schema
has proved to be the fruitful starting-point for the development
of the field, for it makes possible the analysis of action in terms of
the subjective point of view of the actor in his orientation to specific
features of the situation in which he acts. Broadly speaking, to
attempt to deal with the empirical inadequacies of this view by
jumping directly, through the medium of anti-intellectualistic psy-

^ See the author's The Structure of Social Action, Chaps. II and III.

200 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

chology, to the more fundamental forces activating human behavior,
has not proved fruitful. The fruitful path has rather been the intro-
duction of specific refinements and distinctions within the basic
stnictural scheme with which "rationalistic positivism" started. The
body of this paper will be concerned with a review of several of
the most important of these steps in analytical refinement, showing
how, taken together, they have led up to a far more comprehensive
analytical scheme. This can perhaps most conveniently be done
in terms of the contributions of four important theorists, Pareto,
Malinowski, Durkheim, and Max Weber, none of whom had any
important direct influence on any of the others.

It is of primary significance that Pareto's^ analytical scheme for
tlie treatment of a social system started precisely with this funda-
mental frame of reference. Like the earlier positivists, he took as
his starting-point the cognitive patterns in terms which the actor
is oriented to his situation of action. Again like them, he based his
classification on the relation of these patterns to the standards of
empirical scientific validity— in his terms, to "logico-experimental"
standards. At this point, however, he broke decisively with the
main positivistic tradition. He found it necessary, on grounds which
in view of Pareto's general intellectual character most certainly
were primarily empirical rather than philosophical, to distinguish
two modes of deviance from conformity with logico-experimental
standards. There were, on the one hand, the modes of deviance
familiar to the older positivists, namely the failure to attain a
logico-experimental solution of problems intrinsically capable of
such solution. This may be attributable either to ignorance, the
sheer absence of logically necessary knowledge of fact, or possibly
of inference, or to error, to allegations of fact which observation
can disprove or to logical fallacy in inference. In so far as cogni-
tive patterns were deviant in this respect, Pareto summed them up
as "pseudo-scientific" theories. Failure to conform with logico-
experimental standards was not, however, confined to this mode of
deviance, but included another, "the theories which surpass expe-
rience." These involved propositions, especially major premises,
which are intrinsically incapable of being tested by scientific pro-
cedures. The attributes of God, for instance, are not entities cap-

^ The Mind and Society. See also the author's The Structure of Social
Action, Chap. V— VII; and "Pareto's Central Analytical SLhen\e," Journal of
Social Philosophy, I, 1935, 1AA-2b2.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 201

able of empirical observation; hence propositions involving them
can by logico-experimental methods neither be proved nor dis-
proved. In this connection, Pareto's primary service lay in the
clarity with which the distinction was worked out and applied, and
his demonstration of the essentially prominent role in systems of
human action of the latter class of cognitive elements. It is pre-
cisely in the field of religious ideas and of theological and meta-
physical doctrines that its prominence has been greatest.

Pareto, however, did not stop here. From tlie very first, he
treated the cognitive aspects of action in terms of their functional
interdependence with the other elements of the social system,
notably with what he called the "sentiments." He thereby broke
through the "rationalistic bias" of earlier positivism and demon-
strated by an immense weight of evidence that it was not possible
to deal adequately with the significance of religious and magical
ideas solely on the hypothesis that men entertaining them as beliefs
drew the logical conclusions and acted accordingly. In this con-
nection, Pareto's position has been widely interpreted as essen-
tially a psychological one, as a reduction of non-logical ideas to the
status of mere manifestations of instinct. Critical analysis of his
work^ shows, however, that this interpretation is not justified, but
that he left the question of the more ultimate nature of non-cog-
nitive factors open. It can be shown that the way in which he
treated the sentiments is incompatible in certain critical respects
with the hypothesis that they are biologically inherited instinctual
drives alone. This would involve a determinacy irrespective of
cultural variation, which he explicitly repudiated.

It is perhaps best to state that, as Pareto left the subject, there
were factors particularly prominent in the field of religious be-
havior which involved the expression of sentiments or attitudes
other than those important to action in a rationally utilitarian
context. He did not, however, go far in analyzing the nature of
these factors. It should, however, be clear that with the introduc-
tion, as a functionally necessary category, of the non-empirical
effective elements which cannot be fitted into the pattern of rational
techniques, Pareto brought about a fundamental break in the neatly
closed system of positivistic interpretation of the phenomena of
religion. He enormously broadened the analytical perspective

6 Cf. The Structure of Social Action, 200 flF., 241 ff.

202 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

which needed to be taken into account before a new theoretical
integration could be achieved.

The earlier positivistic theory started with the attempt to ana-
lyze the relation of the actor to particular types of situations com-
mon to all human social life, such as death and the experience of
dreams. This starting-point was undoubtedly sound. The diffi-
culty lay in interpreting such situations and the actor's relations
to them too narrowly, essentially as a matter of the solution of
empirical problems, of the actor's resorting to a "reasonable" course
of action in the light of beliefs which he took for granted. Pareto
provided much evidence that this exclusively cognitive approach
was not adequate, but it remained for Malinowski" to return to
detailed analysis of action in relation to particular situations in a
broader perspective. Malinowski maintained continuity with the
"classical" approach in that he took men's adaptation to practical
situations by rational knowledge and technique as his initial point
of reference. Instead of attempting to fit all the obvious facts
positively into this framework, however, he showed a variety of
reasons why in many circumstances rational knowledge and tech-
nique could not provide adequate mechanisms of adjustment to the
total situation.

This approach threw into high relief a fundamental empirical
observation, namely that instead of there being one single set of
ideas and practices involved, for instance in gardening, canoe-
building, or deep-sea fishing in the Trobriand Islands, there were
in fact two distinct systems. On the one hand, the native was
clearly possessed of an impressive amount of sound empirical
knowledge of the proper uses of the soil and the processes of plant
growth. He acted quite rationally in terms of his knowledge and
above all was quite clear about the connection between intelligent
and energetic work and a favorable outcome. There is no tend-
ency to excuse failure on supernatural grounds when it could be
clearly attributed to failure to attain adequate current standards
of technical procedure. Side by side with this system of rational
knowledge and technique, however, and specifically not confused
with it, was a system of magical beliefs and practices. These be-
liefs concerned the possible intervention in the situation of forces
and entities which are "supernatural" in the sense that they are

"^ See esp. "Magic, Science, and Religion," by Bronislaw Malinowski, edited
by Robert Redfield, the Free Press, Glencoe, 111.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 203

not from our point of view objects of empirical observation and
experience, but rather what Pareto would call "imaginary" enti-
ties, and on the other hand, entities with a specifically sacred char-
acter. Correspondingly, the practices were not rational techniques
but rituals involving specific orientation to this world of super-
natural forces and entities. It is true that the Trobriander believes
that a proper performance of magic is indispensable to a successful
outcome of the enterprise; but it is one of Malinowski's most im-
portant insights that this attribution applies only to the range of
uncertainty in the outcome of rational technique, to those factors
in the situation which are beyond rational understanding and con-
trol on the part of the actor.

This approach to the analysis of primitive magic enabled Malin-
owski clearly to refute both the view of Levy-Bruhl,^ that primitive
man confuses the realm of the supernatural and the sacred with
the utilitarian and the rational, and also the view which had been
classically put forward by Frazer^ that magic was essentially
primitive science, serving the same fundamental functions.

Malinowski, however, went beyond this in attempting to under-
stand the functional necessity for such mechanisms as magic. In
this connection, he laid stress on the importance of the emotional
interests involved in the successful outcome of such enterprises.
The combination of a strong emotional interest with important
factors of uncertainty, which on the given technical level are in-
herent in the situation, produces a state of tension and exposes the
actor to frustration. This, it should be noted, exists not only in
cases where uncontrollable factors, such as bad weather or insect
pests in gardening, result in "undeserved" failure, but also in
cases where success is out of proportion to reasonable expectations
of the results of intelligence and effort. Unless there were mecha-
nisms which had the psychological function of mitigating the sense
of frustration, the consequences would be unfavorable to main-
taining a high level of confidence or effort, and it is in this connec-
tion that magic may be seen to perform important positive
functions. It should be clear that this is a very different level of
interpretation from that which attributes it only to the primitive
level of knowledge. It would follow that wherever such uncertainty
elements enter into the pursuit of emotionally important goals, if

* Primitive Mentality.
9 The Golden Bough.

204 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

not magic, at least functionally equivalent phenomena could be
expected to appear.^"

In the case of magic, orientation to supernatural entities enters
into action which is directed to the achievement of practical, em-
pirical goals, such as a good crop or a large catch of fish. Malin-
owski, however, calls attention to the fact that there are situations
which are analogous in other respects but in which no practical
goal can be pursued. I The type case of this is death") From the
practical point of view, the Trobrianders, like anyone else, are
surely aware that "nothing can be done about it." No ritual ob-
servances will bring the deceased back to life. But precisely for
this reason, the problem of emotional adjustment is all the greater
in importance. The significance both practically and emotionally
of a human individual is of such a magnitude that his death involves
a major process of readjustment for the survivors. Malinowski
shows that the death of another involves exposure to sharply con-
fhcting emotional reactions, some of which, if given free range,
would lead to action and attitudes detrimental to the social group.
There is great need for patterns of action which provide occasion
for the regulated expression of strong emotions, and which in such
a situation of emotional conflict reinforce those reactions which are
most favorable to the continued solidarity and functioning of the
social group. /One may suggest that in no society is action on the
occasion of death confined to the utilitarian aspects of the disposal
of the corpse and other practical adjustments"! There is always
specifically ritual observance of some kind which, as Malinowski
shows, cannot adequately be interpreted as merely acting out the
bizarre ideas which primitive man in his ignorance develops about
the nature of death.

Malinowski shows quite clearly that neither ritual practices,
magical or religious, nor the beliefs about supernatural forces and
entities integrated with them can be treated simply as a primitive
and inadequate form of rational techniques or scientific knowledge;
they are qualitatively distinct and have quite different functional

I*' For example, the field of health is, in spite of the achievements of modem
medicine, even in our own society a classical example of this type of situation.
Careful examination of our own treatment of health even through medical prac-
tice reveals that though magic in a strict sense is not prominent, there is an
unstable succession of beliefs which overemxihasize the therapeutic possibilities
of certain diagnostic ideas and therapeutic practices. The efi^ect is to create an
optimistic bias in favor of successful treatment of disease which apparently has
considerable functional significance.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 205

significance in the system of action. Durkheim/' however, went
farther than Mahnowski in working out the specific character of
this difference, as well as in bringing out certain further aspects
of the functional problem. Whereas Malinowski tended to focus
attention on functions in relation to action in a situation, Durkheim
became particularly interested in the problem of the specific atti-
tudes exhibited toward supernatural entities and ritual objects and
actions. The results of this study he summed up in the fundamental
distinction between the sacred and the profane. Directly contrast-
ing tlie attitudes appropriate in a ritual context with those towards
objects of utilitarian significance and their use in fields of rational
technique,pie found one fundamental feature of the sacred to be
its radical dissociation from any utilitarian context."^ The sacred is
to be treated with a certain specific attitude of respect, which Durk-
heim identified with the appropriate attitude toward moral
obligations and authority. If the effect of the prominence which
Durkheim gives to the conception of the sacred is strongly to rein-
force the significance of Malinowski's observation that the two sys-
tems are not confused but are in fact treated as essentially separate,
it also brings out even more sharply than did Malinowski the inade-
quacy of the older approach to this range of problems which treated
them entirely as the outcome of intellectual processes in ways in-
distinguishable from the solution of empirical problems. Such treat-
ment could not but obscure the fundamental distinction upon which
Durkheim insisted.

The central significance of the sacred in religion, however, served
to raise in a peculiarly acute form the question of the source of the
attitude of respect.t Spencer, for instance, had derived it from the
belief that the souls of the dead reappear to the living, and from
ideas about the probable dangers of association with them.' Max
Miiller and the naturalist school, on the other hand, had attempted
to derive all sacred things in the last analysis from personification
of certain phenomena of nature which were respected and feared
because of their intrinsically imposing or terrifying character. Durk-
heim opened up an entirely new line of thought by suggesting that
it was hopeless to look for a solution of the problem on this level
at all. There was in fact no common intrinsic quality of things
treated as sacred which could account for the attitude of respect.

11 The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. See also The Structure of
Social Actiou, Chapter XI.

206 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

In fact, almost everything from the sublime to the ridiculous has in
some society been treated as sacred. Hence the source of sacredness
is not intrinsic; the problem is of a diflFerent character. Sacred ob-
jects and entities are symbols. The problem then becomes one of
identifying the referents of such symbols. It is that which is symbol-
ized and not the intrinsic quality of the symbol which becomes
crucial.

At this point Durkheim became aware of the fundamental sig-
nificance of his previous insight that the attitude of respect for
sacred things was essentially identical with the attitude of respect
for moral authority. I If sacred things are symbols, the essential
quality of that which they symbolize is that it is an entity which
would command moral rcspectr^It was by this path that Durkheim
arrived at the famous proposition that society is always the real
object of religious veneration. In this form the proposition is cer-
tainly unacceptable, but there is no doubt of the fundamental
importance of Durkheim's insight into the exceedingly close integra-
tion of the system of religious symbols of a society and the patterns
sanctioned by the common moral sentiments of the members of the
community. In his earher work,^- Durkheim had progressed far in
understanding the functional significance of an integrated system
of morally sanctioned norms. Against this background the integra-
tion he demonstrated suggested a most important aspect of the
functional significance of religion. [Por the problem arises, if moral
norms and the sentiments supporting them are of such primary im-
portance, what are the mechanisms by which they are maintained
other than external processes of enforcement? jIt was Durkheim's
view that religious ritual was of primary significance as a mechan-
ism for expressing and reinforcing the sentiments most essential to
the institutional integration of the society. It can readily be seen
that this is closely linked to Malinowski's view of the significance
of funeral ceremonies as a mechanism for reasserting the solidarity
of the group on the occasion of severe emotional strain. Thus Durk-
heim worked out certain aspects of the specific relations between
religion and social structure more sharply than did Malinowski,
and in addition put the problem in a diflFerent functional perspec-
tive in that he applied it to the society as a whole in abstraction
from particular situations of tension and strain for the individual.

12 Especially De la division du travail and Le suicide. See also The Structure
of Social Action, Chap. VIII, X.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 207

One of the most notable features of the development under con-
sideration lay in the fact that the cognitive patterns associated
with religion were no longer, as in the older positivism, treated as
essentially given points of reference, but were rather brought into
functional relationship with a variety of other elements of social
system of action. Pareto in rather general terms showed their inter-
dependence with the sentiments. Malinowski contributed the ex-
ceedingly important relation to particular types of human situation,
such as those of uncertainty and death. He in no way contradicted
the emphasis placed by Pareto on emotional factors or sentiments.
These, however, acquire their significance for specifically structured
patterns of action only through their relation to specific situations.
Malinowski was well aware in turn of the relation of both these
factors to the solidarity of the social group, but this aspect formed
the center of Durkheim's analytical attention. Clearly, religious
ideas could only be treated sociologically in terms of their inter-
dependence with all four types of factors.

There were, however, still certain serious problems left un-
solved. In particular, neither Malinowski nor Durkheim raised the
problem of the relation of these factors to the variability of social
structure from one society to another. Both were primarily con-
cerned with analysis of the functioning of a given social system
without either comparative or dynamic references. Furthermore,
Durkheim's important insight into the role of symbolism in religious
ideas might, without further analysis, suggest that the specific pat-
terns, hence their variations, were of only secondary importance.
Indeed, there is clearly discernible in Durkheim's thinking in this
field a tendency to circular reasoning in that he tends to treat reli-
gious patterns as a symbolic manifestation of "society," but at the
same time to define the most fundamental aspect of society as a
set of patterns of moral and religious sentiment.

Max Weber approached the whole field in very different terms.
In his study of the relation between Protestantism and capitalism, ^^
his primary concern was with those features of the institutional
system of modern Western society which were most distinctive in
differentiating it from the other great civilizations. Having estab-
lished what he felt to be an adequate relation of congruence be-
tween the cognitive patterns of Calvinism and some of the principal
institutionalized attitudes towards secular roles of our own society,

13 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

20S ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

he set about systematically to place this material in the broadest
possible comparative perspective through studying especially the
religion and social structure of China, India, and ancient Judea.^^
As a generalized result of these studies, he found it was not pos-
sible to reduce the striking variations of pattern on the level of
religious ideas in these cases to any features of an independently
existent social structure or economic situation, though he continu-
ally insisted on the very great importance of situational factors in
a number of diflPerent connections.^^ These factors, however, served
only to pose the problems with which great movements of religious
thought have been concerned. But the distinctive cognitive patterns
were only understandable as a result of a cumulative tradition of
intellectual effort in grappling with the problems thus presented
and formulated.

For present purposes, even more important than Weber's views
about the independent causal significance of religious ideas is his
clarification of their functional relation to the system of action. Fol-
lowing up the same general line of analysis which provides one of
the major themes of Pareto's and Malinowski's work,l\Veber made
clear above all that there is a fundamental distinction between the
significance for human action of problems of empirical causation
and what, on the other hand, he called the "problem of meaning." J
In such cases as premature death through accident, the problem of
! houPit happened in the sense of an adequate explanation of empi-
rical causes can readily be solved to the satisfaction of most minds
and yet leave a sense not merely of emotional but of cognitive frus-
tration with respect to the problem o^why^uch things must hap-
pen^Correlative with the functional need for emotional adjustment
to such experiences as death is a cognitive need for understanding,
for trying to have it "make sense. "^IWeber attempted to show that
problems of this nature, concerning the discrepancy between nor-
mal human interest and expectations in any situation or society
and what actually happens are inherent in the nature of human
existence.'' They always pose problems of the order which on the
most generalized line have come to be known as the problem of
evil, of the meaning of suffering, and the like. In terms of his com-

^"^ Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religionssoziologie. See also The Structure of
Social Action, Chaps. XIV, XV, and XVII.

1^ See especially his treatment of the role of the balance of social power in
the establishment of the ascendancy of the Brahmans in India, and of the inter-
national position of the people of Israel in the definition of religious problems for
the prophetic movement.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 209

parative material, however, Weber shows there are diflFerent direc-
tions of definition of human situations in which rationally integrated
solutions of these problems may be sought. It is differentiation with
respect to the treatment of precisely such problems which consti-
tute the primary modes of variation between the great systems of
religious thought.

Such differences as, for instance, that between the Hindu phi-
losophy of Karma and transmigration and the Christian doctrine
of Grace with their philosophical backgrounds are not of merely
speculative significance. Weber is able to show, in ways which
correlate directly with the work of Malinowski and Durkheim, how
intimately such differences in doctrine are bound up with practical
attitudes towards the most various aspects of everyday life. For
if we can speak of a need to understand ultimate frustrations in
order for tliem to "make sense," it is equally urgent that the values
and goals of everyday life should also "make sense." A tendency to
integration of these two levels seems to be inherent in human ,
action. Perhaps the most striking feature of Weber's analysis is the
demonstration of the extent to which precisely the variations in
socially sanctioned values and goals in secular life correspond to
the variations in the dominant religious philosophy of the great
civilizations.

It can be shown with little difficulty that those results of Weber's
comparative and dynamic study integrate directly with the con-
ceptual scheme developed as a result of the work of the other
writers. Thus Weber's theory of the positive significance of religious
ideas is in no way to be confused with the earlier naively rational-
istic positivism^ The influence of religious doctrine is not exerted
through the actor's coming to a conviction and then acting upon it
in a rational sense. It is rather, on the individual level, a matter of
introducing a determinate structure at certain points in the system
of action where, in relation to the situation men have to face, other
elements, such as their emotional needs, do not suflBce to determine
specific orientations of behavior^ In the theories of Malinowski and
Durkheim, certain kinds of sentiments and emotional reactions
were shown to be essential to a functioning social system. These
cannot stand alone, however, but are necessarily integrated with
cognitive patterns; for without them there could be no coordination
of action in a coherently structured social system. This is because
functional analysis of the stiucture of action shows that^ situations
must be subjectively defined,"^and the goals and values to which

210 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

action is oriented must be congruent with these definitions, must,
that is, have "meaning."

It is of course never safe to say a scientific conceptual scheme
has reached a definitive completion of its development. Continual
change is in the nature of science. There are, however, relative
degrees of conceptual integration, and it seems safe to say that the
cumulative results of the work just reviewed constitute in broad
outline a relatively well-integrated analytical scheme which covers
most of the more important broader aspects of the role of religion in
social systems. It is unlikely that in the near future this analytical
scheme will give way to a radical structural change, though notable
refinement and revision is to be expected. It is perhaps safe to say
that it places the sociology of religion for the first time on a footing
where it is possible to combine empirical study and theoretical
analysis on a large scale on a level in conformity with the best cur-
rent standards of social science and psychology.

When we look back, the schemes of Tylor and Spencer seem
hopelessly naive and inadequate to the modern sociologist, anthro-
pologist, or psychologist. It is, however, notable that the develop-
ment sketched did not take place by repudiating their work and
attempting to appeal directly to the facts without benefit of theory.
The process was quite different. It consisted in raising problems
which were inherent in the earlier scheme and modifying the
scheme as a result of the empirical observation suggested by these
problems. Thus Malinowski did not abandon all attempt to relate
magic to rational technique. Not being satisfied with its identifi-
cation with primitive science and technology, he looked for specific
modes of difference from and relation to them, retaining the estab-
lished interpretation of the nature and functions of rational tech-
nique as his initial point of reference. It is notable again that in this
process the newer developments of psychological theory in relation
to the role of emotional factors have played an essential part. The
most fruitful results have not, however, resulted from substituting
a psychological "theory of religion" for another type, but rather
from incorporating the results of psychological investigation into
a wider scheme.

In order for this development to take place it was essential that
certain elements of philosoj^hical dogmatism in the older positivism
should be overcome. One reason for the limitations of Spencer's
insight lay in the presumption that if a cognitive pattern was sig-
nificant to human action, it must be assimilable to the pattern of

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 211

science. Pareto, however, showed clearly that the "pscudoscientific"
did not exhaust significant patterns which deviated from scientific
standards. Malinowski went further in showing the functional rela-
tion of certain non-scientific ideas to elements of uncertainty and
frustration which were inherent in the situation of action. Durk-
heim called attention to the importance of the relation of symbol-
ism as distinguished from that of intrinsic causality in cognitive
patterns. Finally, Weber integrated the various aspects of the role
of non-empirical cognitive patterns in social action in terms of his
theory of the significance of the problems of meaning and the cor-
responding cognitive structures, in a way which precluded, for
analytical purposes, their being assimilated to the patterns of sci-
ence.^''' All of these distinctions by virtue of which the cognitive
patterns of religion are treated separately from those of science
have positive significance for empirical understanding of religious
phenomena. Like any such scientific categories, they are to the
scientist sanctioned by the fact that they can be shown to work.
Failure to make these distinctions does not in the present state of
knowledge and in terms of the relevant frame of reference^"^ help
us to understand certain critically important facts of human life.
What the philosophical significance of this situation may be is not
as such the task of the social scientist to determine. Only one safe
prediction on this level can be made. Any new philosophical syn-
thesis will need positively to take account of these distinctions
rather than to attempt to reinstate for the scientific level the older
positivistic conception of the homogeneity of all human thought and
its problems. If these distinctions are to be transcended it cannot
well be in the form of "reducing" religious ideas to those of science
—in the sense of Western intellectual history— or vice versa. The
proved scientific utility of the distinctions is suflBcient basis on which
to eliminate this as a serious possibility.

1^ See the writer's paper, "The Role of Ideas in Social Action," American
Sociological Review, III, 1938, for a general analytical discussion of the problem
included in the present volume.

17 Every treatment of questions of fact and every empirical investigation is
"in terms of a conceptual scheme." Scientifically the sole sanction of such a con-
ceptual scheme is its "utihty," the degree to which it "works" in facihtating the
attainment of the goals of scientific investigation. Hence the conceptual struc-
ture of any system of scientific theory is subject to the same kind of relativity
with "arbitrariness." It is subject to the disciplining constraint both of verifica-
tion in all questions of particular empirical fact, and of logical precision and
consistency among the many difi^erent parts of a highly complex conceptual
structure. The "theory of social action" is by now a theoretical structure so
highly developed and with so many ramifications in both these respects that ele-
ments structurally essential to it cannot be lightly dismissed as expressing only
"one point of view."

XI

The Present Position and Prospects
of Systematic Theory in Sociology

THE GENERAL NATURE and Functions of Systematic Theory. It is
scarcely too much to say that the most important single index of the
state of maturity of a science is the state of its systematic theory.
This includes the character of the generalized conceptual scheme
in use in the field, the kinds and degrees of logical integration of
the diflFerent elements which make it up, and the ways in which it
is actually being used in empirical research. On this basis the thesis
may be advanced that sociology is just in the process of emerging
into the status of a mature science. Heretofore it has not enjoyed
the kind of integration and directed activity which only the avail-
ability and common acceptance and employment of a well-articu-
lated generalized theoretical system can give to a science. The main
framework of such a system is, however, now available, though this
fact is not as yet very generally appreciated and much in the way
of development and refinement remains to be done on the purely
theoretical level, as well as its systematic use and revision in actual
research. It may therefore be held that we stand on the threshold
of a definitely new era in sociology and the neighboring social
science fields.

"Theory" is a term which covers a wide variety of different things
which have in common only the element of generalized concept-
ualization. The theory of concern to the present paper in the first
place constitutes a "system" and thereby differs from discrete
"theories," that is, particular generalizations about particular phe-
nomena or classes of them. A theoretical system in the present sense
is a body of logically interdependent generalized concepts of em-
pirical reference. Such a system tends, ideally, to become "logically
closed," to reach such a state of logical integration that every logical

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 213

implication of any combination of propositions in the system is
explicitly stated in some other proposition in the same system.^

In a highly developed system of theory there may be a wide va-
riety of different types of generalized concepts and functions which
they may serve. A thorough discussion of the possibilities cannot be
undertaken here, so attention will be confined to those most vital
to the general status of the scientific field. The two most general
functions of theory are the facilitation of description and analysis.
The two are most intimately connected since it is only when the
essential facts about a phenomenon have been described in a care-
fully systematic and orderly manner that accurate analysis becomes
possible at all.

The basic category of all scientific description seems to be that
of empirical system. The empirical references of statements of fact
cannot be isolated from each other, but each describes one aspect
or feature of an interconnected whole which, taken as a whole, has
some measures of independent significance as an entity. Apart from
theoretical conceptualization there would appear to be no method
of selecting among the indefinite number of varying kinds of fac-
tual observation which can be made about a concrete phenomenon
or field so that the various descriptive statements about it articulate
into a coherent whole, which constitutes an "adequate," a "deter-
minate" description. Adequacy in description is secured in so far
as determinate and verifiable answers can be given to all the scien-
tifically important questions involved. What questions are impor-
tant is largely determined by the logical structure of the general-
ized conceptual scheme which, implicitly or explicitly, is employed.

Specific descriptive propositions often refer to particular aspects
or properties of an empirically existent set of phenomena. Such
propositions are, however, empirically meaningless unless the "what"
which they qualify is clearly and determinately conceived and
defined. This "what," the interconnected empirically existent phe-
nomena which constitute the field of description and analysis for a
scientific investigation, is what is meant by an empirical "system."
It is that which can, for scientific purposes, be treated at the same
time as a body of phenomena sufficiently extensive, complex and
diversified so that the results of their study are significant and not
merely truistic, and sufficiently limited and simplified so that the

1 For a fuller development of this view of theory, see the autlior's The
Structure of Social Action, (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1937), especially
Chaps. I and XIX.

214 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

problems involved are manageable and the investigator does not
get lost in the maze.

The functions of a generalized conceptual scheme on the descrip-
tive level seem to be performed mainly in terms of t\vo types of
conceptual elements. The first consists in what is called the "frame
of reference." This is the most general framework of categories in
terms of which empirical scientific work "makes sense." Thus, in
classical mechanics, three-dimensional rectilinear space, time, mass,
location, motion are the essential elements of the frame of refer-
ence. Every descriptive statement, to be applicable to a mechanical
system must be referable to one or more "particles" each with a
given mass, capable of location in space, changing its location in
time through motion, etc. Besides providing the specific categories
in terms of which a system is described, the function of the frame
of reference is above all to provide a test of the determinacy of the
description of a system. It is a logical implication of the structure of
the conceptual system that there is a limited number of essential
categories, specific values for which must be obtained before the
description can be determinate. Its use is the only way of locating
the important gaps in available knowledge.

The second level is that of the structure of systems as such. Phe-
nomena which are significantly interrelated, which constitute a sys-
tem, are intrinsically interrelated on the structural level. This fact
seems to be inherent in the most general frame of reference of em-
pirical knowledge itself, which implies the fundamental significance
of the concept of system as that is taken for granted here. Structure
is the "static" aspect of the descriptive mode of treatment of a sys-
tem. From the structural point of view a system is composed of
"units," of sub-systems which potentially exist independently, and
their structural interrelations. Thus a system in mechanics is "made
up" of particles as its units. The structure of the system consists in
the number of particles, their properties, such as mass, and their
interrelations, such as relative locations, velocities and directions of
motion.

The functions of the frame of reference and of structural cate-
gories in their descriptive use are to state the necessary facts, and
the setting for solving problems of dynamic analysis, the ultimate
goal of scientific investigation. Besides the immense possibilities of
variation in the scope of analysis, there are two aspects of the goal
itself; first the "causal explanation" of past specific phenomena or
processes and the prediction of future events; second, the attain-

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 215

ment of generalized analytieal knowledge, of "laws" which can be
applied to an indefinite number of specific cases with the use of
the appropriate factual data. The attainment of the two goals, or
aspects of the same goal, go hand in hand. On the one hand specific
causal explanation is attainable only through the application of
some generalized analytical knowledge; on the other, the extension
of analytical generalization is only possible by generalization from
empirical cases and verification in terms of them.

In both respects scientific advance consists especially in the grad-
ual widening of the scope of dynamic analysis. Even the simplest
rational practical activity would be impossible without the ability
to establish a dynamic relation between a single, simple "necessary
condition" and a consequent effect under the assumption that in a
relevant degree "other things are equal." This, applied in a partic-
ular case, implies some degree of generalization that this kind of
factor is a necessary condition of the kind of effect, thus, that "boil-
ing" for a certain length of time— i.e., a generalized type of ante-
cedent process— is necessary if potatoes are to be "cooked"— i.e.,
reach a certain kind of observable state. This kind of common-
sense analysis merges gradually into science in proportion to the
complexity of the system of dynamically interdependent variables
which can be treated together, and to the breadth of applicability
to particular situations of the analytical generalizations commanded.

Sometimes one aspect is predominant in the development of a
body of scientific knowledge, sometimes the other. Where, how-
ever, breadth of applicability can be attained only through extreme
simplicity in the relations of variables, only a secondary order of
scientific significance can be attributed to the results. For where
only very simple relationships, or only those of two or three vari-
ables, can be involved in a dynamic generalization it must inevit-
ably remain undesirably abstract in the sense that in very few cases
of concrete empirical systems, will these relationships and these
variables be the only or the predominant ones involved in the solu-
tion of the pressing empirical problems. Hence, the ideal of scien-
tific theory must be to extend the dynamic scope of analysis of com-
plex systems as a whole as far as possible. It is the attainment of
this ideal which presents the greatest theoretical difficulties to
science.

Put a little differently, the essential feature of dynamic analysis
in the fullest sense is the treatment of a body of interdependent
phenomena simultaneously, in the mathematical sense. The sim-

216 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

plest case is the analysis of the effect of variation in one antecedent
factor, but this ignores the reciprocal effect of these changes on this
factor. The ideal solution is the possession of a logically complete
system of dynamic generalizations which can state all the elements
of reciprocal interdependence between all the variables of the sys-
tem. The ideal has, in the formal sense, been attained only in the
systems of differential equations of analytical mechanics. All other
sciences are limited to a more "primitive" level of systematic the-
oretical analysis.

For this level of dynamic analysis to be feasible, there seem to be
two essential necessary conditions. On the one hand, tlie variables
need to be of an empirical character such that the particulars within
the generalized categories are in actuality the relevant statements
of fact about a given state of the empirical system as indicated by
the structure of problems of the science. On the other hand, the
formal logical character of these concepts must be such as to be
susceptible to special types of technical manipulation. The only
kind of technical manipulation so far available which makes simul-
taneous dynamic analysis of interdependence of several variables
in a complex system possible in a completely rigorous sense, is the
matiiematics of the differential calculus and some of its more refined
derivatives.

To be susceptible of this type of analytical manipulation a vari-
able must be of a very particular sort— it must vary only in numeri-
cally quantitative value on a continuum. This requirement greatly
narrows the range of observational possibility. In many cases even
where numerical continua can be observed they are not necessarily
the variables of greatest empirical significance.

The most essential condition of successful dynamic analysis is
continual and systematic reference of every problem to the state of
the system as a whole. If it is not possible to provide for that by
explicit inclusion of every relevant fact as the value of a variable
which is included in the dynamic analysis at that point, there must
be some method of simplification. Logically, this is possible only
through the removal of some generalized categories from the role
of variables and their treatment as constants. An analytical system
of the type of mechanics does just this for certain elements outside
the system which are conditional to it. But it is also logically feasi-
ble within the system. This is essentially what happens when struc-
tural categories are used in the treatment of dynamic problems.

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 217

Their function is to simplify the dynamic problems to the point
where they are manageable without the possibility of refined mathe-
matical analysis. At the same time the loss, which is very great, is
partly compensated by relating all problems explicitly and sys-
tematically to the total system. For the structure of a system as
described in the context of a generalized conceptual scheme is a
genuinely technical analytical tool. It ensures that nothing of vital
importance is inadvertently overlooked, and ties in loose ends,
giving determinancy to problems and solutions. It minimizes the
danger, so serious to common-sense thinking, of filling gaps by re-
sort to uncriticized residual categories.

It should be noted that in mechanics the structure of the system
does not enter in as a distinct theoretical element. For descriptive
purposes, it is of course relevant for any state of the system. But
on the dynamic plane it dissolves into process and interdependence.
This calls attention to the important fact that structure and process
are highly relative categories. Structure does not refer to any onto-
logical stability in phenomena but only to a relative stability— to
sufficiently stable uniformities in the results of underlying processes
so that their constancy within certain limits is a workable pragmatic
assumption.

Once resort is made to the structure of a system as a positive
constituent of dynamic analysis there must be a way of linking these
"static" structural categories and their relevant particular statements
of fact to the dynamically variable elements in the system. This
link is supplied by the all-important concept of function. Its crucial
role is to provide criteria of the importance of dynamic factors and
processes within the system. They are important in so far as they
have functional significance to the system, and their specific im-
portance is understood in terms of the analysis of specific functional
relations between the parts of the system and between it and its
environment.

The significance of the concept of function implies the conception
of the empirical system as a "going concern." Its structure is that
system of determinate patterns which empirical observation shows,
within certain limits, "tend to be maintained" or on a somewhat
more dynamic version "tend to develop" according to an empiri-
cally constant pattern (e. g. the pattern of growth of a young
organism ) .

Functional significance in this context is inherently teleological.

21S ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

A process or set of conditions either "contributes" to the mainte-
nance (or development) of the system or it is "dysfunctional" in
that it detracts from the integration, effectiveness, etc., of the sys-
tem. It is thus the functional reference of all particular conditions
and process to the state of the total system as a going concern
which provides the logical equivalent of simultaneous equations in
a fully developed system of analytical theory. This appears to be
the only way in which dynamic interdependence of variable factors
in a system can be explicitly analyzed without the technical tools
of mathematics and the operational and empirical prerequisites of
their employment.

The logical type of generalized theoretical system under discus-
sion may thus be called a "structural-functional system" as distin-
guished from an analytical system. It consists of the generalized
categories necessary for an adequate description of states of an
empirical system. On the one hand, it includes a system of struc-
tuj-al categories which must be logically adequate to give a deter-
minate description of an empirically possible, complete empirical
system of the relevant class. One of the prime functions of system
on this level is to ensure completeness, to make it methodically im-
possible to overlook anything important, and thus explicitly to
describe all essential structural elements and relations of the sys-
tem. For if this is not done implicitly, uncriticized allegations about
the missing elements will always play a part in determining con-
clusions and interpretations.

On the other hand, such a system must also include a set of dy-
namic functional categories. These must articulate directly with the
structural categories— they must describe processes by which these
particular structures are maintained or upset, and the relations of
the system to its environment are mediated. This aspect of the sys-
tem must also be complete in the same sense.

On a relatively complete and explicit level this type of general-
ized system has been most fully developed in physiology- and more
recently if less completely in psychology. The anatomical structure
of the organism is an essential fixed point of reference for all phy-
siological analyses of its functioning. Function in relation to the
maintenance of this structure in a given environment is the source
of criteria for the attribution of significance to processes such as

- For the place of structural-functional analysis in physiology, see especially
W. B. Cannon, The Wisdom of the Body, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
1932).

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 219

respiration, nutrition, etc., and of their dynamic interdependence.
In recent psychology, it is "character structure" or personahty which
plays the role analogous to that of anatomical structure in biology
while "motives" in relation to situations are the dynamic elements.

II

Unsatisfactory Types of Theory in Recent Sociology. It is the
primary thesis of this paper that the structural-functional type of
system is the one which is most likely and suitable to play a domi-
nant role in sociological theory. In varying degrees it has, though
largely implicitly and in a fragmentary fashion, been in actual use
in the field. But until quite recently the predominant trends of
thought in this field have been such as to prevent its emergence
into the central explicit position which would allow it to develop
freely all its potentialities for fruitful integration of the science. On
the one hand, there has been a school of empiricism which was
blind to the functions of theory in science— often mistakenly think-
ing it was following the model of the physical sciences. On the
other hand, what has gone by the name of "theory" has consisted
mainly in conceptual structures on quite a different level from
what is here meant by a generalized theoretical system.

One major strand of thought in the history of sociological theory
has been that closely associated with, indeed merging into, the phi-
losophy of history. The central interest here has been in the estab-
lishment of a highly generalized pattern in the processes of change
of human societies as a whole, whether it be linear evolutionism,
cyclical or dialectic process, etc. Perhaps the evolutionary anthro-
pologists like Tylor and Morgan have been most prominent here.
But it also, in certain respects, includes Marx and his followers,
Veblen and many others.

The element of generality which justifies calling these writers
particularly theorists lies in the comprehensiveness of the empirical
generalizations they have formulated and attempted to establish.
The theory of analytical mechanics, or of general physiology, on
the other hand, does not as such contain any empirical generaliza-
tions at all. It is a set of tools by which, working on adequate data,
both specific empirical solutions and empirical generalizations can
be arrived at. To make empirical generalization the central focus of
theory in a science is to put the cart before the horse. In proportion
as a generalized theoretical system is really perfected, and, what

220 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

necessarily goes with it, empirical research and knowledge of fact
builds up, it becomes possible to attain more and more compre-
hensive empirical generalizations. Indeed it can be said that any
system of sound empirical generalizations implies a generalized
theoretical system.

But concentrating theoretical attention on this level of empirical
generalization to the exclusion of the other is very risky. Such sys-
tems have had a notorious tendency to overreach the facts and their
own analytical underpinning and by and large have not, in the
meanings originally meant by their authors, stood the test of com-
petent criticism. On this level no competent modern sociologist can
be a Comtean, a Spencerian, or even a Marxian.

The prominence of this tendency has had two very serious un-
favorable consequences. First it has, by focussing attention at the
wrong place, impeded the progress of the subject. It has attempted
to attain, at one stroke, a goal which can only be approached grad-
ually by building the necessary factual foundations and analytical
tools. It is not surprising that such ill-advised attempts should lead
to difficulties. As these have become increasingly formidable and
evident, the second consequence has appeared. Since "theory" has
been so largely identified with such attempts at comprehensive
empirical generalization, tlieir failure has discredited not only
themselves, which is only right and proper, but also everything else
which has gone by the name of theory. This reaction has contribut-
ed greatly to a kind of "empiricism" which has blindly rejected the
help of theoretical tools in general. While one tendency, it may be
said, has sought to create a great building by a sheer act of will
without going through the requisite of technical procedures, the
other has tried to make a virtue of working with bare hands alone,
rejecting all tools and mechanical equipment.

A second major strand of "theoretical" thinking in sociology has
been that which has attempted to assess the importance of various
"factors" in the determination of social phenomena. Usually it has
taken the form of attempting to prove the exclusive or predominant
importance of one such factor— geographic, biological, economic or
what not.

This type of theorizing, though in a diflFerent way, also puts the
cart before the horse. It also involves a kind of generalization which
can only be soundly established as a result of the kind of investiga-
tion in which generalized theory, in the present sense, is an indis-

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 221

pensable tool. If it is sound it, like the other, will imply a system of
theory, and will depend upon it. But it is unlikely that such an un-
criticized implicit system will be as adequate as one which has been
carefully and explicitly worked out in direct relation to the facts.

Indeed a very large part of this "factor" theorizing has had the
eflFect, if not the function, of evading the problem of a generalized
theory of social systems. It has tended to do this in two ways. The
major trend, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, has been to at-
tribute the principal role to factors which are not specific to social
systems, notably the environmental (e.g., geographical), and the
biological and the economic.

In the first two of these cases the most important elements of
theoretical generality have already been thoroughly worked out
by investigations in other fields which have high prestige in the
scientific world. Though on principle new discoveries in any field
of application should lead to revision of the theoretical structure of
a science, in fact, in the case of biology, for instance, there was
little chance of human social tail being able to wag the dog of all
known lower organic species. If, on the one hand, it was assumed
that men, being organisms, were subject to biological laws, and, on
the other, that the theory of natural selection was fully established
as explaining the process of development of organic species in gen-
eral, the predominant tendency would naturally be simply to seek
in human social development examples of the working of the prin-
ciples of natural selection without too much attention to the dis-
tinctive features of human society in other respects. Thus both
economic competition and international rivalries have been widely
interpreted in these terms. This has led to widespread neglect of
the fundamental canon of science, the need to study in the very first
instance the facts of the particular phenomena.

This unfortunate effect has been reinforced by another circum-
stance. Until recently it has been rare to find very much insight into
the senses in which scientific theory on practically all levels is
abstract. Thus natural selection has been interpreted as a general-
ized description of the process by which change in organic species
came about— not as the formulation of certain elements in the pro-
cess which might have a more or less dominant role relative to
others in different cases. The effect of this tendency to "empirical
closure" of a system is to make its application to any given field,
especially a new one, a rigidly simple question of whether it "ap-

222 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

plies" or not. Application is interpreted in "all or none" terms— it
is either a case or not. If it is in any sense a case, then there is no
incentive to look further and study the interdependence of the
factors thus formulated with others which might be involved, since
the latter are assumed not to exist or to be unimportant.^

A slightly different though closely analogous situation occurs
when the factors singled out are of certain types predominantly
obsersed in human social behavior, but are treated in such a way
as to ignore major elements of the context in which they operate in
social systems.

A leading example of this type is the kind of theory which lays
primary emphasis on rational adaptation of means to given ends in
technological or economic contexts. This tendency has been predom-
inant in the whole "utilitarian" tradition of social thought since
Locke and in a modified form is decisive for Marx and Veblen. As
I have shown in other connections this mode of treatment of social
action as a whole has implied a very specific form of generalized
theoretical system which has very seriously broken down in the
course of the last generation of theoretical work.^ The key to this
process of breakdown is the emergence into a position of central
prominence of certain modes and factors in the integration of social
systems which could not be taken account of in utilitarian terms.

The utilitarian type of factor analysis is analogous to the environ-
mental and biological in that it singles out elements which also can
be treated in complete abstraction from social systems as such.
Actual rational behavior is not, of course, observed apart from social
situations. But the implicit conceptual scheme is such that other
elements, of a "social" rather than a biological or environmental
character, enter only in the role of conditions of the sitiiation in
which people act. They become, that is, theoretically equivalent to
the physical environment and are thus deprived of any distinctive
theoretical role in the social system of action itself.

All of the above factor theories have impeded the development of
a theory of social systems by imposing an implicit generalized con-
ceptual scheme which denied the empirical relevance of a distinc-
tively social system— as a generalized theoretical system or a class
of empirical systems. There would be no objection to this if the

•** The above is what Whitehead has called "the fallacy of misplaced con-
creteness."

■* See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, Chaps. Ill, XII.

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 223

resulting theoretical structures had proved to be adequate for the
solution of the pressing ranges of empirical problems which have
dominated social science. At point after point, however, this em-
pirical inadequacy has come to be exposed and has necessitated
theoretical reconstruction.^ A common strategy has been the retreat
from one lost factor theory to another— thus from a rational utilitar-
ian type to a bio-psychological instinct theory or one of natural
selection. None of these has, however, provided more than tem-
porary relief from the relentless pressure of empirical criticism and
developing empirical knowledge.

It is not surprising that in this atmosphere attempts should have
been made to elevate the neglected distinctively "social" elements
into a dominant factor in the same sense— to oppose a "sociolo-
gistic"^ theory to an economic or biological one. The most notable
example of this possibility is what is in part the actual significance,
but still more the predominant interpretation, placed upon Durk-
heim's famous formula that "society is a reality sui generis" which
"constrains" the thought, feelings and actions of individuals. If how-
ever this alternative is taken as simply another "factor" theory it
involves the same theoretical and empirical diflBculties which all
other similar constructions do. It throws light on some empirical
problems but only at the cost of increasing difficulties in other
directions."^

Not the least deleterious eflFect of the "factor" type of theorizing,
to which it is even more subject than the empirical generalization
type, is the division of the field into warring "schools" of thought.
On this basis every school has some solid empirical justification but
equally each, as a result of the need for closure of the system, in-
volves insuperable difficulties and conflicts with other interpreta-
tions of the same phenomena. Professional pride and vested inter-
ests get bound up with the defense or promotion of one theory
against all others and the result is an impasse. In such a situation it
is not surprising that theory as such should be discredited and many

5 Two conspicuous fields are the breakdown of the theories of social evolu-
tion of the Spencerian type, and the growing dissatisfaction with an individual-
istic utilitarian interpretation of the modem industrial economy.

^ A term used by P. A. Sorokin in Contemporary Sociological Theories,
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1928).

■^ It is the author's contention that progress toward the formulation of a
genuine structural-functional system is a far more important aspect of Durk-
heim's work. See The Structure of Social Action, Chaps. VIII-XI and Section III
below.

224 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

of the sanest, least obsessive minds become disillusioned with the
whole thing and become dogmatic empiricists, denying as a matter
of principle that theory can do anything for science. They feel it
is, rather, only a matter of speculative construction which leads
away from respect for facts, and that thus the progress of science
can consist only in the accumulation of discrete, unrelated, un-
guided discoveries of fact.

Such empiricists often invoke the supposed authority of the nat-
ural sciences. But the whole history of science shows that this is a
gross misinterpretation. Perhaps the most extraordinary view is the
relatively common contention that the glory of physics is mathe-
matical method, while at the same time "theory" is an unnecessary
impediment. But rn^thematics in physics is theory. The greatness
of Newton and Laplace, of Einstein and Heisenberg is as theorists
in the strictest sense. A science of physics without higher mathe-
matics would be the real equivalent of the empiricists' ideal for
social science. This shows quite clearly that what we need is not
a science purified of theoretical infection— but one with the nearest
possible approach to an equivalent of the role of mathematical
analysis in physics. The trouble with sociology has not been that
it has had too much theory but that it has been plagued with the
wrong kinds and what it has had of the right has been insufficiently
developed and used to meet the need.

Ill

Approaches to a Generalized Social System. In various partial
aspects of the field of human social behavior highly developed
theoretical schemes of what are here considered the right kind
have existed. This is notably true of economic theory, especially
since the discovery of the principle of marginal utility, and of psy-
chological theory, especially since Freud.

Economics has directly followed the methodological model of
analytical mechanics and has been able to do so because, uniquely
among social disciplines, it can deal primarily with numerically
quantitative continua as variables. It has proved possible in prin-
ciple to describe the state of a price economy in terms of the values
of the variables of a system of simultaneous differential equations,
though it is not possible operationally to ascertain the exact values
of the variables nor would it be mathematically possible to solve
the equations because of their excessive complexity. Hence most
actual working economic analysis has had to fall back on more

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 225

"primitive" analytical methods, and use the system of diflFerential
equations only as a methodological model.

But even more serious than this limitation has been the difficulty
of fitting economic theory into the broader context of the social
system as a whole. This was not a serious problem to the classical
economists since they implicitly assumed a "utilitarian" system
which gave economic "factors" the dominant dynamic role.^ The
general direction of solution seems to be that technical economic
analysis makes sense only in the context of an "institutional" struc-
ture of social relationship patterns which is not, as such, part of
the system dynamically treated by economic theory, but must con-
stitute a set of constant data for it. Exactly what this means when
the institutional data are treated on structural-functional terms
while the economic data are not, remains on the whole an unsolved
problem.

It is significant that concern with economic theory as well as
training in mathematics and physics constituted the background of
by far the most important attempt so far made to build up a
generalized analysis of social systems as a whole in a dynamic
analytical system on the model of mechanics— that of Pareto.^
Pareto's attempt undoubtedly put systematic theoretical thinking
about social systems on a new level; it is unique in the literature
for its comprehensiveness and the sophistication of its understand-
ing of the physical science model. And yet it must be regarded as
a relative failure.

Pareto started with the view that economic theory had become
a genuine dynamic system, but it was, relative to concrete social
problems (including those which are usually classed as "eco-
nomic"), empirically inadequate because unduly abstract. Hence
he sought to analyze the most important missing variables in a
total social system in terms of their dynamic interdependence with
those of economics. He took the "logical action," which is involved
in the economic as well as certain other phases of the orientation of
action, as a starting point and attempted to analyze the remaining
residual category of nonlogical action inductively in order to reveal
the principal variables.

The result is highly complex and not very satisfactory. He iso-
lated three variables which are very heterogeneous relative to one

8 See The Structure of Social Action, Chaps. Ill and IV.

8 Cf. L. J. Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's Inter-
pretation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937) Parsons, The Structure
of Social Action, Chaps. V-VII.

226 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

another. The most satisfactorily analyzed, the "derivations," proves
to be empirically the least significant. Even this, however, cannot
be reduced to variation on a continuum but its values must be
treated in terms of a four-fold qualitative classification. The same
is true of the most important, the "residues," except that here the
classification is far more complex and its basis of principle in the
structure of social systems of action far less clear. Indeed it gives
the impression of a great deal of arbitrariness. Finally, with the
fourth variable, social heterogeneity, Pareto shifts to an altogether
different level. The first three referred immediately to elements of
the motivation or orientation of the action of individuals. The
fourth refers to an aspect of the structure of a system of social rela-
tionships. Its appearance may be taken as an indication of the ex-
treme difficulty of operating in this field without structural cate-
gories. Its relevance to Pareto's principal empirical generalizations
is very clear and it serves the function of giving empirical relevance
to his analytical scheme. But strictly speaking it has no place in the
latter as a variable but should, with the aid of the relevant data,
be derivable from the system of variables.

It was said above that Pareto's attempt was a relative failure.
He certainly succeeded in avoiding all the principal theoretical
difficulties discussed above. His system is an extraordinarily useful
instrument of criticism. It also, when skillfully used as by Pareto
himself, yields important though rather general empirical insights.
But it has signally failed to work as a direct source of detailed
analytical tools in detailed research. What is successfully established
is too vague and general. The gaps have to be filled by arbitrary ad
hoc constructions and classifications or by the introduction of struc-
tural categories which are merely tolerated, not systematically
developed.

The conclusion is that Pareto took what is, in the present state
of sociological knowledge, the less fruitful alternative. A structural-
functional system must sacrifice much of the dynamic flexibility
Pareto aimed at. But it can hope to counterbalance this by a great
gain in explicit systematic determinacy and precision in detailed
analytical use.

The other alternative, the structural-functional type, also has
important antecedents. The most important of these are the follow-
ing four:

1. The developments of modern dynamic and clinical psychology
which conceive the human individual as a dynamic structural-func-

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 227

tional system. Psychoanalytic theory has been the most important
single influence in this field but stands by no means alone. This psy-
chological theory is highly important both as a methodological
model for that of a social system and as itself providing some of the
most essential components of it.

2. Modern social and cultural anthropology, especially that with
something of a "functional" slant though by no means confined to
those writers usually designated as belonging to the functional
school. Probably Malinowski's is so far the most important single
name. Perhaps the basic point is that the scale of non-literate socie-
ties has been small and there has been no established division into
different specialisms in dealing with it. Hence the anthropologist,
when dealing with a society, was more likely than other social
scientists to see it as a single functioning system.

3. Durkheim and his followers. As has been noted above, Durk-
heim in many respects tended to set a "sociologistic" factor tlieory
over against the individualistic factor theories current in his day.
But along with this heading there is a more important strand in his
thought which gained increasingly in strength in the course of his
career. This was a genuinely structural-functional treatment of the
social system— with a gradual clarification of the more important
elements of it. This is above all evident from the way in which he
treated empirical problems, in his analysis of the stability of a sys-
tem of functionally differentiated roles in his Division of Labor, in
his study, Le Suicide, and in his interpretation of religious ritual in
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.

4. Max Weber. In part Weber can serve as a type case of the
more generalized thinking of the historical disciplines in the institu-
tional field. But also, in reaction against the individualistic factor
theories of his time, he went much farther than any other writer to-
ward the underpinning of empirical study of comparative institu-
tions with a generalized theoretical scheme. Incomplete though
this was, it converged with Durkheim's scheme and supplemented
it in the directions where comparative structural perspective is
most important.^^

10 In addition to the The Structure of Social Action, Chaps. XIV-XVII, see
the author's introduction to Weber's Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(translated from Wirtschaft und Gcsellschaft, Part I).

228 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

IV

Outline of a Structural-Functional Theory of Social Systems.
Limitations of space forbid following out the substantive problems
in the development of the present state of the structural-functional
theory of social systems. It is, however, contended that, developing
with particular clarity though by no means exclusively in the above
four sources, we now have the main outline of an articulated system
of structural-functional theory available and in actual use. The final
section of this paper will be devoted to an exceedingly bare and
general sketch of this main outline. Of necessity most of the details
will have to be omitted. As in every developing theoretical struc-
ture, there are innumerable difficulties and unsolved problems
which also cannot be entered into.

The first essential of a generalized theoretical system is the "frame
of reference." For the social system in question it is quite clear that
it is that of "action" or perhaps better "actor-situation" in a sense
analogous to the organism-environment frame of reference of the
biological sciences.

The actor-situation frame of reference is shared with psychology,
but for a social system it takes on the added complication intro-
duced by the treatment of a plurality of inter acting actors in situ-
ations which are in part discrete, in part shared in common.

The unit of all social systems is the human individual as actor,
as an entity which has the basic characteristics of striving toward
the attainment of "goals," of "reacting" emotionally or affectively
toward objects and events, and of, to a greater or less degree, cog-
nitively knowing or understanding his situation, his goals and him-
self. Action is, in this frame of reference, inherently structured on a
"normative," "teleological," or possibly better, a "voluntaristic" sys-
tem of "coordinates" or axes. A goal is by definition a "desirable"
state of affairs, failure to attain it a "frustration." Affective reaction
includes components of pleasurable or painful significance to the
actor, and of approval or disapproval of the object or state which
occasions the reaction. Finally, cognitive orientation is subject to
standards of "correctness" and "adequacy" of knowledge and under-
standing.

This essential "normative orientation" of action directs attention
to the crucial role of the "patterns" which define the desirable
direction of action in the form of goals and standards of behavior.
This system of normative patterns seems to be best treated as one

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 229

very important element of the "culture" of the group, which also
includes cognitive patterns of "ideas," symbols and other elements.
P'rom the present point of view, however, a social system is a sys-
tem of action, i.e., of motivated human behavior, not a system of
culture patterns. It articulates with culture patterns in one connec-
tion just as it does with physical and biological conditions in
another. But a "system of culture" is a different order of abstraction
from a "social system" though it is to a large degree an abstraction
from the same concrete phenomena.^ ^

In all this, the point of view of interpretation of action has a
peculiar duality. One essential component is its "meaning" to the
actor, whether on a consciously explicit level or not. The other is
its relevance to an "objective" concatenation of objects and events
as analyzed and interpreted by an observer.

In a sense this basic frame of reference consists in the outline of
the structural categories of human personality in a psychological
sense, in terms of the particular values of which each particular
character structure or sequences of action must be described and
analyzed. But the structure of social systems cannot be derived
directly from the actor-situation frame of reference. It requires
functional analysis of the complications introduced by the inter-
action of a plurality of actors.

Even in abstraction from social relationships, features of the situ-
ation of action and the biologically determined needs and capacities
of an individual provide certain fixed points of determination in
the system of action. The functional needs of social integration and
the conditions necessary for the functioning of a plurality of actors
as a "unit" system sufficiently well- integrated to exist as such impose
others.

But functional needs, whether their ultimate sources be biologi-
cal, socio-cultural or individual are, so far as they are dynamically
relevant to this conceptual scheme, satisfied through processes of
action. The need to eat is biologically determined, but the human
processes of food production and the variations in the social cus-
toms of food taste and consumption are no more biologically de-
termined than any other social phenomena, such as, for instance

11 For the distinction between action and culture, see The Structure of
Social Action, Chap. XIX, pp. 762 fF. This view diflFers from that of culture and
social system set forth in Kluckhohn and Kelly, "The Concept of Culture," in
Ralph Linton, ed.. The Science of Man in the World Crisis, Columbia Univer-
sity Press.

230 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the production and enjoyment of symphonic music. Hence, the
ultimate "source" of needs is not relevant except in so far as it
affects the structure and orientation of social systems of action,
especially by providing "foci" around which attitudes, symbols and
action patterns cluster.

A structure is a set of relatively stable patterned relationships of
units. Since the unit of social system is the actor, social structure is
a patterned system of the social relationships of actors. It is a dis-
tinctive feature of the structure of systems of social action, how-
ever, that in most relationships the actor does not participate as a
total entity,^- but only by virtue of a given differentiated "sector"
of his total action. Such a sector, which is the unit of a system of
social relationships, has come predominantly to be called a "role."^^
Hence, the previous statement must be revised to say that social
structure is a system of patterned relationships of actors in their
capacity as playing roles relative to one another. Role is the con-
cept which links the subsystem of the actor as a "psychological"
behaving entity to the distinctively social structure.

Two primary questions arise in following on beyond this point.
First, what is the nature of this link, what is social structure from
the point of view of the actor playing his roles within it? Second,
what is the nature of the "system" of the patterned relationships of
social structure?

The clue to the first question is found in the normative-voluntaris-
tic aspect of the structure of action. From the point of view of the
social system, a role is an element of generalized patterning of the
action of its component individuals. But this is not merely a matter
of statistical "trend." It is a matter of goals and standards. From the
point of view of the actor, his role is defined by the normative
expectations of the members of the group as formulated in its social
traditions. The existence of these expectations among his fellows
constitutes an essential feature of the situation in which any given
actor is placed. His conformity with them or lack of it brings con-
sequences to him, the sanctions of approval and reward, or of con-
demnation and punishment. But more than this, they constitute
part of his own personality. In the course of process of socialization
he absorbs— to a greater or less degree— the standards and ideals of

1^ In the sense in which a given brick as a whole is or is not "part" of a
given wall.

13 This concept has been used above all by Ralph Linton in The Study of
Man, (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936). See especially Chap. VIII.

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 231

his group so that they become effective motivating forces in his
own conduct, independently of external sanctions.

From this point of view the essential aspect of social structure
lies in a system of patterned expectations defining the proper be-
havior of persons playing certain roles, enforced both by the incum-
bents' own positive motives for conformity and by the sanctions of
others. Such systems of patterned expectations, seen in the per-
spective of their place in a total social system and sufficiently thor-
oughly established in action to be taken for granted as legitimate,
are conveniently called "institutions." The fundamental, structur-
ally stable element of social systems then, which, according to the
present argument, must play a crucial role in their theoretical anal-
ysis, is their structure of institutional patterns defining the roles of
their constituent actors.

Seen from the functional point of view, institutionalized roles
constitute the mechanism by which extremely varied potentialities
of "human nature" become integrated in such a way as to dovetail
into a single integrated system capable of meeting the situational
exigencies with which the society and its members are faced. Rela-
tive to these potentialities they have two primary functions: first,
the selective one of bringing out those possibilities of behavior
which "fit" the needs and the tolerances of the particular patterned
structure and by-passing or repressing the others; secondly, through
interactive mechanisms the maximum of motivational backing for
action in conformity with the expectations of roles must be secured.
Above all, both the disinterested motives associated with "con-
science" and "ideals" and the self-interested ones must be mobilized
in the interest of the same directions of behavior.

The second main problem is that of the structure of institutions
themselves as a system. They are resultants of and controlling fac-
tors in the action of human beings in society. Hence, as a system
they must at the same time be related to the functional needs of
their actors as individuals and of the social systems they compose.
Thus, the basic structural principle, as in the case of anatomy, is
that of functional diflFerentiation. The functional reference, how-
ever, is in the social case more complex since both functional needs
of the actor and those of the social system are intertwined.

Any scheme for analyzing such a functionally differentiated
structure is necessarily complex and there is presumably no single
"right" one. A basic three-fold scheme has, however, proved very

232 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

useful and seems of highly generalized significance.^"* In the first
place, tliere are "situational" institutions or patterns. These are
cases of the organization of roles about aspects of the situation in
which actors and social systems are placed. Leading examples are
kinship roles, organized about the biological relatedness of individ-
uals through descent, and in part at least, political institutions,
organized about solidarity with respect to the use and suflFerance
of force within a territorial area.

The second class are "instrumental" institutions, patterned about
the attainment of certain classes of goals as such. For example, a
given technology like that of modern medicine is pursued within
the framework of an institutionalized role, that of physician.
Finally, third, there are "integrative" institutions, those primarily
oriented to regulating the relations of individuals so as to avoid
conflict or promote positive cooperation. Social stratification and
authority are primary examples.

Since relative valuation of personal qualities and achievements
is inevitable in a system, it is, thus essential that these valuations be
integrated in an ordered system of ranking, the system of stratifi-
cation of a society. Similarly the potentialities of deviant behavior
and the need for detailed coordination of the action of many peo-
ple are, in any at all complex society, such that spontaneous response
to unorganized controls cannot be relied upon. Some persons and
organized agencies must be in a position within limits to repress
deviance or its consequences or to ensure effective cooperation.
Again, it is essential to the integration of a society that such control
over others be institutionally ordered and regulated and constitute
a system of roles of legitimate authority. This is an important factor
in the effectiveness of the control since it makes possible appeal to
a sense of moral obligation, and makes it possible to regulate
authority which, if misused, has serious, disruptive potentialities.

The importance of conceiving institutions as a functionally dif-
ferentiated system lies in making it possible to place changes in
any one part of it in the perspective of their interdependence in
the system as a whole. In so far as the system is adequately for-
mulated in generalized terms and is structurally complete, it ensures
that explicit attention will be given to every major possibility of the
repercussions of a change in different directions.

14 See "Toward a Common Language for the Area of Social Science," Part
II, mimeographed for rise by students in Harvard College (reprinted in the
original edition of this volume. )

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 233

Dynamic analysis is not, however, possible in terms of the system-
atic treatment of institutional structure alone. This involves the pos-
sibility of generalized treatment of the behavioral tendencies of
the human actors, in the situations in which they are placed and
subject to the expectations of their institutionalized roles. In the
most general terms such generalization depends on a theory of the
"motivation" of human behavior.

The ultimate foundations of such a theory must certainly be
derived from the science of psychology. But both because the "idio-
syncratic" element in the behavior and motivation of individuals is
so great and because the levels of abstraction current in psychology
have been what they have, it has not been possible, in general, to
derive an adequate theory of the motivation of socially structured
mass phenomena through the simple "application" of psychological
generalizations. The relationship between the psychological level
and behavior in social systems is complex, but light is thrown on it
in terms of the psychological implications of the conception of role.

This is above all true in two directions. The early tendency of
psychology was to consider "personality" as largely an expression of
genetic constitution or of unique idiosyncracy. Study of socialization
in a comparative perspective is, however, demonstrating that there
are important elements of uniformity in the "character structure" of
those who have been socialized in the same cultural and institutional
system, subject to variations according to different roles within the
system. ^^ Though the limits of applicability of this conception of a
character structure appropriate to a given role structure are as yet
by no means clear, its general theoretical significance is established.
In so far as it applies, the pattern of motivation to be used in
explaining behavior in an institutionalized role is not derived
directly from the "propensities of human nature," in general. It is
a matter of such components organized into a particular structure.
Such a structured personality type will have its own appropriate
patterns of motivation and tendencies of behavior.

The other principal direction of development is different. It con-
cerns the area within which there is, in any given social system, a
range of flexibility in behavior on a psychological level. Evidence,
particularly from complex societies, points to the view that this
range is relatively wide for large proportions of the population and

15 See, for instance, Abram Kardiner, The Individual and His Society, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1939), and various recent writings of Mar-
garet Mead.

234 ESSAYS IN SOaOLOGICAL THEORY

that the distribution of character types more or less successfully
fulfilling the requirements of a given role also covers a wide range.

The fundamental mechanism here is what may be called the
"structural generalization of goals" and of other aspects of orien-
tation. As W. I. Thomas puts it, one of the fundamental functions of
institutions is to "define the situation"^*' for action. Once a situation
is institutionally defined and the definition upheld by an adequately
integrated system of sanctions, action in conformity with the relevant
expectations tends, as pointed out, to mobilize a wide variety of
motivational elements in its service. Thus, to take one of the most
famous examples, the "profit motive," which has played such a
prominent part in economic discussion, is not a category of psy-
chology at all. The correct view is rather that a system of "free
enterprise" in a money and market economy so defines the situation
for the conducting or aspiring to the conduct of business enterprise,
that they must seek profit as a condition of survival and as a
measure of success of their activities. Hence, whatever interests the
individual may have in achievement, self-respect, the admiration of
others, etc., to say nothing of what money will buy, are channeled
into profit-making activity.^'^ In a differently defined situation, the
same fundamental motives would lead to a totally different kind of
activity.^^

Thus, in analyzing the dynamic problems of a social system, it
is not enough to apply "psychology" to the behavior of individuals
in the relevant "objective" situations. It is necessary to qualify the
interpretation of their "reactions" in terms of the evidence on at least
two other problems— what can be known about a character struc-
ture "typical" of that particular social system and particular roles
within it, and what will be the effect of the structurally generalized
goals and orientations resulting from the "definitions of the situ-
ation" current in the society.

But with due regard of this type of quaUfication, it remains true
that the basic dynamic categories of social systems are "psycho-

is See especially hi^ The Unadjusted Girl, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.,
1927), Introduction, ^/j •-'!' '• f-0* <-',-:,, /

I'f See Talcott Parsons, "The Motivation of Economic Activity," Canadian
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 6: 187-203, May, 1940. For a fur-
ther analysis of the relation of role-structure to the dynamics of motivation see
Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and Social Control," Psychiatry, 5: 551-572,
November, 1942. Both are reprinted in the present volume.

J'^See B. Malinowski, Coral Gardens and their Magic, (London: G. Allen
and Unwin, 1935), vol. I, Chap. I, Sec. 9.

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 235

logical." The relation of psychology to the theory of social systems
appears to be closely analogous to that of biochemistry to general
physiology. Just as tlie organism is not a category of general chem-
istry, so social system is not one of psychology. But within the
framework of the physiological conception of what a functioning
organism is, the processes are chemical in nature. Similarly, the
process of social behavior as of any other are psychological. But
without the meaning given them by their institutional-structural
context they lose their relevance to the understanding of social
phenomena.

However sketchy and inadequate the above outline may be, it
may be hoped that it does give an idea of the main character of the
emerging structural-functional theory of social systems. It remains to
raise the question of what aspect of that theory may be considered
specifically sociological.

It is of course possible to consider sociological theory as con-
cerned with the total theory of social systems in general. It seems,
however, undesirable to do this since it would make of sociology
such an extremely comprehensive discipline, including as it would
have to, for instance, both the major part of psychology and all of
economic theory." The most important alternative is to treat soci-
ology as the science of institutions in the above sense or more
specifically of institutional structure. This would, as here conceived,
by no means limit it to purely static structural analysis but could
retain a definite focus on problems of structure, including struc-
tural change. Dynamic, particularly psychological, problems would
enter into sociology in terms of their specific relevance to this
context.^*^

This view leaves room for a clear distinction from psychology as
the general science of human personality structure and motivation.
It is quite clear that many of the concrete problems of psychology
in this sense are not sociological at all. For example, sociological
considerations would be secondary and peripheral in the whole
field of clinical psychology. The two sciences are, however, neces-
sarily closely interdependent and data concerning the role structure
of the social system are at least implicity involved in practically all

19 This is in slightly modified form essentially tlie view put forth in The Struc-
ture of Social Action, Chap. XIX. Institutions are those elements of the struc-
ture of social systems which most distinctively embody the patterns of "common
value integration" of a system of action.

236 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

concrete psychology problems. This, however, is not an unusual
situation in the relationship of different sciences.

This view also makes it possible to distinguish sociology from
economic theory. Economic theory is concerned with certain dis-
tinctive dynamic processes which go on within social systems. A
situation where it is relevant in more than the broadest respects is
confined to certain distinctive types of social systems, notably those
where there is an important degree of primary orientation to con-
siderations of optimum utilization of resources and of cost. Such a
situation presupposes in the first place a distinctive institutional
structure. In the second place, as a consequence of this, it presup-
poses the organization of motives about certain types of structurally
generalized goals. But, given these conditions, the distinctive
dynamic consequences of economically oriented action must be
analyzed in terms of a specific technical conceptual scheme. As
Pareto and many others have been well aware, this scheme is
highly abstract and the larger aspects of the dynamics of total
economic systems will inevitably involve interdependence with
non-economic variables.

In some respects analogous to the distinctive features of a mar-
ket or price economy is the emergence in complex social systems of
certain prominent functionally differentiated structures. Perhaps the
most important of these is that of government. It is always possible
to make a study of such structures and the relevant social processes
the subject of a relatively independent science. So far, however, in
none of these cases has a distinctive analytical scheme appeared
which would give that science a theoretical status analogous to
that, for instance, of economics. Thus, it is highly questionable
whether "political theory" in a scientific rather tlian an ethical and
normative sense should be regarded as a fundamental element of
the theory of social systems. It seems more logical to regard it as a
field of application of the general theory of social institutions but
one which is sufficiently differentiated to be treated as an independ-
ent discipline for many purposes. The same general considerations
apply to other aspects of structural differentiation, such as, for ex-
ample, that of religion.

Finally, there is a question as to whether anthropology should
be considered in a theoretical sense an independent science. As the
study of non-literate societies, it is of course a pragmatic field of spe-
cialization of considerable significance, in some ways analogous to

POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY IN SOCIOLOGY 237

the field of government. In so far, however, as its theoretical concern
is with the study of social systems as such, there seems to be no
reason to regard social anthropology as a distinctive theoretical dis-
cipline. In the relevant respects, it must be regarded as a branch of
sociology, and in its other aspects, of economics, government and so
on. There is, however, one problem, analysis of which might modify
this view. To many of its proponents, the distinctive feature of
anthropology is that it is the science of culture, not of social
systems. It is implicit in the above analysis that culture, though em-
pirically fundamental to social systems and in one sense a compo-
nent of them, is not in the theoretical sense exclusively a social
phenomenon. It has been pointed out above that the study of the
structure of cultural patterns as such and of their structural inter-
dependence is a legitimate abstraction from the concrete phenom-
ena of human behavior and its material consequences, which is
quite different from their study in the context of interdependence in
a social system. It is perfectly clear that this study is not equivalent
to the study of institutions as aspects of a social system. If the focus
of theoretical interest of anthropology is to develop in this direction,
two important consequences would seem to follow. First, it is quite
clear that its traditional primary concern with non-literate peoples
cannot be upheld. The culture of non-literate peoples is neither
more nor less a subject for the differentiation of a science than is
their institutional structure. Secondly, it is particularly important to
clarify the generalized relationship between culture and social
structure. A great deal of confusion appears to be prevalent on this
point among both sociologists and cultural anthropologists.

XII

The Problem of Controlled
Institutional Change

THE MEMBERS OF the Conference reached definite agreement on the
important conclusion that the sources of German aggressive expan-
sionism are not merely a matter of the particular recent situation in
which the German nation has been placed, or of the character and
policies of a particular regime which can be expected to vanish
with the fall of the regime. Although drawn out and accentuated by
these factors, the more important sources lie deeper and would not
necessarily be seriously affected by chances at these levels.

The principal emphasis of the Conference was on the existence
of a typical German character structure which predisposes people
to define all human relations in terms of dominance, submission,
and romantic revolt. It was, however, also agreed that such a
typical character structure, although probably an independent fac-
tor^ of great significance, is supported by, and closely interdepend-
ent with, an institutional structure of German society. The inter-
dependence is such that on the one hand any permanent and
far-reaching change in the orientation of the German people prob-
ably cannot rest on a change of character structure alone, but must
also involve institutional change; otherwise, institutional conditions
would continue to breed the same type of character structure in
new generations. On the other hand, it may prove that a direct
attack on character structure as such is less promising than one
through other forces that operate on the institutional system and
which, through changes in that, may serve to create conditions
favorable to a change in character structure.

1 Exactly how far it is an independent factor is exceedingly difficult to
judge since only actual imifonnities of behavior are available as direct evidence.
Hence, for certain purposes character structure and institutional structure may
be treated as different abstractions from the same facts. Even so far as they
are actually independent i^ermanent change of character structure is dependent
upon institutional change.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 239

Analytical Introduction
Institutions in the Social System

The institutional structure of a society must be regarded as a spe-
cial aspect of the total social system. Especially for purposes of con-
sidering the possibilities of dynamic change in institutions it is
essential to treat them systematically and explicitly in terms of their
interdependence with the other principal elements of the system.

Institutions are those patterns which define the essentials of the
legitimately expected behavior of persons insofar as they perform
structurally important roles in the social system. There are, o£
course, many degrees of conformity or lack of it, but a pattern is
"institutionalized" only insofar as at least a minimum degree of con-
formity is legitimately expected— thus its absence treated with
sanctions at least of strong disapproval— and a suflBcient degree of
conformity on the part of a sufficient proportion of the relevant
population exists so that this pattern defines the dominant struc-
tural outline of the relevant system of concrete social relationships.
It is the structurally significant elements of the total concrete rela-
tionship pattern which are institutionally relevant. What these are
cannot be decided in terms of the subjective sentiments of partici-
pant observers but only in the perspective of structural analysis of
the social system.

Institutional patterns are the "backbone" of the social system. But
they are by no means absolutely rigid entities and certainly have
no mysteriously "substantial" nature. They are only relatively stable
uniform resultants of the processes of behavior of the members of
the society, and hence of the forces which determine that behavior.
Their relative stability results from the particular structure of inter-
dependence of those forces, and institutional structure is subject to
change as a function of any one of many different kinds of change
in the underlying system of forces. Their relatively stable role in
social systems, however, indicates that institutionalized patterns do
in fact mobilize a combination of forces in support of their mainte-
nance which is of primary significance in the total equilibrium of a
social system. Analysis of the nature and principal components of
this combination is the first requisite of an approach to the prob-
lem of institutional change.

Furthermore, institutionalization is a general phenomenon of all
extensive and permanent social systems. Hence, the broad outHne

240 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

of the problem concerns elements which are universal to all societies
and does not depend upon specialized knowledge of the particular
society in question. A general analysis of the problem can be pre-
sented first- and then applied to the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case.

The uniformities of human behavior must be analyzed in terms
of the structure of motivational forces on the one hand, and of the
situation in which they have to operate, on the other. In looking for
the structure of forces underlying institutions, it is important to
keep in mind that both elements of the determination of human be-
havior are involved in a peculiar kind of interdependence. For in
social relationships it is the expected and actual behavior and
manifestation of the sentiments of others which is the most impor-
tant component of the situation in which any one person acts.
Hence, to a very large extent, the structure of the situation is de-
pendent on the stability of the motivational structure of the mem-
bers of the society at large. So long as a stable structure is main-
tained this accounts for the interlocking of so many motivational
elements in support of the same goals and standards. It above all
accounts for the cardinal fact of institutional behavior, that in an
integrated system "self-interested" elements of motivation and dis-
interested moral sentiments of duty tend to motivate the same con-
crete goals.

Such an interlocking is, however, never complete. There are im-
portant elements of the situation of action of different classes of
persons which are not primarily dependent on the crystallized senti-
ments of others. Conversely, there are unstable elements in the
motivation structure of persons. It is at these two points that the
principal openings for institutional change are to be sought. It is a
further implication of the general character of institutions that the
consequences of changes at these points may be more important
than would appear at first sight because any change at these pomts
will interact with the other elements of the system and may well
set up cumulative tendencies to change.

Before exploring these possibilities further, however, it is neces-
sary to develop a somewhat clearer picture of the main elements of
stability in an institutional system. It is these which have to be
modified to achieve fundamental changes.

2 This analysis is of course generalized from the study of many empirical
cases— not simply deduced from general considerations.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 241

Factors of Rigidity: "Vested Interests"

It is inherent in the nature of an institutional system that it should
create, and is in part supported by, a complex system of vested in-
terests. Even on occasion in conflict with very deep-rooted moral
sentiments, people will often be powerfully motivated by consider-
ations of interest. There is no question of the importance of inter-
ests but only of the perspective in which they are seen in the total
social system and of the nature of the structure of motivational ele-
ments referred to as an interest.

Among "interests" in general those which may be called "vested"
are distinguished by the fact that they are oriented to the mainte-
nance of objects of interest which have already become established.
This means that to a greater or less degree the status and situations
and their perquisites to which such interests are attached already
involve some element of legitimacy or claim to it. To attempt to
deprive a person or a group of something in which they enjoy a
vested interest thus involves not only imposing the frustrations at-
tendant to the deprivation as such but also to a greater or less
degree outrages the moral sentiments surrounding the claim of
legitimacy. The resistance of the people or groups affected is thus
strengthened by their sense of injustice. Furthermore, the same fact
enables them to rally support for their claims from people who do
not share the same interests. The obverse of this, finally, is the fact
that among those who oppose a vested-interest group there is likely
to be an element of sense of guilt arising from the fact that they
share the same patterns of value. This introduces an element of
ambivalence which in an important sense weakens the position of
the attacker. If the guilt is repressed, however, it may make the
actual attack more extreme than it would otherwise have been. But
in such cases the attacker may be highly vulnerable to the proper
kind of attempt to change his attitudes.

The structure of interests in a group is a function both of the
structure of the realistic situations in which people act and of the
"definitions" of those situations which are institutionalized in tlie
society. It is this latter fundamental aspect which is most likely to be
misunderstood in common sense thinking, since one is prone to
assume that what people want to "get out of" a realistic situation,
or avoid in it, is universal, a matter of "liuman nature." The actual
tendency is to project one's own definitions of situations onto the

242 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

action of other people and societies. An actor thinks of what he
would want in such a situation.

The consequence of the role of institutionalized definitions of
situations in the structuring of interests is at some points to intro-
duce elements of rigidity, which would not otherwise exist, of flex-
ibility at others. In the first case it delays or altogether blocks what
might otherwise be felt to be a "natural" reaction to a change in
the realistic situation.^ It is, therefore, never safe to count on the
efiFect of changing a situation on the structure of interests without
specifically investigating the definitions of situations within the
groups involved.

The efi^ect of a change in the realistic situation while an institu-
tionalized definition remains unchanged is to create a strain. The
line of least resistance in reaction to this stiain will usually be to
attempt more aggressively than before to reassert the old definition
of the situation and to shape the realistic situation in conformity
with it. This total reaction involving above all the appropriate emo-
tional components is what is generally meant by talking about the
behavior of "the vested interests." For constructive change to take
place it is therefore not only necessary to provide realistic opportu-
nities which can be utilized to satisfy the interests of groups. It is
also necessary to have some mechanism for coping with these other
aspects of the problem. Two things are above all important. First,
to provide new alternative definitions of the situation which give
the new realistic opportunities positive meaning. It is particularly
important that these should not be too far removed from the sym-
bols and prestige standards previously current. Secondly, the emo-
tionally aggressive defensiveness must be dealt with. This is to a
large extent a reaction to a sense of insecurity, and requires some
kind of measures of reassurance.

Of course, there are occasions where it is not possible to redefine

the situation so that an interest group will fit into a new situation.

Then its compulsory repression is the only way. But here, besides

the question of adequate means of compulsion, a most important

consideration is that of the moral position of the compelling agent.

For the moral sentiments which legitimize an interest are shared by,

3 A dramatic example is the "suicidal mania" of Japanese soldiers. To the
Occidental a hopeless situation where no further contribution to the cause is
possible is an occasion for honorable surrender. To most Japanese, apparently,
surrender under any circumstances is an intolerable disgrace. This is a matter of
differences in the definition of the situation, not of the realistic situations them-
selves.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 243

and shade into, those of other groups. For the long run effect the
moral isolation and insulation of a group which has to be frustrated
is at least as important as the physical capacity to carry it through.

The converse of this difficulty lies in the fact that rational adap-
tation to realistic situations is a fundamental component of human
social behavior. Hence, change of situation plus sheer cognitive
enlightenment about its possibilities can often effect important
changes. It must, however, to exploit this possibility, operate so as
to avoid too serious conflict with the forces just discussed. Above
all the change must be such as not to be interpreted— psychologi-
cally, not intellectually alone— as threatening security in those things
in which members of the group have important emotional investment.

The phenomenon of vested interests thus proves to be a special
case of the general integration of diverse motivational forces about
an institutional structure. It is exceedingly difficult to say that the
elements of self-interest are the decisive factors in most cases. It is
the mutual reenforcement of the different elements which is the
principal source of rigidity— interest taken alone is probably one of
the factors most accessible to change.

A particularly important class of cases of this mutual reenforce-
ment is that where group solidarities are involved. In a functionally
differentiated society like that of the modern Occident, in perhaps a
majority of groups solidarity is secondary to the functional signifi-
cance of the roles of the members. But even here, sentiments of
solidarity readily acquire a prominent place. Insofar as this happens
the security of their members becomes associated with the status of
the group as such, rather than fulfillment of the functional norms
which ideally govern its role; and sanctions come to be applied to
what is interpreted as loyalty to the group rather than functionally
adequate achievement. Once such patterns of group solidarity are
firmly established a serious obstacle to change is introduced. Ap-
peals to a group in terms of functional values may be ineffective
unless they can also carry the sentiments of group solidarity with
them. Such sentiments are particularly difficult to deal with when
the members of the group feel insecure,^ because this creates a
"defensive" attitude system.

^ Guilt may be an important element in this insecurity. Wliere people are
really uneasy about the moral justification of their position, they may defend it
with all the emotional intensity of fanaticism. In this case the "ethics" of group
loyalty is often used to rationalize away the deeper moral conflict.

244 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The concept of "vested interest" thus serves as a key to the prob-
lem of rigidity in an institutional system because it is the most con-
spicuous pattern of behavior which appears in particular groups in
resistance to change or tlireats of it. As such, however, it apphes to
particular groups. It is a mode of focusing all the principal compo-
nents of motivation on such resistance. But any one group is struc-
turally interdependent with others in the same social system. More-
over, the same persons play a variety of different roles as members
of different groups.

It is a cardinal fact of social change that it impinges unevenly on
the different parts of the society it affects. It alters the status and
role of some groups but not directly of others. Or it may alter the
situation or definition of it of the members of a group in one of their
roles— for example, occupational; but not directly in another— for
example, kinship. But it is in the nature of this structural interde-
pendence of groups and roles in a social system that alteration in
any one will set up waves of repercussion in many others. The dif-
ferent structural elements of a social system are "geared in" to one
another. The factors of stability or rigidity just discussed are present
in each one. Change at one point sets up a strain in neighboring
parts of the system. One fundamental and immediate possibility of
reaction to the strain is the vested-interest reaction— to activate an
emotionally defensive resistance to the change. After the problem of
overcoming this pattern of reaction at the points where the forces
of change impinge most immediately on the system itself, the next
problem is that of preventing the development of this barrier to its
structurally necessary repercussions beyond these points.

This is a basically important consideration since if the defensive
reaction becomes sufficiently firmly consolidated, one of two things
must happen. Either the reaction will be so powerful as to eliminate
the change and, if not restore the previous balance, lead to a quite
different direction of change. Or, short of this, there will be a per-
manent state of malintegration and tension which will prevent
stable institutionalization of the new patterns even within their
primary area of application. Not only will there be elements of
group conflict but, perhaps even more important, a large number
of persons will be caught in a pattern of conflicting pressures and
ambivalent attitudes as "marginal men." For the patterns dominant
in one set of roles a person plays will conflict more or less seriously
with those in others. The resulting situation of insecurity for many

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 245

produces a high degree of instability of overt attitudes and be-
havior.

An example of fundamental significance in modern Western so-
ciety is the tension between occupational and family roles. The
occupational system has, through the inherently dynamic character
of modern technology and of the development of large-scale organ-
ization, been a focus of continual change, profoundly altering the
pattern of the occupational role. On the whole the forces for change
operating directly on the family have not been so strong and have
been of a different, largely an ideological, character. Hence, the
defensive reaction pattern has been particularly strong in the fam-
ily and in those agencies which, like the churches, have assumed
the role of guardians of the integrity of its traditional patterns. As
so often happens, only a very vague insight into the real sources of
the changes has existed, so the hostility generated has largely been
discharged upon scapegoats, prominent among which has been the
"younger generation."

Two further features of the "psychological" structure of social
systems are of very general significance for the present discussion.
First, psychologists have strongly emphasized the importance of
emotional attitudes toward those objects which impinge directly
upon the everyday emotional life of a person, particularly those
concrete persons with whom he is placed in immediate contacts:
his own parents, siblings, spouse, or "boss." It is readily understand-
able that he should have strong and often complicated emotional
feehngs toward them. But it is also true that people have very
strong feelings about objects, patterns, and symbols which are rela-
tively remote from their personal experiences and interests. Indeed,
for most of a population most of the time the majority of those
objects which are essential to the structuring and behavior of large-
scale social units are in this category. Thus, in time of peace a po-
tential national enemy, the ideal of equality of opportunity or the
flag can arouse very powerful reactions. Of course, reflection and
analysis shows that even people's immediate interests are in fact de-
pendent on these things and what they symbolize. But the intel-
lectual complexity of the relation is too great for it to account
adequately for the emotional reaction. This must depend on non-
rational mechanisms to an even higher degree than reactions to
immediate objects. The nature of these mechanisms is a problem
of great importance.

246 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL. THEORY

It is clear that the connection may be relatively loose between
these two basic levels and tliat attitudes toward the remoter objects
may be subject to change by psychological techniques which would
not operate successfully to change a man's attitude toward his
mother or his "boss." It is essential to keep this in mind in discus-
sing problems of ideology, political attitudes and the like.

The second important fact is that the conception of a completely
integrated social system is a limiting case. Every at all complex
society contains very important elements of internal conflict and
tension. In some respects this is an impediment to change since
patterns of defensive vested-interest behavior already exist in im-
portant cases as responses to conflict with other internal elements.
But it also almost certainly means that there are "allies" within the
social system itself which can be enlisted on the side of change in
any given direction.

In particular, Germany is not, relatively to the rest of the Western
world, a completely "sealed off" unique society. Many of its most
important culture patterns and structural elements shade imper-
ceptibly into those on the democratic side of the confhct. They are
genuinely institutionalized in Germany or have been very incom-
pletely eradicated under the Nazi regime. They constitute funda-
mentally important avenues of approach to change in the other, the
conflicting elements.

This lack of full integration has a further consequence: it means
that the underlying institutional foundations of national behavior
are not as firm as they would be in a better integrated system. In-
deed, one factor in the violence of these manifestations in the case
of Germany lies in the conflict; part of the energy has the function
of repressing the sentiments and patterns opposed to the recent
course. The expectation may then be that not too radical an altera-
tion in the balance of forces could have "disproportionately" great
effects on immediate behavior. This is, indeed, what happened in
the shift from Weimar to the Nazi regime. The Germany of Weimar
was not spurious— a "deceitful mask" as many are now inclined to
feel. That would be as serious an error as the previous one of sup-
posing that it was the one "true Germany" once the "bad" monarchy
had been eliminated.

But of course merely shifting the balance till the scale tips is not
a radical cure— it would take too little to shift it back again. But it
can be an early phase of a farther-reaching process— the obverse of
what the Nazi regime has hoped it was accomplishing.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 241

Channels of Influence

To recall a previous starting point: human behavior may be influ-
enced either through the situations in which people must act, or
through "subjective" elements— their sentiments, goals, attitudes,
definitions of situations. Tliis classification may serve for orinetation
to the analysis of the elements of flexibility, hence possible openings
for control, of a social system.

The first must be differentiated according to whether it is the
situation external to the social system as a whole, which is inde-
pendent of its internal institutional structure, or the immediate
situations in which large classes of people act— of which institu-
tional patterns themselves constitute a crucial element— which is to
be deliberately controlled. In the latter case only certain elements
of situations are subject to control as a means of bringing about
institutional change; others must be a result of it.

A second essential discrimination is between using control of the
situation to suppress a structural element or manifestation, and
using it to alter it by making available new channels of expression
for the same basic sentiments and goals— so that the sense of conti-
nuity need not be lost.

Turning to the subjective side, it is possible to attempt through
"education" and "propaganda" to affect mass sentiments through
influencing various of their manifestations. The phenomena in this
field are exceedingly complex and in an elementary stage of analysis.
The most important thing to be said is that the chances of success-
ful influence do not depend mainly on the apparent "reasonable-
ness" of what is transmitted but on its relation to the functional
equilibrium of the system on which it impinges. This in turn
depends on at least three factors: the functional significance of the
manffestations it attempts to displace, the potential functions of the
new patterns which are put forward, and the appropriateness of
the source and manner of influence, that is, the definition of the situ-
ation of 'laeing influenced" from the point of view of the recipients.

Again it is important to discriminate sentiments and their mani-
festations touching remoter objects concerning the society at large,
from those touching the immediate interests of its members.

Just as actual situations deviate from institutionally sanctioned
definitions of the same situations, so ideological and symbolic pat-
terns associated with the sentiment system do not stand in a simple
relation of correspondence with the sentiments manifested. Ideo-
logical patterns are inevitably highly selective if not distorted rela-

248 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL, THEORY

tive to the system of sentiments which support institutions. These
and other patterns often involve psychological reactions to strain
and thus contain elements of prejection and displacement on "cul-
ture heroes" or scapegoats. Finally, symbolism plays a very prom-
inent part in this field.

These considerations, combined with the others already discussed,
show that it is not to be expected that the "logical" consequences of
ideas will be automatically "acted out." What will happen is rather
the resultant of the interaction of verbal patterns with a variety of
other elements in the total social system.

The Case of Germany
The Problem: Objectives of a Program

The members of the Conference agreed that the dominant char-
acter structure of modern Germany had been distinguished by a
striking dualism between "A: an emotional, idealistic, active, ro-
mantic component which may be constructive or destructive and
anti-social," and "B : an orderly, hard-working hierarchy preoccupied,
methodical, submissive, gregarious, materialistic" component.^

In the traditional pre-Nazi German society it is overwhelmingly
the B component which has become institutionalized. The A com-
ponent arises from two principal interdependent sources: certain
features of the socialization process in the German family, and the
tensions arising from life in that type of institutional order. It is
expressed in romantic, unrealistic emotionalism and yearnings.
Under other circumstances the dissociation has historically been
radical— the romantic yearning has found an outlet in religion, art,
music and other-worldly, particularly a-political, forms.

The peculiarity of the Nazi movement is that it has harnessed this
romantic dynamism to an aggressive, expansionist, nationalistic
political goal— and an internal revolution— and has utilized and
subordinated all the motives behind the B component as well. In
both cases the synthesis has been dependent at the same time on
certain features of the situation and on a meaningful definition of
the situation and system of symbols. The first task of a program of
institutional change is to disrupt this synthesis and create a situ-
ation in which the romantic element will again find an a-political

° Quoted from Report of the Conference, Appendix 3, p. 10. Compare
Erikson, Erik Homburger, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," Psychiatry
(1942) 5:475-493.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 249

form of expression. This will not, however, "cure" the basic difficulty
tut only its most virulent and, to the United Nations, dangerous
manifestation. Its importance, however, should not be underesti-
mated. This may be referred to as a semi-institutionalized feature
of the German system.

The second problematical set of features of the German institu-
tional system comprises certain traits associated with the B compo-
nents of her character structure." Orderliness, industry, and me-
thodicality are not "trouble-making" traits if they are stable. Even,
these, however, are skewed by their relation to the dominance-
submission element which finds its institutional counterpart in a
rigidly hierarchical status system where the superiority-inferiority
aspect of roles tends to be emphasized to the exclusion of their
positive functional significance, and in a peculiar prominence of
relations of authority.

A second conspicuous general trait of German institutions is their
"formalism." In part this serves to emphasize status and authority
as such. But there is also what to Americans seems a peculiar kind
of dissociation between the status system and the "inner" emotional
interests and character of persons. This is both a determinant and
a consequence of the dualism of German character. Goals within
the status system fail to satisfy the romantic longings of component
A as previously defined. Germans are much more preoccupied with
status than Americans, but there has been little romantization of
success in Germany. Americans are prone to romanticize attainment
within the institutionalized status system; while Germans have a
greater romantic interest in goals outside it.

Both these traits permeate the whole role and group structure of
German society. But their special incidence varies in the difiFerent
parts of the social structure. The Prussian state has remained the
center of both these patterns. For, long before industrialization, in
its civil service it developed a highly formalized hierarchical and
authoritarian structure which, with the waning of feudalism, came
to hold a position of high prestige in the society. Much the same
was true of the other main structure, the military establishment,
which shared the same traits but in the officers' corps with even
greater emphasis on a prestige status and with this, a highly favor-
able situation for the dominance of "militaristic" values.

♦> For a somewhat fuller analysis of these institutional traits than space al-
lows here, see Parsons, Talcott, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi
Germany," /. Legal and Political Social., Nov. 1942, reprinted above.

250 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Another important pre-industrial component of the German in-
stitutional system was tlie "conservative" structure of the peasantiy
and the older artisan and middle-class groups. Above all, these
lower groups could readily integrate their status in the occupational
system with a patriarchal-authoritarian family structure. For the
most part the significant occupational unit was a family, not an
individual person as such. The father was, as a peasant, for instance,
the actual head of a producing organization in which his familial
and productive roles coincided.

The third fundamental aspect of German society is a structural
tension which in a very broad sense may be described as that be-
tween the firmly institutionalized patterns of this older pre-indus-
trial structure and the structure of situations and— in part— senti-
ments resulting from tlie impact of modern industrialism and its
principal social accompaniments, notably large-scale urbanization.
It is a case of partial integration and partial conflict. Industrialism
would never have had the spectacular development which, by
contrast with all the Latin countries, it had in Germany unless the
previous institutional structure had been favorable to it. But in
part the result was an industrial system with a different emphasis
from tliat in the United States. The state has played a much more
prominent role. Within industry itself there has been more emphasis
on hierarchy, authority, formalism, status-consciousness.

But at the same time there has been very serious tension. One
point of tension is between the status system and the patterns of
individual, technical achievement. The enormous German sensi-
tivity to "proletarization" has something to do with the definition of
all but the highest statuses in organization as involving subordina-
tion and limitation to a strictly formal definition of role. Another
most important consequence is the change in the kinship situation.
Where the role of father and head of a small economic unit were
combined they reenforced each other. But where a man is an au-
thoritarian father in the family, but a subordinate whose subor-
dination is continually symbolically rubbed in outside, it creates a
serious ambivalence in his own attitudes and in his significance to
his wife and children. The result has been to break down a rela-
tively well integrated patriarchal pattern.

The result of this major internal tension was to arouse intensely
defensive vested-interest behavior on the part of the groups most
closely identified with these conservative patterns and to introduce

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 251

a very large element of insecurity into the lives of large numbers
who were torn between conflicting patterns. This situation played
a large part in the instability of the Weimar regime and accounted
for much of the susceptibility of large elements of the population
to the appeal of Nazi propaganda.

The problem of control of German institutional structure may be
put, therefore, in terms of the following three major objectives:

To eliminate the specific Nazi synthesis of the two major
components of German character, or to divert it from its
recent distinctive channels of expression if this is possible.

To eliminate, or at least seriously reduce, the structural role
of the hierarchical, authoritarian and formalistic elements in
the "conservative" German institutional structure— in particu-
lar its focus on the army and the military class should be
broken.

To displace the conservative pattern and to reduce the
tension by systematically fostering those elements of the pat-
tern of modern Germany, especially of industrialism, which
are closest to theii* counterparts in the democratic countries.

Representative Control of the Situation
It is clear that the first task, now nearing completion, is to break
down the German military effort against the United Nations. Victory
for the United Nations can, in combination with other things, have
a profound eflfect on the internal institutional structure of Germany
as well as on its immediate power to make war. This is particularly
true since the Nazi movement, as an anti-traditional "charismatic"
movement, is peculiarly dependent on success to maintain its in-
ternal prestige. It is irrevocably committed to success in this war
and can scarcely survive a really thorough defeat. Defeat should,
if properly managed, not only realistically disrupt the Nazi organi-
zation but be the most important factor in permanently eliminating
the "Hitler myth" as the primary focus of the romantic elements in
German national psychology. For this to happen it is, however,
essential that the moral prestige of the victorious powers in Ger-
many should be maintained. The German propaganda line will
surely be that it is an "unfair" victory of material force alone. How-
ever stern tiie victors should be, they should never lose sight of the
importance of getting across a sense of the justice of their cause-
not of impulsive and arbitrary revenge.

The logical "follow-up" of military victory is to place Germany in
a position where it is quite clear that a repetition of her aggression

252 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

will not be tolerated and cannot be successful. There are many
possible ways in which this objective can be achieved. There is no
point in trying to decide between them; it is necessary only to indi-
cate that once chosen, they should fulfill three principal conditions :

The control must be effective. To the German type of men-
tality the idea that objectively it is possible to "get away"
with a repetition of aggressive aggrandizement is a direct
invitation to attempt it. The security system must be strong.
This means above all solidarity among those responsible for
its enforcement.

It must be such as to maintain the moral position of those
who impose it. It is not necessary to be bound by Nazi ideol-
ogists' definitions of German rights nor to avoid all just pun-
ishment for past derelictions of duty to the community of na-
tions—but the attendant severity must not be such as to be
construed, in the long run, as dictated simply by the victors'
self-interest or revenge— using main force to hold Germany
down. The Germans must be given "a chance" to play a role
of honor and dignity in the world.

It must not be such as to interfere with any of the other
vital measures to be proposed in following paragraphs. This
applies above all to the widely current proposals for de-
industrialization of Germany which, while depriving her im-
mediately of the power to make war, would almost certainly
confirm the patterns which it is desirable should be changed.
Much the same objections apply to most of the proposals for
partition of Germany which would be very likely to arouse
an irredentist nationalism such as dominated the early nine-
teenth century there, only more intense.

The effect of these measures should be to eliminate the Nazi
synthesis and perhaps accomplish even more. But to accomplish this
permanently, it is necessary to think well beyond the problem of
German military power as such, toward coping with the psycho-
logical repercussions of its collapse. It is here that the combination
of effective firmness with a strong moral position is so crucial, as is
also non-interference with other measures.

The Nazi pattern of aggrandizement is an extreme manifestation
of a more general German tendency to be fascinated with power.
The flourishing of this tendency is in part dependent on the German
nation functioning as a unit of power in a system of competitive
politico-military power relationships, where the definition of success
consists in achieving a position of ascendancy over its competitors.
The fundamental remedy for such a situation is to so define the

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 253

situation that the international order is a cooperative order and
Germany is not primarily a competitive unit. The moral foundations
for such a definition exist but have been overlaid by the competitive
power pattern. They must be brought again to the fore.

Successful fulfillment of the conditions just enumerated would
force the romantic element into a-political channels, or into internal
revolution.' By thoroughly discrediting certain crucial elements of
the conservative structure— which are already vulnerable because of
having "played ball" with the Nazis— it can go farther to facilitate
the weakening of this deeper stratum of German institutions. This
is particularly true of the military class and tradition.

In the internal structure of Germany the two obvious cases for
compulsory suppression are the Nazi party and all its subsidiary
organizations and the Junker class. The greater the extent to which
both these measures are accomplished by spontaneous internal
German movements or agencies, the better, for the principal danger
to be avoided is the saddling of the victorious foreigner with respon-
sibility for destroying "legitimate" German institutions. The col-
lapse of the Party should be an almost automatic consequence of
thorough military defeat. Allied Military Government will simply
have to step into the resulting organizational vacuum.

The case of the Junker class is more difficult because of its deeper-
seated status of legitimacy. First, however, it is important that it has
been considerably weakened during the events of recent years. The
further the Party- Army conflict goes in this direction before final col-
lapse the better. The considerable element which has been closely
identified with Nazism should be a victim of the collapse of the
Party while another is destroyed in conflict with it.

It may well be that the bulk of what is left will be adequately
cared for by Russian occupation of Northeastern Germany. Since
the Soviets have not the same tradition of respect for established
property rights as Americans, the moral dilemma for them of direct
expropriation of Junker estates would not be nearly so serious.

Should this combination of factors prove insufficient, it is prob-
ably best to attack the Junkers at their most vulnerable point— their
economic basis. Their system of estates has notoriously long rested
on an unsound economic basis and could be maintained even in
Weimar times only by an elaborate system of agricultural tariffs and

7 This is a case of attitudes toward a "remote" object which, because of
their loose connection with the experience of persons, can be relatively easily
transferred to another object.

254 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

subsidies. These should be swept away and "nature" allowed to
take its course.

The main point is to destroy the principal symbolic focus of the
historic military tradition in Germany, This is vulnerable because it
is out of keeping witii "modern" patterns and structures— it can
above all be attacked as a case of exclusive class privilege. But it is
essential to avoid the boomerang efiFect of the sufferings of the
Junkers being defined as the symbol of the "unfair persecution" of
Germany.

There are two other structural elements of conservative Germany
which raise serious problems because of their previous association
with Nazism, and more broadly militarism. These are the traditional
higher civil service groups and the big industrialists. In the situation
which led to Nazism both tended to behave as typical vested-in-
terest groups and largely threw in their lot with the Nazis although,
for most of their members, probably mainly as a choice of what
they felt to be the lesser evil.

The two groups are by no means identical in their significance.
The higher civil service has had strong pre-industrial traditions
which, with its ideal of disinterested service to the state, has made
it peculiarly susceptible to an anti-capitalistic ideological appeal— a
susceptibility which the Nazis have exploited to the full. But it is
overwhelmingly a conservative anti-capitalism which can be readily
mobilized against all movements of the left. In some respects it is
the main citadel of the conservative German patterns which are the
source of most trouble, hierarchy, authoritarianism, formalism and
status-consciousness. Hence, it is a potentially dangerous focussing
point second only to the military.

At the same time, however, it is much more difficult for the De-
mocracies to cope with. The military ideal has little appeal to the
Democratic peoples— but an honest, highly trained, technically com-
petent civil service does, largely because Americans are so acutely
conscious of their own shortcomings in this respect.*^ Hence, a policy
of direct liquidation could scarcely fail to be attended by very
formidable guilt feelings. This, and the importance of this group to
order and stability in a transitional period in Germany suggests the
advisability of an indirect attack. Probably the most important

8 Dr. Margaret Mead points out— in a private communication— that the
appeal of a good civil service to Americans and to tlie British is very diflFerent and
that, on this point, it may prove difficult to devise a policy satisfactory to both
countries.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 255

single defense of the old conservative patterns here is the class basis
of recruitment of the higher personnel. Nazism itself involved a
revolt against the class aspect of the older German society and the
general process may be expected to continue after its fall, with a
leftward emphasis. The most important policy then is to facilitate
effective, not merely formal, equality of opporttmity in the civil
service.** It is to be hoped that the stage will have been set for such
a development by the disorganization of this class produced during
the Nazi regime.

The case of the industrial groups is somewhat different. Part of
their orientation has of course, been determined by the internal
capital-or management-labor tension— but only part. In Germany
industry has developed within a conservative pre-industrial social
structure. This has meant that the higher business groups were in
a more insecure position than in this country because in a highly
status-conscious society the highest prestige statuses were not their
own. They have thus tended to become "feudalized" by imitating
and attempting to amalgamate with the old upper classes. In the
situation which led up to Nazism this tendency was accentuated by
the common polarization against the left.

It has also been accentuated by the very prominence of the state
in the German economy— for the power of the state has meant in
this connection prominence of the role relative to business of the
old, conservative, administrative civil service. The same has been
true of the close relations of the army to those industries important
to war.

Hence, it may be concluded that it is largely by virtue of its close
fusion with and dependence on the traditional conservative upper
structure of Germany— and more recently with elements of the Nazi
party organization— for example, Goering— that German industry
has developed institutional tendencies dangerous to the United
Nations, and not by virtue of the intrinsic characteristics of indus-
trialism. It is above all its integration with a militaristic state and
conservative class structure which is the source of this danger.

For other reasons the deindustrialization for Germany seems most

^ A key strategic point here is entrance to the Law faculties of the universi-
ties, the most important channel of access to the higher civil service. In the
Weimar days there was a striking difference between the Philosophical faculties
which leaned on the whole to the left— with students drawn from the middle
classes— and the Law faculties which were rightist with students mainly from
tlie Conservative upper groups. The system of student Verbindungen played an
important part in this situation.

256 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

undesirable. But unless the character of the state is greatly changed,
socialization would not improve the situation— by giving more powder
to the conservative bureaucracy it might make it worse. So long as
free enterprise is permitted a prominent place in the American and
the British economies, an attempt at radical suppression of its
German counterpart would arouse a powerful guilt reaction. Hence,
it is a reorientation of German business in the direction of a liberal
industrialism which seems most desirable.

The cases just discussed have been those of the principal elite
groups in pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany. Other groups such as the
lower middle class and in certain respects the peasantry have played
a very important part in the background of Nazism. But there is
little to be said for their compulsory suppression. It is to alterations
in the situation and sentiments of their members, and in the remote
objects upon which their sentiments become projected, that one
must look for any important change in their characters and attitudes.

The case for compulsory suppression in relation to Germany may
then be summarized. Both in the case of her power to make war
and of the most important elite groups contributing to her aggres-
sive disposition, the United Nations will soon have the physical op-
portunity to go as far as they deem wise. In using this power two
dangers must be avoided. On the one hand certain forms of ruth-
lessness, while effective, would conflict so radically with democratic
values that their repercussions in the society of the victors would
be devastating. On the other hand, certain ways of exercising their
power would probably arouse a powerful boomerang reaction and
thus fail of their purpose. It is not in any simple sense a question
of a "hard" or a "soft" peace. It is rather a technical question of the
measures which will attain the goal on which the members of the
Conference were agreed— a reintegration of Germany into the com-
munity of Western nations. The technical problem is largely that
of protecting security interests but at the same time minimizing the
defensive vested-interest reaction to change, the importance of
which the whole weight of modern social science emphasizes.

Permissive Control of the Situation
As in the case of compulsory suppression, use of control of the sit-
uation to open new avenues of action can have consequences at
more than one level. It is probably advisable to avoid all use of this
for the immediate future for the German nation as a whole. But the

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 257

prospect of future full membership in a cooperative international
organization should be offered. The danger is that of making this
offer too patronizing. It is essential to safeguard the moral position
of those dispensing favors.

With respect to the internal situation in which the various groups
of people act, the first problem is that of order and security. The
evidence is very strong that the rapid change, the mobility and the
complex tensions of an industiial society will in any case produce
a high level of psychologically significant insecurity among the
masses of the population. The reaction to this state contains an im-
portant element of aggression which has in part been displaced upon
the foreign enemy. In addition to this, the German people have been
subjected to an extraordinary variety of influences making for still
greater insecurity. Some of these are consequences of war as such.

But the character of the Nazi regime has a special place in this
connection. On the remote level it undoubtedly gave a temporary
basis for a greatly enhanced sense of security— although this will be
devastatingly shattered by defeat. But on the immediate level in at
least two respects, it operated the other way. It subjected millions
to an essentially arbitrary hazard to status, property, freedom and
life itself which must have stood in terrific contrast to the old orderly
German system. Fear and anxiety as to what may come next must
play a tremendous role among almost all Germans. In addition to
this the Nazis have pursued a systematic policy of breaking up vir-
tually all the independent groupings in the society— from the great
Trade Union movement to the family. They have "atomized" the
society wherever its older groupings conflicted with the Party,
which involved an exceedingly wide area. Since the importance of
attachment to such groupings for the security of the individual citi-
zen is known, their disruption must have been attended by an im-
mense heightening of the level of insecurity.^^

Hence, it can be inferred that the fundamental immediate need
of the German people is for order and security— as an essential con-
dition of almost anything else. It seems clear that the immediate
agency for providing this will be Allied Military Government, and
its role will be crucially important.

There is a most important basis in German tradition for a favor-
able response to such a change— in the old pattern of meticulous

10 Though emotional enthusiasm for Nazism has compensated for this, to
how great an extent no one can say. In any case, this source of security will be
gone after the war.

258 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

order— of security of property and status, and strictly legal pro-
cedure. In this circumstance it is inevitable that important vestiges
of the old conservative pattern should re-emerge, including hier-
archy, authoritarianism and formalism. Indeed, the role of the AMG
autliorities will itself be defined in terms of these German patterns,
more rigidly authoritarian and more formalistic than would be the
case in an Anglo-Saxon country. To be effective in the present sense,
it is essential that AMG should accept this role.

But it is none the less important to avoid two closely interdepend-
ent dangers. One is, as the path of least resistance to quick restora-
tion of order, lending too strong a sanction to the older conservative
patterns and the social elements which symbolize them. Above all
it is essential that the occupying authority should not "identify"
with the old, upper classes, but should remain aloof from them.^^
There is presumably a very tangible limit to the extent to which
such an authority can permit any pattern of order it once allows to
be established to be displaced by violence. But it can do much by
refraining from lending its positive sanction and prestige to an order
and thereby handicapping other groups and patterns. It should
assiduously cultivate as fluid a situation as the basic requirements
of order will permit.

The second danger arises from the fact that in a state of pro-
nounced insecurity spontaneous groupings tend to be largely "de-
fensive" in orientation. There will be a strong tendency to rally
around old traditional patterns. But, in addition, there is ample
evidence that the patterns governing such defensive orientation to
security tend, when seen in relation to the main institutional trends
of modern Western civilization, to be "regressive" in character. In
particular, the elements of universalism in relation to functional
efficiency, and the orientation to functionally specialized roles tend
to disintegrate in favor of particularistic group solidarities. This is
a particularly serious danger for Germany, both because of the high
level of insecurity and because the Nazis have already gone very
far to destroy these patterns in the older German society.

A certain amount of this tendency is a "healthy" reaction in the

circumstances. But it should not be allowed to become too firmly

consolidated. It may be necessary to take positive steps to eliminate

some of its more extreme manifestations. But more important ways

^ 1 It is probable that the extent to which the Allies confirmed the legitimacy
of the position of the conservative elements after the last war was an important
impediment to the strengthening of more liberal forces within Germany.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 259

of mitigating it are to reduce the need for it by improving the level
of security, and opening opportunities for alternative patterns of
institutionalization.

This type of group formation is a danger for two main reasons.
The importance of conservative, militaristic, nationalistic patterns in
recent German history is so great that it would be exceedingly dif-
ficult to avoid a very close connection and hence a tendency to
resurgence. But secondly, if Western civilization is to survive at all,
it must be as a relatively mobile, "individualistic," industrial society
where such universalistic values as those of science, modern tech-
nology, and the rights of the individual citizen play a prominent
part. No major unit like Germany in this "Great Society" can be
successfully insulated from these patterns. But a great block of the
social structure which is institutionalized in a conflicting pattern is
a source of serious internal conflict and tension in the society as a
whole. It is precisely from such a conflict that, in large measure,
the Nazi movement has grown. A policy which would consolidate
such tendencies would not conduce to less tension than existed in
pre-war European society. It would be laying the foundations of a
repetition of the disturbance through which the Western world has
lived.

Security, and measures to counteract the above tendencies, im-
portant as they are, are probably not enough to start a strong move-
ment of positive institutional change in the right direction. There is,
however, a possibility of using control of the situation of action at
least to encourage this. In selecting points at which to exert such
control three primary considerations are most important: first, ac-
cessibility to effective influence; second, strategic significance in the
total system of the structure affected; and, third, vulnerability to
serious boomerang repercussions which might nullify the desired
effect. There are four principal structures which have been widely
discussed as possibilities— the family, the educational system, the
state itself and economic or, more in sociological terms, occupa-
tional situations.

There is little doubt that in terms of strategic significance the
family is the most important structure because of its paramount
influence on the socialization of the younger generation. It is, how-
ever, by far the least accessible to direct influence since it belongs
so much to the sphere of private life which is protected from inter-
ference. Probably, by far the most important ways of influencing

260 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the family are by indirect influence. It is to be expected that any
substantial change in the occupational structure would profoundly
influence the roles of husband and father. Greater security and a
removal of the emphasis on hierarchy and relations of authority
would greatly reduce the need of a man to "take it out" by being a
petty tyrant over his wife and children. This would be a primary
objective of the economic policy suggested hereafter.

The second major point touches the position of women. This has
been a major source of difficulty in German society because of the
deep ambivalence in the child's relation to his mother it has fos-
tered. Any change which can enhance the dignity and position of
independent resposibility of women so that they can successfully
"stand up" to men, will operate in the right direction. But here also
it is probable that occupational changes offer the most important
possibilities. The opening of further occupational opportunities for
women is only one phase of it. Making domestic service more ex-
pensive and servants less submissive would have an important effect
in tlirowing more responsibility on middle-class women. But most
important would be a shift in the definition of the masculine occu-
pational role. Germany has been a rather extreme case of status con-
sciousness. This has meant that the position of the married woman
has, to a far greater extent than with the democracies, been defined
by the status of her husband^-— and hence her scope for independ-
ent development has been very narrowly circumscribed. A change
of emphasis in the direction of functional role rather than status
would alter this and give a wider scope for feminine independence.
The use of this freedom need not take any one direction— it does not
do so in the United States. But it would go far to emancipate
women from a dependency relationship to particular men.

The case of the educational system is a peculiarly difficult one.
To the psychologically minded, it offers a very tempting opening.
This is particularly true of the naive "rationalists" who think of the
German problem as one of simple indoctrination with the proper
attitudes and values. But it is quite positively known, both on the
level of psychology and of social structure, that this is not the case.
The problem is that of making the desired patterns "stick." The at-
titudes fostered in democratic schools are not the product of teach-
ers and text books alone— These influences are reinforced by many
others, such as those of home, play group and the general social

1^ Symbolized by the fact that a married woman takes not only the name,
but the title of her husband; for example, Frau Oberst, Frau Professor.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 261

atmosphere. If all these could be controlled at the same time, the
case of the educational system would be difficult. But they almost
certainly cannot, as the case of the family shows.

Even if it were possible to mold the school system rather com-
pletely to the desired pattern, it is very questionable whether it
would be desirable to attempt it, since in the absence of control
over the other elements of the situation there would be an especially
stiong likelihood of a powerful boomerang reaction which would
more than nullify the direct effect. The German type of mentality
is, with its paranoid characteristics, more than usually likely to re-
sent what it interprets— often irrationally— as gratuitously patroniz-
ing "interference." Any United Nations agency or policy which was
in the position of "dictating" the education of Germans would be
an ideal scapegoat around which to rally all the resentments which
will inevitably be produced by the humiliation of defeat. Not only
would this produce serious difficulties in the behavior of adults, but
it would react so powerfully on the younger generation that it
would probably completely destroy the educational program. This
is particularly true if it has not proved possible through the family
to lay appropriate foundations in character structure for a "demo-
cratic" education.

Even more in this field than in many others any fundamental
change ought to appear to come from spontaneous German sources.
And should attempts to alter the institutional balance by other
measures succeed, an educational reorientation would automatically
follow. But to use imposed educational reform— even with the co-
operation of Democratic Germans— as a main direct avenue of
change is one of the most dangerous suggestions under discussion.

This does not, of course, by any means preclude a certain amount
of negative control of education. But even here the more of it can
be a spontaneous result of the revulsion incident to the collapse of
the Nazi regime the better.

Somewhat the same considerations apply to proposals for the
direct control of government, for this is a critical symbolic focus of
the ideological and sentimental structure of a nation. The fate of
the Weimar regime in this regard is instructive. It was, in fact, by
no means simply imposed by the victorious allies. But the Nazis
fully succeeded in getting it defined as such by a large fraction of
the German masses— as an "alien" regime which should be replaced
by something "truly German." In general it is much better to at-
tempt to control the patterns of government through control of the

262 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

situation in which it has to act. If that is properly handled, the
"form" of government can safely be allowed to care for itself. At-
tempts to influence that directly are in grave danger of boomerang
effect.

These two cases suggest two further rather general maxims which
should govern United Nations behavior toward Germany. The first
is that a quick, easy turning of the German people to patterns and
forms closely in accord with democratic values should be regarded
with serious suspicion and not too readily and joyfully accepted.
This is not so much because it is likely to be "insincere," masking a
plot, as because of the ambivalence and instability of the structure
of sentiments underlying it. It is likely to represent the dominance
of one potentiality of an ambivalent structure. It is after all the
major premise of this analysis that basic changes of institutions and
character structure are necessary before a stable, permanent re-
orientation of the German people can take place. It is impossible
that such changes should have been completed within a brief pe-
riod after the war.

Secondly, American functionaries dealing with Germans in any
capacity should be on their guard against using those who on a naive
level "make a good impression" on tiiem personally. For the prob-
ability is that they will be people congenial to American patterns
and hence incapable of exercising leadership over those Germans
whose attitudes are different and hence most need to be changed.
The first question to ask about a person, an organization or a group
is, what is its position in the German social system? Is it in a suf-
ficiently strategic position to exert an important influence in the
right direction? Only when this question can be answered in the
affirmative does it become even relevant to ask, how can we get
along with him or them?

There are two specific directions in which this danger is particu-
larly acute. First, attraction to Germans with good democratic ideas
and attitudes is likely. But this very fact may so define their status
in their own society as to preclude their effectiveness in doing what
is desired. Second, there is an inclination to have a strong predilec-
tion for people of the old, established, upper classes— they are
"educated," and have good manners, for example. But in a revolu-
tionary situation, identifying with them may directly block the
forces which could accomplish the most desirable changes in a
larger context.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROIXED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 263

These considerations suggest one aspect of a policy. It seems un-
likely that after the collapse of the Nazi regime there will be any-
thing like a government of Germany. Although a difficult situation
in many respects, this will have the great advantage of relieving the
occupying forces of the obligation to work with any particular
group. In such a situation it would, within the requirements of
order, seem highly advisable to allow as much freedom as possible
for the spontaneous formation of groups and emergence of leaders.
Such a policy could do much to prevent the serious error of pre-
mature commitment to people who later prove unable to carry
their own followers with them. The basic principle applies all the
way from a national government down to the smallest groups.

The fourth major structiure to be considered here is the economic-
occupational structure. This seems to be much the most promising
as a lever of institutional change according to all three of the criteria
previously set forth.

First, it is undoubtedly a highly strategic point in the total struc-
ture. It is one in which the great bulk of the adult male population,
and a considerable fraction of the female, spend nearly half their
waking hours. The situation and definition or role in the occupa-
tional sphere is of profound, direct significance But through its close
structural interdependence with kinship and the class structure an
important change there would have major repercussions in these
neighboring areas.

The desirable direction of change is in the first place a quantita-
tive spread in the incidence of functionally differentiated roles
where functional achievement is the principal emphasis and value.
In proportion to this spread, roles in which an established status
was the main emphasis, as in large sections of the peasantry, the
old Mittelstand and the older elite groups, would be correspond-
ingly weakened.

The second aspect of change is one of altered emphasis, away
from hierarchy, authority and formalism, in the direction of func-
tional achievement as the dominant value, and status as the reflec-
tion of this, not vice versa.

The probable effect on the family has already been indicated-
mitigation of the authoritarianism of the husband-father role and
opportimity for a more dignified feminine role to develop. On the
class structure the principal effect would be to weaken the rigid
formahsm of the status hierarchy.

264 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Secondly, it is a point of departure which is much less likely than
the others to arouse defensive reactions which might be strong
enough to defeat its purpose. In the first place, it is, as such, fairly
close to ideological neutrality. Most of the required changes, so far
as they need advertisement at all, can be justified simply as meas-
ures to open opportunities and contribute to the welfare of Ger-
mans. Many can be so unobtrusive as to arouse little attention
beyond the limited groups most immediately affected. So far as the
context is mainly commercial and technical the democratic peoples
are used to treating these problems more objectively than others.
Above all the status of the German nation need not be dramatically
involved.

There is a very solid common basis of shared value here in the
admiration for technical and organizational eflBciency and achieve-
ment. Few Americans will deny the Germans a high rating in these
respects and vice versa.

There seems to be one major point at which trouble is likely;
namely, German oversensitiveness to alleged American "material-
ism," and "money-consciousness." For this reason the emphasis
should probably be placed on technical— including scientific— devel-
opment rather than directly on trade and commercial development.

In the field of indirect repercussions there is one major risk, and
one factor which might block the process. In the nature of the case
the German tendency to military aggression could only be gradually
eliminated. It is possible that a policy which increased German in-
dustrial power before the deeper structural change had gone far
enough would play into the hands of a nationalistically aggressive
resurgence. The answer to this objection lies in other features of
the control structure. If the latter is strong, no tendency to militari-
zation of the German economy could get well started, however
great her industrial potential. Even after Hitler's advent to power,
it was the weakness of the Allies, who could not bring themselves
to intervene before it was too late, not the strength of Germany
before her rearmament was far advanced, which made it possible
for Germany to become a military threat. It is to a better system of
international control, not to de-industrialization of Germany, that
one must look for a solution of this problem. ^^

1'* This paper was written before the public discussion of the so-called
"Morgenthau Plan." That discussion has not caused me to alter my fundamental
opinion.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 265

The possible block lies in the question of capacity to accept the
repercussions of such a policy. The probable consequence is German
industrial expansion. In view of Germany's economic position, this
would be possible only with considerable expansion of her foreign
trade. Protectionism has been a growing tendency all over the world
and has not been least prominent in the United States. If the auto-
matic reaction to German trade expansion everywhere were the
progressive raising of trade barriers, this would bring the process
to a halt or force it into a nationalistic-aggressive pattern.

It has not been possible to consider here the probable repercus-
sions of the opposite policy— the drastic de-industrialization of Ger-
many. SuflBce it to say that from the point of view of Western insti-
tutional stability they would appear to be even more serious.

But apart from these questions of repercussions, is a control
through economic-occupational channels on a scale large enough
to be effective, realistically feasible? If it is seriously meant, it
should be.

The essential thing is that there should be a policy of fostering a
highly productive, full-employment, expanding economy for Ger-
many. The inherent tendencies of the modern industrial economy
are such that if this is achieved its influence on institutional change
will be automatically in the right direction. Conversely, tendencies
to particularism, the breakdown of functional specialization, over-
emphasis on group solidarity are overwhelmingly defensive reac-
tions to the insecurity attendant on a contracting field of oppor-
tunity. It is not modern industrialism as such, but its pathology and
the incompleteness of its development which fosters these phe-
nomena.

Specific means are various. One is relative freedom for trade ex-
pansion. Another is fostering fiscal and monetary stability and the
measures economists advocate to stimulate high production.

Apart from this type of measures there is another possibility. It
has been indicated that the principal area of common value is tech-
nical and organizational achievement. It is, therefore, suggested
that the first majer steps in the reintegration of Germany into the
Western community should be the admission of the professional
representatives of these values into the community of their Allied
"opposite numbers." This should be true of technologists, trade
groups, scientific societies, professional groups, university exchange.
The professionally specialized character of their role would do

266 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

much to reduce their vulnerabiHt>' to being defined as "traitors sell-
ing out" to the enemy, in the German view. At the same time, these
groups have a key influence in defining crucially important patterns
in democratic society. Genuine integration of the German counter-
parts would do much to set a right tone for the corresponding devel-
opment in Germany. It would also help to avoid defining the situ-
ation in terms of corrupting German "idealism" with Western
commercialism and "materialism," since science, technology and the
professions are relatively immune to this charge.

Direct Gontrol of Subjective Factors
Whatever may be true of the long-run influence of "ideas" in
shaping social structures and culture patterns, it is one of the most
important results of modern psychological and social science that,
except in certain particular areas, ideas and sentiments, both on the
individual and the mass levels, are more dependent manifestations
of deeper lying structures— character structure and institutional struc-
ture, as they have been called here— than independent determinants
of behavior. They are, however, inf£?rdependent with the other ele-
ments of the system and there is always the possibility that in par-
ticular instances they may be highly strategic factors. Hence, the
problems on this level should be explicitly considered as an integral
part of an analysis like the present.

The most obviously important of the mass manifestations in this
field is the ideological definition of the situation. The Nazi move-
ment has succeeded in winning acceptance by a large portion of the
German people— in varying degrees of intensity and completeness
—for a relatively well-integrated complex ideological system. Its
principal component elements have been "endemic" in Western
society, although part of the combination has been peculiarly Ger-
man in a pre-Nazi sense. But it is the intensity of affective fixation
and the particular combination which are unique.

The most important components, familiar as they are, had best
be summarized as follows: first, perhaps, is the conception of the
German national community, the Volksgemeinschaft, pseudo-bio-
logically defined as a "race," as having a special historic role, a
mission to purge the world of the great evils and impurities of the
time— of "materialism," "corruption," plutocracy, bolshevism. This
purge is to usher in an eschatological millennium, the New Order
or Tausendiaehriges Reich in which all men will be blissfully
happy and noble.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 267

A major aspect of the corrupt world which is to be purged is
capitahstic materiahsm, commercial-mindedness. Over against this
is set the "heroic" ideal which serves to rationalize a conspicuous
readiness to resort to force in order to execute the providential mis-
sion—and thus to idealize "militarism."

The sense of a special mission is also closely associated with the
"master race" idea. Since the Germans are the heroic people, it is
to be expected that their superiority should be manifested in a
position of dominance attained by force and perpetuated that way.
All other peoples are thus inferior and to be subordinated— for
their own good, of course. The development of democracy, capital-
ism and bolshevism among the most important of these other peo-
ples demonstrates their decadence and unfitness to perform a role
of leadership in the world.

The Jew has of course served as the master symbol of the ad-
versary of the German people and their mission. One of his most
important functions is to unify the different evils which beset them
in a single tangible symbol— above all to bring capitalism and bol-
shevism together. The Jew is not only a group enemy but is also a
semi-magical source of "infection." So far as the Nazis attack any-
thing, it becomes "Jewish" in sovereign disregard of the alleged bio-
logical race doctrine. Thus both American capitalism and Russian
communism are essentially Jewish, although J. P. Morgan and Henry
Ford, like Lenin and Stalin, would appear to have no Jewish ante-
cedents whatever. Even the British people as a whole have become
"white Jews" to certain radical Nazi circles.

The relation of an ideological system to the social system in
which it takes root is highly complex, and subject to a great deal of
variation in different circumstances. In a well-integrated society the
dominant ideology in large measure reflects and interprets a large
part of the system of actually institutionalized patterns. But even
in the most stable societies the ideological patterns are selective
relative to the institutional. Ideological formulation often reflects a
need to justify, which may imply a sense of insecurity. Hence, those
patterns which are most completely taken for granted are likely to
play a small role, if any, in explicit ideology. The system is thus
"skewed" in the direction of emphasizing elements which are felt
to be "problematical." Consciousness of contrast with other societies
is one major factor in this.

Every society has important elements of conflict. Hence, an ide-

268 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ology which has unifying functions will tend to "play down" the
elements of internal conflict and thus be "skewed" in another way.
In the United States, for example, from the "official" ideology one
could get little insight into the actual divergences and conflicts
between religious, ethnic and class groups.

Finally, the objects of ideological formulation are mainly in the
"remote" category to most persons— or are high-level abstractions
with a similar significance. Hence, they are less fully controlled by
realistic considerations and constitute particularly favorable oppor-
tunities for the operation of such nonrational and irrational mechan-
isms as projection, displacement, identification. Where there are
severe and definitely structured tensions in a society there are almost
certain to be ideological patterns which contain conspicuous ele-
ments of unrealism, romantic idealization, and distortion.

All these considerations apply in full measure to the various levels
of German ideology. The nearest thing to an official ideology of
the older Germany was what may be called "Prussian conservatism."
This went far toward directly reflecting the institutionalization of
the conservative patterns previously discussed. It took relatively
little account of the A component of German character. To some
extent, however, this was expressed in religious form, and in the
valuation of various forms of a-political romanticism— in the arts and
philosophy. Germany as a land of poets and idealistic dreamers
fits into this situation.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this underlying conservative
ideology for the present problem is its bearing on the readiness with
which Germans respond to an "anti-capitalistic" appeal. The basic
value and prestige symbols of this pattern are pre-industrial, center-
ing on class traditions, the enormous dignity of the state, a noblesse
oblige code of honor, and an ideal of disinterested service and duty.
This made it easy to define profit-making business as a form of
corruption of these high ideals, and the countries particularly marked
by its prominence, like England and the United States, became very
vulnerable to the stigma of "materialism"; for example, England as
the "nation of shopkeepers" and the United States as ruled by the
"Almighty Dollar." The Anglo-Saxon "business ideology" has served
to make these countries all the more vulnerable. The German devil
could only too easily find scripture to quote.

It may be assumed that the sentiments expressed in this ideolog-
ical complex are still very powerful in Germany and that their defi-

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 269

nition of Anglo-Saxon character as materialistic by contrast with
their own noble idealism is a very serious impediment to tlie Allies
acquiring a role of moral prestige relative to Germany. It is also
one primary foundation of the appeal of the symbol "socialism"
there. ^*

This background is important to understanding the role of the
ideology of the "left" in Germany also. This took over the patterns
of rationalism and the Enlightenment, and of course opposed Ger-
man conservatism. But it too was, although from a very different
point of view, anti-capitalistic. It may even be suggested that the
latent anticapitalism of the conservative background, plus the pres-
tige of the state, was an important positive factor in the wide ap-
peal of Marxian socialism in Germany— which gave it the largest
socialist party in Europe. At any rate, "liberalism" tended to be
ground down between these two millstones and was far weaker
than elsewhere in the Western world.

From an ideological view Nazism is a kind of synthesis of these
two basic currents plus a highly emotionalized nationalistic-political
expression of the A component of German character as an escha-
tological political romanticism. It has presented an extraordinarily
wide combination of symbolic appeals calculated to catch virtually
every main strain of German sentiment with which it is difficult for
Anglo-Saxons to cope.

What are the prospects and possibilities following the collapse
of Nazism? First, the immediate collapse is likely to be devastatingly
thorough and to give rise to a profound convulsion of sentiment
and thought. The Germans are likely to be the most badly dis-
oriented people of modern history for a considerable period. This
is, in part, because in accepting emotional adherence to such a
drastically romantic doctrine as Nazism, they have gone extraordi-
narily far to isolate themselves both from the reality and from the
moral community of Western civilization. Hence, the awakening
from their "hypnotic self-intoxication" will produce a very severe
national "hangover." But it is also in part because of a fundamental
factor of instability. As a charismatic movement par excellence
Nazism has lacked the security given by an sstablished basis of

14 For an expression of this antithesis on a very high level, see Troeltsch,
Ernest, Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa, Tiibingen Mohr, von Hansbaron, 1925
(ix and 268 pp.). A much more vulgar version is that of Somlaart, Werner,
Handler und Helden, Munchen, Duncker and Humblot, 1915 (vii and 145 pp.).
Both are pre-Nazi.

270 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

legitimacy. Lacking this, it has to be legitimized by success and is
overwhelmingly dependent on this. Hitler has unequivocally com-
mitted the movement to the definition of this war as the ultimate
test by ordeal of his mission. Its definitive loss cannot but result in
the deflation of the whole Nazi myth and an acute crisis of con-
fidence.^^

But though the Nazi ideological structure may, except for a
group of fanatical die-hards who will go underground, be expected
to disintegrate, its components will remain "endemic" in the Ger-
man situation. What are the prospects of restructuring?

The selectivity of ideologies is such that in the German case it is
highly probable that there are more favorable starting points for
integration with American— and British— patterns on the institu-
tional level than on the ideological. Institutionally German society
has been rather conspicuously unintegrated. A dominant national
ideology tends to concentrate on defining the situation for the
nation as a unit; it has to unify and therefore play down actual
structural elements which do not fit well. Furthermore, orientation
to other national units plays a very prominent role with a need to
feel a strong contrast and assert a "real" superiority to those which
seem to enjoy the dominant external position in the world.

Given the forces underlying the formation of ideology in Ger-
many on the character structure and institutional levels, it seems
most unlikely that before these are greatly changed there is any
prospect of stimulating the formation and dominance of a national
ideology which could be closely integrated with those of the demo-
cratic countries and also be made to "stick." A repetition of the
1918-1919 romantic-Utopian enthusiasm for Wilsonian democracy
seems unlikely. But if it should appear it should be regarded with
even more skepticism than the study of this experience would sug-
gest. For a firm basis for it almost certainly could not exist.

It is more likely that a revolutionary situation may develop in
Germany which would bring a communist ideology to a command-
ing position. By interpreting the defeat as a victory for the working
classes and the revolution, and thoroughly liquidating the old up-
per classes, this could do much to eradicate the humiliation of de-

!•'» These considerations remind one of the importance of insuring that in
every symbolic as well as realistic respect it is a definitive victory of Allied arms.
It seems quite possible that a major motive of the tenacity of German resistance
at certain conspicuous points— as in Italy and at Brest— is to preserve the
myth that a German force is not "really" beaten. It is only eventually "unfairly"
overwhelmed by superior force. It has won a moral victory.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 271

iesLt}^ But it is scarcely likely that Britain and the United States will
wish actively to promote this solution, although they may adapt to
it more or less gracefully if it should happen spontaneously or
through Russian influence.

These considerations play an important part in determining the
emphasis placed in foregoing paragraphs upon approach to the
German problem through situational factors. Above all the view so
common among Americans that it is "conversion" to democratic
values which is the key to bringing Germany "around" is one of the
most dangerous misconceptions currently in the air. To attempt to
do so by propaganda or other means of indoctrination would almost
certainly intensify a tendency to ideological reaction which would
give the Germans the unique role they so desperately feel they
need and deserve.

The main conclusion from the foregoing analysis is that the ideo-
logical problem needs to be handled with especial care, and most
important, an attempt to define the situation for the German nation
as a unit in "democratic" terms is dangerous. But before considering
what can be done, it is necessary to discuss one possibility of spon-
taneous development.

One of the keynotes of German attitude structure for a very long
time has been dualism. Although the best-institutionalized, the con-
servative pattern has never had the sanction of more than one side
of this duality. This fact has been fundamental to the "formalism"
of German institutions. There has been a strong feeling that some-
how the fulfillment of institutionalized roles did not provide a field
of expression of the "real" inner personality. It was rather a set of
duties and obligations laid dov^oi by Providence— or "fate"— which
merely demonstrated the tragic element in life. In earlier times this
"inner" life was predominantly defined in religious terms, with a
specific Lutheran slant. More recently it has been in artistic or
philosophical terms.

But this romanticism has not remained individualistic. It has in
later times gotten linked to a conception of the "real" life, that is
mission, of the German people, which was not to remain a prosai-
cally conservative system of order. The ability to mobilize the ro-
mantic urge was one of the most important sources of strength of
the Nazi movement.

16 This possibility was suggested to me by Dr. Robert Waelder— unpub-
lished correspondence.

272 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

This dualism goes to the very roots of the German structure. It
will not and cannot be overcome until the long process of funda-
mental change is nearly complete. Furthermore, the romantic ele-
ment cannot be permitted political expression in terms of national
power. The immediate effect of suppressing this expression will be
to bring the conservative component back to a dominant position.
But the romantic component will not disappear— it will have to find
expression in some other form.

It is of course possible that the link with the mission of the Ger-
man nation will be broken and a purely individualistic romanticism
reappear. But particularly in a world where nationalistic feelings
run high everywhere, this seems unlikely. It is more likely that it
will take another direction. The element of aggression may well be
turned inward upon themselves. The defeat may be interpreted
masochistically as just punishment for their own derelictions— surely
there must be an enormous reservoir of guilt available for this
purpose. ^'^

But if this happens it is likely to be associated with a new expres-
sion rather than an elimination of the national sense of mission as a
specially chosen people. If this can be completely sublimated into
a cultural mission perhaps, well and good. But it is more likely to
contain an undercurrent of a sense of persecution and an orientation
to the day of fulfillment when revenge can be taken.

The analogy to the Jewish people in the time of the Prophets is
striking. Acceptance of the same order of deposition from all im-
mediate hopes of worldly glory as a judgment of God would solve
the immediate problem of German aggression. But it would not
insure against its eventual revival, and it would preserve a basis for
it because it would consolidate the separateness of the German
people instead of assimilating them into the larger community of
Western civilization. It would probably favor alteration of their
institutional structure in a direction different from that envisaged
here.

Whether or not such a development will take place is probably

considerably more dependent on processes on the situational and

institutional levels, and thus the direct influence on them of Allied

policies, than on those on the ideological level as such. But Allied

ideological policy can at least avoid measures which would favor

1" The existence of this reservoir has been questioned by Dr. Margaret Mead.
A good deal of evidence, however, seems to indicate its great importance. This is
surely one of the most important problems for further research about Germany.

THE PROBI^M OF CONTROLLED INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 273

it— or the perpetuation of Nazism— and can exert some pressure
toward influencing a balance of forces if it is at all close.

The most fundamental consideration is that of the moral position
of the victorious Western powers. This is a field where actions speak
louder than words and a propaganda deliberately emphasizing a
strong moral case would probably be interpreted as self-righteous
cant. But the Western Allies are rather unlikely to indulge in this.
A more serious danger is succumbing to a wave of guilt and self-
depreciation. This could hardly fail to have a serious effect on
Germany since it would confirm their own arrogance. To retain
moral self-confidence without "protesting too much" is one of the
most important conditions of exerting the right influence.

Western civilization as a whole has been a moral community his-
torically—although never anywhere nearly perfectly integrated. This
has been based on the values of Christianity and certain derived or
closely related secular values— such as those of science, and free in-
quiry, the dignity and freedom of the person, even equality of op-
portunity. Despite differentiated versions, distortions, and contra-
dictory values there, these values are by on means dead in Ger-
many. Their wholesale violation must have produced much guilt-
feeling however deeply repressed it may now be.

A cautious propaganda appeal to these sentiments may be consid-
ered—by word and deed. In doing so, two especial precautions
should be observed. First, the appeal should as far as possible be
dissociated from anything to do with the status of the German
nation as a unit. It should be made to the rights and duties of per-
sons or citizens and groups as such, not as Germans, and to imper-
sonal patterns such as truth or freedom. The obviousness of the
inclusion of Germans under the universality of such values should
be the main context.

Second, the form in which they are expressed should so far as
possible avoid association with or suggestion of those aspects of
Western societies which have served as widespread negative sym-
bols in Germany. Thus, expressions of the values of freedom should
not emphasize freedom to make profits, or even, in many contexts,
of trade. Similarly suggestion of a direct connection of adherence
to such values with the British or American position of power in
the world should be avoided.

Although major effects cannot be expected from positive propa-
ganda of this sort, it is undoubtedly worth promoting on the prin-

274 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ciple that "every little bit helps." But in the field of ideology and
sentiments the most important conclusions from sociological and
psychological analysis are those concerning the dangers to avoid.

One general methodological point may be emphasized in con-
clusion. A complex social system like the German is composed of
many variable elements which are interdependent in complex ways.
It is highly unlikely that there is any one sovereign "key" to the
practical solution of the German problem. The Germans do not
suflFer from a unified disease syndrome for which a specific remedy
is known. Confronted with this kind of problem the basic orienta-
tion of policy is clear. Although some openings for control are far
more strategic than others, in general there are two fundamental
maxims:

Utilize every opening for control which is practicable and can be
shown to influence the system in the right direction, but

Analyze the repercussions of such change throughout the system
as carefully as possible.

Where there is reason to believe that these, as will frequently be
the case, include processes which tend to neutralize or nullify the
change, make sure that one or more of the following conditions is
fulfilled: that the counteracting force is of suflBciently small mag-
nitude so that the net gain is substantial; that measures are feasible
which can be expected effectively to neutralize it; or, that the pro-
posal for change is abandoned.

XIII

Population and the Social
Structure of Japan

THE STRUCTURE AND trends of population of an area constitute both
an important index to the deeper-lying social structure and situ-
ation, and a very important set of conditions which will affect its
future development. The population situation of Japan reflects the
most fundamental fact about Japanese society: that it has been a
society in transition from a "feudal" preindustrial organization— of
a very distinctive type— to a modem urbanized industrial society
closer to the social type of the great industrial countries of the
West than any other Oriental country.

Available evidence indicates that before the Meiji restoration
the population of Japan had long been relatively stable at a level
of approximately thirty millions. As in practically all other prein-
dustrial societies this stable balance was achieved in terms of a
high birth rate balanced by a high mortality rate, with all the fa-
miliar concomitants of that situation, such as high infant mortality
and high disease rates in many fields. The most authoritative recent
study states: "The pattern of mortality in Japan . . . was similar to
that of mediaeval Europe, or that of the isolated regions of con-
temporary China. The ultimate controls to growth were famine and
epidemics. . . . Even abortion and infanticide appear to have been
techniques that flourished after the great calamities— not tech-
niques ... to forestall the calamities."^

With the dramatic change in Japan's situation in the mid-nine-
teenth century, there began a rapid process of industrialization and
urbanization. As in the corresponding phases of the process in the
Western world, it was marked by a rapid increase of population, to
a total of over seventy millions by 1940. Only in the latest recorded

1 Irene B. Taeuber and Edwin G. Beal, "The Dynamics of Population in
Japan," Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth (New York:
Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944), p. 6.

276 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

census period— between 1935 and 1940— did the rate of increase
begin to slacken.

Certain notable facts stand out in the more detailed picture. Ap-
parent increases in death rates are almost certainly explicable in
terms of improved registration of deaths. Hence the increase seems
almost wholly due to a progressive lowering of death rates without
a compensating reduction of birth rates— again typical of the earlier
stages of industrialization in the Western world. A further striking
fact is that the rural population, as closely as can be ascertained,
had remained almost exactly constant during the period. The whole
increase has gone to the cities, and until the most recent period to
the largest cities. A very large part of this urban increase, how-
ever, came from the surplus of rural births. Finally, the process
which has marked all Western industrial countries also has set in
unmistakably in Japan— the decline in birth rates in urban commu-
nities. By 1940 the total rate of growth was beginning to slacken,
but it still was very rapid. On the basis of extrapolation of the
curve, a stage comparable to the approaching stabilization, or
actual decline, in Western countries would not be reached for a
long time.

Thus the process of declining rate of increase has probably been
setting in more slowly than in the West. But the above are the
fundamentals of it. Nothing could better reflect the basic impor-
tance of Japan's emergence from rural isolation to industrialism,
nor the fact that the social consequences, at the outreak of the war,
were very far from complete.

The population history of the Western world seems to indicate
that even a major war does not necessarily change the fundamental
course of development of a population. In both Germany and
Great Britain the birth and death rates continued to decline after
1918, though the process probably was accelerated by the war. For
Japan, however, defeat may mean a profounder population crisis
very closely connected with the major problems of her whole
society.

The great urban population has not been supported primarily
by interchange with the countryside of the home islands; "foreign
trade," whether in the free markets of world trade or in a closed
imperial system, has played an essential part. The very stability of
the rural population seems to indicate great tenacity in a rural
standard of living which has risen only gradually during the period

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 277

of great economic expansion. If Japan is forced back economically
upon herself, the rigidity of the whole structure is such that it
might force her population balance back into the old pattern of
high rural-type birth rates compensated in a correspondingly high
death rate— with eventually a new stabilization at a figure probably
somewhere between the thirty millions of Tokugawa and the seventy
millions of the present. If this happens, however, it will both con-
dition and reflect profound changes in Japanese tendencies of social
development— a drastic check to the process of internal change
which has dominated the society for the better part of a century.

The recent characteristics of Japanese social structure and its
potentialities of adaptation to the consequences of defeat must be
understood in terms of the dynamic consequences of this process
of industrialization. This process, curiously, has combined features
resembling the Western counterpart with striking differences and
peculiarities of its own. To understand this in turn it is necessary
to sketch briefly the main outline of the older authentically Japa-
nese components and the particular type of Western industrialism
which has come into Japan.

The base, and the part which has been changed least fundamen-
tally, is the social structure of the rural villages in which, on the
eve of the war, about 70 per cent of the population still lived. In
main outline this base has been similar to that of peasant societies
in many parts of the world. The basic unit has been the kinship
group responsible for the tillage of an agricultural holding. With a
good many local variations this still is the common element. The
kinship unit is patrilineal, with status inherited by primogeniture,
so that the normal household contains three rather than two gen-
erations. The eldest son remains in his father's household, brings a
wife from outside, and with the retirement or death of the father
becomes proprietor and head of the household. Younger sons must
find places outside since the holding is passed down intact and
undivided. In the last couple of generations much the commonest
outlet for younger sons has been migration to the cities, without
complete severance of ties with the home village and family. Daugh-
ters always go out, either to marry into a similar farm family— per-
haps in a neighboring village— or to migrate to the city. Until she
is married a daughter is very strictly under the control of her
parental family.

The tradition of continuity of family on the ancestral holdings

278 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

is very strong. If there is no son to inherit, it is common practice to
adopt a young man to marry a daughter. In this case the usual pat-
tern is reversed. The new son-in-law takes the name of his wife's
family and becomes a member of their household. Holdings are
so small that doubtless there have been processes of subdivision in
the past. Recently, however, the dominant facts are the tenacity
with which they are kept together, and the stability of the village
community as a group of family units which have held this status
for an indefinite period and intend to maintain it indefinitely in the
future.

This fundamental pattern has not depended on the extent of in-
dependent proprietorship or tenancy. Though varying in different
places, the general situation in that regard has been mixed. A very
few farmers have owned enough land to rent some of it to others,
and there has been a fairly large class who have owned all that
they and their families have cultivated. The largest class includes
those who have owned some land but have rented the rest in vary-
ing proportions. A substantial minority have been entirely tenants
with no land of their own. This situation has been facilitated by
the fact that most holdings are split up; a family cultivates a num-
ber of different plots scattered through the village lands, not a
single consolidated "farm" in the American sense.

In spite of the prevalence of tenancy, modern rural Japan is char-
acterized by relative lack of a prominent rural landowning class in
the social structure. At first sight this is surprising in view of her
feudal history. The explanation lies largely in the fact that the
samurai of the Tokugawa period were not a landed gentry in the
European sense, but were attached to the court of the daimyo who
owned the land and paid them "rice stipends" out of the proceeds.
Continuity of status bound to specific holdings of land thus applied
to the peasantry and the high feudal nobility, but not to the gentry
class.

In modem Japan there are landowners in the villages who are
"gentlemen" rather than cultivators. But they are not decisively
important to the social structure. Of the rural land owned by non-
cultivators, town- or city-dwelling landlords probably hold a larger
proportion. A certain prestige seems to attach to landownership as
compared to other sources of income, but by no means a decisive
one when compared to China or "county" England. On the whole,
owners of rural land tend to merge with the larger middle class of

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 279

people of business and professional status, which, though much
smaller and weaker, is very similar to our own in basic social char-
acteristics.

The most distinctive feature of rural Japanese social organization,
which it shares with the rest of the society, is the family council.
The most important structural implication of this is the solidarity
of a considerable number of household units which are related by
kinship on both the paternal and maternal sides, though the former
tends to predominate. All major decisions— such as the purchase or
sale of land, marriage of a child, unusual steps in education, a new
business venture— must be referred to the family council. The pres-
tige of seniority or other high status works eflFectively in attaining
unanimity within the family council.

Through the mechanism of the family council, kinsmen whose
places of residence have become scattered are kept close together
in mutual support. Property is managed in the light of common
interest. The most promising youths of the various collateral lines
may be picked for united backing in getting higher education or in
a business venture. In particular the branches of rural families that
have migrated to the cities are kept closely bound to relatives in
their native villages. This pattern has certainly done a great deal to
preserve the older patterns of life in the urban population and to
slow up the process of social change which urbanization inevitably
sets in motion. Finally it should be noted that the system of family
councils produces an interlocking network of overlapping kinship
groups. There is a slightly different council for each household.
Members who are central for one will be peripheral for another.
This seamless web binds every individual in a very tight system of
traditional obligations.

On top of this peasant base in preindustrial Japan was erected a
highly stratified class system based on rigid primogeniture and
continuity of kinship groups in their hereditary status. The family
council system and the sharp subordination of the individual have
been at least as marked on this level as on that of the peasantry.
The two most important elements of this higher structure were
the daimtjo nobility and the samurai gentry.

The most important features of these older upper classes for the
understanding of modern Japan account both for the surprising lack
of resistance to "modernization" in the Meiji period, and for certain
peculiar features of the society which emerged as a result. The Toku-

280 ESSAYS m SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

gawa regime was a unique kind of feudal dictatorship. Though
built up on a decentralized feudal structure of society, it did not in
fact put the daimyo class in a very firm position in the total society,
largely because the principle of the regime was that of divide and
rule. The "inner lords" ( fudai daimyo ) who were directly integrated
with the regime were made so heavily dependent on it that their
position was inherently weak. At the same time they were set over
against the "outer lords" {tozama) who were kept impotent by ex-
clusion and isolation from each other. The initiative for the restora-
tion came from the latter; but the situation did not encourage a new
equilibrium on a feudal basis. Having upset the delicate balance of
the Tokugawa regime itself, they set up a highly centralized struc-
ture in which the socially dominant classes and the government
were bound up closely with each other.

The samurai class, as noted above, were in a slightly different
position, the dominant characteristic of which was their lack of
independent roots in the land and the local community, with cor-
responding direct dependence on the daimyo to whom each was
bound by ties of personal loyalty. One consequence was sharp dif-
ferentiation in the power and wealth of different samurai. The most
prominent and powerful were those who held positions of trust and
influence at the courts of outstanding daimyo, especially the outer
lords. In the restoration these men were in fact more influential
than the daimyo themselves, though each acted in his lord's name.
Already they constituted a kind of higher civil service group.

With the success of the political overturn it was natural that the
nobility— including the kuge or court nobility— should be amalga-
mated with these ambitious and influential samurai to form a new
centralized national nobility. Outside their traditional loyalty to
their particular daim^yo the samurai had no vested interest to bind
them to their local community. The position of the daimyo was
weak, so it did not prove very difficult to deprive them of their
special feudal status, to buy out their rights, and set up almost
overnight one of the most highly centralized political structures of
modem times.

One additional important group was involved. In the absence of
modern technology, transportation, and communications, there had
been little organization of production in Japan beyond the handi-
craft level. But, as is common in such societies, an upper class with
considerable wealth and everything that was to be found in the

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 281

capital of a centralized regime in Yedo had produced a situation
favorable to a considerable growth of mercantile trade and finance.
This was further favored by the long period of internal peace of
the Tolcugawa regime. As a result mercantile houses of very con-
siderable wealth and extensity of interests grew up. Even the
daimyo, especially the outer lords, engaged in manufacturing and
commerce— at first surreptitiously, then openly.

Here was an extreme example of such a new "bourgeois" class
having to fit into the interstices of the existing social structure.
"Feudal" Japan was dominated by aristocratic classes of the type
which idealized the military virtues and a corresponding code of
honor and looked with extreme contempt on the merchant and
tradesman. Traditionally even the humble peasant ranked higher in
the social scale than the merchant. In fact considerable wealth and
influence developed, but in a setting which promoted maximum
dissatisfaction with the existing regime.

The wealthier merchant classes thus were natural allies of the
rebelhous elements and played a prominent part in financing and
otherwise facilitating the restoration. They were rewarded by ad-
mission to the new national aristocracy, with seats in the House of
Peers, patents of nobility for many of the most prominent, and a
general tendency to intermarry and fuse with the older families.
This, however, was very difiPerent from the "bourgeois revolutions"
which took place in much of Europe. In various respects the older
aristocratic groups remained dominant; it was their values and pat-
terns of life which set the principal tone for the new Japan. Im-
portant as the mercantile elements were as the direct vehicle of
Japan's economic modernization, it was only for brief periods, as in
the 1920's, that they acquired anything like the upper hand.

Japan thus made the transition to modernization with minimum
immediate disturbance of her preindustrial social structure. The
peasant base remained essentially intact. The old upper classes
faced greatly altered conditions, but on the whole as a group
remained in the top positions of prestige, wealth and power. The
military values and code of the samurai had an opportunity for a
new field of expression in the form of the armed forces of a modern
nation, supported by a nationalistically tinged system of universal
education.

With these older patterns and values there also remained intact
the Japanese family system with its rigid system of obligations

282 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

subordinating all individual interests to those of family units.
Through long centuries of conditioning by a hierarchical social
system, these patterns of subordination of the individual to his
larger family, of the young to the old, of women to men, shaded
almost imperceptibly into a subordination of people of lower to
those of higher status in a highly crystalized class system, and of
general predisposition to accept legitimate authority. The imperial
institution— master symbol of this highly hierarchized and integrated
system— not only remained intact but was also exalted to a new
position of prestige which was exploited systematically by the new
ruling group.

The dynamic significance of this older component of Japanese
social structure is greatly heightened by its exceedingly close inte-
gration with the magico-religious tradition of Shinto. It is important
to understand the radical difference of this from the Christian tra-
dition in its relation to social obligations. The rather sharp segre-
gation of spiritual from temporal affairs which is characteristic of
the Occident is unknown to Japan. From the highest pinnacle of
government in the person of the emperor to the humblest house-
hold, virtually every status has at the same time a magico-religious
and a secular aspect. The obligations of everyday social life are not
merely derived ultimately from religious authority, they are im-
mediately and directly ritual obligations. The pressure to con-
formity which inheres in every well-integrated system of social
relationships is greatly heightened by this situation as long as
general acceptance of the whole pattern of Shinto remains un-
touched.

While much of ordinary social obligation in Japan carries a
directly sacred character unknown to Occidentals, at the same time
it involves an attitude toward these sacred sanctions quite different
from our own. The Western emphasis is on the individual's own
responsible conscience; social pressures are minimized and submis-
sion to them is felt to be unworthy. Our concept of moral heroism
idealizes the person who stands up for his convictions against
others and against tradition. The predominant feeling of the indi-
vidual who transgresses his obligations is that of guilt— while that
of others is one of moral indignation.

In Japan the emphasis is quite different. Obligations are not im-
posed by a principle in wliich one "believes" but by specific acts of

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 283

oneself or others in traditionally defined situations, or by the ac-
cepted patterns of one's status. "Responsibility" is the willingness
to accept the implications of these obligations and carry them out
regardless of personal cost. The individual's own emotional reaction
to transgression is shame that the honor due to his status is be-
smirched, while that of others is that he has disgraced the group with
which he is identified— the consequences are not personalized in
his own character. Moral idealism is to take responsibility in the
above sense, not to stand out for principles. Moral conflict is a
matter of being caught between conflicting obligations, not of con-
flict between principle and pressure of practical necessity as it is
predominantly with Occidentals.

This mode of incidence of sacred sanctions in a "moral" context
is an indispensable background for understanding Japanese behav-
ior in the situations presented by the social structure. Though
highly formalistic it is a system characterized by a moral rigor in
many respects greater than in Western societies.

There is every reason to believe that the rigor is so great that,
even apart from the special insecurity introduced by the conse-
quences of Westernization, it does not operate without severe strains
on most individuals. Whatever these may be there is no doubt that
they are intensified by the juxtaposition with radically different
Occidental values.

There is a good deal of evidence that, with all its outward sta-
bility, the Tokugawa system had been accumulating tensions over
a long period and in fact was far from completely static. However
that may have been, the new society was inherently dynamic. It not
only grew rapidly in population, in industrial organization and pro-
ductive facilities, in foreign trade and political prestige— emerging
as the only Oriental unit in the system of great powers— but it also
underwent a rapid and drastic internal social transformation. Many
of the tensions generated by this internal change were certainly
expressed in heightened nationalistic feeling and thus formed the
popular basis of Japanese expansionism.

The new regime speedily created a highly centralized organi-
zation into which all the most influential social elements were
drawn. Second only to consolidation of its own power, it was dedi-
cated to a program of swift modernization of the country through
adoption of Western patterns of organization and technology, both

284 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

industrial and military. The combination of centralization and
modernization set the fundamental pattern of those aspects of recent
Japanese society which most closely resemble the West.

Very early there was established a system of universal education
following the Continental European model. Schools on all levels
were organs of the state. Teachers of even the village schools were
appointed and controlled by the prefectural governments. Funda-
mental policies were determined by the Ministry of Education in
Tokyo, which closely supervised both prefectural agencies and
local schools. On the higher levels an important immediate objec-
tive was the training of a civil service after the Continental model.
The primary entry to that civil service was through attainment of
academic distinction in the universities, particularly the Imperial
University of Tokyo. Once on the ladder a very strict merit system
prevailed. For a considerable period, however, the class balance
was not upset very seriously; considerations of status and wealth
were so important in controlling access to higher education that in
fact sons of the higher groups predominated.

Industrial development, to an extent quite unfamiliar in the
Anglo-Saxon world, was conducted in direct collaboration between
the business firms and the state, which supervised and subsidized.
Conditions generally favored the rise to power of a relatively small
number of large firms with widely distributed holdings and inter-
ests. The top financial control of these firms remained in the hands
of family groups, the famous Zaibatsu, which were organized and
governed in traditional Japanese fashion through family councils.
New talent indeed was brought into these families from time to
time through the adoption of able young men of humble origin—
often through marriage to a daughter. But lower down, with steady
expansion of the scale of operations, there was increasing need for
technical and administrative personnel too numerous to fit into this
traditional pattern. Here also the tendency was to organize the
firms bureaucratically, to recruit, relatively regardless of origin, from
able, well-trained graduates of the institutions of higher education,
and to open to talents opportunities for a career that might lead far.

Rapid expansion of industry led to growth of cities even more
pronounced in their concentration than in other industrial coun-
tries. To these cities flocked the surplus population of the rural
areas. There was opportunity for rise in status to a degree unknown
to a relatively static, predominantly rural society. Urban conditions

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 285

and exposure to Western cultural influences undermined in many
elements the traditionalism and familistic solidarity of the older
rural population, and this even began to have repercussions in the
rural areas themselves. Individualism on the Western model seemed
to be— and indeed was— making great strides in Japan. To be sure,
the country was governed largely by an aristocracy headed by a
rather antiquated type of emperor, but this was not so very differ-
ent from several European countries.

In two respects, however, even on this level there was an impor-
tant difference from Europe, to say nothing of the United States.
In the first place, even in the cities large elements of the population
clung tenaciously to the old patterns of organization. Not only small
retail shops, but also innumerable manufacturing processes were
carried on in households by family units working together much as
peasant families work. Such units were bound together by family
ties with each other and with peasant units in country villages.
Within the limits of the pattern of primogeniture, children remained
with the family. Unless numbers were too large, hired help was
virtually taken into the household or slept on the work premises. As
an observant European writer remarked, the Japanese working class
resisted proletarization to an extraordinary degree.^ It is not inap-
propriate to refer to very large elements of them as an "urban
peasantry." With all this went a tenacious clinging to many old
Japanese customs and patterns of life such as type of house, kimono,
and the like. Too rapid acquisition of Western habits was undoubt-
edly checked by the low income levels of the masses— in turn a func-
tion of the swift increase of population.

In the second place, the very resistance to the spread of indivi-
dualistic and directly competitive patterns served to accentuate
certain strains in the society which presumably were present already
in considerable degree. In its contrast with Western types of indi-
vidualism, social scientists tend to assume that a strong system of
group solidarity— subordination of the individual to the family, for
instance— protects and supports the individual in such a way that
breakdown of this solidarity intensifies insecurity. There can be no
doubt of the strength of Japanese group solidarity, especially in the
family, but its relation to the security of the individual seems to be
the reverse of that usually assumed. Instead of protecting the indi-

2 Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, Japan in Transition ( New Haven,
1938).

286 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

vidual member and giving him security, the tendency, according to
his status, is to push him into relations outside the group where he
functions as a representative of the entire group rather than as an
individual. He carries responsibility for its good name in the above
sense. His success reflects credit on the group and is admired by
them; but if he fails he disgraces the whole group and he is blamed
and punished by their disapproval or in extreme cases by ostracism.

An inevitable tendency of Westernization in Japan has been to
widen progressively the area of competitive relationships. This is
just as characteristic of a merit system of promotion within large-
scale organizations as it is of the "individualistic" competition of
businessmen in the market. Participating in such competition as a
representative of his family and other groups, the Japanese experi-
ences heightened insecurity that has been an important factor in
the remarkable dynamic energy evidenced in the speedy transfor-
mation of his nation. But at the same time all this increases a level
of anxiety which already must have been relatively high. The con-
sequences to the individual of failure to succeed are so serious that
he must not fail; in the extreme case his position becomes com-
pletely intolerable.

The growth of nationalistic sentiment in Western countries has
been associated with rising levels of insecurity resulting from the
breaking up of the old traditional structures and sohdarities of pre-
industrial society. In Japan the very refusal of these structures to
break up has contributed to the increase of insecurity. This certainly
has much to do with the susceptibility of many of the urban ele-
ments to a nationalistic appeal, since other aspects of the situation
were favorable.

In Japan, however, nationalism has assumed a special character
through its relation to the religio-magical traditions of State Shinto.
These have provided a pattern for a definition of the situation which
was ideally suited to symbolize and canalize nationalistic sentiment.
The imperial restoration not only symbolized the religio-political
unity and solidarity of the nation, but also provided the rationale,
in the increasingly prevalent and official interpretation, of giving
the Japanese nation as a whole a f)Osition of special prominence
among other nations. In Western nations— short of the Nazi revolu-
tion—violent nationalism was a kind of pseudo-religion in sharp
conflict with the universalistic elements of Christianity. In Japan it
could fuse with a major indigenous tradition to give a peculiarly
powerful sacred sanction to the goal of military aggrandizement.

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTUBE OF JAPAN 287

Nevertheless, to many Western observers the development of
Japan seemed to be following broadly the path of "liberal indus-
trialism" which in time might be expected to overcome both mass
tendencies toward nationalism and the influence of older patterns
inherited from the earlier background in the upper groups. There
probably was much wishful thinking in this judgment. But in the
absence of another set of factors it might have been much more
nearly correct than events proved it to be,

A major aspect of Japanese feudalism, as of its Western counter-
part, lay in the position of prestige and privilege occupied by a spe-
cifically military class— the samurai. Considering this background,
the part played by the feudal classes in the overturn, and the cir-
cumstances, it is not surprising that strengthening and moderniza-
tion of the armed forces was one of the cardinal early poHcies of
the new regime. In implementing this policy, however, there were
two particularly significant features of the new Japanese military
structure. First the European system of universal military service
was adopted. Second, officers were to be selected and promoted by
a relatively rigid merit system. In so rigidly aristocratic a society
with a military background it is remarkable that a decision, ap-
parently deliberate, was taken that an oflBcer did not need to be a
"gentleman" in the sense in which that was true of practically all
European armies at the time.

Conscription meant that army service was the most important
connection the ordinary village youth had with the big outside
world— and the considerable majority of conscripts have remained
rural, with many more from small towns. He had this experience
under rigidly controlled conditions highly favorable to indoctri-
nation. Moreover, through the veterans' associations the army
reached down into the daily life of the village. Along with the
schools, this provided a channel of propagandistic influence over
the masses of a population already predisposed to accept authority.
This influence was exceedingly powerful. Only a government in
which army and civil authority saw eye to eye could command this
double channel— and that, given the tone of the Japanese armed
forces, was apt to mean one in which the military predominated.

In the circumstances, especially with the background of Shinto
nationalism, it was almost inevitable that this power over the masses
should be used in an anti-Western sense. By their very constitution
the armed forces were bound peculiarly to the imperial institution
with its embodiment of what was distinctively Japanese in a tradi-

288 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

tional sense— to say nothing of the pronounced ethnocentrism of the
myth of the Sun Goddess. On top of this, however, the predomi-
nantly rural composition of the army was bound to put a premium
on a type of reaction well known in the Western world: that of
simple rural folk against the corruption and wickedness of the
cities. The profound tensions which the process of urbanization and
industrialization was inevitably creating in Japanese society could
very readily become polarized about the rural-urban antithesis—
secondarily about the antithesis of a wealthy exploiting class (the
predominantly urban Zaibatsu ) and the poor and struggling masses.
In this situation the army naturally became the champion both of
traditional Japanese values and of the people, who after all were
mostly peasants, against the moneyed interests and against the
corrupting influence of the West.

In this setting considerable tension would certainly have devel-
oped anyway. Conceivably an urbane and cosmopolitan aristocracy
in full control of the armed forces might have held it in line. This
did not happen. The free road to talent in the armed forces opened
the opportunity for a new type of element to rise to the top within
the army. These no longer were the aristocratic Choshu samurai
of earlier days, but men of humble origin, sons of small town busi-
nessmen or even peasants. They were proud of their professional
records and of the fact that they could rise and compete with their
erstwhOe betters. At the same time they were caught up in a cause.
They were the champions of the little man and of the best reli-
giously sanctioned traditions of old Japan against the destructive
influence of the foreigner. They, predominantly, were the "milita-
rists" who upset the more stable equilibrium of Japanese affairs at
home and who initiated the career of conquest abroad which was
the primary dynamic precipitating factor of Japan's clash with the
powers.

The rise of this new group culminated in the early 1930's. It was
not surprising that, given the situation, the whole Japanese social
structure should swing over into their control and accept the path
of conquest on which they were bent. They acted in the name of
the emperor; this gave them a formal legitimacy far stronger than
in most societies. They appealed to sentiments which went very
deep in the masses of the population. Finally the whole structure-
government, business, and the dominant social classes— had become
very highly centralized. There was such a close integration of inter-

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTUBE OF JAPAN 289

ests that, despite severe internal conflicts between different ele-
ments, the structure as a whole virtually had to follow the lead of
the element which was able to gain the highest political control.
The only kind of opposition which could have hoped to be effective
would have been so disruptive to the system that it would have
dragged down its leaders with the rest. Only when faced with
disastrous and imminent defeat in war could the break come.

The Japanese society which was caught up into the war thus
was undergoing a highly dynamic process of change and was in a
state of unstable equilibrium. The fundamental components of
that situation certainly are still present. The question of the future
is in large part the question of what are the principal possibilities
of re-structuring which the new situation will allow, and what kinds
of furtlier dynamic change may be expected under the conditions
which probably will exist. Obviously there are so many unknown
factors that there can be no question of an attempt at "prediction."
The best that can be done is to make a contribution to clarification
of the problems which will have to be faced by all who deal with
policy toward Japan. This includes the humblest American citizen
who by his vote and expressed opinion exercises influence even as
an individual.

Clearly there is no formula by which measures taken in the im-
mediate future— short of extermination— could remove, certainly
and permanently, the possibility of revival of a Japanese militarism
which might become a future threat to American security. There
seem to be three major possibilities of the direction Japanese social
development might take. All three have the potentiality either of
making the Japanese more amenable to adjustment in a peaceful
world order, or of their again becoming truculently aggressive and,
in the absence of adequate repressive controls, acquiring the means
to make themselves unpleasant. In all three cases, the alternative
that works out will depend substantially on the international envi-
ronment of Japan rather than on her internal development alone.

The first of the three major possibilities is reversion to an essen-
tially preindustrial agrarian society in which an overwhelming
majority are peasants. In this case the structures with higher inte-
grative functions might vary within a wide range of alternatives.
Secondly, it is conceivable that power should be secured by a revo-
lutionary regime of the communist type which, within a relatively
short period, would drastically liquidate the older traditional pat-

290 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

terns. What might emerge from such a situation in positive terms
is exceedingly difficult to foresee. Finally, it is possible that the
fundamental trend of development since the Meiji restoration should
be continued, but that the nationalistic-militaristic element should
be prevented from predominating. Then the general evolution
should take the direction of approximation to the Western "demo-
cratic" type of society with emphasis on either its individualistic or
its socialistic version.

Certain fundamental features of the situation, relevant to selec-
tion among these possibilities, can be taken for granted. First is the
fact that, whatever the losses resulting from the war and from im-
mediate postwar economic and social chaos, the fundamental fac-
tors making for rapid increase in population would still operate.
The only immediate alleviations of this tendency to be expected
involve the incidence of higher death rates from disease, malnu-
trition, and the like, and the kind of decline in birth rates associated
with chaotic social conditions in which levels of insecurity are ex-
ceedingly high. Even if such conditions should lead to an absolute
decline the prospect is that with restoration of order and a mini-
mum of security the upward tendency would be resumed imme-
diately—unless held in check by very nearly absolute limitations of
resources.

Secondly, there may be a very serious crisis in the economic
sphere— not merely a cyclical depression— caused by the interrup-
tion of foreign trade and the cutting oflF of the islands from the
foreign raw materials and markets on which the economy has been
dependent. The problems of this crisis are beyond the scope of
this paper. The present concern is only with its social consequences.
It will mean a considerable period of economic contraction, lower-
ing of standards of living, diminishing fields of individual opportu-
nity, and insecurity.

Finally it may be assumed that there will be rather thorough
demilitarization. This includes not only removal of armaments and
certain potential facilities for their production, but also complete
demobilization of the armed forces, prohibition of the renewal of
universal military service, and elimination of the privileged consti-
tutional position of the service ministries. The principal specific
social mechanisms which in prewar Japan were instrumental in
tipping the balance in favor of aggressive militarism will thus be

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 291

eliminated from the picture— at least for as long as control is
effective.

The combination of the first two factors is certain to mean that
there is a heightened state of general insecurity and, for a consid-
erable period, a contracting rather than expanding field of oppor-
tunity for the majority of individuals. There also will be an initial
revulsion from the regime, and to some extent from the values
which are associated with the disastrous defeat. Whether this is of
long-run significance will depend on the subsequent development
of the situation. The case of Germany after the last war should not
be forgotten.

If Japan is permitted to stew in her own juice after demilitariza-
tion by being virtually cut off from international trade and cultural
relations, it will almost certainly serve to consolidate the traditional
indigenous patterns more firmly than ever. The urban and indus-
trial sector of the society has provided the main focus of the forces
making for their weakening, and this sector would be diminished
greatly in relative significance. Millions of urban people would be
forced back into the villages and absorbed into the traditional kin-
ship groupings.

Such a situation would produce many explosive tensions, starting
with sheer overcrowding of the land. Perhaps the most important,
however, would result from the system of inheritance. The power-
ful tradition of primogeniture would inhibit subdivision of hold-
ings; but at recent rates of population growth— which, as noted, are
likely to be resumed— there would be no satisfactory status available
in the rural community structure for the surplus— to say nothing of
food. The system certainly could give here and there, but it is
sufficiently rigid so that one of two major outcomes is probable. On
the one hand the lid may be kept on; i.e., discipline might be main-
tained in terms of the old patterns and the explosive tensions mas-
tered. The result of these pressures then would be to bring popula-
tion into balance, presumably on a partly preindustrial basis with
reduced rate of increase through higher death rates rather than
fewer births. Presumably some reduction through postponement of
marriage is also possible. On the other hand the lid may blow off
and some kind of an internal revolution occur which would break
up the traditional peasant system.

Which of these possibilities is actually realized and what the

292 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

consequences may be will not depend mainly on the social structure
of the masses of the population, but on the higher integrative struc-
tures. In this respect the situation is such that a stable situation in
a sense favorable to the United States is not likely. A foundation
for a revival of aggressive tendencies would probably be laid which
could be kept in check only by an external system of political order
so strong that any challenge to it would be suicidal.

Tensions within the masses will be so powerful that only a rela-
tively strong higher structure will presumably be able to master
them. It is of the first importance that the basic traditions of Japa-
nese society are strongly hierarchical and authoritarian. Any appeal
to order is certain to include this aspect in a prominent place. In
detail it is impossible to predict just what the outcome might be.
With the relative disappearance of the armed forces, of the indus-
trial organizations of the Zaibatsu and their like, the highly cen-
tralized structure of Japan might give way and local elements rise
to considerably greater prominence. Whatever the emphasis as
between centralization and decentralization, hierarchy and authority
seem certain to be prominent. The dominant groups, whoever they
are, wall certainly have to depend largely on force for maintenance
of their position. This will favor crystallization of a rigidly stratified
social system on the pattern of old Japan, with reestablishment of
aristocratic groups. It is also very difficult to see how it could avoid
reinstating the militaristic values among these dominant tone-setting
groups. It should be remembered that the genesis of these values
was not primarily in nationalistic ambitions against the outside
world, but in the internal situation in Japan, in the interest of ad-
vantage over feudal rivals in the chronic civil wars and of mainte-
nance of a position of dominance over a demilitarized and hence
politically impotent peasantry. Hence the outcome might well be
a Japan impotent to make war in the modern sense— even more so
in the coming atomic age. A Japan genuinely peaceful in sentiment,
however, cured of the combination of a propensity to resort to force
with an oversensitive suspicious attitude toward others, would seem
to be very unlikely. It would be a Japan which, given another Meiji
restoration to unify and modernize the nation, and a favorable ex-
ternal situation, could be expected almost automatically to embark
on another career of conquest. Such a Japan would offer a maximum
of resistance to integration with the cosmopolitan community of

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 293

world society, since maintenance of its precarious internal equili-
brium would depend on keeping intact a set of ideological and
symbolic patterns continuous with those of old Japan, It would
have to insulate itself from the cultural currents of the world.

Particularly in the earlier stages, however, the equilibrium of such
a system would be very precarious. Almost certainly the masses
would be seething with unrest. The relative weakness of the middle
class has been one of the most important facts of modem Japan,
relative to other industrial countries. This middle class has been
small numerically and lacking in cultural, political, and economic
autonomy, and has been very open to influence from above. It has
offered, for instance, practically no resistance to being taken along
in the militaristic-nationalistic wave of the last generation. If and
when the highly centralized structure on which the integration of
the nation has depended is weakened sufficiently, the way may well
be open for a revolutionary movement.

If internal disorders once get under way— which is quite likely
after withdrawal of occupation forces— there will probably be
some kind of struggle for power. Thorough demobilization will have
operated to cancel the advantage of the groups previously domi-
nant. A small, well-organized group might be able to seize and con-
solidate power. Under the circumstances it is overwhelmingly prob-
able that such a group would hold communist ideology and would
have affiliations with the communists in Soviet Russia and North
China,

It should be remembered that the Russian Revolution did not
take place in a maturely industrial country. In the first instance, its
position was based on the discontent of the peasantry in an over-
whelmingly agricultural country. In Japan too there exists much
agrarian discontent which will be accentuated enormously by forc-
ing so much of the urban population back onto the land. Moreover,
in the nationalistic phase this has already had an anti-capitalistic
animus against the Zaibatsu. This agrarian anti-capitalism and anti-
urbanism can be exploited without too much difficulty in a radical
rather than a conservative direction. Secondly, though the Japanese
industrial worker has been far less proletarized than his Western
brother and there has been no strong labor movement, there is no
reason to believe that the mass of workers and "urban peasantry"
would resist such a movement or would not indeed be strongly sus-

294 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ceptible to its propaganda. Russia in 1917 had no strong labor
movement, whereas in Britain with a powerful and well-established
trade unionism there is only a negligible communist movement.

If such a revolutionary movement should gain control in Japan
one inevitable consequence would ensue. The basic patterns of
authoritarianism would not be eliminated but would be reincarnated
in the new system. In Japan a radical dictatorship, as readily as a
reactionary one, would find conditions relatively favorable. Most of
the basic patterns of Japanese social tradition could be maintained
despite radical changes in the system of ideological symbols. Two
generations of relative Westernization certainly have gone far to lay
the foundations of such a change.

A conservative, traditionalist Japan would tend to isolation from
the rest of the world as the only possible way of maintaining its
system. A communist Japan, of course, would not do so. It would
have natural allies on the continent of Eastern Asia. But in addition
its consolidation as a system would be highly dependent on a
return to industrialization and urbanization. In the Japanese case
this is allied particularly closely with the question of foreign trade.
Relations with the Soviet sphere of influence would open up pos-
sibilities which do not exist in the older capitalist sphere. It could
and probably would offer a prospect of hope to the Japanese masses
which the traditionalist possibility could not.

Just as Japan's underlying authoritarianism would not disappear
but would reappear in another form in a communist system, so also
her tendency to militarism probably would remain. It is of the
first importance that modern Japanese militarism has not rested on
aristocratic foundations but has developed deep roots in the masses
of the people; the army itself is a popular organ of protest against
the "interests." Preservation of this tendency is not in the least in-
compatible with a communist system. If, as seems entirely possible,
communism generally tends to an aggressive policy backed by force,
a communist Japan would almost certainly play a prominent role.

The third possibility of development is one that would bring
Japanese society closer to the model of the Western democratic
nations. The foregoing analysis indicates that this, of the three pos-
sibilities, is the most difficult to effect and would require the most
favorable— which presumably means the most carefully regulated-
conditions. This is not only because there are serious factors of
instability involved in such a development in any society, but also

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 295

because of two types of specific features of the Japanese case. First,
the immediate practical situation which must be expected is pecul-
iarly unfavorable, and second, from a long-run point of view, the
obstacles in the pre-Westernized Japanese society and the part of
it which has survived are more formidable.

If the development which came closest to begin the dominant
trend in the 1920's is to go forward to a stage of relative stability,
it is indispensable that conditions should favor the continual exten-
sion of "individualism" in the fundamental sense. This is not incom-
patible with the British Labour Party's kind of socialism. It means
fundamentally a situation where the individual can become eman-
cipated from the pressure of the particularistic group solidarities
which have been so prominent in traditional Japanese society. It
means that he must learn not only to take responsibility in the sense
of preserving his group, but also to be responsible for independence
from such group pressures, to value achievement as such, not merely
as the enhancement of his family's (or nation's) prestige.

The conditions of peasant society of the Japanese type are such
that it is impossible for this type of value to become predominant.
By far the most favorable conditions are those of the Westernized
type of urban society with occupational roles of the type best exem-
plified in modern industry. Therefore a situation is essential that
places large masses of the population in a position where their fun-
damental interests and security are bound up with further extension
of this type of pattern. This condition cannot be given where the
general field of opportunity is contracting. Opportunity for reason-
able economic expansion along peaceful lines is an essential pre-
requisite.

A second fundamental prerequisite touches the higher integrative
groups. Demilitarization, including elimination of the privileged
position of the armed services, goes without saying. Also a definite
change in the previous trend of centralization of the top integrative
structure is very important. The monopoly position of the Zaibatsu
families should be broken up and governmental subsidy to their
firms eliminated. In many different fields governmental administra-
tion should be decentralized and responsibility at lower levels built
up.

It seems highly undesirable, however, to attempt to secure these
ends by means that are too abruptly revolutionary. Restoration of
relative stability which can enhance security is essential to such a

296 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

development. Conditions should be organized so as to weaken the
older undesirable elements gradually rather than to eliminate them
by violent action, since this would arouse a reaction which probably
would endanger the whole policy. Above all conditions should aim
at building up into a progressively stronger position those persons
who have an important stake in a liberal system: professional and
technical people, individuals with substantial administrative posi-
tions either public or private, small and moderate businessmen,
trade union leaders, and the like.

It goes without saying that a major factor in tipping the balance
of prewar Japanese development in the wrong direction was the
system of repressive controls which inhibited the natural expression
of many of the aspects of a movement of "liberalization," especially
the control of "dangerous thoughts." Above all there must be reg-
ular cultural and intellectual contact with the outside world so that
the roles which are favored by the situation can become integrated
with ideological and cultural factors.

The above argument is not in any simple sense a defense of the
imperial institution, of Shinto, and all the other things which demo-
cratic people feel have been objectionable in Japan. It is hoped
profoundly that the course of development will be such as progres-
sively to weaken those elements and correspondingly to strengthen
those which are more in line with democratic values. But the evi-
dence of the above analysis does point to the conclusion that an
attempt at drastic and sudden elimination of these things by action
of the victors is not likely to produce the result desired. A demo-
cratic society in the best sense cannot be produced by fiat; it has to
grow relatively slowly through the influence of favorable conditions.
Drastic intervention of the type so often advocated is likely to drive
Japanese society into one of the two other alternatives discussed
above.

Perhaps the most important condition of a democratic direction
of development in Japan is sufficient stability so that the forces
which can effect the desired change have opportunity to operate
steadily over a long enough period. Continuity with tlie situation
which has brought Japan as far as she went before the war seems
essential. There is no fundamental reason why that continuity
should involve "selling out" the aims for which Americans fought—
if it is combined with steady, responsible pressure to keep Japan on
an even keel by preventing a revival of the tendencies that previ-

POPULATION AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF JAPAN 297

ously interfered with this development. This means, above all, pre-
vention of revival of the militaristic trend with a new position of
privilege and prestige for the militaristic element, while keeping
open the channels for outside cultural and ideological influence, and
finally giving Japan economic opportunities sufficient so that the
hope which is essential to embark on new ventures will not be lost.

XIV

Certain Primary Sources and
Patterns of Aggression in the
Social Structure of the
Western World

The Problem of Aggression
THE PROBLEM OF power and its control is not identical with that
of aggression.^ Without any conscious intent on the part of one in-
dividual or collectivity to gain at the expense of another, or even
any unconscious disposition to do so, there would still be important
sources of instability in the relations of individuals and social groups
into which the use of power could and would play. There can, how-
ever, be little doubt that the widespread incidence of aggressive
tendencies is the most important single factor in the dangerously
disruptive potentialities of power relationships; and if these could

1 "Aggression" will here be defined as the disposition on the part of an indi-
vidual or a collectivity to orient its action to goals which include a conscious or
unconscious intention illegitimately to injure the interests of other individuals
or collectivities in the same system. The term illegitimately deUberately implies
that the individual or collectivity in question is integrated, however imperfectly,
in a moral order which defines reciprocal rights and obligations. The universality
of the existence of a moral order in this sense is a cardinal thesis of modem
social science. This is not to say that world society constitutes one integrated
moral order in this sense; on the contrary, the diversity of such orders is a pri-
mary problem of integration, but it is not as such tlie problem of aggression.
Thus friction and hostility arising from lack of mutual understanding or mere
thoughtlessness or insensitiveness to the position of the other party are not as
such acts of aggression, although aggressive dispositions become attracted to these
situations as fields of expression perhaps more readily than any others, because
they are easier to rationalize.

The use of the term aggression here is thus narrower than in some psycho-
logical, particularly psychoanalytic, discussions. In particular "self-assertion"
the "drive to mastery"— for example, of a technical skill— without meaningful
hostility to others, will not be treated as aggression. It will not be an issue in
the present analysis to decide as to whether, on deeper psychological levels, ag-
gression in the sense here meant, and nonaggressive self-assertion, or mastery, are
fundamentally different or whether they derive from the same roots. On the
level of social behavior the diflFerence is fundamental, and that is what matters
in the present context.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 299

be notably lessened, the prospects of effective control would be
correspondingly enhanced.

Modern sociological and psychological analysis has greatly im-
proved understanding of the factors and situations which produce
aggressive dispositions. This understanding in turn carries vdth it
the potentiality of devising and applying measures of deliberate
control, although it is naive to suppose that control will follow
automatically on knowledge of causes. Indeed the problem of utiliz-
ing what knowledge we have for control is so complex that no
attempt will be made to deal with it in this brief paper, which will
be confined to sketching a few of the diagnostic considerations on
which any program of control would have to be based. This is not
to depreciate the importance of an action program, but is merely
an application of the principle of the division of labor. It is better
to do one thing reasonably well than to attempt too many things
and do none of them well.

All social behavior, including the "policies" of the most complex
collectivities like nation-states, is ultimately the behavior of human
beings, understandable in terms of the motivation of individuals,
perhaps millions of them, in the situations in which they are placed.
Therefore the psychological level of understanding of individual
motivation is fundamental to even the most complex of mass phe-
nomena. At the same time, however, the complications and modifi-
cations introduced by the facts of the organization of individuals in
social systems are equally crucial. If it were possible to arrive at a
statistically reliable estimate of the average strength of aggressive
tendencies in the population of a nation, it would by itself be worth-
less as a basis of predicting the probability of that nation embarking
on an aggressive war. The specific goals and objects to which these
aggressive dispositions are attached, the ways in which they are
depressed, deflected, projected, or can be directly expressed accord-
ing to the forces which channel or oppose them, and the structure
of situations into which they come— all these are equally important
with any aggressive potential in general in determining concrete
behavioral outcomes. Indeed they may be far more important to
understand, since many of these factors in aggressive behavior may
be far more accessible to control than are the ultimate reservoirs of
aggressive motivation themselves. The present analysis therefore
will be largely concerned with the social structuring of aggression
in Western society, rather taking for granted that there is an ade-

300 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

quate reservoir to motivate the familiar types of aggressive behavior.

A few elementary facts about the psychology of aggression need,
however, to be stated since they will underlie the analysis on the
social level. There does not seem to be any very clear understanding
of how far or in what sense aggressive dispositions in the sense here
meant are inherited. It is, however, highly probable that there are
very wide variations in hereditary constitution in this as in other
respects and that the variations within any one ethnic population
are far more significant than those between "races" or national
groups. But whether on the individual or the group level, it is at
least very doubtful how far anything like a human "beast of prey"
by heredity exists. Ideas to that effect almost certainly contain far
more projection and fantasy than solid empirical observation and
analysis. Indeed there is much to be said for the hypothesis tliat
aggression grows more out of weakness and handicap than out of
biological strength.

Far more definite and clear is the relation between aggression
on the one hand and insecurity and anxiety on the other. Whatever
the hereditary potential, and whatever it may mean, there is an im-
mense accumulation of evidence that in childhood aggressive
patterns develop when security in some form, mostly in human
relationships, is threatened, and when realistic fears shade over
into anxiety of the neurotic type. This is a very complex field and
only a few points can be brought out here.

Insecurity, as the term is used in psychology, certainly has a
number of dimensions. One of the most important generalizations
concerns the extent to which the specific patterning of reactions to
insecurity is a function of the human relationships in which the
child is placed rather than of its physical safety and welfare alone.
One of the major human dimensions is unquestionably that of love
or affection, which in most social systems centers on the relation-
ship of mother and child. The absolute level of maternal affection
is undoubtedly of fundamental significance, but equally so is its
consistency. The withdrawal of love to which the child has become
accustomed, or ambivalence, however deeply repressed, may have
devastating effects. Similarly, relative distribution of affection be-
tween siblings is important. Frustration through withdrawal, if not
absolute low-level or absence, undoubtedly is normally reacted to
with aggression. A common example is provided by the fantasies

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 301

of children that they will die or commit suicide so the parents will
be sorry for their maltreatment.

Another major dimension of security touches expectations of
achievement and of conformity with behavioral standards. Here
two contexts seem to be particularly important as sources of anxiety
and aggression. The first is the sense of inadequacy, of being ex-
pected to do things which one is unable to achieve, and thus in-
curring punishment or the loss of rewards. The second is the sense
of unfairness, of being unjustly punished or denied deserved re-
wards. In both cases the comparative context is fundamentally im-
portant. Inadequacy is highlighted by the superior achievements of
others with whom one feels himself to be in competition, and un-
fairness almost always involves specific examples of what is felt to
be unjust favoritism toward others. Again in both cases the consist-
ency of the standards which are held up to the child and of adults
in applying them is crucial. In this general context the sense of
inadequacy or injustice may generate aggressive impulses, on the
one hand toward those who are held to have imposed such unfair
standards or applied them unfairly, and on the other hand toward
more successful rivals or beneficiaries of unfair favoritism.

Two further facts about these structured patterns of aggression in
childhood are particularly important. First, they are rooted in
normal reactions to strain and frustration in human relations at the
stages of development when the individual is particularly vulner-
able, since he has not, as some psychologists say, yet attained a
strong ego-development. But unless they are corrected by an ade-
quate strengthening of security, these reactions readily embark on
a cumulative vicious circle of "neurotic" fixation. The child who
has reacted with anxiety and aggression to inadequate or ambiva-
lent maternal love builds up defenses against re-exposure to such
frustrating situations and becomes incapable of responding to genu-
ine love. The child who has felt inadequate in the face of expecta-
tions beyond his capacity to fulfill becomes neurotically resistant
to stimuli toward even the achievements he is capable of and ag-
gressive toward all attempts to make him conform. Unless re-equili-
bration takes place in time, these defensive patterns persist and
form rigid barriers to integration in a normal system of human rela-
tionships. The result is that the individual tends either to react
aggressively, without being able to control himself, in situations

302 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

which do not call for it at all, or to overreact far more violently
than the situation calls for.

The second important fact is a result of the conflict of the aggres-
sive impulses, thus generated and fixated, with the moral norms
current in the family and society and the sentiments integrated with
them. In childhood the persons in relation to whom such afiEects are
developed are primarily the members of the child's own immediate
family. But solidarity with them and aflFection toward them is a pri-
mary ethical imperative in the society. Indeed it is more than an
ethical imperative, since these attitudes become "introjected" as
part of the fundamental attitude system of the child himself. The
hostile impulses therefore conflict both with his own standards and
sentiments and with the realistic situation, and cannot be overtly
expressed, except under strong emotional compulsion, or even toler-
ated as conscious thoughts. They tend therefore, to be dissociated
from the positive, socially approved attitude system and "repressed."
This repressed attitude system, however, persists and seeks indirect
expression, especially in symbolic form. This may be purely in fan-
tasy, but there is one particularly important phenomenon for the
present context, namely displacement on a "scapegoat." If the
father or mother or sibling cannot be overtly hated, a symbolically
appropriate object outside the circle of persons who must be loved
is chosen and gratification of the impulse indirectly secured. Pre-
cisely because his aggressive impulses are repressed, the person is
unaware of the fact of displacement and by rationalization is con-
vinced that this is a reasonable reaction to what the scapegoat has
done or is likely to do if given a chance. There can be no doubt but
what an enormously important component of group hostility has
this psychological origin and character.

The Kinship System
"Western society" is a very complex entity with many different
variations on national, regional, cultural, class, and other bases.
There are, nevertheless, a small number of structurally distinctive
features of it which, though unevenly distributed in different parts,
are of such strategic significance for the whole that they can be
singled out as presenting in the most accentuated form the prob-
lems which are crucial to the whole. These are, above all, those
features associated with the development of the modern type of
urban and industrial society, which is far more highly developed in

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 303

the modern Western world than anywhere else or at any other
period.^

In attempting to analyze the genesis and channeling of aggression
in modern Western society, four aspects or structural-functional con-
texts appear to stand out as of paramount importance, and will be
discussed in order. They are: First, the kinship system in its context
in the larger society, since this is the environment in which the prin-
cipal patterns in the individual personality become crystallized.
Second, the occupational system, since this is the arena of the most
important competitive process in which the individual must achieve
his status. Third, the fundamental process of dynamic change by
which traditional values and sentiments are exposed to a far more
drastic and continuing disintegrating influence than in most soci-
eties. And fourth, the set of institutional structures through which
aggression becomes organized in relation to a small number of
structurally significant tensions, rather than diffused and dissipated
in an indefinite variety of different channels without threatening
the stability of the social system as a whole.^

The dominant feature of the kinship system of modern Western
urban and industrial society is the relatively isolated conjugal family
which is primarily dependent for its status and income on the oc-
cupational status of one member, the husband and father. This role,
however, is segregated from the family structure itself, unlike the
role of the peasant father. Work is normally done in separate prem-
ises, other members of the family do not cooperate in the work
process and, above all, status is based on individual qualities and
achievements which specifically cannot be shared by other mem-
bers of the family unit.

It follows that sons on maturity must be emancipated from their
families of orientation and "make their own way in the world"
rather than fitting into a going concern organized around kinship.
Determination of occupational status by family connections threat-

2 Modem Japan and the Early Roman Empire are the two cases outside this
sphere which have gone farthest in approaching the modem Western situation.

3 The study which comes closest to the present attempt in approach and
analytical method is Clyde Kluckhohn's Navaho Witchcraft, Papers of the Pea-
body Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University,
(1944) 22: no. 2, (see also the author's review, Amer. J. Sociology [19461
51:566-569). Naturally because of the vast extent of Western society, the facts
must be determined on a basis of broad general impressions rather than on
specific field observation. This does not, however, invalidate the comparability
of the two analyses. There is a very important sense in which nationalism in the
Westem world is the functional equivalent of Navaho witchcraft.

304 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ens the universalistic standards so important to the system as a
whole. Daughters become overwhelmingly dependent on their
marriage to the right individual man— not kinship group— for their
status and security. In practice their parents cannot greatly help
them— marriage becomes primarily a matter of individual responsi-
bility and choice.

This kinship system in its larger setting involves a variety of in-
fluences on the child which favor high levels of insecurity structured
in relatively definite and uniform ways and correspondingly a good
deal of aggression. In the first place, the affective orientations of
the child are concentrated on a very small number of persons, par-
ticularly since the family size is likely to be small. Of adult ob-
jects, particularly in the early years, the mother overwhelmingly
predominates, because the care of household and children tradi-
tionally falls to her, and because the father is normally away from
the household, at work most of the child's waking hours. This creates
a very high degree of sensitivity to the emotional attitudes of the
mother and of vulnerability to anything disturbing about them. To
reinforce this, most associations outside the immediate family in
the neighborhood play group and school are those in which the child
cannot take security of love and status for granted but is placed in
competition with others either directly or for adult approval by
the teacher and parents. The fact that his mother loves him does
not solve his problems; he must stand on his own feet. Furthermore
doing well in such situations is highly valued in the societ>% and this
attitude is apt to be shared by the mother, so that her own love and
approval tend to become contingent on the child's objective per-
formance rather than unconditional as it is in many societies.'* This
love is therefore more acutely needed than in most societies and
more precarious. The situation is favorable to a high level of anxiety
and hence of aggression. But because of the very acuteness of the
need for affection and approval, direct expression of aggression is
more than normally dangerous and hence likely to be repressed.

On top of this situation come factors which are differential be-
tween the sexes and not only intensify insecurity but have much to
do with the direction aggressive tendencies take. Our kinship situ-
ation, it has been noted, throws children of both sexes overwhelm-

^ See Mead, Margaret, And Keep Your Powder Dry, N. Y., William Mor-
row, 1942, for a discussion of the pattern of "conditional love" and its conse-
quences.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 305

ingly upon the mother as the emotionally significant adult. In such
a situation "identification" in the sense that the adult becomes a
"role model" is the normal result. For a girl this is normal an natu-
ral not only because she belongs to the same sex as the mother,
but because the functions of housewife and mother are immediately
before her eyes and are tangible and relatively easily understood
by a child. Almost as soon as she is physically able, the girl begins
a direct apprenticeship in the adult feminine role. It is very notable
that girls' play consists in cooking, sewing, playing with dolls, and
so on, activities which are a direct mimicry of their mothers'. But
the boy does not have his father immediately available; in addition
—especially in the middle classes, but increasingly perhaps in the
lower— the things the father does are intangible and difficult for a
child to understand, such as working in an office, or even running
a complicated machine tool.

Thus the girl has a more favorable opportunity for emotional
maturing through positive identification with an adult model, a fact
which seems to have much to do with the well-known earlier ma-
turity of girls. The boy on the other hand has a tendency to form
a direct feminine identification, since his mother is the model most
readily available and significant to him. But he is not destined to
become an adult woman. Moreover he soon discovers that in cer-
tain vital respects women are considered inferior to men, that it
would hence be shameful for him to grow up to be like a woman.
Hence when boys emerge into what Freudians call the "latency
period," their behavior tends to be marked by a kind of "compulsive
masculinity." They refuse to have anything to do with girls. "Sissy"
becomes the worst of all insults. They get interested in athletics and
physical prowess, in the things in which men have the most primi-
tive and obvious advantage over women. Furthermore they become
allergic to all expression of tender emotion; they must be "tough."
This universal pattern bears all the earmarks of a "reaction forma-
tion." It is so conspicuous, not because it is simply "masculine
nature" but because it is a defense against a feminine identification.
The commonness with which "mother fixation" is involved in all
types of neurotic and psychotic disorders of Western men strongly
confirms this. It may be inferred also that the ambivalence involved
is an important source of anxiety— lest one not be able to prove his
masculinity— and that aggression toward women who "after all are
to blame," is an essential concomitant.

306 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

One particular aspect of this situation is worthy of special atten-
tion. In addition to the mother's being the object of love and identi-
fication, she is to the young boy the principal agent of socially sig-
nificant discipline.^ Not only does she administer the disciplines
which make him a tolerable citizen of the family group, but she
stimulates him to give a good account of himself outside the home
and makes known her disappointment and disapproval if he fails to
measure up to her expectations. She, above all, focuses in herself
the symbols of what is "good" behavior, of conformity with the ex-
pectations of the respectable adult world. When he revolts against
identification with his mother in the name of masculinity, it is not
surprising that a boy unconsciously identifies "goodness" with
femininity and that being a "bad boy" becomes a positive goal. It
seems that the association of goodness with femininity, and therewith
much of our Western ambivalence toward ethical values, has its
roots in this situation. At any rate there is a strong tendency for
boyish behavior to run in anti-social if not directly destructive
directions, in striking contrast to that of pre-adolescent girls.

As would be expected if such a pattern is deep-seated and has
continued for several generations, it becomes imbedded in the psy-
chology of adults as well as children. The mother therefore secretly
—usually unconsciously— admires such behavior and, particularly
when it is combined with winning qualities in other respects, re-
wards it with her love— so the "bad" boy is enabled to have the best
of both worlds. She may quite frequently treat such a 'Tbad" son as
her favorite as compared with a "sissy" brother who conforms with
all her overt expectations much better.

It should be particularly noted that this is not the functionally
dominant pattern of the adult masculine role. It combines an em-
phasis on physical prowess with a kind of irresponsibility. But the
adult man predominantly gains his place by using his mind rather
than his brawn and by accepting responsibility, not by repudiating
it. There must therefore, in a large majority of boys, be a further
transition as they grow to maturity; they must come to value other
hues of achievement and accept responsibilities. It is to be presumed
that this transition in turn is not accomplished without further re-
pressions. At least this "bad boy" pattern did permit a direct outlet
of aggression in physical terms, though to be sure this could not be

f* In this she is followed by a teacher who in the United States is almost
always a woman until quite a late stage in the process of schooling.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 307

directed against mothers. But the discipHne of most adult mascuHne
roles sharply limits that, although a sublimated form in competitive
activities is still possible. It is however probable that this is one
important source of a reservoir of latent aggression susceptible of
mobilization in group antagonisms, and particularly war, because
it legitimatizes physical aggression as such.

With girls the situation is different, but not intrinsically or nec-
essarily more favorable. In childhood a girl has the opportunity to
mature primarily through identification with the mother and hence
introjection of the mother role pattern. But girls later face a situa-
tion of realistic insecurity which profoundly disturbs the continuity
of transition to adulthood in this role. In many societies marriages
are arranged by the older generation who are primarily concerned
with providing good mothers for their grandchildren, and the qual-
ities of this pattern are then a positive asset. But increasingly in
Western society a girl must seek her fundamental adult security—
which, inherently in the structure of the situation, depends over-
whelmingly on her relation to the one particular man she marries—
by direct appeal to the personal sentiments of men— and she must
do so in competition with the other girls of her age group. Com-
pared with the masculine problems of becoming established in a
satisfactory occupational career line, it is a more severe type of com-
petitive insecurity, because so much depends on the one step which
is almost irrevocable and the average age of marriage is such that
the occupational prospects of a suitor are necessarily still indefinite.
In addition to this, she must compete for the personal favor of a
young man who, in the nature of the influences to which he has
been exposed, tends to be deeply ambivalent about the primary
role his future wife is going to play, hence severely handicapped in
making rational decisions on such matters.^

The undoubted predominant tendency in this situation is for
the plane of competition in the process of selection of marriage part-

* An additional feature of this ambivalence not touched above concerns
attitudes toward sex. The fact of the incest taboo plus the intensity of emotional
concentration on the mother makes for strong inhibitions against sexual attach-
ments, since the sexual relation to the mother becomes the ideal of love. The
revolt against this attachment in the "bad boy" pattern thus \ery readily draws
the attitude toward sex into the polarity, and sexual interests become "bad"
but attractive. Indeed frequently the hedonic aspect of sex becomes tinged with
aggression; sexuality is, so to speak, a means of taking revenge on women for
their maltreatment of boys as children. It is notable that the sentimentally
idealized stereotype of the "good" woman is strikingly asexual. It may be pre-
sumed that this stereotype is largely the product of masculine fantasies.

^8 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ners to be deflected markedly from attraction to "good wives and
mothers" (and husbands and fathers) toward an accent on "ro-
mantic love," certain rather immature types of sexuality, and "gla-
mor"—the exploitation of certain specifically feminine assets of
attraction.

Psychologically speaking, this situation implies two very funda-
mental sources of frustration for the growing girl. The first is the dis-
covery of what is, in tlie relevant sense, "masculine superiority," the
fact that her own security hke that of other women is dependent on
the favor— even "whim"— of a man, that she must compete for mas-
culine favor and cannot stand on her own feet. This is a shock be-
cause in her early experience her mother was the center of the world
and by identifying with her she expected to be in a similar position.
Secondly, it turns out that the qualities and ideals which were the
focus of her childhood identification and personality development
are not the primary asset in solving her fundamental problem, are
even to a degree a positive handicap. The severity and relative
abruptness of this transition cannot but, in a large proportion of cases,
be a source of much insecurity, hence the source of a high level of
anxiety and of aggressive impulses. The primary source of this
aggression is the sense of having been deceived, of being allowed
to believe that a certain path was the way to security and success
only to find that it does not seem to count. The aggression, it may
be presumed, is directed both against men and against women: the
latter because they are the primary "deceivers," they are not what
they seem to be; tlie former because it is they who seem to have
forced upon women this intolerable fate of having to be two or
more incompatible things. This undoubtedly underlies the wide-
spread ambivalence among women toward the role of motherhood,
which is a primary factor in the declining birth rate, as well as
toward sexual relations and the role of being a woman in any other
fundamental respect.'^

The upshot of the above analysis is in the first place that the
typical Western individual— apart from any special constitutional

"^ In this and other previous discussions, emphasis has been deliberately
placed on the negative aspect of the situation, the strains and their disruptive
consequences. This is because present interest is in sources of aggression. The
positive side is not evaluated; hence the reader should exercise great care not to
take this discussion as a general appraisal of the emotional qualifies of the West-
em kinship system. Furthermore it should go without saying that these patterns
have a very unequal incidence in the population, ranging from virtual negli-
gibility to pathological intensity.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 309

predispositions— has been through an experience, in the process of
growing to adulthood, which involved emotional strains of such
severity as to produce an adult personality with a large reservoir of
aggressive disposition. Secondly, the bulk of aggression generated
from this source must in the nature of the case remain repressed.
In spite of the disquieting amount of actual disruption of family
solidarity, and quarreling and bickering even where families are not
broken up, the social norms enjoining mutual affection among fam-
ily members, especially respectful affection toward parents and
love between spouses, are very powerful. Where such a large reser-
voir of repressed aggression exists but cannot be directly expressed,
it tends to become "free-floating" and to be susceptible of mobili-
zation against various kinds of scapegoats outside the immediate
situation of its genesis.

In addition to establishing the basis for the existence of a large
reservoir of repressed aggression, the above analysis tells us some-
thing of the directions which its indirect expression may be likely
to take and the "themes" of grievance which are most likely to
arouse aggressive reactions. In the first place. Western society is
one in which most positions of large-scale responsibility are held
by men. In this connection the cult of "compulsive masculinity"
cannot but be of significance. Western men are peculiarly suscep-
tible to the appeal of an adolescent type of assertively masculine
behavior and attitude which may take various forms. They have in
common a tendency to revolt against the routine aspects of the pri-
marily institutionalized masculine role of sober responsibility, me-
ticulous respect for the rights of others, and tender affection toward
women. Assertion through physical prowess, with an endemic tend-
ency toward violence and hence the military ideal, is inherent in
the complex and the most dangerous potentiality.

It is, however, not only masculine psychology which is important
in this respect. Through at least two channels the psychology of
women may reinforce this tendency. First, there is undoubtedly
widespread if repressed resentment on the part of women over
being forced to accept their sex role and its contradictory compo-
nents. This is expressed in an undercurrent of aggression toward
the men with whom they are associated, which, given the latter's
hypersensitiveness toward women's attitudes toward them, can be
expected to accentuate the pattern of compulsive masculinity.

But this feminine resentment against men is only one side of an

310 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ambivalent structure of attitudes. The situation by virtue of which
women have to accept an inferior position in crucial respects leads
to an idealization of precisely the extreme type of aggressive mas-
culinity. It is quite clear that Western men are peculiarly depend-
ent emotionally on women and therefore feminine admiration of
them will powerfully stimulate any pattern of behavior which can
evoke it.^

The childhood situation of the Western world also provides the
prototypes of what appear to be the two primarily significant themes
or contexts of meaning in which it is easiest to evoke an aggressive
reaction, since these are the contexts in which the people of the
Western world have been oversensitized by the traumatic experi-
ences of their childhood.

The first of these is the question of "adequacy," of living up to
an acceptable standard of achievement or behavior. There is a tend-
ency to be hypersensitive to any suggestion of inferiority or in-
capacity to achieve goals which have once been set. This in turn is
manifested in two ways of primary significance for present pur-
poses. On the one hand the peoples of Western society are highly
susceptible to wishful and distorted beliefs in their own superiority
to others, as individuals or in terms of any collectivity with which
they are identified, since this belief, and its recognition by others,
tends to allay anxiety about their own adequacy. On the other hand,
since such a belief in superiority has compulsive characteristics,
those who have to deal with such people find it "hard to take," even
when the former have a highly realistic attitude. But it also stimu-
lates a vicious circle of resentment on the part of those who, shar-
ing the same hypersensitivity, are treated as inferior. It is, in other
words, inordinately easy for either individual or group relationships
in the Western world to become defined as relations of superiority
and inferiority and to evoke aggressive responses, if the assumption
of superiority is, even justly, questioned, or if, again even justly,
there is any imputation of inferiority.

The second major context of meanings is that of loyalty, honesty,
integrity, justice of dealing. Both in competition with others and
in relation to expectations which he has been allowed to build up,
the Western child has usually had the traumatic experience of
disillusionment, of being "let down." The boy has not been allowed

8 The indications are that this feminine admiration, not to say adultation,
of the "heroic" "He-man" pattern played a major role in the spread of the Nazi
movement in Germany.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 311

to emulate the ideal of his mother; when he has been "good," he has
been punished rather than rewarded for it, and his "bad" brother
has been preferred. The girl has found out both that her mother as
a woman is an inferior being and that to be a "good woman," that is
a mother, does not pay. These experiences are the prototype of a
certain hypersensitivity to the question of whether others can be
trusted either as individuals or collectivities. In sex relations there
is a tendency to be compulsively preoccupied with the fidelity of
the partner. In general there is an overreadiness to believe that the
other fellow will attempt to deceive or injure one. Naturally, since
this hypersensitivity is associated with repressed aggression, it is
very easy for the aggressive impulse to be projected on the other
party to the relation, producing the "paranoid" pattern of over-
readiness to impute hostile intentions where they do not exist, or to
exaggerate them grossly where they do. In its extreme form the
rest of the world is apt to be seen as mainly preoccupied with plot-
ting to destroy one or one's group. The Western tendency is to be
"thin-skinned," unable to "take it," when frustrations must be faced
and to place the blame on others when most of it belongs at home.

The Occupational System

The other most fundamental institutional structure of modern
Western society, the occupational system, can for present purposes
be dealt with much more briefly— especially since a good deal has
been anticipated in dealing with kinship, the two being so closely
interdependent. Its most essential feature is the primacy of func-
tional achievement. This implies the selection of people on the
basis of their capacities to perform the task, of innate ability and
training, not of birth or any other antecedent element of status. It
further implies the segregation of the technical role from other
aspects of the incumbent's life, most of which are in the nature of
the case governed by other types of standards. This takes the form
in the type case of physical segregation and of segregation of per-
sonnel and activity, so that it involves a distinct system of relation-
ships. Finally, it implies a peculiar type of discipline in that any
type of personal feeling which might come in conflict wdth these
relationships is subordinated to the requirements of the technical
task, which are often highly exacting and often narrowly specialized.

There is an inherently competitive dimension of the occupational
system. Even when competitive victory is not as such a major direct

312 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

goal, but rather is subordinated to functional achievement as such,
a selective process, which among other things governs access to
opportunity for all the higher achievements, is inherent in the sys-
tem. A man has to "win" the competition for selection, often re-
peatedly, in order to have an opportunity to prove his capacity for
the higher achievements. The inevitable result of the competitive
and selective processes is the distribution of the personnel of the
system in a relatively elaborate hierarchy of prestige which is sym-
bolized and expressed in manifold ways.

It is furthermore relevant that in the aggregate, particular roles,
and still more organizations, undertake functions which are alto-
gether unknown in simpler societies. Men are more frequently sub-
jected to the discipline and strains of more exacting skills. But even
more important are two other consequences. One is the involvement
of people in systems of social relationship of very great complexity
which, because of their newness and rapidly changing character,
cannot be adequately governed by established and traditionalized
norms. The other is the fact that explicit responsibility, in that
great consequences hinge on the decisions and competence of indi-
viduals, is a far greater factor than in simpler societies. In view of
what we know of the deep-seated tendencies to dependency and
the psychological difficulties involved in assuming responsibility,
this is a fact of prime importance.

When these features of the occupational system are brought into
relation to the personality structure discussed above, two classes of
conclusions touching the problem of aggression appear to follow.
The first set concerns the relation to the general levels of aggression
in the society, the second the channeling of what exists into difiFer-
ent actual and potential types and directions of expression.

Though it is difficult to arrive at more than a very rough judg-
ment, it seems clear that the balance is rather heavily on the side
of increasing rather than reducing the levels of insecurity and hence
of anxiety and aggression— the foundations of which are laid in the
process of socialization in the family. It is true that the wide field
for competitive activity provides some outlets which are construc-
tive for sublimating aggression by harnessing it to the motivation of
constructive achievement, and at the same time "winning." But the
other side of the medal is the condemnation of probably a consider-
ably larger number to being "losers"— since success in such a system
is to a considerable degree inherently relative— and thereby feeding

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 313

any tendency to feel unduly inadequate or unjustly treated. At the
same time, participation in the occupational system means subjec-
tion to a severe discipline. It means continual control of emotions
so that repression and dissociation are favored rather than counter-
acted.^ Perhaps most imjiortant of all, however, the competitive
process is governed by a rather strict code which is very often in
conflict with immediate impulses. In particular it is essential to be
a "good loser" and take one's misfortunes and disappointments with
outward equanimity. This reinforces the need to repress feelings
of resentment against unfair treatment, whether the feelings are
realistically justified or not, and hence their availability for mobili-
zation in indirect channels of expression.

The above considerations apply primarily to men since they are
the primary carriers of the occupational system. Conversely, how-
ever, by the segregation of occupational from familial roles, most
women are denied a sense of participation with their men in a com-
mon enterprise. Moreover, it is in the occupational sphere that the
'TDig things" are done, and this drastic exclusion must serve to in-
crease the inferiority feelings of women and hence their resent-
ment at their condemnation by the accident of sex to an inferior
role.

In respect to the channeling of aggression as distinguished from
its absolute level, two things are of primary importance. First, if
there are no reasons to suppose that, on the average, absolute levels
are lowered, at the same time few direct outlets are provided for
most types of aggressive impulse. Hence the general need for in-
direct channels of expression, particularly by displacement on scape-
goats, is reinforced by experience in this sphere of life.

Secondly, it is above all in the occupational sphere that the pri-
mary institutionalization of the basic themes of the above discussion
takes place— childhood is an apprenticeship for the final test which

^ This discipline includes adherence to sharply objective standards in the
face of the strains growing out of the emotional complexity of the system of
social relationships of the work situation, and the additional strains imposed by
high levels of responsibility for those who have to assume it. In addition, the
mobility which is inherent in such a system has two further significant conse-
quences. Status is inherently insecure, in tliat it cannot be guaranteed inde-
pendently of performance— to say notliing of the results of economic fluctua-
tions in causing unemployment and the like. Then technological and organiza-
tional change, as well as promotion and job change of the individual, are also
inherent and make it difficult to "settle down" to a complete emotional adjust-
ment to any one stable situation; it is necessary to make continual new adjust-
ments with all the attendant emotional difficulty.

314 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the adult world imposes on man. Ability to perform well and hold
one's own or excel in competition is the primary realistic test of
adult adequacy, but many, probably the considerable majority, are
condemned to what, especially if they are oversensitive, they must
feel to be an unsatisfactory experience. Many also will inevitably
feel they have been unjustly treated, because there is in fact much
injustice, much of which is very deeply rooted in the nature of the
society, and because many are disposed to be paranoid and see
more injustice than actually exists. To feel unjustly treated is more-
over not only a balm to one's sense of resentment, it is an alibi for
failure, since how could one succeed if he is not given a chance?

Thus the kinship and the occupational systems constitute from the
present point of view a mutually reinforcing system of forces acting
on the individual to generate large quantities of aggressive impulse,
to repress the greater part of it, and to channel it in the direction of
finding agencies which can be symbolically held responsible for
failure and for deception and injustice to the individual and to those
with whom he is identified. ^"^ Perhaps the most important mitiga-
tion of the general situation which the working of the occupational
system brings about is that occupational success may do much to
reduce the pressure toward compulsive masculinity. But the diffi-
culty here is that sufficient success to have this effect is attainable
only to a minority of the masculine population. Lack of it would
seem to have the opposite effect, and this is just as much a conse-
quence of the system as the other.

The Structure of Group Hostility

The occupational system of the Western world is probably the
most important institutional "precipitate" of a fundamental dynamic
process which Max Weber has called the "process of rationaliza-
tion." Through it, as well as other channels, this process has had a
fundamental part in structuring attitudes in the Western world
which is relevant to the problem of aggression and hence calls for a
brief discussion.

1^ If anything, probably the kinship system has to absorb more strains
originating in the occupational system than vice versa. In any case the effect of
these strains is to accentuate the sources of aggression inherent in the kinsfiip
system rather than to mitigate them. This would appear to operate above all
through tlie influence on children of parents who themselves are showing the
effects of tension. In so far as a man ' takes out" the frustrations of his occupa-
tional situation on his wiie she may in turn "take it out" on the children.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 315

The progress of science and related elements of rational thought
is the core and fundamental prototype of the process. Science is an
inherently dynamic thing. Unless prevented by influences extrane-
ous to it, it will continually evolve. Moreover, unless science is
hermetically insulated from the rest of social life, which is manifestly
impossible, this dynamic process of change will be extended into
neighboring realms of thought, for example, philosophical and reli-
gious thought, and in the direction of practical application wherever
rational norms play a significant role in the determination of action.
Hence through this dynamic factor, a continuing process of change
is introduced, both into the primary symbolic systems which help
to integrate the life of a society, and into the structure of the situ-
ations in which a large part of the population must carry on their
activities.

The significance of this arises in the first place from the fact that
there is much evidence that security in the sense relevant to this
analysis is to a high degree a function of the stability of certain ele-
ments of the socio-cultural situation. This is true especially because
certain aspects of the situations people face are involved in the
actual and, as they feel it, prospective fulfillment of their "legitimate
expectations." These expectations are, even apart from any neurotic
distortions, apt to be highly concrete so that any change, even if it
is not intrinsically unfavorable, is apt to be disturbing and arouse a
reaction of anxiety. It should above all be noted that technological
change inevitably disrupts the informal human relationships of the
members of working groups— relationships which have been shown
to be highly important to the stability and working efficiency of the
participants.^^ On the other hand, the corresponding process of
change on the level of ideas and symbols tends to disrupt estab-
lished symbolic systems which are exceedingly important to the
security and stability of the orientation of people.

The weight of evidence seems to be that the amount of such
change to which even the best-integrated personalities can adapt
without the possibility of upsetting the smooth functioning of per-
sonality is rather limited; but in proportion as there is a neurotic
type of insecurity, there tends to be a compulsive need for stabihty
in these respects. The capacity to adapt to both types of change is
a function of "emotional maturity," and the above analysis has

i^Cf. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, William J., Management and the
Worker; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941.

316 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

shown that there must be serious hmitations on the levels of emo-
tional maturity which most members of Western society can have
attained. There seems, therefore, to be no doubt that the continu-
ing incidence of dynamic change through the process of rationali-
zation is one major source of the generalized insecurity which char-
acterizes our society. As such it should also be a major factor in
maintaining the reservoir of aggressive impulses at a high level. It
is a factor so deep-seated in our societ)' that it must be expected to
continue to operate on a major scale for the foreseeable future; only
profound changes in the whole social situation which would invali-
date the greater part of this analysis would produce a situation
where this would not be true.

It is not, however, the significance of the process of rationaliza-
tion, as a source of quantitative addition to the reservoir of aggres-
sion, which is most important, but rather the way it operates to
structure the direction of its actual and potential expression. It is
a major factor in the polarization of attitudes in the society, espe-
cially as they are distributed between different groups in the popu-
lation in such a way as to focus anxiety and aggression on a single
structured line of tension.

It must be remembered that the incidence of the process of
rationalization is highly uneven in the social structure. With respect
to any given level of traditionalized values, symbols, and structuring
of situations, there are always relatively "emancipated" and rela-
tively traditional groups and sectors of the society. Certain of the
emancipated groups, like the best of the professions for instance,
become relatively well institutionalized so that the dynamic process
of which they are agents is not so disturbing to them. They always,
however, contain at least a fringe, if not more, where insecurity is
expressed in compulsively distorted patterns of extreme emancipa-
tion which are highly provocative to the more traditionalized ele-
ments, which lead into a vicious circle in proportion as elements of
both groups are compulsively motivated.

The process is, however, always tending to spread into the rela-
tively traditionalized areas of the society and thereby tending to -
threaten the security of the population elements most dependent on
traditionalized patterns. Partly these elements already have serious
insecurities and are compulsively dependent on traditionalism;
partly change introduces new insecurities. In either case, the result
is to stimulate what has elsewhere been called a "fundamentalist
reaction," a compulsively distorted exaggeration of traditional

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 317

values and other related patterns.^- This above all attaches to those
elements of culture and society which are not so readily and in the
same sense susceptible of rationalization as are the areas of science,
technology, and administrative organization— namely, religion,
family, class attitudes, the informal traditions of ethnic culture, and
the like, where non-logical symbolic systems are heavily involved.

The reverse side of the exaggerated assertion of these traditional
patterns is the aggressive attack on the symbols which appear to
threaten them, science as such, atheism and other antireligious as-
pects of liberal rationalism, the relaxation of traditional sex morality
—especially in the larger urban communities and in "bohemian"
circles— political and economic radicalism, and the like. The com-
pulsive adherents of emancipated values on the other hand tend to
brand all traditional values as "stupid," reactionary, unenlightened,
and thus a vicious circle of mounting antagonism readily gets
started. This polarization in fact corresponds roughly to structured
differentiations of the society, with latent or more or less actual con-
flicts of interest as between rural and urban elements, capital and
labor, upper and lower class groups, and the like, which feed fuel
to the flames.

It is above all important that the values about which the funda-
mentalist pattern of reaction tends to cluster are those particularly
important in the constitution and symbolization of informal group
solidarities— those of families, social class, socio-religious groups,
ethnic groups, and nations. Many of these solidarities are seriously
in conflict with the explicit values of the Western world which
largely stem from the rationahstic traditions of the Enlightenment,^^
They are hence particularly difficult to defend against rationalistic
attack. Since, however, they are of fundamental emotional impor-
tance, the consequence more frequently than not is their "defensive"
assertion rather than their abandonment. This very difficulty of
rational defense when rational values are in fact accepted, favors
this context as a field for the mobilization of repressed aggression,
since it is in a state of bafflement that people are most likely to react
with "unreasonable" aggression.

These circumstances seem to go far toward explaining the strik-

1- Cf. Parsons, Talcott, "Some Sociological Aspects of the Fascist Move-
ments," Social Forces, Nov. 1942, reprinted as Chapter VII above. Also: "The
Sociology of Modem Anti-Semitism' in Jews in a Gentile World, Graeber &
Britt Teds.]; N. Y.; Macmillan, 1942.

13 Cf. Gunnar Myrdal's discussion of "Tlie American Creed" in An Ameri-
can Dilemma; N. Y., Harpers, 1944 (2 vols.).

318 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ing fact that aggression in the Western world tends to focus so
much on antagonisms between soHdary groups. Some of these
groups are, to be sure, those growing out of the formal and utili-
tarian structure of modern society, like the conflict of business and
the labor unions. Probably more important, however, are the lines
of conflict which cut across these groups, particularly those between
religious and ethnic groups within nations and, above all, the con-
flict of nationalisms. Group conflict seems to be particularly signifi-
cant because on the one hand solidarity with an informal group,
the appeal of which is to "infrarational" sentiments, is a peculiarly
potent measure for allaying the neurotic types of anxiety which are
so common; on the other hand an antagonistic group is a peculiarly
appropriate symbolic object on which to displace the emotional
reactions which cannot be openly expressed within one's own group
lest they tlireaten its solidarity. In this whole context, it is peculiarly
appropriate that groups be available in regard to which the ambi-
valent structure of emotions in relation to the t\vo dominant themes
discussed above can be expressed. The "out-group" should, that
is, be a group in relation to which one's own group can feel a com-
fortably self-righteous sense of superiority and at the same time a
group which can be plausibly accused of arrogating to itself an
illegitimate superiority of its own. Correspondingly it should be a
group with strong claims to a position of high ethical standing of
its own which, however, can plausibly be made out to be essen-
tially specious and to conceal a subtle deception. The Jews have
in both these connections furnished almost the ideal scapegoat
throughout the Western world.

Latent aggression has thus been channeled into internal group
conflicts of various sorts throughout the Western world: anti-
semitism and anti-laborism, and anti-negro, anti-Catholic, and
anti-foreigner feeling are found in this country. There are, how-
ever, potent reasons why nationalism should be the most important
and serious focus of these tendencies. The first is the realistic basis
of it. The organization of our civilization into nation-states which
are the dominant power units has been a crucial realistic fact of the
situation. Above all, in the chronic tendency to resort to war in
crisis situations the loyalty to one's government has been to be in
one sense the ultimate residual loyalty, the one which could claim
any sacrifice no matter how great if need be.

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 319

At the same time it is highly significant that as between the fun-
damentaHst and the emancipated poles of modern attitude struc-
ttire, nationalistic loyalty as such is largely neutral. It is, however,
a particularly suitable focus for fundamentalist sentiments in ac-
cusing their opponents of a specious sincerity since it does tend to
be an ultimate test of altruism and sincerity. The "foreigner" is,
moreover, outside the principal immediate system of law and or-
der; hence aggression toward him does not carry the same oppro-
brium or immediate danger of reprisal that it does toward one's
"fellow-citizen." Hostility to the foreigner has thus furnished a
means of transcending the principal, immediately threatening group
conflicts, of achieving "unity"— but at the expense of a less imme-
diate but in fact more dangerous threat to security, since national
states now command such destructive weapons that war between
them is approaching suicidal significance.

Thus the immense reservoir of aggression in Western society is
sharply inhibited from direct expression within the smaller groups
in which it is primarily generated. The structure of the society in
which it is produced contains a strong predisposition for it to be
channeled into group antagonisms. The significance of the nation-
state is, however, such that there is a strong pressure to internal
unity within each such unit and therefore a tendency to focus ag-
gression on the potential conflicts between nation-state units. In
addition to the existence of a plurality of such units, each a poten-
tial target of the focused aggression from all the others, the situ-
ation is particularly unstable because of the endemic tendency to
define their relations in the manner least calculated to build an
effectively solidary international order. Each state is, namely, highly
ambivalent about the superiority-inferiority question. Each tends
to have a deep-seated presumption of its own superiority and a
corresponding resentment against any other's corresponding pre-
sumption. Each at the same time tends to feel that it has been un-
fairly treated in the past and is ready on the slightest provocation
to assume that the others are ready to plot new outrages in the
immediate future. Each tends to be easily convinced of the right-
eousness of its own policy while at the same time it is overready to
suspect the motives of all others. In short, the "jungle philosophy"
—which corresponds to a larger element in the real sentiments of
all of us than can readily be admitted, even to ourselves— tends to

320 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

be projected onto the relations of nation-states at precisely the point
where, under the technological and organizational situation of the
modern world, it can do the most harm.

Conclusion

In conclusion, to forestall misunderstanding, it is well to call
explicit attention to some of the limitations of the analysis just de-
veloped. That it is specifically limited to analyzing sources of ag-
gression and their channeling has already been stated. It needs,
however, to be repeated that the more positive sides are deliberately
omitted. It is thus not in any sense a complete or balanced pic-
ture of the dynamic psychological balance of Western society, even
so far as such a picture could be drawn in the light of present
knowledge and on a comparable level of generality and abstrac-
tion. Above all, it should not by itself be taken as an adequate basis
for any suggestions of remedial action. By omitting consideration
of the positive aspects, it has precisely neglected the principal as-
sets on which any such program would have to rely. It is confined
to a specifically limited diagnostic function. Its results must be com-
bined with those of other studies before they have any practical
value beyond this.

This analysis has been couched in terms of a very high level
of "ideal-typical" abstraction. It has presumed to deal with the
social structure and psychological dynamics of the Western world
as a whole, in full consciousness of the fact that there are and have
been innumerable ranges of variation within this enormously com-
plicated sociocultural system, many of which are of prime signifi-
cance to any practical purpose.

In the first place, within any one national society this analysis
applies unequally to different elements of its population. In fact it
applies most completely and directly to the urban, middle-class
elements, those which have been most heavily involved in the con-
sequences of the industrial revolution. Substantial modifications
need to be made in dealing with rural populations. The same is
true of the highest elite groups, particularly those whose position
was firmly institutionalized before the major social changes of the
industrial era took place. This is especially true of the older Euro-
pean hereditary aristocracies. It is even necessary to make substan-
tial modifications for the case of social groups which have so low a
status that their being in the major competition for places on the

PATTERNS OF AGGRESSION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 321

general scale of prestige cannot be realistically supposed, thus for
large parts, at least, of the "proletarian" elements. These are only
among the most conspicuous of the qualifications, each of which
would have important consequences for the psychological reaction
patterns of the relevant groups.

Similaily, most of the "secondary" complications of the system of
dynamic relationships under consideration have perforce been ne-
glected. It is a fact of the first importance that, for instance, in
American adult culture there is a fundamentally important institu-
tionalization of "adolescent" values which is in continual competi-
tion with the main system.

Finally, it is quite clear that there are extremely important na-
tional variations in the relevant patterns. To a considerable degree
the analysis has been focused on American conditions. Their greater
familiarity favors this. But it is not necessarily a source of serious
bias, since in certain respects the United States represents a closer
approach to the "ideal type" of structure which is of prime strategic
significance for the whole Western world— significant because the
fundamental patterns of industrial society have been less modified
by powerful institutional complexes which were present in the
pre-existing society.

France, for instance, has developed less far along these lines than
most Western countries, and has integrated more of the older soci-
ety with the new tendencies. There seems, for instance, to have been
far less isolation of the immediate conjugal family there than in
this country.

Certain of the consequences most important to the practical situ-
ation have appeared most highly developed in Germany and greatly
accentuated under the Nazi regime.^^ The peculiarly virulent nation-
alistic aggressiveness of Nazi Germany certainly cannot be ade-
quately explained in terms of the factors analyzed in the present
paper. It depended on other elements which were either peculiar
to Germany, or relatively far more important there than for instance
in this country. This is true of the strongly authoritarian character
of the father-son relationship, and of the much more sharply subor-
dinated position of women in Germany. There was also a much

1* Cf. Parsons, T., "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany,"
/. Legal and Political Sociology, Nov. 1942, and "The Problem of Controlled
Institutional Change," Psi/chiatry (1945) 8:79-101, both reprinted here. See
also Ericson, Eric Homburger, 'Hitler's Imagery and the Dream of German
Youth," Psychiatry (1942) 5:475-493.

322 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

more rigidly formalistic and hierarchical occupational system there,
and conditions were much more favorable to the development of a
strongly militaristic variety of nationalism.

Nevertheless, difiFerences of this sort do not invalidate the anal-
ysis presented here. They are, however extremely deviant, variations
on the same fundamental themes. Much of the general foundation
of the situation has been in fact common to all the major nations
of the Western world where the process of industrialization and
rationalization has taken strong hold. It is a question, not of a right
and a wrong analysis, but of the appropriate adaptation of one
which is in the nature of the case general and abstract, to the con-
cretely variable circumstances of different particular situations.
This adaptation is achieved, not by substituting a new "correct"
for an incorrect explanation, but by introducing an analysis of the
effect of specific modifications of the generalized structure pre-
sented here, and by taking account of additional factors which the
generality of this analysis has not permitted to be treated.

'■■ I

XV

Social Classes and Class Conflict
in the Light of Recent
Sociological Theory

I. The Marxian View as a Point of Departure

Nineteen hundred and forty-eight is the centenary of the Com-
munist Manifesto— the first major theoretical statement of Marxism
—and some stocktaking of where Marx and Engels stood in an im-
portant hne of the development of social science rather than only
as the ideological founders of "scientific socialism" is in order.

The president of the American Economic Association, Professor
Schumpeter/ has particularly clearly distinguished these two as-
pects of Marx's work. He has also within the scientific component
distinguished Marx, the economic theorist, from Marx, the sociolo-
gist. In both respects I should like to follow Professor Schumpeter.

From my point of view, looking toward the development of
modern sociological theory, Marx represented a first major step
beyond the point at which the Utilitarian theorists, who set the
frame of reference within which the classical economics developed,
stood. Marx introduced no fundamental modification of the general
theory of human social behavior in the terms which this school of
thought represented. He did, however, unlike the Utilitarians, see
and emphasize the massive fact of the structuring of interests rather
than treating them as distributed at random. The structure of the
productive forces which Marx outlined for capitalist society is
real and of fundamental importance. Naturally, many refinements
in the presentation of the structural facts and their historical devel-
opment have been introduced since Marx's day, but the fundamental
fact is certainly correct. The theory of class conflict is an integral
part of this. It is of great interest to sociology.

^ J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.

324 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Marx, however, tended to treat the socioeconomic structure of
capitalist enterprise as a single indivisible entity rather than break-
ing it down analytically into a set of the distinct variables involved
in it. It is this analytical breakdown which is for present purposes
the most distinctive feature of modern sociological analysis, and
which must be done to take advantage of advances that have taken
place. It results both in a modification of the Marxian view of the
system itself and enables the establishment of relations to other
aspects of the total social system, aspects of which Marx was un-
aware. This change results in an important modification of Marx's
empirical perspective in relation to the class problem as in other
contexts. The primary structural emphasis no longer falls on the
orientation of capitalistic enterprise to profit and the theory of ex-
ploitation but rather on the structure of occupational roles within
the system of industrial society.

Thus class conflict and its structural bases are seen in a somewhat
diflFerent perspective. Conflict does not have the same order of in-
evitability, but is led back to the interrelations of a series of more
particular factors, the combinations of which may vary. Exactly
how serious the element of conflict is becomes a matter of empirical
investigation. Similarly, the Marxian utopianism about the class-
lessness of communist society is brought into serious question. There
is a sense in which the Marxian view of the inevitability of class
conflict is the obverse of the Utopian factor in Marxian thought.

It should, however, be clearly noted how important Marx was in
the development of modern sociological thought. All three of the
writers who may be regarded as its most important theoretical
founders— Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber— were
profoundly concerned with the problems raised by Marx. Each of
them took the Marxian view with great seriousness as compared
with its Utilitarian background, but none of them ended up as a
Marxian. Each pushed on to a further development in a distinctive
direction which in spite of the diversity of their backgrounds con-
tains a striking common element.-

II. The Approach to the Analysis of Social Stratification in Terms
of Modern Sociological Theory
On the basis of modern sociological approach, it may perhaps be
said that Marx looked at the structure of capitalistic enterprise and

2 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action.

SOCIAL CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 325

generalized a social system from it, including the class structure
and, to him the inevitable conflicts involved in it. Conversely, the
concept of the generalized social system is the basis of modem
sociological thinking. Analyzed in this framework, both capitalistic
enterprise and social stratification are seen in the context of their
role in such a social system. The organization of production and
social stratification are, of course, both variable in these terms,
though also functionally related to each other. For the functional
basis of the phenomena of stratification, it is necessary to analyze
the problem of integrating and ordering social relationships v^^ithin
a social system. Some set of norms governing relations of superiority
and inferiority is an inherent need of every stable social system.
There vn}l be immense variation, but this is a constant point of
reference. Such a patterning or ordering is the stratification system
of the society.

As M^ith all other major structural elements of the social system,
the norms governing its stratification tend to become institutional-
ized; that is, moral sentiments crystallize about them and the whole
system of motivational elements (including both disinterested and
self-interested components) tends to be structured in support of
conformity to them. There is a system of sanctions, both formal
and informal, in support; so that deviant tendencies are met with
varying degrees and kinds of disapproval, withdrawal of co-opera-
tion, and positive infliction of punishment. Conversely, there are
rewards for conformity and institutionalized achievements.^

It follows that in relation to the problem of social class as in
other fields, the general problem of economic motivation must be
viewed in an institutional context. Even the system of profit seeking
of modern capitalism is, there is abundant evidence, an institution-
alized system. To be sure, it grew up as a result of emancipation
from previous institutional controls in a pre-capitalistic order, but
it could not have become established and stabilized to the extent
that actually happened had it not had a positive system of moral
sentiments underlying it and had it not acquired an institutional
status of its own. The Marxian interpretation of this problem tends
to see the structuring and control of self-interest only in terms of
the reahstic situation in which people are placed. Modem socio-

3 See Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, for a variety of diflFerent
discussions of the problem of institutionalization and its relation to motivation
on the psychological level.

326 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

logical theory accedes fully to the importance of this aspect, but
insists tliat it must be seen in combination with a structure of insti-
tutionalized moral sentiments as well, so that conformity is deter-
mined by a system of mutually reinforcing situational pressures and
subjective motivational elements, which in one sense are obverse
aspects of the same process,

III. The Fundamentals of Stratification in a Modern
Industrialized Social System

The distinctive feature of this structure called "social stratifi-
cation" is that it ranks individuals in the general social hierarchy in
generalized terms, not in any one specific context. For the sake of
simplicity, we may first speak specifically of the importance of two
such contexts in a modern Industrial society and then of the articu-
lations between them.

Looked at in the large, by far the most prominent structure of
modern Western society is that organized around the "work" people
do, whether this work is in the field of economic enterprise, of
governmental function, or of various other types of private nonpro-
fit activity, such as that of our own academic profession. The ex-
tremely elaborate division of labor, which permits a tremendous
specialization of functions of this sort, of course necessitates an
equally elaborate system of exchange, where the products of the
work of specialized groups ( whether they be material or immaterial )
are made available to those who can utilize them, and vice versa,
the specialist is enabled to live without performing innumerable
functions for himself, because he has access to the results of the
work of innumerable others. Similarly, there must be a property sys-
tem which regulates claims to transferable entities, material or im-
material, and thereby secures rights in means of life and in the
facilities which are necessary for the performance of function. This
whole complex of structural elements in our society may be called
"the instrumental complex." Its three fundamental elements— occu-
pation, exchange, and property— are all inextricably interdependent.

On a high level of the structural differentiation of a social system,
the occupational system seems to be the least variable of the three
and thus in a certain sense structurally the most fundamental. Elab-
oration of the system of exchange and its segregation from func-
tionally irrelevant contexts are certainly essential. But there may be
great variation in the extent to which the units in the exchange

SOCIAL CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 327

process enjoy autonomy in their decisions and are thus free to be
oriented to their own "profit" or act merely as agents of a more
comprehensive organization. Similarly, though presumably some-
thing like the Roman-modern institution of ownership is called for,
the organization units in which such rights inhere may also vary,
and with them the line between property and contractual rights.

Within such ranges of variation, a highly developed system of
occupational roles, with functional considerations dominating them,
will tend to have certain relatively constant features. Perhaps the
most important of these features, seen in comparative perspective,
is its inherently "individualistic" character. That is, the status of
the individual must be determined on grounds essentially peculiar
to himself, notably his own personal qualities, technical competence,
and his own decisions about his occupational career and with re-
spect to which he is not identified with any solidary group.

This is, of course, not in the least to suggest that he has complete
freedom; he is subject to all manner of pressures, many of which
are from various points of view "irrational." It is nevertheless fun-
damental that status and role allocation and the processes of mobil-
ity from status to status are in terms of the individual as a unit and
not of solidary groups, like kinship groups, castes, village commu-
nities, etc.

There is, furthermore, an inherent hierarchical aspect to such a
system. There are two fundamental functional bases of the hierar-
chical aspect. One is the diflFerentiation of levels of skill and com-
petence involved in the many different functional roles. The require-
ment of rare abilities on the one hand and of competence which can
only be acquired by prolonged and difficult training on the other
make such differentiation inherent. Secondly, organization on an
ever increasing scale is a fundamental feature of such a system.
Such organization naturally involves centralization and differentia-
tion of leadership and authority; so that those who take respon-
sibility for co-ordinating the actions of many others must have a
different status in important respects from those who are essentially
in the role of carrying out specifications laid down by others. From
a sociological point of view, one of the fundamental problems in
such a system is the way in which these basic underlying differen-
tiations get structured into institutionalized status differentiations.

The second major context of an industrialized social system which
is relevant to its stratification is that of kinship. The fundamental

328 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

principle of kinship relationships is that of the solidarity of the mem-
bers of the kinsliip unit which precludes individualistic differentia-
tion of fortune and status in the sense in which this is fundamental
to the occupational system In other societies, extended kinship units
are very prominent indeed. In our society, the size of the unit has
been reduced to a relative minimum— the conjugal family of parents
and immature children. Only on this basis is it compatible with our
occupational system at all. Nevertheless, this minimum is funda-
mental to our social system and differentiations of status, except
those involved in age and sex roles, cannot be tolerated within it.
The same individual who has a role in the occupational system is
also a member of the family unit. In the latter context, his status
must be shared within broad limits by the others, irrespective of
their personal competence, qualities, and deserts. The articulation
of the two is possible only by virtue of the fact that in the type
case only one member of a family unit, the husband or father, is in
the fullest sense normally a functioning member of the occupational
system. Important though this degree of segregation of the two is,
for it to be complete would be functionally impossible.

Wives, by virtue of at least different qualities and achievements
than those of their husbands, must in the relevant contexts share
their status. This means that criteria and symbols of status relevant
to the family must be extended to realms outside the sphere of the
same order of functionally utilitarian considerations on which a
woman's husband's status in his occupation is based. The style of
life of a family and its implication in the realm of feminine activities,
however dependent it may be on a husband's income, precludes
that total status should be a simple function of the "shop" concerns
of a man's occuf)ational world. Equally important, children must
share the status of their parents if there is to be a family system at
all. If the status of the parents is hierarchically differentiated, there
will inevitably be an element of differential access to opportunity.

It is only in terms of the articulation of these two fundamentals,
the instrumental complex and kinship, that I should speak of social
class in a sociological sense. A class may then be defined as a plural-
ity of kinship units which, in those respects where status in a hier-
archical context is shared by their members, have approximately
equal status. The class status of an individual, therefore, is that
which he shares with the other members in an effective kinship
unit. We have a class system, therefore, only insofar as the differ-

SOCIAL, CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 329

entiations inherent in our occupational structure, with its difiFer-
ential relations to the exchange system and to property, remunera-
tion, etc., has become ramified out into a system of strata, which
involve differentiations of family living based partly on income,
standard of life and style of life, and, of course, differential access
for the younger generation to opportunity as well as differential
pressures to which they are subject. There is no doubt that every-
where that modern industrial society has existed there has been a
class system in this sense. There are, however, considerable varia-
tions from one society to another, particularly between tiie European
versions of industrial capitalism and the American.

In certain respects, the above considerations might be regarded
as obvious. It has been necessary to enter into them, however, be-
cause of their bearing on the perspective in which the modern class
system is seen. "Liberal" economic thought has for understandable
reasons paid primary attention to the market system and therefore
views the economy as a system of market-oriented units rather than
concerning itself with occupational structure, most of which is in-
ternal to such units. Marxian thought shares this emphasis with the
addition of the capitalist-labor division in its bearing on the market
process. Neither has had much concern for the family. The impor-
tance of the difference of perspective will become evident in the
analysis of class conflict which follows.

IV. The Analysis of Class Conflict in Sociological Terms

The above sociological analysis of social stratification is based
heavily on the general view that stratification is to an important
degree an integrating structure in the social system. The ordering of
relationships in this context is necessary to stability. This is neces-
sary precisely because of the importance of potential though often
latent conflicts. Therefore, the problem of class conflict may be
approached in terms of an analysis of these latent conflicts and of
the ways in which the institutional integration of the system does
and does not succeed in developing adequate control mechanisms.
The following principal aspects of the tendency to develop class
conflict in our type of social system may be mentioned.

1. There is an inherently competitive aspect of our individualistic
occupational system. Because it is differentiated on a prestige scale
and because there is individual choice of occupation and a measure
of equality of opportunity, there will inevitably be some differentia-

330 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

tion into winners and losers. Certain psychological consequences of
such situations are known. There will be certain tendencies to ar-
rogance on the part of some winners and to resentment and to a
"sour grapes" attitude on the part of some losers. The extent to
which the system is institutionalized in terms of genuine standards
of fair competition is the critical problem.

2. The role of organization means that there must be an impor-
tant part played by discipline and authority. Discipline and author-
ity do not exist on a grand scale without generating some resistance.
Some form, therefore, of structuring in terms of an opposition of
sentiments and interests between those in authority and those sub-
ject to it is endemic in such a system. The whole problem of the
institutionalization of authority so as to insure its adequate accept-
ance where necessary and protect against its abuse is difficult—
doubly so in such a complex system.

3. There does seem to be a general tendency for the strategically
placed, the powerful, to exploit the weaker or less favorably placed.
The ways in which such a tendency works out and in which it is
controlled and counteracted are almost infinitely various in diflPer-
ent societies and social situations. Among the many possibilities,
Marxian theory of capitalistic exploitation selects what it claims to
be an integrated combination of reinforcing factors, the principal
components of which are the use of positions of authority within
organizations (the capitalistic "boss"); the exploitation of bargain-
ing advantage in market relations (e.g., the labor market); and the
use of the power of the state to the diflFerential advantage of certain
private interests ("executive committee of the bourgeoisie"). In
my opinion, the Marxian view of this factor needs to be broken
down into such components which are certainly independently
variable and related to a variety of other factors which Marx did
not consider. In the face of ideology and counterideology, this is
particularly difficult but it is essential if one is to reach a basis for
a scientific judgment of the Marxian doctrine of the dynamics of
capitalism.

4. There seem to be inherent tendencies for those who are struc-
turally placed at notably different points in a differentiated social
structure to develop different "cultures." There will tend to be a
differentiation of attitude systems, of ideologies, and of definitions
of the situation to a greater or less degree around the structure of
the occupational system and of the other components of the instru-

SCXDIAL CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 331

mental complex, such as the relation to markets and profits. The
development of these differentiated cultures may readily impede
communication across the lines of these groups. Under certain cir-
cumstances, this tendency to develop a hiatus may become cumu-
lative unless counteracted by effective integrative mechanisms. A
leading modern example is the opposing ideologies of business and
labor groups in modern industrial society. Marx provided a begin-
ning of analysis in this direction— but it did not go far enough.

5. It is precisely in the area of such a subculture, which is inte-
grated v^ith a structural status, that the problem of articulation with
kinship becomes most important. The differences in the situation
of people placed at different points in the occupational system and
of the consequences for family income and living conditions seem
to lead to a notable differentiation of family type. In American
urban society, a relatively clear differentiation of this kind has been
shown to exist between "middle-class" and "lower-class" groups as
they are generally called in the sociological literature. These differ-
ences are apparently such as to penetrate into the deepest psycho-
logical layers of attitude determination. There are indications from
our society that the family structure of the lower groups is such as
to favor attitudes which positively handicap their members in com-
petition for status in the occupational system. The role of the inte-
gration between occupation and kinship, therefore, under certain
circumstances can become an important factor in pushing toward
cumulative separation of classes and potential conflict between
them.

6. Absolute equality of opportunity in the occupational system,
which is, in a sense, the ideal type norm for such a system, is in
practice impossible. There seem to be two main types of limitation.

a) Certain of these are, as noted above, inherent in the func-
tional requirements of family solidarity. Children must share the
status of their parents, and insofar as this is differentiated, the more
favored groups will have differential access to opportunity. This
seems to be counteracted by certain compensating mechanisms,
such as leading some of the children of the upper groups into paths
which positively handicap them in occupational competition (e.g.,
the playboy pattern ) . It may also be pointed out that a differential
birth rale has a functional significance in leaving relatively more
room at the top for the children of the lower groups.

b) There are important reasons to believe that the complete

332 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

institutionalization of the universalistic and functionally specific
standards so prominent in our occupational world is not possible
in a large scale social system. Such problems as the difficulty in
establishing comparability of different lines of achievement, the
lack of complete adequacy of objective standards of judgment of
them, and similar things necessitate mechanisms which avoid too
direct a comparison and which favor a very rough, broad scale
rather than one of elaborately precise comparison. To take just one
example in the academic profession, there is a wide variation of
degrees of distinction between the senior members of any large
university faculty. The tendency, however, is to play down these
variations in favor of a broad similarity of status; for instance, as
full professor, to conceal differentiations of salary within this group
from public view, and to concentrate the most highly competitive
elements at certain very narrowly specified points, such as the ap-
pointment to permanent rank. Considerations such as these lead to
the view that there will be elements in an occupational system
which nm counter to the main structural type but which have the
function of cushioning the impact of the latter on certain "human
factors" and thus protect the stability of the system.

The fundamental problem then is how far factors such as these
operate to produce deep-seated and chronic conflict between classes
and how far they are counteracted by other factors in the social
system such as the last mentioned. It should first, of course, be
pointed out that these are not the only directions in which a struc-
turing tending to conflict takes place. There is considerable evidence
that in the modern Western World, national solidarity tends gen-
erally to take precedence over class solidarity and that, even more
generally, the solidarity of ethnic groupings is of particularly cru-
cial significance. One cannot help having the impression that in
these matters Marx chose one among the possibilities rather than
proving that there could be only one of crucial significance.

Furthermore, in Europe the precapitalistic residues of the old
class structure in the ways in which they got tied in with the con-
sequences of the developing industrial society have a great deal to
do with the acuteness of class conflict. A good example of this is
Germany with the continuing powerful position during the imperial
and even the Weimar periods of the nobility and the old civil serv-
ice and professional groups which were certainly not the product

SOCIAL. CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 333

of the capitalistic process alone. The problem of the "threat of com-
munism" in Germany just before Hitler was certainly colored by their
role. Class conflict certainly exists in the United States, but it is differ-
ent from the German case and much less influenced than the latter
by precapitalistic structures. Marxian theory inhibited the recog-
nition of differences such as this— all class conflicts in a society in
any sense capitalistic had to be reduced to a single pattern. Another
most important set of conclusions from this type of analysis is that
there must be certain elements of fundamental identity of the
functional problems of social stratification and class in capitalist and
socialist societies, if we have given two really fundamental ele-
ments: the large-scale organization and occupational role differen-
tiation of industrial society and a family system. The history of
Soviet Russia would seem to confirm this view. The role of the
managerial and intelligentsia class, which has been progressively
strengthened since the revolution, does not have a place in the
Marxist Utopia. In certain major respects, the role of managers and
technical personnel closely resembles American society. I, for one,
do not believe that there is a sharp and fundamental sociological
distinction between capitalist society and all noncapitalist industrial
societies. I believe that class conflict is endemic in our modern in-
dustrial type of society. I do not, however, believe that the case has
been made for believing that it is the dominant feature of every
such society and of its dynamic development. Its relation to other
elements of tension, conflict, and dynamic change is a complex mat-
ter, about which we cannot attempt the Marxian order of general-
ization with certainty until our science is much further developed
than it is today.

It is relevant to this set of problems that since Marx wrote, our
knowledge of comparative social structures has immensely broad-
ened and deepened. Seen in the perspective of such knowledge,
the sociological emphases on the interpretation of modem Western
society have shifted notably. Capitalist and socialist industrialisms
tend to be seen as variants of a single fundamental type, not as
drastically distinct stages in a single process of dialectic evolution.
Indeed, to the modern sociologist the rigid evolutionary schema of
Marxian thought appears as a strait jacket rather than a genuine
source of illumination of the immensely variant facts of institutional
life.

334 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

V. Conclusion

The Marxian theory of class conflict seen as a step in the develop-
ment of social science rather than as a clarion call to revolution thus
represents a distinct step in advance of the ultilitarian background
of the predominant economic tliought of a century ago. Though
couched in terms of a neo-Hegelian evolutionary theory of history,
it was, seen in terms of subsequent developments of social science,
an advance more on the level of empirical insight and generalization
from it than of the analytical treatment of dynamic factors in social
process. The endless exegetical discussions of the "relations" or "con-
ditions" of production and of what was meant or implied in them
is an indication of this.

As a point of focus for the subsequent development of modern
sociological theory, however, the Marxian ideas have had an im-
portant place, forming a point of departure for the formulation of
many of the fundamentals of the theory of social institutions. The
Marxian view of the importance of class structure has in a broad
way been vindicated.

When the problem of the genesis and importance of social classes
and their conflicts is approached in these modern sociological terms,
however, considerable modifications of the Marxian position are
necessitated. Systems of stratification in certain respects are seen to
have positive functions in the stabilization of social systems. The
institutionalization of motivation operates within the system of capi-
talistic profit making. The Marxian ideal of a classless society is in
all probability Utopian— above all so long as a family system is main-
tained but also for other reasons. The differences between capitalist
and socialist societies, particularly with respect to stratification, are
not as great as Marx and Engels thought.

In both types there is a variety of potential sources of class con-
flict centering about the structure of the productive process. Those
lying within the Marxian purview are not so monolithically inte-
grated in the process of capitalist exploitation as Marx thought, but
are seen to be much more specific and in certain degrees independ-
ently variable. Some of them, like the relation to family solidarity,
lay outside the Marxian focus of emphasis on the relations of pro-
duction.

Insofar as Marx and Engels were true social scientists, as indeed
in one principal aspect of their role they were, we justly celebrate
their centennial in a scientific meeting. They promulgated ideas

SOCIAL CLASSES AND CLASS CONFLICT 335

which were a notable advance on the general state of knowledge in
the field at the time. They provided a major stimulus and definition
of problems for further notable advances. They formed an indis-
pensable link in the chain of development of social science. The
fact that social science in this aspect of their field has evolved
beyond the level to which they brought it is a tribute to their
achievement.

XVI

Psychoanalysis and the
Social Structure

The Basic Common Frame of Reference

BOTH PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY and the type of sociological theory
which is in process of developing a new type of analysis of social
structure and its dynamics go back to the same basic conceptual
scheme or frame of reference which it is convenient to call the
theory of action. This theory conceives the behaving individual or
actor as operating in a situation which is given independently of his
goals and wishes, but, within the limits of that situation and using
those potentialities which are subject to his control, actively oriented
to the attainment of a system of goals and wishes. Studying the pro-
cesses of action, the scheme takes the point of view of the meaning
of the various elements of the system to the actor. Meaning may be
of several different types, of which, perhaps, the most important
are the cognitive and the affective or emotional. Finally, the mutual
orientation of human beings to each other, both as objects of mean-
ing and as means to each other's goals, is a fundamental aspect of
the scheme. Though it is logically possible to treat a single individ-
ual in isolation from others, there is every reason to believe that
this case is not of important empirical significance. All concrete
action is in this sense social, including psychopathological behavior.
There are two main foci of theoretical organization of systems
within the broad framework of this conceptual scheme. One is the
individual personality as a system, and the other is the social sys-
tem. The first is, according to this point of view, the primary focus
of the subject matter of the science of psychology; the second that
of social science in the specific sense. The same fundamental con-
ceptual components are involved in the treatment of both, and on
a broader level whatever theories exist in both are part of the same
fundamental theoretical system. Nevertheless, it is extremely impor-

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTUBE 337

tant to differentiate the various levels and ways in which these
conceptual components are involved or combined. It is dangerous
to shift from the one level to the other without taking adequate
account of the systematic differences that are involved.

The Social System
as a Structural-Functional System of Action

It is essential from the point of view of social science to treat the
social system as a distinct and independent entity which must be
studied and analyzed on its own level, not as a composite resultant
of the actions of the component individuals alone. There is no rea-
son to attribute any fundamental logical or ontological priority to
either the social system or the personality. In treating the social
system as a system, structural categories have proved to be
essential in the same sense as in the biological sciences, and pre-
sumably also in psychology.^ In the present state of knowledge of
social systems, it is not possible to treat a total social system directly
as a dynamic equilibrium of motivational forces. It is necessary to
treat motivational problems in the context of their relation to struc-
ture, and to raise dynamic problems in terms of the balance of forces
operating to maintain or alter a given structure. At this point, how-
ever, psychological categories in social science play a fundamental
role which is in some respects analogous to biochemistry in bio-
logical science. In this context what is meant by social structure is
a system of patterned expectations of the behavior of individuals
who occupy particular statuses in the social system. Such a system
of patterned legitimate expectations is called by sociologists a sys-
tem of roles. In so far as a cluster of such roles is of strategic sig-
nificance to the social system, the complex of patterns which define
expected behavior in them may be referred to as an institution. For
example, in so far as the behavior of spouses in their mutual rela-
tionships is governed by socially sanctioned legitimate expectations
in such a sense that departure from these patterns will call forth
reactions of moral disapproval or overt sanctions, we speak of the
institution of marriage. Institutional structures in this sense are the
fundamental element of the structure of the social system. They
constitute relatively stable crystallizations of behavioral forces in

1 Cf. Cannon, Walter B. and Higginson, George: The Wisdom of the Body.
Second Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939; Freud: The Ego and the
Id. London: Hogarth Press, 1927; Parsons, Talcott: The other essays in the
present volume.

338 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

such a way that action can be sufficiently regularized so as to be
compatible with the functional requirements of a society.

From the psychological point of view, institutionalized roles seem
to have two primary functions. The first is the structuring of the
reality situation for the action of the individual. They define the
expectations of behavior which are generalized in the attitude pat-
terns of other individuals with whom he may come in contact. They
tell him what the probable consequences of various alternative
forms of action are likely to be. Second, they structure the 'superego
content' for the individual. It is fundamentally the patterns institu-
tionalized in role structure which constitute the moral standards
which are introjected in the process of socialization and become an
important part of the personahty structure of the individual himself,
whether he conforms to them or not. It may be stated as a funda-
mental theorem of social science that one measure of the integra-
tion of a social system is the coincidence of the patterns which are
introjected in the average superego of those occupying tlie relevant
social statuses with the functional needs of the social system which
has that particular structure.

The Discrepancy Between Personality Structure
and Institutional Motivation

One of the most important reasons why it is dangerous to infer
too directly from the psychological to the social structure level and
vice versa is the extremely important fact that there is not a simple
correspondence between personality structure and institutional
structure. On the level of clinical diagnosis, the persons occupying
the same well-defined status in the social system will be found to
cover a wide range of f)ersonality types. It is true that seen in suffi-
ciently broad perspective there will be modal types which differ
from one society to another, but this is a statistical correspondence
and not one of the social pattern to the personality pattern of each
individual. This means that there must be mechanisms by which the
behavior of individuals is motivated to conform with institutional
expectations, even though personality structure as such does not
give an adequately effective background for it.

It is convenient to refer to the fundamental mechanism involved
here as the 'structural generalization of goals'; thus there is a level
of the structuring of motivational forces which is essentially a func-

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 339

tion of the institutional situations in which people are put, rather
than of their particular personality structures. It may be said to
operate within the range of flexibility which personality structures
permit, and, of course, to involve a greater or less amount of strain
to carry out that conformity. This, however, is one area of the anal-
ysis of motivation where the relation of psychology to social struc-
ture is particularly important. To cite just one example, most
attempts at a direct psychological attack on the problem of so-
called economic motivation, or the profit motive, have proved to be
singularly unfruitful. The essential reason for this is that the uni-
formities of social behavior do not directly correspond to uni-
formities on the psychological level independent of the institutional
context. Anything like the profit motive of modem Western society
is not a psychological universal, and the corresponding behavior
would not be found in many, for instance, nonliterate and other
societies.^

The Problem of the Use of Motivational Categories in Dynamic
Explanations on the Sociological Level

The most notable direct contributions of psychoanalytic theory
to the empirical understanding of behavior would seem to fall in
the dynamic theory of motivation of the individual in the context of
the structure of personality. The most important problem of the
relation of psychoanalysis to social structure from the point of view
of the sociologist is how these categories can be used for explana-
tory purposes on the level of the analysis of social structure and
its changes as such. This is a field in which it is particularly dan-
gerous to attempt too direct an explanation. The lack of corres-
pondence between personality structure and social structure should
make this clear.

The sociologist is, in the first instance, concerned with behavior
and attitudes which are of strategic significance to the social sys-
tem. In the terms stated, this means tendencies which either support
the structure of an existing social system or tend to alter it in
specific ways.^ The judgments of significance on which the state-
ments of sociological problems of motivation are based must there-

2 Cf. Parsons, Talcott: The Motivation of Economic Activities, Chap.
Ill above.

3 This excludes behavior which varies at random, relative to structural pat-
terns, from being treated as sociologically significant.

340 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

fore be couched in terms of the frame of reference of the social
system, not of personality, though of course they must be com-
patible with established knowledge of personality.

Such problems must in turn be approached in terms of constructs
of typical motivation, typical of the persons occupying given statuses
in the social structure. The most obvious of the ingredients of such
constructs will of course be derived from the situation in which a
given incumbent of such a status is placed— a situation principally
compounded of the behavior and attitudes of others. But psycho-
analytic theory shows that these alone are not sufficient; certain
typical elements of structure of the particular personality, such as
superego content and ways in which the instinctual components are
organized, are also involved. It is furthermore often necessary to
hnk these elements in a developmental sequence so that the moti-
vational structures resulting from an earlier situation in the life
cycle become elements in shaping the situations of a later stage.

There is involved throughout this procedure a peculiar process
of abstraction from the frame of reference of personality as a func-
tioning system. Psychologists and psychoanalysts tend to take this
frame of reference for granted and thus find it difficult to accept
the sociologist's mode of abstraction. They feel it is psychologically
inadequate, as indeed it is. But adequacy is not an absolute; it is
relative to the problems which facts and conceptual schemes can
help to solve. The typical problems of the psychologist and the
sociologist are different and therefore they need to use the same
concepts at diflFerent levels of abstraction and in diflFerent com-
binations.

In general it may be said that psychological analysis is oriented
to the explanation of the concrete acts, attitudes, or ideas of indi-
viduals. Both motivational elements and the social structure come
into this, the latter as describing the situation in which the indi-
vidual must act or to which he has been exposed. Adequacy is
judged in terms of the completeness of accounting for one given
act, attitude, or idea as compared to another. The frame of refer-
ence is, as has been said, the j)ersonality of the relevant individual
treated as a system.

The sociologist's problems are different. They concern the bal-
ance of motivational forces involved in the maintenance of, and
alteration in, the structure of a social system. This balance is a
peculiar sort of resultant of very complex interaction processes. It

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 341

can only be successfully analyzed by abstracting from the idiosyn-
cratic variability of individual behaviors and motivations in terms
of strategic relevance to the social system. Conversely the psycholo-
gist abstracts from what are to him the equally idiosyncratic vari-
ations of social situations in reaching psychological generalizations
about such matters as the relations of love and security.

If we had a completely adequate dynamic theory of human moti-
vation it is probable that this difference of levels of abstraction
would disappear. Then the use of structural categories, on the
levels of either personality or the social system, would be unneces-
sary, for such categories are only empirical generalizations intro-
duced to fill the gaps left by the inadequacy of our dynamic knowl-
edge. In the meantime, however, we must put up with the compli-
cations involved in the diversity of levels.

It follows from these considerations, if they are accepted, that
the motivational constructs needed for the solution of any sociolo-
gical problem will generally turn out to be inadequate to explain
the action of any particular individual involved in the very con-
crete events being studied. They will be concerned with certain
elements in this motivation, but the combinations of these elements
with others, and hence what will be the order of their strategic
significance to the psychological problem, cannot be inferred from
the sociological analysis.

Conversely, psychologists, whether they are aware of it or not,
categorize the social structure. But by the same token, the concep-
tualizations they find adequate for their purposes will generally
turn out to be inadequate to the explanation of a single process of
change in a social structure in which the same concrete persons
and action-sequences were involved.

It is, in my opinion, neglect of the indispensability of distin-
guishing these levels of abstraction which, more than errors or
differences of opinion about facts, has accounted for the difficulties.
These difficulties, from the sociologist's point of view, have been
prominent in much of what may be called psychologically (psy-
choanalytically ) oriented sociology which attempts to generalize
about societies from Totem and Taboo to Geoffrey Gorer's Ameri-
can People. In the absence of very careful discrimination of these
levels it was almost inevitable that the analyst would 'extrapolate'
directly from what he found in the personalities he had studied in
the clinical situation. He would then necessarily categorize social

342 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

structures ad hoc in the light of these references without systematic
reference to the social system as a conceptual scheme and the cri-
teria of relevance inherent in such a reference.^ Certain sociologists
likewise indulge in ad hoc psychological constructions without ref-
erence to technical psychological considerations.^

An Example of the Use of Motivational Categories for Sociological
Purposes: American Youth

To give concrete content to the abstract analysis presented above,
a brief account of one example of what may be considered the most
fruitful level of use of psychoanalytic categories in sociological
interpretation is given. The essential facts are matters of common
observation.

Starting at about high school age young Americans, especially in
the urban middle classes, embark on patterns of behavior and at-
titudes which do not constitute a stage in a continuous transition
from childhood to adulthood but deviate from such a line of con-
tinuity. Instead of gradually assuming increasing responsibilities
there is a tendency to such irresponsible acts as reckless driving. A
major aspect of increasing maturity would seem to be progressively
greater freedom from needs to conform with rigidly detailed pat-
terns of the group. On the contrary, there is in youth a rather ex-
treme pressure to conformity in details of dress and behavior.
Finally, maturity seems to involve increasing capacity for realistic
orientation to emotionally significant objects, but in youth there is
a resurgence of romanticism— a resurgence of unrealistic idealization
not only in relation to age-peers of the opposite sex, but also in the
form of hero worship; moreover, such figures as athletic stars whose
functions are of quite secondary importance in the adult world tend
to be idealized far more than eminent statesmen, executives or
scientists.

This pattern of attitudes and behavior is sufficiently general and
pronounced to be singled out as a distinctively structured complex
conveniently called the youth culture. Its principal characteristics
may be summarized.

1. Compulsive independence of and antagonism to adult expecta-

^ In extreme instances, the history of social change has tended to be inter-
preted as the simple consequence of the collective 'acting out' of the emotional
tensions observed in personalities.

•'' In essence this is what Max We]:)er did on a high level in his construction of
ideal types ot motivation. Cf. Parsons, Talcott: Introduction to: The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization (Sec. 2) by Max Weber. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1947.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 343

tions and authority. This involves recalcitrance to adult standards
of responsibility and, in extreme instances, treating the conformist
—who, for instance, takes school work seriously— as a 'sissy' who
should be excluded from peer-group participation.

2. Compulsive conformity within the peer group of age mates.
It is intolerable to be 'different'; not, for example, to use lipstick as
soon as the other girls do. Related to this is an intense fear of be-
ing excluded, a corresponding competitiveness for acceptance by
the 'right' groups, and a ruthless rejection of those who 'don't make
the grade'.

3. Romanticism: an unrealistic idealization of emotionally sig-
nificant objects. There is a general tendency to see the world in
sharply black and white terms; identifications with one's gang, or
team, or school tend to be very intense and involve highly imma-
ture disparagements of other groups.

There is thus a well-defined sociological problem. In the social-
ization of the younger generation in the American social system,
there is a specifically structured deviation (a mass phenomenon)
from the path of asymptotic approach to 'maturity'. What is this
all about? Comparative evidence adequately disposes of the pop-
ular view that it is a consequence of physiological maturation be-
cause there is no reason to believe that Samoans or Chinese 'ado-
lesce' differently from Americans in a physiological sense.^ It is
therefore plausible to suggest that the American social structure
through its impact on the human material may provide a field of
interpretation.

The essential structural facts are very simple but must be con-
sidered at two age levels. American middle class children, unlike
many others, are reared in small conjugal families normally sepa-
rated in place of residence and other respects from other close kin.
There is a very small circle of emotionally significant persons on
whom the child's object cathexes must be focused: father, mother,
and one, two or three siblings. Of these the mother occupies a par-
ticularly central place for both sexes because no other women have
a remotely similar role, and because the father works away from
home and is thus absent a great deal of the time; moreover, there
is a very sharp distinction between relations inside the home and
those outside. In the neighborhood play group and later in school,

6 Cf. Mead, Margaret: Coming of Age in Samoa. New York: William Morrow
& Co., 1928, and Levy, M. J., Jr.: The Family Revolution in Modern China,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949.

344 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAJL THEORY

the child must 'find its own level' in competition with others with
whose parents his parents have no clearly ordered status relation-
ship, who are just neighbors.

Approaching adulthood the American youth faces a situation very
different from the youth of many other societies. Both sexes look
forward to the 'independence' of leaving the parental home and
setting up a home of their own. The choice of a partner in marriage
is their personal responsibility, without major parental participation
in the decision. Boys must make their own way, achieving status and
income in a competitive occupational system. Most girls can look
forward to support by a husband, but they must choose the husband
on their own responsibility, and their own status and welfare and
that of their children depends most crucially on the wisdom of the
choice.

What is the impact of these two successive situations on the
human material exposed to them, taking due account of differentia-
tion according to sex? Insights into motivation which stem from
psychoanalysis more than any other source provide the principal
clues.

In the first place, the sharp limitation of the circle of objects of
cathexis tends to intensify emotional involvements. This is particu-
larly true of the common significance of the relation to the mother
since she is unique and the father tends to be remote. This intensity
is reinforced by early exposure to a competitive process outside the
family in which it seems reasonable to assume that the insecurity
generated tends to be compensated by greater dependence on fam-
ilial cathexes. Thus more than other family systems the American
makes the child highly dependent emotionally on its parents, par-
ticularly the mother.

The child is then placed in a situation, as it approaches adulthood,
where it must, if it is to live adequately up to expectations, break
away from these ties far more drastically than is necessary in most
societies. If a male, he must choose his own occupation and make
his own way in it. He must make the complicated emotional adjust-
ment to a sexual partner and spouse on his own initiative and re-
sponsibility. A girl must 'catch' an acceptable man by exercise of
her own feminine attraction in sharp competition with other girls
and without adult support.

For boys the situation is greatly complicated by the tendency to
feminine identification inherent in the especially intense relation

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 345

to the mother and the remoteness of the father. This seems to ac-
count for a reaction-formation of 'compulsive mascuhnity' which
appears in the latency period and is carried, in a socially structured
way, over into adolescence and beyond. With it goes a deep am-
bivalence toward moral values (since these tend to be felt as
feminine ) and toward the acceptability of sexuality. For girls there
seems to be greater stability in childhood through identification
with the mother which probably accounts for much of their pre-
cocity. When, however, they face the 'mancatching' situation, to be
too much of a motherly figure is, in the face of masculine ambiva-
lence, by no means an unambiguous asset. The conflict between
'glamor' and the domestic pattern seems to have its roots in this
situation.

Thus the compulsive independence of the youth culture may,
according to well-established psychological principles, be inter-
preted as involving a reaction-formation against dependency needs,
which is for understandable reasons particularly prominent among
boys. The compulsive conformity, in turn, would seem to serve as
an outlet for these dependency needs, but displaced from parental
figures onto the peer group so that it does not interfere with the
independence. The element of romanticism finally seems to express
the ambivalence and insecurity which are inherent in the emotional
patterning of both sexes when faced with highly crucial decisions.
It is a tonic stimulus to confidence and action in the face of poten-
tially paralyzing conflicts.

The above is a highly schematic and simplified interpretation of
the psychological dynamics of American youth culture. Any experi-
enced analyst can add many more nuances of motivation, as a so-
ciologist would on the details of the social structiue. The analysis
is carried only far enough to illustrate concretely an application of
psychoanalytic concepts to sociological usage. This is not 'psycho-
analytic sociology' in the sense of generalizing from clinical insights
in terms of their 'implications' for society. It involves the use of tech-
nical sociological theory in the statement of problems and the anal-
ysis of social structure; nevertheless, the contributions of psycho-
analysis are crucial. Without them a far cruder level of dynamic in-
terpretation would have to be accepted. By further refinement of
both components of the scheme, far more refined and subtle inter-
pretations are likely to be attainable.

346 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Conclusion

Psychoanalytic theory can make a crucially important contribu-
tion to the problems of the sociologist, though not, of course, to the
exclusion of other traditions of psychological theory. This contribu-
tion is, however, likely to be much more fruitful if it is made in the
form of the adaptation of psychoanalytic concepts and analyses of
motivation to the technical needs of sociological theory in terms of
problems stated in sociological terms.

This way of using psychoanalytic theory, it has been pointed out,
involves putting it into a frame of reference, the social system,
which is not usually familiar to the clinical analyst and which is not
reducible to terms of his own clinical experience and standards of
expectation, couched as these are, implicitly or explicitly, in terms of
the frame of reference of personality. To make the transition re-
quires such a shift in perspective and problems that it must be held
that the analyst, no matter how well trained, is not per se compe-
tent to apply psychoanalytic theory to sociological problems. To do
this he must be a trained sociologist, he must learn to think in terms
of social systems, and he does not automatically learn this from
clinical experience as an analyst but only from studying sociology
as such.

But if the sociologist is to utilize the potential contributions
of psychoanalysis to his problems, he can only do so competently
by going to the authentic sources, by learning psychoanalysis him-
self, as far as possible by the regular training procedures. To some
important degree the same people must have real competence in
both fields. Only from such a solid base is the diflFusion of psycho-
analytic knowledge into such a neighboring field possible without
distortion.

If the general position here taken is sound, there is a further im-
plication which may be briefly noted in conclusion. If psychoana-
lytic theory is as important to sociology as it certainly seems to be,
the converse relationship should also be important. This is indeed
strongly indicated by the fact that analytic theory has laid so much
emphasis on the psychological importance of social relationships—
of the child to parents, of the adult to love objects, etc.

Concretely, these relationships are aspects of social systems; the
family, for example, is a small-scale social system. The sociological
aspects of the family as a social system have, understandably, not
been explicitly considered by psychoanalysts because they have
concentrated on the particular relations of each patient to each of

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 347

the members of his family in turn. There has been little occasion to
consider the total family as a social system, though this might well
yield insights not derivable from the 'atomistic' treatment of each
relationship in turn.

Unfortunately the sociologists as yet have not provided as much
help as they might. The science is in general very immature (but
then, psychoanalysis is not yet very old) and the principal pre-
occupation of sociologists has so far been with 'macroscopic' social
systems. But the evidence is strong that the same fundamental con-
ceptual scheme, the social system, is applicable all the way from
the largest-scale societies (like the United States) to groups of
such small size as the family.^ But the sociological study of small
groups is in its barest beginnings and, paradoxically, only sugges-
tions of the technical analysis of the family as a social system exist.

But in relation to the family the problem for the psychoanalyst
is the obverse of that outlined above for the sociologist. Supposing
that in the near future we attain something which could respectably
be called a sociology of the family; this would no more as such
solve the analyst's problems about family structure than a psycho-
analytic theory of personality solves the sociologist's problems of
motivation. But such a theory would contain the essential concep-
tual bases on which the analyst could construct a theory of family
structure adapted to his needs.

The sociologist must face the problems of human motivation
whether he wants to or not. If he does not acquire a genuinely com-
petent theory, he will implicitly adopt a series of ad hoc ideas which
are no less crucial because they are exempted from critical analysis.
Turning to psychoanalysis with the proper adaptations can provide
him with a way out of the dilemma. Perhaps the situation is not
altogether incomparable in reverse. The analyst is in fact dealing
with social systems. His ideas about them have tended to be ad hoc
and common sense. Such ideas may be adequate for many em-
pirical purposes but tend to break down as subtler levels of general-
ization are attempted. There is the possibility that this gap can be
filled by the products of genuinely technical analysis. Originating as
they do in another frame of reference, to be useful to the analyst
these would have to be adapted to his problems and needs. But can
he in the long run do without them any more than the sociologist
can do without the insights of psychoanalysis?

■J" This is also true of the classical mechanics, e.g., celestial mechanics, ter-
restrial mechanics, and the kinetic theory of gases.

XVII

The Prospects of
Sociological Theory

TWO YEARS AGO at the annual meeting of this Society it was my
privilege to act as chairman of the section on theory and thus to be
responsible for a statement of its contemporary position, as part of
the general stock-taking of the state of our discipline which was the
keynote of that meeting. As that meeting was primarily concerned
with taking stock of where we stood, the present one, with the
keynote of frontiers of research, is primarily concerned with looking
toward the future. It therefore seems appropriate to take advantage
of the present occasion to speak of the future prospects of that
aspect of sociological science on which more than any other I feel
qualified to speak.

The history of science testifies eloquently to the fundamental im-
portance of the state of its theory to any scientific field. Theory is
only one of several ingredients which must go into the total brew,
but for progress beyond certain levels it is an indispensable one.
Social scientists are plagued by the problems of objectivity in the
face of tendencies to value-bias to a much higher degree than is
true of natural scientists. In addition, we have the problem of selec-
tion among an enormous number of possible variables. For both
these reasons, it may be argued that perhaps theory is even more
important in our field than in the natural sciences. At any rate, I
may presume to suggest that my own election to its presidency by
the membership of this society may be interpreted as an act of rec-
ognition of this importance of theory, and a vote of confidence in
its future development.

Though my primary concern this evening is with the future, per-
haps just a word on where we stand at present is in order. Some
fifteen years ago two young Americans, who, since they were my
own children, I knew quite intimately, and who were aged approx-
imately five and three respectively at the time, developed a little

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 349

game of yelling at the top of their voices: "The sociology is about
to begin, said the man with the loud speaker." However right they
may have been about their father's professional achievements up to
that time, as delivering a judgment of the state of the field as a
whole I think they were a bit on the conservative side. It had
akeady begun, but especially in the theoretical phase that begin-
ning did not lie very far back. The historians of our discipline will
have to settle such questions at a future time, but I for one would
not hesitate to label all the theoretical endeavors before the gener-
ation of Durkheim and Max Weber as proto-sociology. With these
figures as the outstanding ones, but with several others including a
number of Americans like Sumner, Park, Cooley, and Thomas, in
a somewhat less prominent role, I feel that the real job of founding
was done in the generation from about 1890 to 1920. We belong to
the second generation, which already has foundations on which to
build. But as for the building itself, a post here and there, and a
few courses of bricks at the corners, are all that is yet visible above
the ground. After all, two or, more correctly, one and a half gen-
erations, in the perspective of the development of a science, is a
very short time.

When, roughly a quarter of a century ago, I attained some degree
of the knowledge of good and evil in a professional sense, this
founding phase was over. The speculative systems were still taken
seriously. But the work of such writers as Sumner, Thomas, Sim-
mel, Cooley, Park, and Mead, was beginning to enter into thinking
in a much more particularized sense. In fact, a research tradition
was already building up, in which a good deal of solid theory was
embodied— as in Sumner's basic idea of the relativity of the mores,
Thomas' four wishes, and many of Park's insights, as into the nature
of competitive processes. This relatively particularized, attention
focusing, problem selecting, use of theory in research, so different
from the purely illustrative relation between theory and empirical
fact in the Spencerian type of system, has continued to develop in
the interim. Such fields as that of Industrial Sociology, starting from
the Mayo-Roethlisberger work, and carried further at Chicago and
Cornell, the study of Ethnic Relations and that of Social Stratifi-
cation will serve to illustrate. At the same time controversies about
total schools, which in my youth centered especially about Behav-
iorism, have greatly subsided.

Our own generation has seen at least the beginnings of a process

350 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

of more general pulling together. Even when a good deal of theory
was actually being used in research much of the teaching of theory
was still in terms of the "systems" of the past, and was organized
about names rather than working conceptual schemes. Graduate
students frantically memorized the contents of Bogardus or Lich-
tenberger with little or no effect on their future research operations,
and little guidance as to how it might be used. But this has grad-
ually been changing. Theory has at least begun no longer to mean
mainly a knowledge of "doctrines," but what matters far more, a
set of patterns for habitual thinking. This change has, in my opinion,
been considerably promoted by increased interest in more general
theory, especially coming from study of the works of Weber and
Durkheim and, though not so immediately sociological, of Freud.
There has thus been the beginning at least, and to me a very en-
couraging beginning, of a process of coalescence of these types of
more or less explicit theory which were really integrated impor-
tantly with research, into a more general theoretical tradition of
some sophistication, really the tradition of a working professional
group.

Compared to the natural sciences the amount of genuine empirical
research done in our field is very modest indeed. Even so, it has
been fairly substantial. But the most disappointing single thing
about it has been the degree to which the results of this work have
failed to be cumulative. The limitations of empirical research
methods, limitations which are being overcome at a goodly rate, are
in part responsible for this fact. But probabhj the most crucial fac-
tor has been precisely this lack of an adequate working theoretical
tradition which is bred into the "bones" of empirical researchers
themselves, so that "instinctively" the problems they work on, the
hypotheses they frame and test, are such that the results, positive
or negative, will have significance for a sufficiently generalized and
integrated body of knowledge so that the mutual implications of
many empirical studies will play directly into each other. There
are, as I have noted, hopeful signs which point in this direction, but
the responsibility on theory to promote this process is heavy indeed.
So important is this point that I should like to have the view of the
future role of theory in sociology, which I shall discuss in the re-
mainder of this address, understood very largely in relation to it.

When, then, I turn to the discussion of the prospects of theory in
our field I can hardly fail to express my own hope as well as a

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 351

diagnosis. I hope to combine in my suggestions both a sense of the
strategic significance of certain types of development, and a realistic
sense of feasibility, if sufficient work by able people is done. I
shall also be talking of the relatively near future, since the shape of
our science two centuries hence, for instance, cannot, I fear, be
realistically foreseen.

Here I should like to discuss five principal types or fields of
theoretical development, which are by no means independent of
one another; they actually overlap considerably as well as interact.
They are:

1) General theory, which I interpret primarily as the theory of
the social system in its sociologically relevant aspects.

2) The theory of motivation of social behavior and its bearing
on the dynamic problems of social systems, its bearing both
on the conditions of stability of social systems and the factors
in their structural change. This of course involves the rela-
tions to the psychological level of analysis of personality and
motivation.

3) The theoretical bases of systematic comparative analysis of
social structures on the various levels. This particularly in-
volves the articulation with the anthropological analysis of
culture.

4) Special theories around particular empirical problem areas,
the specific growing points of the field in empirical research.
This involves their relations to general theory, and the bases
of hypothesis construction in research.

5 ) Last, but in no sense least, the "fitting" of theory to operational
procedures of research and, vice versa, the adaption of the
latter to theoretical needs.

The field of general theory presents peculiar difficulties of assess-
ment in sociology. The era of what I have above called "proto-
sociology" was, as I have noted, conspicuous for the prominence of
speculative systems, of which that of Spencer is an adequate ex-
ample. The strong and largely justified reaction against such sys-
tems combined with a general climate of opinion favorable to
pragmatic empiricism, served to create in many quarters a very
general scepticism of theory, particularly anything that called itself
general or systematic theory, to say nothing of a system of theory.
This wave of anti-theoretical empiricism has, I think fortunately,
greatly subsided, but there is still marked reluctance to recognize

352 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the importance of high levels of generality. The most important
recent expression of this latter sentiment, which in no sense should
be confused with general opposition to theory, is that of my highly
esteemed friend and former student, Robert Merton, first in his
discussion paper directed to my own paper on the Position of Socio-
logical Theory, two years ago, then repeated and amplified in the
Introduction to his recent volume of essays.

The very first point must be the emphatic statement that what I
mean by the place of general theory in the prospects of sociology
is not the revival of speculative systems of the Spencerian type, and
I feel that Merton's fears that this will be the result of the em-
phasis I have in mind are groundless. We have, I think, now pro-
gressed to a level of metliodological sophistication adequate to
protect ourselves against this pitfall.

The basic reason why general theory is so important is that the
cumulative development of knowledge in a scientific field is a
function of the degree of generality of implications by which it is
possible to relate findings, interpretations, and hypotheses on dif-
ferent levels and in different specific empirical fields to each other.
If there is to be a high degree of such generality there must on
some level be a common conceptual scheme which makes the work
of different investigators in a specific sub-field and those in different
sub-fields commensurable.

The essential difficulty with the speculative systems has been
their premature closure without the requisite theoretical clarifica-
tion and integration, operational techniques or empirical evidence.
This forced them to use empirical materials in a purely illustrative
way without systematic verification of general propositions or the
possibility of empirical evidence leading to modification of the
theory. Put a little differently, they presumed to set up a theoretical
system instead of a systematic conceptual scheme.

It seems quite clear, that in the sense of mechanics a theoretical
system is not now or foreseeably possible in the sociological field.
The diEBculties Pareto's attempt encountered indicate that. But a
conceptual scheme in a partially articulated form exists now and
is for practical purposes in common use; its further refinement and
development is imperative for the welfare of our field, and is en-
tirely feasible.

In order to make clear what I mean, I would first like to note that
there is a variety of ways in which what I am calling general theory

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY ' 353

can fruitfully influence research in the direction of making its
results more cumulative. The first is what may be called a set of
general categories of orientation to observation and problem choice
in the field which defines its major problem areas and the directions
in which to look for concealed factors and variables in explanation.
Thus modern anthropology, by the "cultural point of view," heavily
documented with comparative material, has clearly demonstrated
the limits of purely biological explanations of human behavior and
taught us to look to the processes by which culturally patterned
modes are learned, transmitted and created. Similarly in our own
field the reorientation particularly associated with the names of
Durkheim and Weber showed the inadequacy of the "utilitarian"
framework for the understanding of many social phenomena and
made us look to "institutional" levels— a reorientation which is
indeed the birthright of sociology. Finally, in the field of motivation,
the influence of Freud's perspective has been immense.

Starting from such very broad orientation perspectives there are
varying possible degrees of further specification. At any rate in a
field like ours it seems impossible to stop there. The very basis on
which the utilitarian framework was seen to be theoretically as
well as empirically inadequate, required a clarification of the struc-
ture of systems of social action which went considerably farther
than just indicating a new direction of interest or significance. It
spelled out certain inherent relationships of the components of such
systems which among many other things demonstrated the need for
a theory of motivation on the psychological level of the general
character of what Freud has provided.

This kind of structural "spelling out" narrows the range of theo-
retical arbitrariness. There are firmly specific points in the system
of implications against which empirical results can be measured
and evaluated. That is where a well-structured empirical problem
is formulated. If the facts then, when properly stated and validated,
turn out to be contrary to the theoretical expectation, something
must be modified in the theory.

In the early stages these "islands" of theoretical implication may
be scattered far apart on the sea of fact and so vaguely and gener-
ally seen that only relatively broad empirical statements are directly
relevant to them. This is true of the interpretation of economic
motivation which I will cite presently. But with refinement of gen-
eral theoretical analysis, and the accumulation of empirical evidence

354 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

directly relevant to it, the islands get closer and closer together,
and their topography becomes more sharply defined. It becomes
more and more difficult and unnecessary to navigate in the un-
charted waters of unanalyzed fact without bumping into or at least
orienting to several of them.

The development of general theory in this sense is a matter of
degree. But in proportion as it develops, the generality of implica-
tion increases and the "degree of empiricism," to quote a phrase of
President Conant's, is reduced. It is precisely the existence of such
a general theoretical framework, the more so the further it has
developed, which makes the kind of work at the middle theory
level which Merton advocates maximally fruitful. For it is by virtue
of their connections with these "islands" of general theoretical
knowledge once demonstrated that their overlaps and their mutual
implications for each other lead to their incorporation into a more
general and consistent body of knowledge.

At the end of this road of increasing frequency and specificity of
the islands of theoretical knowledge lies the ideal state, scientifically
speaking, where most actual operational hypotheses of empirical
research are directly derived from a general system of theory. On
any broad front, to my knowledge, only in physics has this state
been attained in any science. We cannot expect to be anywhere
nearly in sight of it. But it does not follow that, distant as we are
from that goal, steps in that direction are futile. Quite the contrary,
any real step in that direction is an advance. Only at this end point
do the islands merge into a continental land mass.

At the very least, then, general theory can provide a broadly
orienting framework. It can also help to provide a common lan-
guage to facilitate communication between workers in different
branches of the field. It can serve to codify, interrelate and make
available a vast amount of existing empirical knowledge. It also
serves to call attention to gaps in our knowledge, and to provide
canons for the criticism of theories and empirical generalizations.
Finally, even if they cannot be systematically derived, it is indis-
pensable to the the systematic clarification of problems and the
fruitful formation of hypotheses. It is this organizing power of
generalized theory even on its present levels which has made it
possible for even a student like myself, who has done only a little
actual empirical research, to illuminate a good many empirical
problems and formulate suggestive hypotheses in several fields.

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 355

Though it is not possible to take time to discuss them adequately
for tliose not already familiar with the fields, I should like to cite
two examples from my own experience. The first is the reorientation
of thinking about the field of the motivation of economic activity.
The heritage of the classical economics and the utilitarian frame of
reference, integrated with the central ideology of our society, had
put the problem of the "incentives" involved in the "profit system"
in a very particular way which had become the object of much
controversy. Application of the emerging general theory of the
institutionalization of motivation, specifically pointed up by the
analysis of the contrast between the orientation of the professional
groups and that of the business world, made it possible to work out
a very fruitful reorientation to this range of problems. This new
view eliminates the alleged absoluteness of the orientation to "self-
interest" held to be inherent in "human nature." It emphasizes the
crucial role of institutional definitions of the situation and the ways
in which they channel many different components of a total moti-
vation system into the path of conformity with institutionalized
expectations. Without the general theoretical reorientation stem-
ming mainly from Durkheim and Weber, this restructuring of the
problem of economic motivation would not have been possible.

The second example illustrates the procedure by which it has
become possible to make use of psychological knowledge in analyz-
ing social phenomena without resort to certain kinds of "psycho-
logical interpretations" of the type which most sociologists have
quite correctly repudiated. Such a phenomenon is the American
"youth culture" with its rebellion against adult standards and con-
trol, its compulsive conformity within the peer group, its romanti-
cism and its irresponsibility. Structural analysis of the American
family system as the primary field of socialization of the child
provides the primary setting. This in turn must be seen both in the
perspective of the comparative variability of kinship structures and
of the articulation of the family with other elements of our own
social structure, notably the occupational role of the father. Only
when this structural setting has been carefully analyzed in socio-
logical terms does it become safe to bring in analysis of the opera-
tion of psychological mechanisms in terms derived particularly from
psychoanalytic theory, and to make such statements as that the
"revolt of youth" contains typically an element of reaction-forma-
tion against dependency needs with certain types of consequences.

356 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Again this type of analysis would not have been possible without
the general reorientation of thinking about the relations between
social structure and the psychological aspects of behavior which
has resulted from the developments in general theory in the last
generation or more; including explicit use of the contributions of
Freud.

Perhaps I may pause in midpassage to apologize for inflicting on
you on such an occasion, when your well-filled stomachs predispose
you to relaxation rather than close attention, such an abstruse
theoretical discourse. I feel the apology is necessary since what I
am about to inflict on you is even more abstruse than what has
gone before. Since I am emphasizing the integration of theory with
empirical research, I might suggest that someone among you might
want to undertake a little research project to determine the impact
on a well-fed group of sociologists of such a discourse. I might
suggest the following four categories for his classification.

1 ) Those who have understood what I have said, whether they
approve of it or not.

2) Those who think they have understood it.

3) Those who do not think they have but wish they had, and

4) Those who didn't understand, know it and are glad of it.

I can only hope that the overwhelming majority will not be found
to fall in the fourth category.

With relatively little alteration, everything I have said up to this
point had been written, and has deliberately been left standing,
when I underwent an important personal experience which pro-
duced what I hope will prove to be a significant theoretical advance
precisely in the field of general theory. With the very able colla-
boration of several of my own Harvard colleagues and of Professors
Tolman of California and Shils of Chicago, the present semester has
been devoted to attempting to practice what I have preached,
namely to press forward with systematic work in the field of gen-
eral theory. Partly because of the intrinsic importance of the fields,
partly because of its urgency in a department committed to the
synthesis of sociology with parts of psychology and anthropology,
we have been devoting our principal energies to the interrelations
and common ground of the three branches of the larger field of
social relations.

This new development, which is still too new for anything like
adequate assessment, seems to consist essentially in a method of

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 357

considerably increasing the number of theoretically known islands
in the sea of social phenomena and thereby narrowing the stretches
of uncharted water between them. The essential new insight, which
unfortunately is not easy to state, concerns the most general aspects
of the conception of the components of systems of social action and
their relations to each other.

It seems to have been the previous assumption, largely implicit,
for instance, in the thinking of Weber, of W. I. Thomas, and in my
own, that there was, as it were, one "action-equation." The actor
was placed on one side— "oriented to" a situation or a world of ob-
jects which constituted the other side. The difficulty concerned the
status of "values" in action, not as the motivational act of "evalu-
ation" of an object, but as the standard by which it was evaluated
—in short, the concept "value-attitudes" which some of you will
remember from my Structure of Social Action. I, following Weber,
had tended to put value-standards or modes of value-orientation
into the actor. Thomas and Znaniecki in their basic distinction be-
tween attitudes and values had put them into the object-system.

We have all long been aware that there were three main prob-
lem foci in the most general theory of human behavior which we
may most generally call those of personality, of culture, and of
social structure. But in spite of this awareness, I think we have
tended to follow the biological model of thought— an organism and
its environment, an actor and his situations. We have not really
treated culture as independent, or if that has been done, as by
some anthropologists, the tendency has been for them in turn to
absorb either personality or social structure into culture, especially
the latter, to the great discomfort of many sociologists. What we
have done, which I wish to report is, I think, to take an important
step toward drawing out for working theory the implications of
the fundamental fact that man is a culture-bearing animal.

Our conclusion then is that value-standards or modes of value-
orientation should be treated as a distinct range of components of
action. In the older view the basic components could be set forth
in a single "table" by classifying the modes of action or motiva-
tional orientation which we have found it convenient to distinguish
as cognitive mapping (in Tolman's sense), cathectic (in the psy-
choanalytic sense) and evaluative, against a classification of the
significant aspects or modalities of objects. These latter we have
classified as quality complexes or attributes of persons and col-

358 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

lectivities, action or performance complexes, and non-human en-
vironmental factors. By adding values as a fourth column to this
classification, this had seemed to yield an adequate paradigm for
the structural components of action-systems.

But something about this paradigm did not quite "click." It
almost suddenly occurred to us to "pull" the value-element out
and put it into a separate range, with a classification of its own
into three modes of value-orientation: cognitive (in the standard,
not content, sense), appreciative and moral. This gave us a para-
digm of three "dimensions" in which each of the three ranges or
sets of modes is classified against each of the other two.

This transformation opened up new possibilities of logical devel-
opment and elaboration which are much too complex and tech-
nical to enter into here. Indeed the implications are as yet only
very incompletely worked out or critically evaluated and it will be
many months before they are in shape for publication. But certain
of them are sufficiently clear to give me at any rate the conviction
that they are of considerable importance, and taken together, will
constitute a substantial further step in the direction of unifying our
theoretical knowledge and broadening the range of generality of
implication, with the probable consequence of contributing sub-
stantially to the cumulativeness of our empirical research.

Certain of these implications, which in broad outline already
seem clear, touch two of the subjects on which I intended to speak
anyway and can, I think, now speak much better. The first of these
is the very fundamental one of the connection of the theories of
motivation and personality structure on the psychological level
with the sociological analysis of social structure. The vital impor-
tance of this connection is evident to all of us, and many sociologists
have been working away at the field for a long time. Seen in the
perspective of the years, I think great progress has been made.
The kind of impasse where "psychology is psychology" and "so-
ciology is sociology" and "never the twain shall meet," which was a
far from uncommon feeling in the early stages of my career, has
almost evaporated. There is a rapidly increasing and broadening
area of mutual supplementation.

What has happened in our group opens up, I think, a way to
eliminating the sources of some of the remaining theoretical difli-
culties in this field, and still more important, building the founda-
tions for establishing more direct and specific connections than

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 359

we have hitherto been able to attain. I should like to indicate some
of these in two fields.

The first is the less radical. We have long suspected, indeed on
some level, known, that the basic structure of the human personality
was intimately involved with the social structure as well as vice
versa. Indeed some have gone so far as to consider personality to
be a direct "microcosm" of the society. Now, however, we have
begun to achieve a considerable clarification of the bases on which
this intimacy of involvement rests, and to bring personality, con-
ceptually as well as genetically, into relation with social structure.
It goes back essentially to the insight that the major axis around
which the expectation-system of any personality becomes organized
in the process of socialization is its interlocking with the expecta-
tion-systems of others, so that the mutuality of socially structured
relationship patterns can no longer be thought of as a resultant of
the motivation-systems of a plurality of actors, but becomes directly
and fundamentally constitutive of those motivation systems. It has
seemed to us possible in terms of this reoriented conception to
bring large parts both of Tolman's type of behavior theory and the
psychoanalytic type of theory of personality, including such related
versions as that of Murray, together in a close relation to socio-
logical theory. Perhaps the farthest we had dared to go before was
to say something like that we considered social structure and per-
sonality were very closely related and intimately interacting sys-
tems of human action. Now I think it will probably prove safe to
say that they are in a theoretical sense different phases or aspects
of the same fundamental action-system. This does not in the least
mean, I hasten to add, that personality is in danger of being "ab-
sorbed" into the social system, as one version of Durkheim's theory
seemed to indicate. The distinction between the personality "level"
of the organization of action and the social system level remains as
vital as it ever was. But the theoretical continuity, and hence the
possibility of using psychological theory in the motivation field for
sociological explanation, have been greatly enhanced.

The second point I had in mind is essentially an extension of this
one or an application of it. As those of you famUiar with some of
my own writing since the Structure of Social Action know, for
some years I have been "playing" with a scheme of what I have
found it convenient to call "pattern variables" in the field of social
structure, which were originally derived by an analytical break-

360 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

down of Toennies' GemeinscJmft-GcseUschaft pair into what seemed
to be more elementary components. This yielded such distinctions
as that between universalism, as illustrated in technical competence
or the "rule of law," and particularism as given in kinship or friend-
ship relations, or to take another case, between the "functional
specificity" of an economic exchange relationship and the "func-
tional diffuseness" of marriage. Thus to take an illustration from my
own work, the judgment of his technical competence on which
the choice of a physician is supposed to rest is a universalistic cri-
terion. Deviantly from the ideal pattern, however, some people
choose a physician because he is Mary Smith's brother-in-law. This
would be a particularistic criterion. Similarly the basis on which a
physician may validate his claim to confidential information about his
patient's private life is that it is necessary if he is to perform the
specific function of caring for the patient's health. But the basis
of a wife's claim to a truthful answer to the question "what were
you doing last night that kept you out till thi-ee in the morning?"
is the generally diffuse obligation of loyalty in the marriage rela-
tionship.

Again I cannot take time to go into the technicalities. But the
theoretical development of which I have spoken has already indi-
cated two significant results. First it has brought a scheme of five
such pattern variables— the four I had been using, with the addition
of the distinction of ascription and achievement which Linton first
introduced into our conceptual armory— into a direct and funda-
mental relation to the structure of action systems themselves. These
concepts can now be systematically derived from the basic frame
of reference of action theory, which was not previously possible.

Secondly, however, it appears that tlie same basic distinctions,
which were all worked out for the analysis of social structure, can,
when rephrased in accord with psychological perspective, be iden-
tified as fundamental points of reference for the structuring of per-
sonality also. Thus what sociologically is called universalism in a
social role definition can be psychologically interpreted as the im-
pact of the mechanism of generalization in object-orientation and
object choice. Correspondingly, what on the sociological level has
been called the institutionalization of "affective neutrality" turns
out to be essentially the same as the imposition of renunciation of
immediate gratification in the interests of the disciplined organ-
ization and longer-run goals of the personality.

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 361

If this correspondence holds up, and I feel confident that it will,
its implications for social science may be far reaching. For what
these variables do on the personality level is to serve as foci for the
structuring of the system of predispositions or needs. But it is pre-
cisely this aspect of psychological theory which is of most impor-
tance for the sociologist since it yields the differentiations of moti-
vational orientation which are crucial to the understanding of so-
cially structured behavior. Empirically we have known a good deal
about these diflFerentiations, but theoretically we have not been able
to connect them up in a systematically generalized way. It looks as
though an important step in this direction had now become possible.
With regard to its potential importance, I may only mention the
extent to which studies of the distribution of attitudes have come
to occupy a central place in the empirical work both of sociologists
and of social psychologists. The connection of these distribution
data with the social structure on the one hand and the structure
of motivational predispositions on the other has had to a high de-
gree to be treated in empirically ad hoc terms. Any step in the
direction of "reducing the degree of empiricism" in such an area
will constitute a substantial scientific advance, I think it is prob-
able that such an advance is in sight, which, if validated, will have
developed from work in general theory.

Let us now turn to the other major theoretical field, the systema-
tization of the bases for comparative analysis of social structures.
First I should like to call attention to the acute embarrassment we
have had to suffer in this field. On the level of what I have made
bold to call "proto-sociology" it was thought that this problem was
solved by the implications of the evolutionary formulae which ar-
ranged all possible structural types in a neat evolutionary series
which ipso facto established both their comparability and their
dynamic relationships. Unfortunately, from one point of view, this
synthesis turned out to be premature; but from another this was
fortunate, for in one sense the realization of this fact was the start-
ing point of the transition from proto-sociology to real sociology.
At any rate, in spite of the magnificence of Max Weber's attempt,
the basic classificatory problem, the solution of which must under-
lie the achievement of high theoretical generality in much of our
field, has remained basically unsolved.

As so often happens there has been a good deal of underground
ferment going on in such a field before the results have begun to

362 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

become widely visible. There are, I think, signs of important pro-
gress. One of these is the great step toward the systematization of
the variability of kinship structure which our anthropological col-
league, Professor Murdock, has reported in his recent book. For
one critically important structural field we can now say that many
of the basic problems have been solved. But this still leaves much
to be worked out, particularly in the fields of more complex institu-
tional variability in the literate societies, in such areas as occupa-
tion, religion, formal organization, social stratification and govern-
ment.

Just as in the problem of the motivation of socially structured
behavior our relations to psychology become peculiarly crucial and
intimate, so in that of systematizing the structural variability of
social systems, our relations to anthropology are correspondingly
crucial. This, of course, is because of the ways in which the basic
cultural orientations underlie and interpenetrate the structuring of
social systems on the action level. Anything, therefore, which can
help to clarify the most fundamental problems of the ways in which
values and other cultural orientation elements are involved in action
systems should sooner or later contribute to this sociological
problem.

In general, anthropological theory in the culture field has in this
respect been disappointing, not that it has not provided many em-
pirical insights, which it certainly has, but precisely in terms of
the present interest in systematization. I am happy to report that
my colleague. Dr. Florence Kluckhohn has, in yet unpublished
work, made some promising suggestions the implications of which
will, I think, turn out to be of great importance. In what follows I
wish gratefully to acknowledge my debt to her work.

In this connection it is important that the central new theoretical
insight to which I have referred above came precisely in this field,
in a new view of the way values are related to action. The essence
of this is the analytical independence of value-orientation relative
to the psychological aspects of motivation. It introduces an element
of "play" into what had previously been a much more rigid relation,
this rigidity having much to do with the unfortunate clash of so-
ciological and anthropological "imperialisms."

The independence of value-orientation encourages the search for
elements of structural focus in that area. The "problem areas" of
value-choice seem to provide one set of such foci, that is, the evalu-

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 363

ation of man's relation to the natural environment, to his biologi-
cal nature and the like. But along with these there are foci differ-
entiating the alternatives of the basic "directionality" of value-
orientation itself. In this connection, it has become possible to see
that a fundamental congruence exists between at least one part in
the set of "pattern variables" mentioned above, that of universalism
and particularism, and Max Weber's distinction, which runs
throughout his sociology of religion, between transcendent and im-
minent orientations, the Western, especially Calvinistic orientation,
illustrating the former, the Chinese the latter.

Bringing such a differentiation in relation to basic orientation-foci
together with the problem foci seems to provide at least an initial
and tentative basis for working out a systematic classification of
some major possibilities of cultural orientation in their relevance to
differentiations of social structure. Then through the congruence
of these with the possible combinations of the values of pattern
variables in the structuring of social roles themselves, it seems pos-
sible further to clarify some of the modes of articulation of the
variability of cultural orientations with that of the structure of the
social systems which are their bearers and, in the processes of
culture change, their creators.

In this field even more than that of the relation between social
structure and motivation, what I am in a position to give you now
is not a report of theoretical work accomplished, but a vision of
what can be accomplished if the requisite hard and competent
work is done. This vision is not, however, I think, mere wishful
thinking. I think we have gone far enough so that we can see real
possibilities. We are in a position to organize a directed and con-
certed effort with definite goals, not merely to grope about in the
hope that something will come out of it.

It seems to me that the importance of progress in this field of
structural analysis which attempts to establish the bases of com-
parability of social structures can scarcely be exaggerated. I have
indeed felt for some time that the fact that we had not been able
to go farther in this direction was a more serious barrier to the all-
important generality and cumulativeness of our knowledge than
was the difficulty of adequately linking the analysis of social struc-
ture to psychological levels of the understanding of motivation.

The problem of the importance of structural variability and its
analy.sis is most obvious when we are dealing with the broad

364 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

structural contrasts between widely differing societies. It is, how-
ever, a serious error to suppose that its importance is confined to
this level. Every society, seen close to, is to an important degree a
microcosm of the various possibilities of the structuring of human
relationships all over the world and throughout history. The vari-
ability within the same society, though subtler and less easy to
analyze, is none the less authentic.

Of course in any one society sojne possibilities of structural vari-
ability are excluded altogether, or can appear only as radically
deviant phenomena. But it must not be assumed that in spite of
its conformity to a broad general type, the American middleclass
family for instance is, precisely in terms of social structure, a uni-
form cut-and-dried thing. It is a complex of many importantly
variant sub-types. For some sociological problems it may be pre-
cisely the structural differentiations between and distribution of
these sub-types which constitute the most important data. To say
merely that these are middle-class families will not solve such prob-
lems. But it is not necessary for the sociologist to stop there and re-
sort to "purely psychological" considerations. He can and should
push his distinctive type of structural analysis on down to these
levels of "minor" variability.

In the present state of knowledge, or that of the foreseeable fu-
ture, we are bound to a "structural-functional" level of theory.
There will continue to be long stretches of open water between our
islands of validated theory. In this situation we cannot achieve
a high level of dynamic generalization for processes and inter-
dependences even within the same society, unless our ranges of
structural variability are really systematized so that when we get
a shift from one to another we know what has changed, to what
and in wliat degree. This order of systematization can, like all
theoretical work, be verified only by empirical research. But experi-
ence shows that it cannot be worked out by sheer ad Jwc empirical
induction, letting the facts reveal their own pattern. It must be
worked out by rigorous theoretical analysis, continually stimulat-
ing and being checked by empirical research. In sum I think this is
one of the very few most vital areas for the development of socio-
logical theory, and here as in the other I think the prospects are
good.

The above two broad areas of prospective theoretical advance
are so close to the most general of general theory that they would

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 365

scarcely qualify as falling within the area of "special theories,"
which was tlie fourth area about which I wanted to talk. I have
precisely taken so much time to discuss these because of their im-
portance for more special theories. I am very far indeed from wish-
ing to disparage the importance of this more special and in one
sense more modest type of theoretical work; quite the contrary. It
is here that the growing points of theory in their direct working
interaction with empirical research are to be found. If the state
of affairs at that level cannot be healthy we should indeed despair
of our science.

I will go farther. It seems to me precisely that the fact that real
working theory at the research levels did not exist and was not
developed in connection with them was perhaps the most telling
symptom that the "speculative systems" of which I have spoken
were only pseudo-scientific, not genuinely so. Most emphatically I
wish to say that the general theory on which I have placed such
emphasis can only be justified in so far as it "spells out" on the
research level, providing the more generalized conceptual basis for
the frames of reference, problem statements and hypotheses, and
many of the operating concepts of research. In these terms it un-
derlines the problem-setting of research, it provides criteria of more
generalized significance of the problem and its empirical solution,
it provides the basis on which the results of one empirical study
become fruitful, not merely in the particular empirical field itself,
but beyond it for other fields; that is for what above I have called
its generality of implication. In my opinion it is precisely because
of its orientation to a sound tradition of general theory, however
incomplete and faulty, that the particular theories which are devel-
oping so rapidly in many branches of the field are so highly impor-
tant and promising for the future. Let us, by all means, work most
intensively on the middle theory level. That way lies real maturity
as a science, and the ultimate test of whether the general theory is
any good. And of course many of the most important contributions
to general theory will come from this source.

This brings me finally to the fifth point on my agenda, the fitting
in of theory with the operational procedures of research. Thus far
I have been talking to you about theory, but I was careful to note
at the outset that however important an ingredient of the scientific
brew theory may be, it is only one of the ingredients. If it is to be
scientific theory it must be tied in, in the closest possible manner.

366 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

with the techniques of empirical research by which alone we can
come to know whether our theoretical ideas are "really so" or just
speculations of peculiar if not disordered minds.

Anyone who has observed the social science scene in this country
over the past quarter century cannot fail to be impressed by the very
great development of research technique in our field, in very many
of its branches. Sampling has come in to make it possible for the
social scientist to manufacture his own statistical data, instead of
having to work only with the by-products of other interests. Tech-
niques of statistical analysis themselves have undergone an im-
mense amount of refinement, for example, in the development of
scaling procedures. An altogether new level has already been at-
tained in the collection and processing of raw data, as through
questionnaire and interview, and the development of coding skills
and the like. I used to think that the construction of a questionnaire
was something any old dub could dream up if he only knew what
information he wanted. I have learned better. The whole immense
development of interviewing techniques with its range from psycho-
analysis to Gallup and Roper lies almost within the time period we
are talking about. The possibilities of the use of projective tech-
niques in sociological research are definitely exciting. The Cross-
Cultural Survey (now rechristened ) and Mr. Watson of I.B.M. vie
with each other to create more elaborate gadgets for the social
scientist to play with. We have even, as in the communications and
the small groups fields, begun to get somewhere with relatively
rigorous experimental methods in sociology, no longer only in psy-
chology among the sciences of human behavior.

This whole development is, in my opinion, in the larger picture
at least as important as that of theory. It is, furthermore, exceed-
ingly impressive, not merely for its accomplishments to date, im-
portant as these are, but still more for its promise for the future.
There is a veritable ferment of invention going on in this area
which is in the very best American tradition.

If I correctly assess the recipe for a really good brew of social
science it is absolutely imperative that these two basic ingredients
should get together and blend with each other. I do not think it
fair to say that we are still in the stage of proto-science. But we are
unquestionably in that of a distinctly iminature science. If it is
really to grow up and not regress into either of the two futilities of
empiricist sterility or empirically irrelevant speculation, the syn-

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 367

thesis must take place. In this as in other respects the beginning
certainly has already been made but we must be quite clear that
it is only a beginning.

This is a point where a division of labor is very much in order.
It surely is not reasonable to suppose that all sociologists should
become fully qualified specialists in theory and the most highly
skilled research technicians at the same time. Some will, indeed
must, have high orders of competence on both sides, but this will
not be true of all. But the essential is that there should be a genu-
ine division of labor. That means that all parties should directly
contribute to the effectiveness of the whole. For the theoretical side
this imposes an obligation to get together with the best research
people and make every efiFort to make their theory researchable in
the highest sense. For the research technician it implies the obliga-
tion to fit his operational procedures to the needs of theory as
closely as he can.

It has been in the nature of the circumstances and processes of
the historical development of theory that much of its empirical
relevance has heretofore been made clear and explicit only on the
level of "broad" observations of fact which were not checked and
elaborated by really technical procedures. The value of this, as for
instance it has appeared in the comparative institutional field,
should not be minimized. But clearly this order of empirical vali-
dation is only a beginning. For opening the doors to much greater
progress it is necessary to be able to put the relevant content of
theory in terms which the empirical research operator can directly
build into his technical operations. This is a major reason why the
middle theories are so important, because it is on that level that
theory will get directly into research techniques and vice versa.
Again in this field the beginnings I happen to know about are suffi-
ciently promising so that I think we can say that the prospects are
good.

Theory has its justification only as part of the larger total of so-
ciological science as a whole. Perhaps in closing I may be permitted
a few general remarks about the prospects of sociology as a science.
I have great confidence that they are good, a solider and stronger
confidence than at any time in my own professional lifetime, pro-
vided of course that the social setting for its development remains
reasonably stable and favorable.

These prospects are, however, bound up with the fulfillment of

368 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

certain internal as well as external conditions. One of the most im-
portant of these on which I would like to say a word, is a proper
balance between fundamental research, including its theoretical
aspect, and applied or "engineering" work. This problem is of course
of particular interest to our friends in the Conference on Family
Welfare. Both the urgencies of the times and the nature of our
American ethos make it unthinkable that social scientists as a pro-
fessional group should shirk their social responsibilities. They, like
the medical profession, must do what they can where they are
needed. Indeed it is only on this assumption that they will do so
that not only the very considerable financial investment of society
in their work, but the interferences in other people's affairs which
are inevitably bound up with our research, can be justified.

It is not a question of whether we try to live up to our social re-
sponsibilities, but of how. If we should put the overwhelming bulk
of our resources, especially of trained talent, into immediately
practical problems it would do some good, but I have no doubt
that it would have to be at the expense of our greater usefulness to
society in the future. For it is only by systematic work on problems
where the probable scientific significance has priority over any im-
mediate possibility of application that the greatest and most rapid
scientific advance can be made. And it is in proportion as sociology
attains stature as a science, with a highly generalized and integrated
body of fundamental knowledge, that practical usefulness far be-
yond the present levels will become possible. This conclusion fol-
lows most directly from the role of theory, as I have tried to outline
it above. If the prospects of sociological theory are good, so are, I
am convinced, those of sociology as a science, but onhj if the scien-
tifically fundamental work is done. Let us, by all means, not be
stingy with the few golden eggs we now have. But let us also breed
a flock of geese of the sort that we can hope will lay many more
than we have yet dreamed of.

One final word. Like all branches of American culture, the roots
of sociology as a science are deep in Euroj)e. Yet I like to think of
sociology as in some sense peculiarly an American discipline, or at
least an American opportunity. There is no doubt that we have the
leadership now. Our very lack of traditionalism perhaps makes it in
some ways easier for us than for some others to delve deeply into
the mysteries of how human action in society ticks. We certainly
have all the makings for developing the technical know-how of re-

THE PROSPECTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 369

search. We are good at organization which is coming to play an
increasingly indispensable part in research.

It is my judgment that a great opportunity exists. Things have
gone far enough so that it seems likely that sociology, in the closest
connection with its sister-sciences of psychology and anthropology,
stands near the beginning of one of those important configurations
of culture growth which Professor Kroeber has so illuminatingly
analyzed. Can American sociology seize this opportunity? One of
our greatest national resources is the capacity to rise to a great
challenge once it is put before us.

We can do it if we can put together the right combination of in-
gredients of the brew. Americans as scientists generally have been
exceptionally strong on experimental work and empirical research.
I have no doubt whatever of the capacity of American sociologists
in this respect. But as theorists Americans have, relative to Euro-
peans, not been so strong— hence the special challenge of the theo-
retical development of our field which justifies the theme of this
address. If we American sociologists can rise to this part of the
challenge the job will really get done. We are not in the habit of
listening too carefully to the timid souls who say, why try, it can't
be done. I think we have already taken up the challenge all along
the line. "The sociology," as my children called it, is not about to
begin. It has been gathering force for a generation and is now really
under way.

XVIII

A Sociologist Looks at the
Legal Profession *

AS A SOCIOLOGIST I am in no sense an expert in the law or the afiFairs
of the legal profession. Worse than that, even from my own pro-
fessional vantage point I have never made any special study of the
law or of lawyers. My only claim to be able to say anything of in-
terest to a group of lawyers on this occasion is that I have been
concerned in a broad way with the structure and functioning of
modern societies, particularly that of the United States and, in that
connection have had a special interest in the place of the profes-
sions in such societies. What I can provide, therefore, is only the
kind of perspective an outsider is capable of, not the intimate
knowledge that a direct student or participant would have.

I should like to begin with two very general observations, one
about our society in general, the other about the historic place of
the legal profession in it. The great ideological conflict of our time
throughout the whole western world, has been between the pro-
ponents of the merits of "capitalism" or "free enterprise" as a "sys-
tem" and "socialism" as a system, whether or not in its communist
variety. The proponents of the former have freely included the "profit
motive" among the central features and, from their point of view
virtues, of the free enterprise system, while the proponents of so-
cialism have looked askance on the entrusting of any serious social
responsibilities to agencies otlier than those of public authority.

It is curious that in this conflict the ideologists of both camps
have, as interpreters of the contemporary scene, almost completely
overlooked the presence and strategic significance in our society of
a set of occupational groups which are not either in their own
opinion or by and large in the public estimation, devoted mainly

"The substance of this paper was presented at the first symposium on the
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the University of Chicago
Law School, Chicago, 111., Dec. 4, 1952.

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 371

to the goal of their own profit, but rather in some sense to "serv-
ice," but which equally are not composed primarily of civil servants,
though a considerable proportion of them are in government em-
ploy, namely the professions. But the comparative historical evi-
dence about societies shows very clearly that the status of the pro-
fessions in our society is unique in history. Famous as the Roman
lawyers were, the development of law as a profession is certainly
far greater today, and tlie doctor, the engineer, the university pro-
fessor, and a variety of others were only in their barest beginnings
at that time compared with their present status. It is a curious para-
dox that this key group, who are the primary spearheads of the
development of science and its practical applications, of the edu-
cation of our people and the trustees of its legal traditions, should
not find an important place in either of the great competing ideo-
logical systems of the time. A proper appraisal of their significance
seems to me an important part of an adequate orientation of our
people to their world.

The second observation concerns a very broad fact about the
history of the legal profession. As it emerged into some prominence
in the late Middle Ages, particularly with the revival of Roman Law
in the Italian Universities, though closely connected with the de-
velopment of the modern secular state, it is probably correct to say
that from the beginning the lawyers maintained a certain inde-
pendence of political authority as such. The lawyer, though in many
respects dependent on princes, was to some extent always an inde-
pendent expert whose doctrines with respect to the law were by no
means simply a special mode of expression of the power interests of
his political superiors. This is a fact which is characteristic of the
professions generally and has been so of the law from the beginning
of its modern history.

In the following brief discussion, a certain kind of abstraction will
necessarily be observed. Some in particular, including some law-
yers, will feel when I am through that too "rosy" a picture of the
legal profession has been painted. This is almost inevitable when
the aim is to bring to attention certain aspects of what sociologists
call the "latent functions" of a set of social institutions. This anal-
ysis will be devoted mainly to this task and should therefore not be
considered a general appraisal of the value of the legal profession.
A few indications will be given of points at which deviant tend-
encies take hold, as in overcompliance with the pressures of client

372 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

interest, sentimentality and formalism. But assessment of just how
far these, and possible other types of deviance go, is a complex
question which should not be prejudged. There is almost certainly
some truth in the old adage "where there is smoke tliere must be
fire." But at the same time there is ample sociological evidence of
ideological distortion in the other direction. There are many rea-
sons why the legal profession is a convenient scapegoat for a variety
of groups in society. Any competent analysis and appraisal of these
less rosy aspects of the place of the profession in our society would
require analysis and extensive research. A proper appreciation of
tlie positive side of the case is an essential condition of evaluation
of the other side of the coin.

I would now like to review a few considerations about the modern
American legal profession in the context of the general place of
the professions in our society. In sociological terminology, a profes-
sion is a cluster of "occupational" roles, that is roles in which the
incumbents perform certain functions valued in the society in
general, and by these activities, typically "earn a living" at a "full-
time job." Among occupational role-types, the professional is dis-
tinguished largely by the independent trusteeship exercised by the
incumbents of a class of such roles of an important part of the
major cultural tradition of the society. This means that its typical
member is trained in that tradition, usually by a formally organized
educational process, so that only those with the proper training are
considered qualified to practice the profession. Furthermore only
members of the profession are treated as qualified to interpret the
tradition authoritatively and, if it admits of this, to develop and im-
prove it. Finally, though there usually is considerable division of
labor within such a group, a substantial proportion of the members
of the profession will be concerned largely with the "practical ap-
plication" of the tradition to a variety of situations where it can be
useful to others than the members of the profession itself. The
professional man is thus a "technical expert" of some order by virtue
of his mastery of the tradition and the skills of its use.

In view of the central importance of expertness is relation to the
mastery of a cultural tradition as a criterion of a professional role,
a few words need to be said about what, from a sociologist's point
of view, are the most important features of the Law as a cultural
tradition and its place in the society. Law, of course, consists in a
body of norms or rules governing human conduct in social situations,

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 373

that is involving the relations of men to other men. Following Dean
Pound I may distinguish law from other bodies of such rules, such
as those governing the aflFairs of "private" organizations, as such
rules as have come to be considered to be of sufficient public con-
cern as to be formally sanctioned by "politically organized society."
It is first essential to keep in mind that there is no clear and in-
herent hue between what is and is not the concern of politically
organized society and thus of the law as such. It is a rather indefi-
nite line and with legislation and court decision, even with ad-
ministrative ruling, a continually shifting line. That the "formal"
law in this sense merges into what sociologists call "informal social
control" is a fact of the first importance.

To use a classification entirely familiar to lawyers it may be said
that legal rules fall into four categories. They may be said to include
first prohibitions, second explicit permissions, that is sanctioning
of acts about the legitimacy of which doubt might be raised (this
is an important aspect of what are called "rights") and prescrip-
tions, that is injunctions that under defined conditions certain
positive performances (obligations) must be undertaken. Back of
these more specific "doctrines" of law of course lie certain "stand-
ards" of apphcability such as "due process of law," "due care" or
"knowledge of the difference of right from wrong." The fourth
class of rules are the procedural which state not substantively what
men are expected to do or not to do, but what in relation to legal
agencies is the proper procedure for determining or enforcing their
rights, or, vice versa, for agencies of the law in determining and
enforcing obligations. The central importance of the procedural
component of our own legal tradition is of course evident.

This legal tradition of ours exists in an extremely complex and
dynamically changing society. It rests on certain authoritative writ-
ten sources of which the federal and state constitutions are of
course the focus, and certain formally legitimized processes of
change, of which ordinary legislation and the processes of constitu-
tional amendment are the obvious ones. But the very existence of
the legal profession as an entity in the society is a result of the fact
that the maintenance of such a tradition in terms of its own inte-
gration and continuity, and its application in relation to our multi-
farious system of social interests would not be possible without some
powerful intermediate mechanism operating between the political
organs which carry ultimate legal authority, the constitutional docu-

374 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ments and the formal acts of legislatures, and the actual implemen-
tation of legal control of going social processes.

The legal profession is not the only mechanism which operates
in this context. The various other channels through which both
legislation and the executive action of government are influenced
are also involved.^ The legal profession is, however, one of the
most important of these, in a broad perspective, probably the most
important.

As such the profession has certain exceedingly important socio-
logical characteristics. First it is in a curiously ambiguous position
of dependence and independence with reference to the state. The
laws for which it is responsible are official enactments of the state.
Part of its structure, the courts, the departments of justice, the at-
torneys general et cetera, are directly organs of the political author-
ity. The member of the bar is formally an "officer of the court," and
for example, disbarment is an act of the political authority.

At the same time, and at least equally important, the profession
is independent of political authority. Even judges, though public
officials, are treated as in a special class with special immunities.
The ordinary member of the bar is not paid by public authority but
by his clients. The bar associations are most definitely not organs
of the state, but private associations of their members. Finally, and
by no means least, the law schools, with their critically important
functions in the training of lawyers, are equally definitely not
organs of the state, but integral parts of the universities. Thus, as I
have said, the profession is, subject to certain checks on the part
both of the state and of the non-legal elements of the control of
universities, to say nothing of the influence of clients, given an
independent position. That, however, this is regarded as a position
of "trusteeshi])" is above all evident in the classification of the law
as a profession and not as a "business." The relation of attorney and
client is a relation of "trust" not of competition for profit; the client's
fee is for "service," not simply the best "bargain" he can get in a
competitive market; his communications to his attorney are pro-

1 For example "lobbying" is a favorite scapegoat of much public discussion,
and there are undoubtedly many abuses in this field. But if legislators attempted
to act only in terms of their independent "convictions" without continual
communication with their constituents as to what was needed and what would
be workable, it is likely that very serious trouble would result. What is needed
is not to prevent people outside legislatures from having any influence on
legislation but to insure that the channels of influence are "representative,"
that competition between different "interests" is "fair" and hence tliat influ-
ence is not "undue.")

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 375

tected by law as confidential and cannot be revealed in the attor-
ney's or any other interest.^

The position of the legal profession in the social structure is thus
an "interstitial" one, and this is one of the most important facts
about it. It is, in the first place, not only "oriented to" but to an
important degree "integrated with" the structure of political author-
ity. But secondly, it is organized around partly independent trus-
teeship of the legal tradition, with respect to which it has inde-
pendent, formally and informally recognized monopolistic prero-
gative; thus in general only properly trained and validated lawyers
are elected or appointed to judicial oflBce. Finally, third, the pro-
fession has most of its dealings with private persons, individual and
corporate, and is very closely involved with their affairs and in-
terests, so much so that the charge of being merely a "tool" of these
interests is not uncommon. I shall discuss each of these facets" of
the interstitial position of the profession in turn, and then comment
on some of the sociological implications of the situation.

It seems best to start with problems of the relation to the cultural
tradition of the law. First it may be noted that apart from the
difficulties of enforcement of legal rules, for which of course the
legal profession as such is not primarily responsible, there is a
critically important problem of "interpretation" in at least a double
sense. The first of these concerns primarily the relation to the client
and will be commented upon further below. It is the "application"
to the specific practical situations faced by clients. Here the prob-
lem of the client is by no means simply his motivation to conform
with or evade the law, but to ktiow what his rights and obligations
are. And, the very fact that so often he must come to a lawyer with
his questions indicates that, in spite of the lawyer's superior knowl-
edge, even for him this interpretation presents what are very often
far from easy questions. Even in so far as the final resolution rests
either with legislatures or with judges, the importance of the work
of members of the legal profession in formulating the questions and
marshalling the evidence on which final decisions are made should
not be underestimated.

The second is the set of questions involved in the internal con-
sistency and hence stability, in the sense which includes orderly
change, of the legal tradition itself. The severity and difficulty of

2 In sociological terms the role of lawyer is defined, along with that of other
professional roles, as "collectivity-oriented" not, like that of the business man,
as "self-oriented." Cf. Parsons, The Social System, Chap. II for definition of
these terms.

376 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the problems of conflicts between mutually contradictory statutes
is well known to lawyers. Anglo-American law of course relies
heavily on the processes of judicial decision and through these the
accumulation of precedents. But tlie problem of maintaining the
internal consistency of the precedent system even to a tolerable
degree is a very formidable one. Furthermore there must be orien-
tation to the authority of the basic constitutional documents, which
naturally means continual reinterpretation of them, and to the posi-
tive acts of legislation which are continually being produced.

The problems faced by our legal profession in this respect may
be compared with two other types of situations. One is the analogy
to the professions concerned with the application of scientific
knowledge, such as engineering and medicine. In these cases it is
a sociologically central fact that the available knowledge is far from
adequate to cover the practical needs. Nevertheless established
scientific knowledge does constitute a highly stable point of refer-
ence. Hence the "authority" of the relevant professional groups for
interpretations can always be referred to such established knowl-
edge. This is, moreover, a basis of reference which is steadily grow-
ing in stability. The other type of case is very different, namely that
in which there is a fountain-head of authority beyond which there
is no appeal. The Roman Catholic Church is perhaps the most con-
spicuous large-scale example, though the Soviet Communist Party
is in certain respects similar. The essential point is that the "correct
doctrine" is assumed not to be dependent on any human will, but
to be infallibly specific and definite, with a clearly authorized
human agency for its implementation.

As compared with both of these our secular law is considerably
looser in its points of reference. The Constitution is considerably
less clear-cut than tlie authoritative canons of the church and even
the Supreme Court is less "canonical" than is the papacy. The legal
profession then has to maintain diflBcult balances in a tradition
which is in itself exceedingly complex, which is applied to very
complex and changing conditions, subject to severe pressures from
interest groups, authoritatively based only on very general and
partly ambiguous documents, and subject to change within con-
siderable limits by the more or less arbitrary and unpredictable
"will of the people."

We know from analysis of a great many such situations that re-
sponsibility for such functions under conditions where no clearly

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION ^77

"right" answers can be attained within considerable hmits, is a
source of strain. We also know that in relation to such strains tend-
encies to various types of "deviant" behavior are likely to develop.
One of these is probably yielding to expediency, above all
through financial temptations and pressures from clients. Ideological
trends in our society are such that there is almost certainly serious
exaggeration in the views of many circles about lawyers on this
point, but that the tendency to abdicate responsibilities in the serv-
ice of financial "self-interest" or merely "peace" in the face of
severe pressure, is there, can scarcely be doubted.

A second type of deviance consists in exaggerated legal "for-
malism" tlie tendency to insist on what is conceived to be the "let-
ter" of the law without due regard to a "reasonable" balance of
considerations. Legal "technicalities" may of course be, and often
are, invoked as tactical weapons in various types of procedures, a
point which will be discussed briefly below, but apart from their
instiumental use, undoubtedly there is a tendency is many legal
quarters to exaggerate the importance of being formally "correct"
down to the last detail. In psychological terms, the legal profession
probably has at least its share, if not more of "compulsive personal-
ities" as compared with other occupations. The essential present
point is that this tendency in the profession is not simply a result of
certain types of people "happening" to be lawyers, but grows out
of the situation in which lawyers as a group are placed.

The third type of deviant tendency prominent in the law may be
said to be the "sentimental" exaggeration of the substantive claims
of clients or other "interests" represented by the lawyer. Thus cor-
poration lawyers may often become more lyrical about the rights of
"property" than the main tradition of the law warrants, or labor
lawyers about "human rights" and the like. Or, to take another
example, the lawyer who identifies with an injured client to the
extent of fighting very hard to get for him what, on cooler consid-
eration look like highly excessive damages, is guilty of "sentimen-
tality" in this sense.^

3 In more technically sociological terms, I may point out that this classification
of typical deviances of lawyers corresponds closely to a more general classi-
fication. Yielding to "expediency" seems to be the most relevant version of
the "alienative" tendency in this case. ("Active alienation" the "rebellious"
attitude toward law, is hardly compatible with the professional role itself,
though it operates in particular contexts.) "Formalism" may in a broad way be
identified with "passive compulsive conformism" while "sentimentality" seems
to fit the category of "active compulsive conformism." For the general classi-
fication see Parsons, The Social System, Chap. VII.

278 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

Problems of the relation of the profession to the state need rela-
tively little comment, since several points have been noted above.
But first I may note again that some lawyers are public officials and
some public offices are reserved exclusively for lawyers, notably
the judiciary. Furthermore every lawyer, by virtue of his admission
to the bar becomes in a limited and qualified sense a public official,
as an "officer of the court." The profession is thus an entity which as
it were penetrates the boundary between public and private capa-
cities and responsibilities. Its members act in both capacities and
the profession has major anchorages in both.

This position, though of course it impinges differently on differ-
ent sectors of the profession, subjects the profession in its inde-
pendent aspect, to a whole series of strains in its relations to polit-
ical authority. In the first place, as noted, the private attorney in
advising clients and the judge in deciding cases are both placed in
a difficult if not sometimes impossible position in saying what in
fact the law is. Partly this is the problem of interpretation of vague
or ambiguous phraseology in the authoritative documents. Partly it
is a matter of the fact that legislatures sometimes flatly contradict
themselves so that either there must be legislative correction, which
is so cumbersome a process as to be impossible within any reason-
able length of time or some kind of "extralegal" compromise.
Finally, there may be questions of sheer impracticality. The law
taken literally sometimes requires the citizen to do what is either
impossible for him, or if possible, only with what in terms of public
sentiment is undue hardship.

What is true in relation to legislation, is, with differences, also
true with reference to the executive organs of government. These
are charged with the responsibility of implementing the decisions
of legislatures. But they are faced with the same difficulties of in-
terpretation as are the courts and lawyers. They have corporate in-
terests which predispose them to one rather than another interpre-
tation. This may lead to a clash of interests with private persons in
the public (individual or corporate) or as between different organs
of government.

Just as from a certain point of view the law-making process itself
is a mechanism for settling conflicts in the society and establishing
rules, so then the legal profession is a kind of "secondary" line of
defense against the disruptive consequences of conflict. It acts as a
buffer between the legislature, the executive organ and the gen-

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 379

eral public, helping to iron out inconsistencies and unrealism in
the law, to protect against special interests of the executive branch
of government, or particular units of it and the like. In performing
this mediating function the most important point to note is the
independent responsible position of the profession. It is not exclu-
sively an organ either of the state or of the private interests of pri-
vate clients. This independent position rests on the institutional-
ization of its own tradition, on the balance of interests, and on inte-
gration with other structures of the society which are relatively
independent, notably the universities through the Law Schools.

Finally a few things may be said about the relation of the legal
profession to the public, i.e. to "private" clients. One of the most
important facts to emphasize is the enormous range of things done
by lawyers for clients. This appears both in the range of different
kinds of specialties within the profession, from Judges, to tax spe-
cialists, patent lawyers, admiralty lawyers, and many others. It also
appears in the many different things done by particular lawyers,
and particularly the fact that technical mastery of the law is in-
volved in only some of them and in many situations is not the most
important element. A few of these points may be commented upon
briefly.

The first set of considerations derives from the fact that a private
attorney's job is to advise his client in relation to a concrete situ-
ation. In this connection his understanding of the situations clients
of the type he deals with get into is just as important as is his
knowledge of the law. Furthermore, his function is not confined to
understanding these situations and the relation of the law to them,
but in various ways involves actively taking a hand in them. Here
above all what may be called "knowhow" about the relevant situ-
ations, such as how to go about defining a problem or what the
chances of reaching a settlement are become most important. Finally
lawyers of course are called upon to carry out a great deal of nego-
tiation on behalf of their clients, sometimes with the attorneys rep-
resenting the other side, sometimes directly with private persons.
Knowledge of the law is, in such situations, often an essential tool
of successful negotiation, but by itself it does not suffice to give
the skill in handling other people which makes the good negotiator.
These considerations are obviously related to the very large amount
of settlement of actual or potential conflict carried out by lawyers
without the direct involvement of public authority at all. This ranges

380 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

all the way from forestalling a conflict of interest by giving advice
as to how to deal with a situation in advance, or possible actively
taking part in handling it, through "settlements out of court" with-
out ever reaching a court, to cases brought before a court but
settled without trial.*

The second major context I wish to discuss briefly concerns the
fact that the lawyer represents his client in situations which very
frequently involve direct conflict of interest with an opponent of
the client, a situation most highly dramatized of course when the
case is tried in court. Here the mediating role of the profession is
clearly evident in the fact that the attorneys for the two sides do
not have the same personal involvement in the case that their prin-
cipals do and can often negotiate with each other without being
swayed by their emotions to the same degree. At least they are
"brother" lawyers bound by the solidarity of their profession, and
not infrequently they know each other well, have no personal
antagonism, and are accustomed to working together.

In the same connection the procedural aspect of the law and the
lawyer's mastery of it, show their importance. For adherence to
procedure narrows and defines the issues, and makes the parties
and public opinion more ready to accept a settlement when it is
arrived at. Procedure, however, has another importance in mitigat-
ing the strain on the lawyer. The fact that the case can be tried by
a standard procedure, relieves him of some pressure of commit-
ment to the case of his client. He can feel that, if he "does his best"
then having assured the client's case a fair trial, he is relieved of
responsibility for an unfavorable verdict if it comes. He may even
take a case with considerable reservations about its soundness,
counting on procedurable fairness to protect the interests of the
opponent. The very fact that the lawyer is given a position of inde-
pendent, though partly informal and unofficial responsibility, both
for the interests of his client and for those of "the law" means that
tliere must be mechanisms which mitigate the pressure to which he
is subject in this position. The procedural emphasis of our legal
system seems to fit in this context.

Mention should also be made here of another aspect of the law-
yer's independent responsibility, namely the protection of the con-

^ In this connection Judge Barnes' statement ( in the paper following this one )
was interesting that in his long experience on the bench about six cases brought
to the court were settled without trial for every one actually brought to trial.

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 381

fidential nature of his relation to his dient. He is, in a certain sense,
in a position to protect his cHent against himself, in that if the latter
says intemperate or unwise things in conference with his attorney
he can be assured they will go no farther. But similarly the attorney
himself is protected in that he is enabled to participate in private
affairs without himself becoming too deeply involved, either in
judgment of the legality of the client's position, or in responsibilities
to his client going too far beyond their professional relationship.

The above discussion has cited facts which are familiar to every
lawyer and are in no sense new to him. I have done so, however,
in order to establish that the legal profession has a place in our
social structure, and performs functions on its behalf, of which
probably the average lawyer himself is only partly aware. He does
his job, on the bench, on behalf of his client etc. according to his
lights and with justification feels that this job is also important to
the society. The essential point to be made in conclusion is to show
in certain ways how it is that by and large, with due allowance for
the incompetence and chicanery found to some extent in every
large group, these functions are useful to society.

With the appropriate qualifications for specific features of its
role and situation, the legal profession shares certain fundamental
characteristics with the other professions. Its members are trained
in and integrated with, a distinctive part of our cultural tradition,
having a fiduciary responsibility for its maintenance, development
and implementation. They are expected to provide a "service" to
the public within limits without regard to immediate self-interest.
The lawyer has a position of independent responsibility so that he
is neither a servant only of the client though he represents his in-
terest, nor of any other group, in the lawyer's case, of public au-
thority.

Above all the member of a profession stands between two major
aspects of our social structure; in the case of the law between pubhc
authority and its norms, and the private individual or group whose
conduct or intentions may or may not be in accord with the law. In
the case of the physician it is between the world of sickness and of
health; he himself is defined as not sick, but he participates more
intimately with the sick than any other well person. In the case of
the teacher it is between the world of childhood, or, on advanced
levels, of relative "untrainedness" and the full status of being
trained.

382 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The professions in this sense may, sociologically, be regarded as
what we call "mechanisms of social control." They either, like the
teaching profession, help to "socialize" the young, to bring them
into accord with the expectations of full membership in the society,
or they bring them back into accord when they have deviated, like
the medical profession.^ The legal profession may be presumed to
do this but also two other things, first to forestall deviance by advis-
ing the client in ways which will keep him better in line, and also
"cooling him off" in many cases and, second, if it comes to a serious
case, implementing the procedure by which a socially sanctioned
decision about the status of the client is arrived at, in the dramatic
cases of the criminal law, the determination of whether he is inno-
cent or guilty of a crime.

Except for the formal determination of innocence or guilt which
has certain special features, analysis has shown that effective per-
formance of these functions depends on whether the role in which
they are performed meets certain broad sociological conditions.
These have been worked out most clearly in connection with the
psychotherapeutic functions of the medical profession. It can how-
ever, be shown that they are of considerably more general signif-
icance, applying to "socialization" both in family and in school, to
some aspects of religious ritual, and to various other situations. In
conclusion I may briefly outline these conditions and indicate how
they apply to the legal case.^

In the first place, in situations of strain, there seems to be re-
quired scope for a certain permissiveness for expression of attitudes
and sentiments which, in ordinary circumstances, would not be
acceptable. If this permissiveness is to operate effectively it must
be associated with relief from anxiety. In order to be capable, psy-
chologically, of "getting things off his chest" a person must be
assured tliat, within certain limits, otherwise ordinary or possible
sanctions will not operate. In general this implies a protected situ-
ation. The confidential character of the lawyer's relation to his
client provides just such a situation. The client can talk freely, to
an understanding and knowledgable ear, without fear of immediate
repercussions. What is relayed beyond this confidential relationship
is selected through the screen of the lawyer's judgment.

^ Illness, in this context can be defined as a fonn of deviant behavior. Cf.
Parsons, TJie Social System. Chap. X.

*» A more extensive discussion of these conditions will be found in Parsons,
The Social System, Chaps. VII and X.

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 383

To some extent the same kind of thing occurs in other phases of
the legal process, notably the hearing by judges of some evidence
in chambers. It could be a feature of the process of trial itself, and
under the most favorable circumstances probably is. This tendency
is, however, counteracted by the publicity of trials, which has de-
veloped rather special features in this country on account of certain
of the characteristics of our press.

In the case of the law, the situations of strain with which it deals
focus to a large extent on conflicts. One of the very important
aspects of legal procedure is to provide mechanisms for "cooling
ofiF" of the passions aroused in such situations. Undoubtedly the
private attorney does a great deal of this. Like the physician, he
helps his client to "face reality," to confine his claims to what he
has a real chance of making "stand up" in court or in direct nego-
tiation, and to realize and emotionally to accept the fact that the
other fellow may have a case too. The element of delay in bringing
things to a head may, though doubtless often carried too far be-
cause of crowding of court calendars and the like, have a similar
function. The important thing here is that a person under strain
should have some opportunity for "tension release" which is
treated as institutionally legitimate.

Secondly, it is a feature of the types of situation I am thinking of,
that there is some assurance of "support" or "acceptance" within
broader limits than would otherwise be the case. The physician in
one sense tends to be particularly "tolerant" of human beings; he
does not judge them morally, but tries to "help" them as best he
can. Certain features of legal practice also seem to fit into this pat-
tern. Though there are expectations that the attorney will not con-
sciously attempt to "get off" a person he knows to be guilty of a
crime, there is on the other hand the presumption that the client is
entitled to a "fair trial" not only in the formal sense, but a hearing
from his attorney, and any help within the bounds of reason and
professional ethics. The lawyer is not easily shocked in the way the
general public may be; he is familiar with the complexities of hu-
man living and ready to "give a break" to the person who has be-
come involved in a difiicult situation. Perhaps the presumption of
innocence, not only as a canon of formal trial procedure, but as a
deepseated trend of the ethos of the profession, is the primary focus
of this feature of the institution of the law. It is strikingly sym-
bolized by the fact that, like the medical profession, payment for

384 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the services of lawyers is not on an ordinary "commercial" basis,
but on a "sliding scale" with a presumption that the lawyer will be
willing to help his client relatively independently of whether it is
financially worth his while.

But while tlie lawyer tends to be both permissive and supportive
in his relations with his clients, there is another side to the picture.
He is after all schooled in the great tradition of the law. As a mem-
ber of a great profession he accepts responsibility for its integrity,
and his whole position in society focuses that responsibility upon
him. His function in relation to clients is by no means only to "give
them what they want" but often to resist their pressures and get
them to realize some of the hard facts of their situations, not only
with reference to what they can, even with clever legal help, expect
to "get away with" but with reference to what the law will permit
them to do. In this sense then, the lawyer stands as a kind of buffer
between the illegitimate desires of his clients and the social interest.
Here he "represents" the law rather than the client. His tendency
under certain circumstances to give way to the pressures of client
interest is one way in which, as noted above, he can be "deviant."
But in this connection he can retreat into the formalism of tlie law
as a way of resisting these pressures. From the present point of view
the significant point is that both these two functions are combined
in a particular way in the same agency.

What I have referred to above as permissiveness and support are
relatively "unconditional" in that the lawyer will not betray his
client's confidence, or refuse to give him the presumption of inno-
cence while he is hearing his story. But there is another class of his
services which are to be treated as conditional, namely the specific
positive services he is willing to provide, especially those performed
in public where the lawyer's own reputation may be involved. The
negative aspect of this has just been discussed, the things which the
lawyer will refuse to do for his client, but there is also a positive
aspect. His legal competence, his knowledge of situations and of
people, his skill in negotiation, etc., are at the service of his client
but, even after he has taken on the case, not wholly on the client's
terms, but to an important degree on his own terms. From a socio-
logical point of view, that is to say, he is "manipulating rewards"
in such a way as to have an important effect in influencing the be-
havior of the client. This influence operates, not only through what
the client "gets" in the sense of achieving his original goals for

A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 385

which he consulted a lawyer, but through the impact on the client
of the attitude of the lawyer, his expressed or implied approval of
this as so legitimate that a lawyer is willing to help him get it,
whereas other elements of the client's goals are disapproved and
help in getting them is refused.

The upshot of these commonplace considerations is that the
sociologist must regard the activities of the legal profession as one
of the very important mechanisms by which a relative balance of
stability is maintained in a dynamic and rather precariously bal-
anced society. The most significant thing is that a pattern of anal-
ysis, worked out in an entirely different context, the psychothera-
peutic aspect of the role of the physician, turns out to be applicable
in this field as well. This is something of which I myself was not
aware until I attempted to put together some thoughts about the
legal profession for this occasion.

XIX

A Revised Analytical Approach
to the Theory of
Social Stratification*

IT HAS COME to be rather widely recognized in the sociological field
that social stratification is a generalized aspect of the structure of
all social systems, and that the system of stratification is intimately
hnked to the level and type of integration of the system as a system.
The major point of reference both for the judgment of the gen-
erality of the importance of stratification, and for its analysis as a
phenomenon, is to be found in the nature of the frame of reference in
terms of which we analyze social action. We conceive action to be ori-
ented to the attainment of goals, and hence to involve selective pro-
cesses relative to goals. Seen in their relations to goals, then, all the
components of systems of action and of the situations in which action
takes place, are subject to the process of evaluation, as desirable or
undesirable, as useful or useless, as gratifying or noxious. Evaluation
in turn has, when it operates in the setting of social systems of

"This paper was written especially for Class, Status and Power: A Reader in
Social Stratification, Bendix & Lipset, Eds. It may be regarded as a revision of
the author's earlier paper, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social
Stratification," first published in the American Journal of Sociology, May 1940,
and reprinted in the Essays, both the first edition (Chapter VII) and the
present one (Chapter IV). The Editors of the stratification volume originally
proposed reprinting of this older paper in it. However, so much work had
intervened in the meantime, both in tlie field of general theory and more
specifically on social stratification, tliat it seemed much better to attempt a
new statement of a general approach to the field. The more recent phases
of the work in general tlieory on which the present paper relies most heavily
will be found discussed in three publications in which the author has had a
major part: Parsons and Shils, Editors, Toward a General Theory of Action
(Harvard University Press, 1951); Parsons, The Social System (Free Press,
1951); and Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action
(Free Press, 1953). In audition Bales' Interaction Process Analysis (Addison-
Wesley Press, 1950) has played a very important part in the background.

On the empirical side the author has, over a considerable period, been en-
gaged in a study of social mobility among high school boys in collaboration
with Samuel A. Stouffer, Florence Kluckhohn, and a research staff. Though
results of this study are not yet ready for publication, the work on it has ex-

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 387

action, two fundamental implications. First the units of systems,
whetlier they be elementary unit acts or roles, collectivities, or
personalities, must in the nature of the case be subject to evalu-
ation. To say that all acts w^ere valued equally, that it did not
"matter" what a person did or how he did it, would simply be to
say that the category of evaluation was irrelevant to the analysis of
action. But given the process of evaluation, the probability is that
it will serve to differentiate entities in a rank order of some kind.
Exactly equal evaluation of two or more entities may of course
occur, but it is a special case of evaluative judgment, not a demon-
stration of its irrelevance. Just how great the differentiations may
be, how permanent or generalized they are, and by what criteria
they are made is of course the focus of a whole series of analytical
and empirical problems, but that they should he imputed to actors
in a system is inherent in the frame of reference we employ for
the analysis of social interaction,^

erted a major influence on my theoretical thinking about the general field. In
addition, in collaboration with Dr. Bales and two assistants, an attempt is
being made to link together the study of stratification in the large-scale society
and in small groups, using in a broad way tlie conceptual scheme outlined in
this paper. Both projects have been carried out under the auspices of the Har-
vard Laboratory of Social Relations. Besides the general funds of the Labora-
tory, the study of mobility has received financial support in the first instance
from the Russell Sage Foundation, but also from the Rockefeller Foundation
and the Harvard Graduate School of Education. I would like herewith to ex-
press gratitude to all these agencies for their assistance.

The paper is, therefore, by no means a product of individual work, but is
essentially collaborative in nature. In the work in general theory I am parti-
cularly indebted to my collaborators, Shils and Bales, and to the co-authors of
Toward a General Theory of Action. With reference to the field of stratification
there is a special debt to Samuel Stouffer and Florence Kluckliohn, and to staff
members who have worked intimately with me on relevant aspects of the two
empirical projects, especially most recently Frank E. Jones, Bengt G. Rund-
blad, and Joseph Berger. I am, however, solely responsible for the specific
formulations which are here set forth. I am greatly indebted to Professor
Stoufi^er, Dr. Bales, and Messrs. Jones, Rundblad and Berger for criticism of the
first draft of this paper.

1 It should be clear that this process of differentiation, with respect to ranking
as in other respects, is a process internal to the social system. In its develop-
ment extra-system phenomena, such as sex, age, individual differences serve as
points of reference. These may determine what concrete units will occupy what
place and in part sometimes affect the range of differentiation, but they never
determine the basic pattern itself which derives from the exigencies of process
in the system as such.

Fiu-thermore, differentiation and integration are, in social as in biological
systems, correlative phenomena. The differentiation of units in a system from
each other in rank as in other respects, involves ipso facto tlie integration of
the components of the units. In the stratification aspect this means that by the
same process by which collectivities are differentially ranked the members of
any one come to be treated as equals— thus the equality of members of a
family unit is a corollary of the differentiation in class status of the family from
other families.

388 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The second implication is the well-known one that it is a condi-
tion of the stability of social systems that there should be an inte-
gration of the value-standards of the component units to constitute
a "common value-system." Again the content of such a common
value system and the degree and modes of its integration with the
actual action of the units in a social system vary empirically. But
the existence of such a pattern system as a point of reference for
the analysis of social phenomena is a central assumption which fol-
lows directly from the frame of reference of actions as applied to
the analysis of social systems.

Stratification in its valuational aspect then is the ranking of units
in a social system in accordance with the standards of the common
value system. This ranking may be equal but obviously from a log-
ical point of view this is a limiting case, and there are good reasons
to believe that from an empirical point of view it should also be so
regarded, the more so the larger and more complex the system. The
valuational aspect must be analytically distinguished from the others
entering into the total "power" system of a society.

In the above statement care has been taken to use the very gen-
eral term "unit" as the "that which" to which ranking evaluation is
applied. One of the most important ranges of problems in the field
of stratification is the discrimination of the different kinds of units
to which the categories of stratification can be applied, and the
order of relations of these different kinds of units to each other.

It will simplify our analysis if in a strict sense we focus attention
on social systems, and hence confine the technical discussion of
the bases of social stratification to the ranking of the units of a
given system of specific reference in terms of scope and time-span.
We may then maintain that for a given social system, in the theo-
retical sense, there can be only one kind of unit, which is the
"membership" role, or status-role complex. The "actor" of whom
this is a role may, however, be either an individual human being or
a collectivity, and it is particularly important to keep in mind that
these two cross-cut each other, a collectivity by definition is com-
posed of a plurality of roles pertaining to actors each of whom has
roles in several different collectivities. Strictly speaking we will not
refer to a personality as having a place in a scale or system of social
stratification, because even in the case of the total society an in-
dividual's membership does not exhaust his personality as a system.

This focus on the specific social system is, we believe, exceedingly

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 389

important. But the familiar sociological fact that a given actor has a
plurality of roles, calls our attention to the fact that the particular
system which is isolated for analysis never stands alone but is al-
ways articulated with a plurality of other systems, specifically
though not exclusively, the systems in which the same actors have
other roles, such for example as kinship units and occupational or-
ganizations in our society. We have found by experience that a
great many of the problems of empirical sociological analysis can
most effectively be handled by treating more than one system at a
time. We shall have occasion below to consider a number of prob-
lems in these terms, but in the meantime it is most important to
define our terms and the basic relationships with which we are con-
cerned in terms of a single system of reference, and then to
introduce the further complications involved in the articulations of
more than one system with each other.

Specific judgments of evaluation are not applied to the system
unit as such— except in a limiting case— but to particular properties
of that unit— always by comparison with others in the system. These
properties may be classificatory, in the sense of characterizing the
unit independently of its relations to other objects in a system as
in the case of sex, age or specific abilities, or they may be rela-
tional, characterizing the way in which it is related to other entities
as in the case of membership in a kinship unit.^

Looked at on another basis the properties to which a judgment
may be applied may be classified as qualities, performances (in-
cluding their reward significance as sanctions) and possessions.^

Qualities are those properties of a unit which can be evaluated
independently of any change in its relations to objects in its situ-
ation, but may be ascribed to the unit as such. Thus when we say
a man "has an I.Q. of 120" we describe a quality usually called "in-
telligence." When, however, we say, "he gave the right answer to
the question" we describe a performance, which is thus a process
of change in his relation to a situational object, the questioner, which

2 This distinction will be recognized as an application of the pattern variable,
universalism-particularism.

3 More accurately qualities and performances are attributable to the system
unit as such, whereas possessions are situational objects in some sense inde-
pendent of such a unit. Qualities (including performance-capacities) may be
modified by learning processes, but they are not transferable. Possession, how-
ever, is a relation to an object which can be transferred from one actor to
another. Qualities (or performances) may be instrumentally or expressive-
symbolically significant. This distinction is parallel to that between facilities
and rewards, as categories of the meaning of possessions.

390 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

can be ascribed to his "agency." Qualities may be interpreted, of
course, in whole or in part, as consequences of previous processes of
performance, on the part of the system-unit in question and/or of
others in the system, and performances are never understandable
without reference to an ascriptive or quality point of reference
which describes "that which" is the starting point of the perform-
ance and that which brings it about. Thus to give the right answer
the man had to be "intelligent." Or to say a man is now a member
of the American Sociological Society is to describe a quality, but he
got there by a variety of performances including (if an "active"
member) getting a Ph.D., applying for membership and paying
his dues. Hereditary status is the limiting case where only qualities
and no prior performances are the requisites, the "ascriptive base,"
of a social status.'*

Possessions are situational objects which are intrinsically trans-
ferable and to which an actor (individual or collective) in a social
system has a specific relationship of "control" such that he has in
the institutionalized case rights to their use, control or disposal dif-
ferentiated from those held by other units in the system. In the
nature of the case possessions are valued objects, valued directly by
their possessor and either actually or potentially by others in the
system. Possession is thus a category not of the "intrinsic" nature of
the object, but of its relation to a unit in a system as distinguished
from its relation to other units in the same system. Possessions in
turn may be of two primary orders of significance in social systems,
either of which may have primacy. On tlie one hand they may be
"facilities," i.e. means-objects relative to instrumental goal-attain-
ment processes, on the otlier hand "rewards," i.e. objects which
either are objects of direct gratification or are symbolically asso-
ciated with such objects.''

It is quite clear that the concrete hierarchical "position" of a
system-unit in a social system cannot be only a function of its place
in the scale of valuation relative to an integrated common value-
system, because no social system is ever perfectly integrated in this
sense. It is convenient to conceptualize this element of discrepancy

"* The reader who is interested in more technieal developments of the theory
of action, may think of quahties in this sense as describing a given location of
a system unit in action-space, whereas performances describe a change of
location from one point to another. Cf. Parsons, Bales and Shils, Working
Papers, Chaps. 3 & 5.

^ Cf. Parsons, The Social System, Chaps. Ill and IV for an extensive discus-
sion of these categories.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 391

between the normatively defined "ideal" ranking order and the
actual state of affairs, in terms of the relation between ranking in
value terms and "power." Power we may define as the realistic ca-
pacity of a system-unit to actualize its "interests" ( attain goals, pre-
vent undesired interference, command respect, control possessions,
etc.) within the context of system-interaction and in this sense to
exert influence on processes in the system.*'

Power in this sense we may conceive to be the resultant of three
sets of factors which are cognate with the above aspects of insti-
tutionalized ranking but are treated differently in order to permit
the analysis of discrepancies between institutionalized standards
and the empirical state of affairs. The first of these is the valuation
of the unit in the system according to value standards, whether
completely common throughout the system or not, and including
both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of judgment in
relation to the standards. The second is the degree to which and
the manner in which actors in the system permit deviance from
these standards in performance. The most obvious way in which
this factor can be seen to operate is the permission of other actors
to allow any one (ego) to do things which are more or less out of
line with the common value standards. The third set of factors is
the control of possessions, which is a source of differential advan-
tage in bringing about a desired result (including preventing one
not desired). The assumption is that these three sets of factors are
interdependent and hence that "position" with respect to any one
of them will be correlated with position with respect to each of
the others, but they will also be to some degree independent.

From this point of view one type of measure of the integration
of a social system (that in terms of pattern consistency) should be
the degree to which ranking in terms of paramount common value
standards does in fact correlate with all three of the above sets of
factors. Any such correlation would, however, be a complex result-
ant of a variety of considerations. Thus there is no reason to believe
that all of the units in the system conform or are expected to con-
form equally with the common value-standards. If ego— the unit of
reference— conforms relatively more fully than the others this may

^ It will be noted that this definition confines the relevant "interests" to those
within the system of reference. The use of one system-membership to promote
interest in influencing events in another system in which the same concrete
entity, e.g. personality, is involved, presents further complications, which need
to be handled independently and not in this elementary set of definitions.

392 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

diminish ego's power relative to that of the others because he is
less willing to exploit opportunities forbidden by the norms. On
the other hand his own deviance, if it happens to mesh with that of
others, may increase his power, because he is allowed to "get away
with it." The effect of deviance on power naturally depends on just
what the nature of the deviance in question on both sides is.
Similarly, access to possessions is always to some degree a function
of factors which are "adventitious" from the point of view of the
value-standards of the system; these discrepancies may or may not
be corrected by the equilibrating mechanisms of the system.'

The problems of the place of power in social systems shade
directly over into those of authority. Both root in the most elemen-
tary fundamentals of social interaction on the one hand, its norma-
tive control on the other. Interaction, as we will discuss further
below, is a continual interplay of what we call "performance" and
"sanctions." What people do has an influence on the state of the
system as a system, and on each other as members; the latter is
the sanction aspect. In so far as influence on the action of others
in the system becomes an institutionalized expectation of a role,
we have the roots of authority. Authority, finally, is full blown when
this institutionalized expectation comes to include the legitimation
of "coercive" sanctions, that is the right to impose consequences
deprivational to alter in case he fails to act as ego has an institu-
tionalized right to expect he will, and of course to use the "threat"
of such consequences to motivate alter to "conform."

Authority in this sense is an aspect of power in a system of social
interaction; it is institutionalized power over others. In the nature
of the case it must be evaluated, and therefore like other evaluated
aspects, be stratified. In the strictest sense we probably ought to
say that every member of a social system has some authority, at
the very least he would be felt to be justified in passively resisting
"unreasonable" demands upon him by others, in efiFect saying nega-

■^ It will be remembered that in the earlier paper, of which the present one is
considered to be a revision, six criteria of differential evaluation were distin-
guished, namely, membership in a kinship unit, personal qualities, achieve-
ments, possessions, authority and power. Three of these, membership, authority
and qualities have now all been consolidated under the one general category
of qualities, but this is defined more broadly than before to include any qual-
ities of a unit of a social system, not only "personal" qualities. It was not seen
at that time that what we here call "relational" qualities, e.g. memberships,
could be treated as qualities of the unit. Furthermore authority, as will be dis-
cussed below, is a quality of the "status" of a unit. Finally, power is redefined
as a resultant ratlier than as a residual factor.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 393

tively "if you do this, I won't—" do something expected. This is cer-
tainly a coercive sanction. In common usage however we tend to
restrict the term authority to the higher ranges of the stratification
of institutionahzed power; thus we speak of parental authority over
children but seldom of children's authority over their parents.

It should also be noted that authority, as legitimizing the use of
power involving coercive sanctions, is not an isolated phenomenon.
It is part of a much larger family of mechanisms of social control
each of which may involve an element of authority, but also other
elements as well. Thus patterns of religious ritual, of therapy, and
of facilitation of ecological adjustment through intervention in the
distribution of possessions or communication may serve this type of
function. We will comment briefly on some of these problems below.

Empirically the imperfections of integration of social systems for-
mulated by the two non-valuational components of the power of a
unit may be extremely important. However, the point of view
from which we approach the analysis of stratification prescribes that
analysis should focus on the common value-pattern aspect. Only
through this can we gain stable points of reference for a technical
theoretical analysis of the empirical influence of the other compo-
nents of the system-process. This is essentially because on general
theoretical grounds we can state that the "focus" of the structure
of a system of action lies in the common value-pattern aspect of
its culture.

We have throughout treated the stratification of a social system
as an aspect of its fundamental structure. It may be regarded as one
of the most important conclusions of sociological theory that the
distinction between the normative and the factual aspects of a
social system must be regarded as relative. The basic categories in
terms of which we describe a system as a structure, i.e. as a set of
objects seen from the point of view of an observer, are the same as
those in terms of which we describe the norms which regulate
behavior or performance. This does not in any way imply that de-
viance from normative expectations is not to be treated as impor-
tant, but concerns only the nature of the categories in terms of
which social phenomena are to be described and analyzed.

Every unit in a system of action, e.g. the actor in a social role, is
treated both as an object having ascertainable qualities, and as an
entity performing the functions of a role. In the quaHty aspect we
may, so far as his position in the system is concerned, speak of an

394 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

actor's status; in the performance aspect we may speak of his role
in the narrower technical sense. The value-standards of the com-
mon value system then will on the one hand categorize the units of
the system as objects in status terms, and the units will be stratified
in this respect so far as application of these status categories leads
to differences of evaluation according to the common standards. At
the same time, for objects having the qualities in question there
will also be expected performances. These in turn will be evaluated
in terms of norms, and the actual performances will be differ-
entially evaluated.

The distinction of performance and quality is, it is important to
recognize, relative. Every performance implies what may be called
an ascriptive or a "quality-base," a description of "that which" acts.
The evaluation of performances is always relative to that base; we
never literally mean that a performance is to be judged with no
reference to ivho is responsible for it. Thus we say "pretty good,
considering he is only twelve years old" or "Somebody with all his
experience ought to have done better." Naturally we very often
think or speak eliptically, and just say "well done" or the reverse;
but the quality-base may always be regarded as implicit if it is not
explicit.

At the same time performances have consequences. If these con-
cern only the situation of action, they may be ignored, not from the
point of view of evaluation of the performance, but in the quality
context. If, however, these consequences involve change in the
properties of the actor (through learning), then we may speak of a
change in his own quality-patterns. A child, as actor in a social
system, does not remain unchanged, but his qualities develop as a
function of the socialization process itself.

On the basis of recent theoretical work it seems possible to treat
the standards on the basis of which both object-qualities and per-
formances are evaluated as reducible to four fundamental types
which correspond to what we believe to be the four dimensions of
action systems.'*^ Any concrete system, including a single role-status
unit considered as a sub-system, will be subjected to all four types
of standard, but they will stand in different orders of precedence in

8 For the theoretical basis of these statements and the derivation of the four
standard types see the Workiiifi Papers, op. cit. See especially Chapter V,
Figure 2, p. 179 and Sec. V of tliat chapter.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 395

different kinds of systems. We will first take up the four types of
standard in their relation to the normative control of performances,
and then speak of their application to the evaluation of status-
qualities.

The first type of standard we wish to consider, in relation to the
evaluation of objects and performances, involves in its cognitive
aspect, what we call universalism. In relation to performance its
dominance defines what we call "technical" norms which maximize
universalistic values in the adaptation of action to the intrinsic
properties of the situational object-system in the service of a spe-
cific goal. This is what in common sense terms we ordinarily mean
by "efficiency." The only reference is to the effectiveness with which
objects in the situation are utilized (including adaptation to its
uncontrollable features) in the interest of attainment of the goal.
There is no consideration of the justification or usefulness of this
particular goal-state itself nor of the consequences of the perform-
ances taken for other units in the system, i.e. in an integrative con-
text, nor of change in quahties of the system. Cognitive knowledge
of the situation is at a premium in defining a technical norm, but
a certain level of effort or commitment to the goal is presumed as
well.

The second basic type of standard is that having to do with the
definition of goals of an action process themselves, what in pattern-
variable terms we have called performance or achievement. As a
system-norm, it will either specify the system-goal or goals to which
the unit is expected to contribute, ( this we may call the prescriptive
case) or it will define the limits of permissible "private" goals of
the unit ( the permissive case ) . As such, an achievement norm does
not define the instrumental or technical means-acts which are
expected but only the goal itself, and of course it is not concerned
with other kinds of consequences either relative to system-integra-
tion or to changes in the qualities of the system or its units.

The third type of standard does concern integration and may be
called the system-integrative. It defines expectations with respect
to a unit's contribution to the maintenance of solidarity with other
units in the system. The focus is on the quality of attitude, on posi-
tive action expected to be taken in the interest of inter-unit soli-
darity. The standards are particularistic, not universalistic, in that
it is the status of both units in their relation of common member-

396 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ship in the same system which constitutes the basis of the expecta-
tions of showing soHdarity. It focuses on the integrative or parti-
cularistic dimension.

Finally, the fourth type of standard concerns the maintenance
and/or regulation of changes in the ascriptive-qualitative "base"
from which other performances take their departure. There are two
primary types of expressive action concerned. The first comprises
those which are expressive of, or implement tlie value-patterns
ascribed to the unit in its status in the system independent of spe-
cific adaptive problems, specific goals or the inter-unit integration
of the system in the particularistic solidarity sense. The second
type is that oriented to bringing about changes in the qualities of the
unit itself through learning processes. In system terms, that is,
socialization is governed by qualitative-ascriptive norms.

From the dynamic or performance point of view social interaction
is a continual back-and-forth alternation between performances and
"sanctions." Sanctions may be thought of as actions which express
attitudes toward the action or performance of others through reward
and punishment. The distinction, it should be made clear, is an
analytical one. Every ( concrete ) act has potential consequences for
the maintenance or change of system state, and is in some degree
oriented to these consequences— this is the aspect we have just been
discussing under the heading of performances. At the same time
every act is in some degree a reaction to the acts of others, and
involves at least an implicit evaluation of the acts of other actors
in the system. It thereby exerts an influence on their subsequent
actions; this is the sanction aspect.

For every type of norm for evaluating performance there is a
norm which defines the corresponding "appropriate" type of sanc-
tion. The formulae for the performance norms look from the dimen-
sion of primary focus "forward" to the next stage of the action pro-
cess, i.e. a technical norm is defined in relation to the specific goal.
The sanction norm on the other hand looks "backward" to the
phase from which the process is emerging and thus "rewards"— in
the positive case— successful transition to a new phase. Thus in the
first type of sanction, which corresponds to technical norms, we may
speak of "approval" as referring both to universalistic standards,
and to the quality base from which the performance takes its depar-
ture; the attitude of "neutrality" protects this quality base and uni-

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 397

versalistic orientation from being "diverted" into premature enjoy-
ment of the goal in question or of other available goal-states/-*

The sanction norms corresponding to the four performance norms
outlined above are, in the same order, first "approval" which is
characterized by attitudes of "specificity," i.e. relativity to the spe-
cific goal to which the action-process in question is cornmitted, and
"neutrality" which is relativized to the initial quality-base and in-
hibits consummatory gratification or diversion prior to attainment
of the goal-state. The second is "response" characterized by attitudes
of specificity and affectivity which is appropriate to the consum-
matory goal-state itself, and directly rewards the actor with access
to goal-objects. It should therefore be conditional on tlie attain-
ment of an approval goal. The third, appropriate to the system-
integrative performance norm is "acceptance" in the form of reci-
procation of the showing of solidarity and characterized by attitudes
of affectivity and diffuseness and the fourth, finally, we have called
"esteem," the evaluation of the unit as a unit in terms of the whole
complex of its qualities, i.e. its total status in the system and char-
acterized by attitudes of diffuseness and neutrality.

The standards governing the evaluation of the qualities of system
units as objects are exactly the same as those governing perform-
ances. In this context, corresponding to technical norms we would
speak of standards evaluating the adaptive or technical perform-
ance-capacities or "competence" of the actor as object, correspond-
ing to the goal-defining norm simply of his goal-orientations, cor-
responding to the system-integrative, to his quality of system-
loyalty, and finally corresponding to the qualitative-ascriptive
standard, we would speak of his residual-qualities. What binds the
performance norms and the quality-standards together is simply
the fact that we think of both as defining the stable state of system-
process. When the system and its units are looked at "statically,"
i.e. as objects in abstraction from the processes going on within
the system, then these norms define the qualities of tlie object and
the sub-objects or "parts" of which it is composed.

In the light of these considerations the formal composition of the
stratification of a social system may be summed up as follows. The
categories in terms of which social objects ( actors ) and systems of

3 The relations between performance-norms and sanction-norms will be found
discussed in Working Papers, Chap. V, Sec. IV. Cf. especially Figure 5, p. 203.

398 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

them in roles are analyzed, are categories which in one aspect are
value-standards. Value-standards, then are classified in terms of the
same dimensions or variables which differentiate units in the social
system in a structural sense and which define the types of sanc-
tioned performance of those units and hence the appropriate sanc-
tions relative to those performances. The evaluation of qualities and
performances has inherently a hierarchical aspect because according
to any value-standard some will rank higher than others. The next
crucial problem we have to face, then, is that of how the different
standards are organized relative to each other in a given social
system; how, that is to say, they constitute a system of standards.

From this point of view any given social system will have a
"paramount" value pattern which, in ideal type terms, we may clas-
sify as belonging to one of the four major types we have outlined.
Thus the paramount values may emphasize efficiency of technical
achievement as such without primary reference to the specification
of goals; they may emphasize a paramount system-goal as the focus
of valuation, they may emphasize the integration of the system, the
relations of solidarity of the units with each other, or finally, they
may emphasize the implementation and preservation of ascribed
system-qualities.^" This is an ideal type classification and hence it
can be taken as a point of departure in order to deal with mixed
types. However, the problem we are now dealing with is quite
sufficiently complex without just now complicating it further by
taking these explicitly into account.

Given the paramount value system, there will be a specification

of the primary aspects of the system as a total object in relation to

each of the four types of standard. As such the system will have

ascriptive base-qualities, it will exist in a situation with concrete

specification of the adaptive problem and hence norms for dealing

wth them— or level of competence to do so; there will be a definition

^^ It is fully realized that this classification of types of basic value-patterns is
highly" formal" and thus by no means concretely adequate for empirical pur-
poses. It must be filled in by the concrete content of the cultural categories
under consideration, which are given in the concrete belief systems and the
concrete system of expressive symbolism. The reason why this classification is
crucial for our present purpases and wliy its formality is not a handicap but a
great advantage, is that it expresses the fundamental categories of the staic-
ture of the social system. If stratification is to be treated as a generalized aspect
of social structure it must be analyzed in terms which are general to all in-
stances and sub-classes of the type of system we are considering. In terms of
the logical structure of our conceptual scheme, what we are dealing with here
is analogous to the "primary qualities" of Locke's picture of the physical
world, whereas, specific cultural content is analogous to "secondary" qualities.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 399

of paramount system-goals and limits of commitment to them;
there will be definitions of the appropriate modes and levels of soli-
darity of the units with each other.

After specifying these aspects of the system, which means "spell-
ing out" the paramount value system in each of the primary func-
tional contexts of system process, we can then approach the prob-
lem of analyzing the structural difiFerentiation of roles in the system.
It should be remembered that we are dealing with this on a purely
descriptive structural level. We are aware that the number of units
belonging to a system, for example, is itself a function of system-
process over time, and from a dynamic point of view should not be
assumed as given, but for present purposes we will ignore this.

The first level of structural analysis is, we may say, the distinc-
tion of "primary" sub-systems, i.e. those which may be interpreted
to constitute direct differentiations of the major system itself. There
will, then, be one of these primary subsystems which is the one
given most stress by the common value system, the one in which
the paramount values are most directly embodied. Since we inter-
pret the American value system to be very closely described in
terms of the universalism-achievement (or performance) pattern,
we may say the strategic subsystem is the "occupational" i.e. the
subsystem organized about the adaptive problems of the total sys-
tem. There should then be a sub-system oriented to system-goal
attainment, one to system-integration and one to expression and
maintenance (including socialization) of the institutionalized as-
criptive-qualitative pattern-complex, i.e. a subsystem with prima-
rily "cultural" functions.

At this point, however, two very important sets of analytical, to
say nothing of empirical, difficulties, arise. The first concerns the
fact that concrete structures do not follow the lines of differentia-
tion of system-function exactly. The functional or dimensional
classification is a frame of reference in terms of which this differ-
entiation may be analyzed, but because of the empirical interre-
lations between the units, the segregation of their properties from
each other does not neatly follow the lines of such a classification.
The situation is closely analogous to that in the biological sciences.
Without the categories of metabohsm, respiration, locomotion, co-
ordination and the like, it would be impossible to analyze the struc-
ture and functioning of complex organisms, but speaking of any
one concrete organ-system as serving only one organic function is

400 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

seldom legitimate. Exactly what the 'Talurrings" of the analytical
lines we have drawn will be in any concrete case will vary with the
type both of value system and of level of its differentiation as a
social system. Rather than attempting to get into these problems
here, it will be better to touch them briefly in relation to concrete
illustration of this analysis.

The second set of difficulties concerns the complexities of system-
subsystem relationships in a full scale social system. At one extreme
we have the type of differentiation found in small groups which
Bales has so ably analyzed. ^^ In a five-member group for example
the possibilities of such differentiation are very strictly limited, but
even here the question must be raised of whether each member's
role should be treated by itself, or whether it is not better to think
of sub-collectivities as already present. It would be appropriate,
for example, to speak of these as "coalitions" or "cliques." Similar
considerations are important in the analysis of family units as systems.

At the other extreme we have the problem of treating such a
complex entity as American Society. For purposes of empirical
analysis the problems seem to center on the relations between three
principal different levels of unit. The one we speak of most com-
monly is the role of the individual actor, not in his total societal
membership but in specific interaction subsystems such as his con-
jugal family or the particular occupational organization, etc. The
second is that of the interactive system of which such a role is itself
a unit, e.g. his conjugal family, or the particular occupational or-
ganization in which he works. The third level then concerns sub-
systems of the society which are aggregates of such units grouped
in relation to common paramount function, such as the occupa-
tional function type or the governmental function and the like.
Again, it seems best merely to call attention at this point to this
immensely difficult field, and to reserve any further treatment of it
for the illustrative analysis of the American stratification system.

Let us return to the problem of the relationships of different types
of evaluative standards to each other. It was stated above that
the type of paramount value-system will establish the primacy of
the norm-type which directly "embodies" these values, in our Amer-
ican case, universalistic-performance values. "Commitment" of the
system to such a set of values we may interpret to mean a tendency
to maximize their implementation in action and thus in concrete
J'Ci. International Process Analysis and Working Papers, op. cit. Ch. IV.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 401

system-structure. This tendency is, however, subject to certain
exigencies, those of adaptation to the conditions of the extra-system
situation— which of course includes other social systems— the inte-
grative exigencies involved in the maintenance of solidary relations
in a system consisting of the kind and number of units in question
and those concerned with maintenance of the institutionalization of
these patterns and management of the attendant motivational ten-
sions. Thus we would class "size" of the society as defined by its
population as constituting an integrative exigency, as would its
composition for example in terms of the ethnic origins of the
population.

Whatever the type of value system, it is this which defines the
primary ascriptive-qualitative base in terms of which the other
aspects of its structure nmst be analyzed. Thus the general dimen-
sional scheme we have outlined must be applied on two diflFerent
levels, first to define the type of system with which we are dealing
in terms of its type of paramount value-system, and second, to
analyze the internal diflPerentiation of the system using this para-
mount value-pattern type as the ascriptive base from which to
carry out the analysis.

Then we must ask what are the implications of the value system
for the definition of goals. First this must be asked on the level of
a goal or goals for the system as such, and then for the units on
whatever level is being considered. Implications for unit goals in
turn may be either prescriptive— both relatively continuous as with
reference to a governmental unit or a university, and in special
circumstances, as in relation to a national emergency— or permissive.
Furthermore, it must be noted that it is fundamental to the nature
of differentiation of a system, that the goals of units should also
be differentiated. Differentiated unit-goals then must be defined
either as "contributions" to system function, or permissively as fall-
ing within limits allowed.

Clearly, what differentiated unit goals will be prescribed or per-
mitted will be a function, in turn, of the three sets of exigencies we
have noted in their relation to the paramount value-system. Even in
very simple systems there is reason to believe that some differen-
tiation on the axis of the distinction between adaptive and integra-
tive functions will take place, i.e. of units whose paramount func-
tion and therefore sub-system goals are more adaptive than any-
thing else, and of units whose paramount functions are more

402 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

integrative than anything else. Both these may however be combined
in subtle ways with system-goal-oriented and pattern-maintenance
or ascriptive functions and hence subsystem goals.

In general we may say that the criteria of relative priority of these
functions and hence sub-system goals will be defined in terms of
the consequences of performance, in the expected way, of the sys-
tem-functions or the maintenance of the system and its institution-
alized value-patterns; it will, that is to say, be a matter of the
strategic significance of the unit-functions in the system process. It
is evident that this significance will vary as a function both of the
type of value system and its cultural content and of the concrete
adaptive, integrative and regulatory exigencies to which it is sub-
ject. We cannot therefore lay down any general priority scales in-
dependent of these factors. In general, however, we can say that
the function most directly institutionalizing the paramount value
will have first place; the problems for analysis concern the ranking
of the other principal functions. In other words what we have devel-
oped here is not an empirical generalization about rank-ordering,
but only a set of categories in terms of which the empirical problem
may be approached.

There remain two further general analytical problems before we
can attempt to illustrate through the analysis of certain aspects of
the American stratification system. The first of these is that of the
way in which the analysis of the place of possessions is to be fitted
into the scheme outlined above. The second is the problem of the
modes and degrees of integration of the different criteria of differen-
tial ranking to form a single "general prestige continuum."

The key to the analysis of possessions lies in the distinction be-
tween facilities and reward objects. Facilities are to be categorized
according to performance-norms, rewards according to sanction
norms. It should, of course, be kept in mind, as noted above, that
a concrete object may be— indeed in principle always is— both a
facility and a reward, but one or the other aspect of its significance
may be of primary importance in a given context. Facilities and
rewards are, strictly speaking, categories of the meaning or signif-
icance of objects, they are not classes of concrete objects.

In the facility or performance aspect the basic classification of types
of possession is that relative to the system-functions in relation to
which they serve as facilities, i.e. relative to the role of the possess-
ing unit, and its various sub-differentiations. Thus for the unit all
facilities have instrumental functions, but for the system the func-

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 403

tions of the facilities will be relative to those of the unit in the system.
A blast furnace has instrumental functions for a steel-manufactur-
ing concern, but pews and priestly robes have instrumental func-
tions as facilities for a church. This duality of reference must always
be kept in mind in judging the categorization of an object of pos-
session. Of course the same distinction may be repeated if the unit
itself is treated as a system. Then there will be facilities for its
adaptive functions, for its goal-consummation phase, or its own inte-
grative functions and for its pattern-maintenance and tension-release
function.

The allocation of roles and that of facilities in a system must, as
a condition of integration of the system, have some kind of ordered
correspondence. This is to say that this is a condition of the stable
state of the system, that is of conformity with or integration in
terms of, its value system. The basic principle of optimum alloca-
tion would seem to be "the facilities to those who need them most to
promote whatever goals or values are relevant to the system as
defined in its specific culture." The standard of effectiveness of
course is contribution to system-function. It therefore includes both
a component of "technical" efficiency and one of commitment to an
institutionalized role, with its various functions in the system. The
relevant questions therefore are first to what end are the facilities
used and second, how efiFectively are they used? The first question
includes adherence to "regulative" rules which protect the interests
of other system-units and functions. The most important general
inference from these considerations seems to be that in so far as a
social system is stratified on the basis of the differential strategic
contributions of its units to system-function, there will tend to be
a corresponding differentiation in the facilities allocated to those
units. This becomes particularly important in the situations where
there are mechanisms of generalization of the control of facilities,
of which money is an outstanding example. Then we would say
that the rank order of control of facilities should tend to correspond
to the rank order of the evaluation of unit-function in the system;
any lack of such correspondence may be regarded as a disturbing
factor in the situation. Furthermore this broad generalization should
with better knowledge, be subject to progressively more minute
specification.

The case of rewards is very closely parallel. However a certain
setting of the more concrete problems needs to be kept in mind.
There is a partial lack of symmetry in the two categories of posses-

404 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

sion because of the fact that adaptive functions require control of
objects which are inherently independent of the interaction process
itself, whereas it seems to be one of the crucial features of human
action systems that this is not so much the case with the functions
of rewards. What we mean to say is that the most basic rewards are
the attitudes of actors and therefore that possession of reward-ob-
jects which are not themselves social objects, is primarily significant
through the fact that this possession can be treated as the symbolic
manifestation of the attitudes of one or more actors. This can be
brought out most clearly in the case of social interaction, but even
in empirical independence of this, it can be said that a person's
valuation of self-acquired reward-objects is a function of his atti-
tude toward the object in essentially the same sense; its possession
symbolizes his "success" in achieving a valued goal in the same way
as if it had been "given" to him by another.

Rewards then are to be classified in terms of their appropriate-
ness as sanctions to the corresponding categories of performances.
A duality of system-reference is as essential in this field as in that
of the analysis of facilities. The overall, superordinate classification
of types of reward must be made from the point of view of system-
function. Then we would speak of approval and its symbols in rela-
tion to adaptive performances, of response and its symbols with
reference to system-goal attainment, acceptance with reference to
system-integration, etc. But the unit is itself a subsystem and the
same logical pattern of differentiation applies to it in turn but with
different specific content. Then for a unit with primarily adaptive
functions, approval and its symbols are rewards for technical oper-
ations effectively performed, but not for "success" in goal-attain-
ment. The right to the "proceeds" as available for "consumption" is
essential in the latter context and this is to be classified as a
response-reward. Acceptance in turn implies recognition of "contri-
bution" to the system, which goes beyond either of the above types
of reward for unit-success alone.

There is an essentially parallel relation between the integration
of possession of reward-objects and the rank-ordering of units by
direct evaluation as prevails in relation to facilities. The principle
here is the very simple one of reward in proportion to "desert," in-
terpreted in the broad sense which includes rewarding of desirable
qualities as well as of performances; it is not to be interpreted in
terms of our value system alone. Generally speaking, then, we may

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 40.5

say that it is a condition of the stable state of a system that the
reward system should tend to follow the same rank order as the
direct evaluation of units in terms of their qualities and perform-
ances. ^^

Before leaving the subject of possessions a word should be said
about symbolism in relation to stratification, though it is too big a
subject to do more than mention here. We have said above that
possession is a category of the meaning of objects (also the distinc-
tion of their facility and reward aspects ) not of their "intrinsic" prop-
erties. This is essentially to say that the situational object is always
treated symbolically. Thus instrumental utility of facilities is a
category of meaning of objects, and must be analyzed in the same
basic terms of symbolic process as other types of meaning are.

Without attempting to carry the analysis farther we may distin-
guish here roughly cognitive-instrumental meanings of objects of
possession and expressive-integrative meanings. It is the latter
broad category which presents most of the analytical problems. A
fundamental part is played in stratification systems by the expres-
sive "style of life" symbolism which is integrated with the various
status-categories, and this is one of the most important fields of the
function of possessions. It is implicit in the whole theory of action
that objects of consummatory gratification shade into symbols of
status. Thus obviously hunger-gratification is essential to maintain
life, and food-objects must have the necessary minimum nutritional
properties. But in what human beings eat, and how and under
what circumstances they eat it— as distinguished from the fact that
they eat— an enormous part is played by the— often unconscious-
symbolic significance of the choice. Thus to have steak for dinner
is on one level an assertion that "I can aflFord something especially

i^It should be clear that we are here speaking directly only of objects of posses-
sion, whether significant as faciUties or as rewards. Objects of possession
separable from the possessor shade, however, in their analytical significance,
into qualities and performances of the actor. Thus membership in a collectivity
may from one point of view be treated as a possession which can be acquired
by active efi^ort, or used as a facility in attaining a goal. It may also be re-
garded as a quality of the actor. These two points of view must be distinguished
as involving different system-references, in some and different stages of the
process through time. Thus membership in a collectivity cannot be used as a
facility for attaining goals ascribed by the membership-status itself; it can
however be used as a facility toward goals in other systems. Similarly the
same actor may be rewarded by membership in a collectivity which he has
been striving to attain, and this membership may be treated as one of his
qualities. These considerations are of course of great significance in the anal-
ysis of social mobility, and will be touched upon below in that connection.

406 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

good," or of the special occasion which it is meant to symbohze.
Essentially then we may say that expressively symbolic objects of
possession form a continuum with status-qualities themselves, a kind
of "extension" of the status-qualities of tiie possessor, and a rein-
forcer of their evaluation, positive or negative. They can thus,
among other things, serve as an instrument of power.

Our final broad analytical problem is that of tlie value-integration
of a social system in its bearing on the problem of stratification. We
have classified the standards of evaluation in terms of functions of
the social system. Since any going system must meet all of the fun-
damental functional prerequisites there must be positive evaluation
of conformity with each of the four types of norm somewhere. This
is true in a functionally integrated (as distinguished from pattern-
integrated) system. This is to say that there may be romantic" or
"utopian" values which make it a positive virtue to act in violation
of necessary conditions of system-function. In full self-conscious-
ness this of course would be rare; there is generally a veil of ration-
alization drawn over such situations.

Then, as we have said, the broad rank-order of procedence will
be, below the paramount value-pattern, the order of relative stra-
tegic importance of the exigencies relating to the other three major
functional problem-contexts of the system. Thus in our system the
primary value-focus is universalism-achievement. It may be sug-
gested that the second order precedence goes to the cultural-latent
area ( universalism-quality ) in the maintenance of the sti'ategic
cultural i)atterns on the one hand ( e.g. science, education ) and the
regulation of personal motivation in relation to the basic value-
system ( family, health, etc. ) Probably the system-integrative comes
next, and except for situations of national emergency, system-goal
attainment last; this last is primarily what we mean by our "indi-
vidualism." Or, to take a contrasting case, in a society where a
transcendental religious orientation occupies the paramount posi-
tion, the first order priority of values will rest in the ascriptive-quali-
tative norms. Then according to whether it is an actively "proselyt-
ing" religion or a more static-traditionalistic type, the next order
would tend to be the system-goal attainment or the system-integra-
tive type, with, presumably the adaptive in the last place. In the
case of Calvinism, however, system-goal came second (the "king-
dom of God on Earth") and because of the nature of this goal, the

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCTAL STRATIFICATION 407

remaking of secular society in the image of God, adaptive consider-
ations apparently outranked the system-integrative.

This broad rank-ordering of value-standard types, however, still
leaves two vital problems unsolved. The first of these concerns
what may be called the "spread" of the evaluative system, i.e. the
relative independence of different sub-system hierarchies, while the
second concerns the patterning of the "interlarding" of high rank
on one scale with lower rank on another; thus in our system how
would a rather high-ranking politician rank compared with a mid-
dle ranking business executive?

Systems of stratification undoubtedly diflFer greatly with respect
to the first problem, that of the relative importance of a tightly in-
tegrated "general prestige continuum." Thus in the European
Middle Ages there seems to have been great importance attached
to maintaining the unequivocal superiority of the nobility-gentry
over any "bourgeois" classes, and of these in turn over any peas-
antry. In our system on the other hand it is much less easy to say
that there is any specific elite group which ranks unequivocally at
the top—is it the business elite, or the "best families," or the top
professionals, or the top ranges in government? The most signif-
icant thing to be said in answer to the question apparently is that
there are no unequivocal standards by which one or the other could
be given first place, as there were in the Middle Ages, and still more
in the case of Brahman supremacy in India.

Broadly it may be said that the amount of "looseness" or spread
is a function of the relative ascendancy of universalistic-perform-
ance values, of the paramountcy of adaptive functions from the
system point of view. A departure from this pattern in the direction
of any of the other thi'ee seems to increase pressure toward tighten-
ing up the scale. If it is the system-goal direction then the standard
of contribution to the goal becomes paramount; a hierarchy of
which the instrumental organization is the prototype gains domi-
nance. The Soviet system, dominated by the goal of Communism, is
close to this type. If it is the "cultural" ascriptive-qualitative focus
then the tendency is to measure all groups in terms of this quality-
standard, i.e. to integrate the system in terms of a diffuse hierarchy
of general esteem. Pre-Nazi Germany was not very far from this
type. Finally, if it is a system-integrative emphasis, the tendancy is
to assign each unit a stably accepted place in the system, so that

408 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

potentialities of disturbance of the system-equilibrium will be
minimized. The "traditionalism" of the classical Chinese system fits
into this type.^^

These considerations lead over into two problem areas which
need to be briefly dealt with, namely tliose of ascription and of
authority. We have tried to make clear throughout that every sys-
tem-imit must have an ascriptive quality-base from which its per-
formances are to be evaluated. Certain of these qualities, however,
may be the consequences of past performances, such as achieved
collectivit>' membership. Others on the other hand are beyond con-
trol in various respects and hence the only problem is how they
are to be evaluated, not whether or not they are to be acquired or
renounced. The type cases at the latter extreme of course are the
biological characteristics of individuals such as age, sex, and bio-
logical relatedness through descent. The hereditary principle is the
extreme of using such an unalterable ascriptive point of reference
as a basis for status-allocation in a social system. In general, I think
it may be said that the adaptive and system-goal emphasis will lay
least stress on ascription in this sense, while the system-integrative
will lay most stress on it. The case of quality-emphasis will vary,
depending on the specific content of the valued qualities. Since a
very important class of such cases are those institutionalizing a
transcendental religious value system, there seems to be a strong
likelihood that this will also favor ascriptive bases; the extreme
case is India, but our own Middle Ages went quite far in that
direction.

There are important relations of interdependence between these
radically ascriptive foci and other more contingent bases of ascrip-
tion. An excellent example is territorial location. Since all action
involves human organisms one potentially relevant basis for analyz-
ing an action is always where the actor is located at the time, in-
cluding of course, changes in his location in the course of an action.
One prominent case is that of location of residence and its connec-
tion with the family as a solidary unit; in all known kinship systems
the two aspects are inherently interdependent, since the basic func-

l^This problem of looseness is being considered at present only witb reference
to the total stratification "profile" and thus involving the mode and degree of
integration of ranking according to all four types of standard. On a more
microscopic level a further problem of the mode of differentiation with respect
to any one type of standard arises. We cannot take space to go into this prob-
lem here.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 409

tions of the family imply sharing of residence in most cases. Another
example is the relation between territorial location and political
jurisdiction; political units are always organized relative to terri-
torial areas of jurisdiction. To be sure an individual may change his
residence or other location of activity under certain conditions from
one political jurisdiction to another; but the consequences of such
change and the constraints on it may be so formidable that it is
for many purposes almost as inescapable as one's sex or parentage.

The case of authority is quite different. Authority is one particu-
larly important type of superiority, that which involves the legiti-
mized right (and/or obligation) to control the actions of others in
a social relationship system. It thus belongs, as we noted above,
among the mechanisms of social control. The factor of legitimation
means that authority is always an aspect of a status in a collectivity;
in so far as this is not the case but there is only realistic ability to
control others, we speak of power.

The primary point is that authority over someone must mean in
some sense and in some respect superiority to him. It is a status-
quality involved in hierarchical evaluations. The legitimation of
the authority is ipso facto that of the superiority. But the nature
and bases of this superiority may of course vary widely. If it is
specific rather than diffuse it need not imply any generalized
superiority and may be compatible with the reverse; thus a traffic
policeman has authority to stop the car of a prominent citizen
who in general prestige terms is greatly his superior.

As Weber made clear, types of authority are to be classified in
terms of the bases of their legitimation, i.e. in terms of the value-
patterns which define the particular mode of superiority which the
authority involves. This may of course be relative to any one of the
functions of a system-process.

There are two kinds of inferences which may be drawn from this
set of references. First, authority will tend to be relatively more
prominent as a function of the priority of either goal-attainment or
system-integrative values. In the one case the focus of the need for
authority is the need to coordinate the contributions of the various
units of the system to the goal. Authority will tend to be a function
of the urgency of "getting things done." The system-integrative
case presumably gives a somewhat lesser emphasis on authority for
getting things done; it is based mainly on the negative need to
prevent units from disturbing the integration of the system, the

410 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

need to keep them "in line." The first is more "prescriptive" author-
ity, the second more "regulative." The primacy of adaptive func-
tions tends to transfer the problem of authority to the next level
down. The unit is evaluated in terms of its achievement, but
authority may be exceedingly important as one of the conditions of
bringing about this achievement. Thus in our society the authority
of the business executive is not a direct but a "derived" authority,
it is legitimized in terms of its contribution to the eflBciency of the
firm. If ascriptive-qualitative values have primacy, the situation
will tend to resemble that in the system-integrative case, but with
perhaps a somewhat greater emphasis on authority. It would seem
safe to infer that the adaptive emphasis would lead to the least
emphasis on authority unless it were a case of ascriptive values with
a strictly anti-authoritarian cast.

Secondly, the problem of authority is very much involved in the
complexities of system-sub-system relationships. It has been em-
phasized that authority is an aspect of a status in a collectivity. The
position of authority, therefore, is very much a function not only of
the unit's status in the specific collectivity, but of the position of
this collectivit)^ in any larger system of which it is a part. The ques-
tion of competing loyalties involved in the different collectivity
memberships of the same persons necessarily limit authority in any
one.

This leads us over to the problem mentioned above, that of the
"inter-larding" of the hierarchical scales set forth in terms of each
of the major types of value-standard. In a complex system, there
must be mechanisms which establish levels of relative equivalence,
as well as mechanisms which insulate against too rigid and specific
comparisons of status. Part of this function is carried out by what
may be called direct evaluation of qualities and performances. Thus
there is no doubt that any occupational role which can be ade-
quately filled by almost any normal adult will not be considered
the equal of one which is both highly valued and requires qualifi-
cations which only a few can fulfill, whatever the combination of
training and native ability which may be involved. But there are
serious limitations on the adequacy of the mechanisms of direct
evaluation. One is the level of competence necessary for an ade-
quate judgment, and hence the problem of how the judgment of
the competent few is to be brought to bear, and to become gen-
eralized through the system. A second problem concerns the in-

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 411

herent element of indeterminacy of many of the standards of rela-
tive evaluation even within a class of cases, while a third concerns
the comparability of different kinds of qualities and performances,
even if the standards are relatively clear and definite with reference
to each kind.

This gap tends to be filled, in part, by the processes of "ecologi-
cal" distribution of possessions and of evaluative judgments, both
as facilities and as reward-objects, but particularly the latter, and
in part through the allocation of attitudinal rewards. In our type of
society these mechanisms function through two main types of
channels, the monetary market system and the fluid public com-
munication system. In the first context it is above all financial re-
sources as generalized access to possessions which come to be dis-
tributed; in the latter context, in the evaluative aspect, it is espe-
cially "reputation" which is allocated. In both cases we may speak
of an ideal type of "free" competitive market process as a kind of
base line. But equally in both cases, this fails to operate fully auto-
matically even under what are empirically the best conditions.
Hence various kinds of modifying "intervention" tend to take place
which "even" the balances. Thus government or private philanthropy
channels funds into uses to which, under competitive conditions
they would not be put, such as health care or higher education,
thereby increasing both the facilities and the rewards available to
those working in those fields and the beneficiaries of their work.
Similarly a person prominent in a field goes out of the way to praise
the work of a younger less known person. By enhancing his reputa-
tion he also shifts the balance of facilities and rewards in the latter's
favor. Essentially what seems to be going on is a kind of continual
series of comparative judgments which say in effect, class A of
roles is receiving too little, class B too much, and then a shift from
B to A takes place.

It is obvious that it is particularly in processes such as these that
the relation between the three components of power which we dis-
cussed above comes to be particularly crucial in the integrative
functions of a system of stratification. It is essentially a question of
the effectiveness of operation of the mechanisms of social control.
Control of possessions is inevitably correlated with high status,
hence tliere is a source of power independent of the direct evalu-
ative legitimation of the status. Similarly potential deviance on
either ego's or alter's part may enhance these possibilities of power.

412 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The function of the mechanisms of social control is to keep the
independent i.e. the illegitimate, use of this power at a minimum. ^^

It may prove helpful to the reader in following the rather in-
volved theoretical analysis of this paper if he is given a schematic
outline of the principal conceptual elements used and some of their
most important relations.

The most important point of reference is the accompanying figure
(Fig. 2, Chap. V, p. 182 of Working Papers). This is necessarily a
highly schematic and hence in certain respects arbitrary represen-
tation, but it does show certain fundamental components and
relations.

The four dimensions of our action space or directions of process
are represented at the four corners of the figure— the adaptive (A),
the goal-attainment or gratification (G), the integrative (I), and
the latent-expressive (L). The order of the four is not arbitrary
but is fundamental, e.g. that G is between A and I.

The four types of standards defining object-qualities and per-
formance and sanction norms are described by the combinations of
pattern variables clustering at each of the corners of the figures.
These are respectively:

A. Qualities of "technical competence"

Performance norms: "technical efficiency"

(Pattern variables: universalism-performance)
Sanction norms: "approval-disapproval"
(Pattern variables: specificity-neutrality)

G. Qualities of a) "system-goal-commitment" or

b) "legitimation of unit-goal-commitment"
Performance Norms: a) system or "relational" responsi-
bility
b) regulative "rules of the game"
( Pattern-variables : performance-particularism )
Sanction norms: conditional response-reward
( Pattern-variables : affectivity-specificity )

i^The ecological allocation of possessions and of communication may, as mecli-
anisms of social systems, be treated as analogous to the "internal environment"
of which physiologists have made so much. The stability of expectations with
respect to the kind of evaluative judgments to be expected from qualities and
performances, and with respect to their relation to control of facilities and
reward-objects, is a condition of tlie integration of the system as a system.
Thus there is functional significance in the constancy of this internal environ-
ment of the social system, an environment which is non-situational for the
system as a whole, but situational, for the action of the units taken as sub-
systems. We shall attempt to analyze this somewhat further in connection with
our own system of stratification presently.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

413

/.

Direction of

energy flow

(performance process)

Figure 2

Phases in the Relationship
of a System to its Situation

KEY

DirecHon of

s)rnibolization

gleaming process)

/

Specificity
(Performance)

SLiality
u$enes5 )

Unlversalism
(Neutrality)

Affectivily
(Particularism)

1.

\

Adaptive
Instnimental

Object
Manipulation

■ /

Instrumental-

EJcpressive

Consuminatory

Performance and

C rati Beat ion

• /

Latent-Receptive

Meaning Integration

and Energy Regulation

Tension build up and

drain off.

/

K
\

Integrative-

Expressive

Sign

Manipulation

\

Neutrality
( Universalism )

Particularism
(Aflectivity)

Performance
(Specificity)

Diffuse ne«
(QuaUty)

1. A— Adaptive Phase

2. G— Goal Gratification Phase

3. I— Integrative Phase

4. L— Latent Pattern Maintenance Phase

414 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

I. Qualities of "loyalty"

Performance norms: showing solidarity

(Pattern variables: particularism-quality)
Sanction norms: diffuse acceptance

(Pattern variables: diff useness-afiFectivity )
L. Qualities of "cultural value-commitinent"
Performance norms: "cultural responsibility"

(Pattern variables: quality-universalism )
Sanction norms: showing esteem

( Pattern-variables : neutrality-diffuseness )
The organization of value-standards relative to each other is
analyzed as follows:

1. Characterization of paramount value pattern (in ideal type
terms one of the above types). This defines the content of the
Latency cell of the figure, when applied to the system as a
whole.

2. The system will then be differentiated into "primary" sub-
systems:

a) One of these will most directly institutionalize the para-
mount value system (the one whose norm type defines
this latent cell, e.g. the occupational system in the United
States )

b ) Others will be differentiated from it in relation to exigencies
of (1) situational adaptation, (2) system and unit goal at-
tainment, (3) system integration, (4) cultural pattern-
maintenance and tension-management. Structural lines
need not correspond directly to this classification, i.e. struc-
tures may be "multifunctional."

The paradigm must be used at least twice to analyze a differen-
tiated system.

The principal criterion for priority of evaluation functions, hence
differentiated subsystems, is strategic significance for system-
process.

Units are rank-ordered

1) By direct evaluation in terms of

a ) Each of four types of standard

b ) Ordering of the four by the scale of strategic significance

2) Ecological "interlarding" through

a) Allocation of facilities

b) Allocation of reward-objects and reputation
To analyze the concrete system we should distinguish

1) A hierarchy of evaluative ranking which is a function of
a) A "general prestige continuum"— more or less "tight or
loose."

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 415

b) Four major sub-hierarchies of direct evaluation in rough
interlarded rank-order.
2) A hierarchy of power as a function of

a) The above direct evaluations

b) Conformity-deviance balances

c) Allocation of possessions

We may now attempt to illustrate the abstract conceptual scheme
just outlined by a brief sketch of certain highlights of the American
system of social stratification, and the problems of analyzing the
processes of mobility within it. On particular points contrasts with
other systems will be discussed, but there will be no attempt to
present a systematic comparative analysis.

As has been several times noted, we treat American society as
having a value-system very close to the universalistic-achievement
or performance ideal type. This gives first place to unit qualities
and performances which have adaptive functions for the system.
Furthermore, and very important, the lack of stress on a specific
system-goal means that the valuation of adaptive functions is not
relativized to such a specific goal, but goals are mainly permis-
sively defined. In general then we may speak of contribution to the
production of valued facilities and reward-objects for unit-goals,
whatever, within the permissible limits, these may be, as the
primary basis of positive evaluation of unit qualities and perform-
ances.

This puts the primary emphasis on productive activity in the
economy, and also it is the source of what in a certain sense is an
"individualistic" slant in the value system. This latter must, how-
ever, be very carefully interpreted. It definitely does not mean that
only achievements of individuals in which they have not cooperated
with others are valued or even that these are given priority. The
achievements of collectivities such as business firms loom very large
indeed. The major point is rather what may be called a "pluralism
of goals" so that there is no overriding system-goal to which all
activity in the system must be conceived to be oriented.

We might put it a little di£Ferently by saying that the primary
system goal is the maximization of the production of valued pos-
sessions and cultural accomplishments which can facilitate the
attainment of legitimate unit goals— whether the units be individual
persons or various types of collectivities. This orientation places a

416 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

particularly strong emphasis on the generalization of control of
possessions through the money and market mechanisms, and on
tire generalization of evaluative communication through the allo-
cation of direct attitudinal rewards, i.e. through "reputation." The
first-order presumption is that the money value of a "product," i.e.
as an exchangeable possession, is a measure of its value relative to
others in the total productive process and similarly that money
remuneration can serve as a workable index of the "reputation" of
a unit in the system, individual or collective. This is of course only
a first order orienting point of reference, and certain of its inade-
quacies will have to be taken up below.

If this general orientation is correctly designated as the central
one, then the most directly valued achievement is what may be
called in a special American sense a "practical" one, one which
visibly eventuates in "production" in this sense. Next in order of
evaluation then would seem to be the functions which are most im-
portant in insuring the conditions on which effective productive
activities in this sense are dependent. In terms of our functional
paradigm these involve as we have noted above, three main types
or directions. The one next in order to the adaptive is probably the
ascriptive-qualitative in a special content sense, then the integra-
tive aspect and finally the system-goal. We may take up each of
these in turn.

The significance of values in the ascriptive-qualitative sphere
is perhaps best brought out in terms of its relation to the uni-
versalistic component of the basic value-orientation type. There
seems to be two main contexts of its application. One of these
concerns the standards by which productive activities themselves
are to be judged, and of course is generalized to cover other func-
tions so far as such standards can be implemented in such a field.
The place of science in our cultural system is the most important
single example of this generalization. It is true that there is a sense
in which its valuation is derivative rather than primary; the order
runs from technology to science rather than vice versa. But once
technology has attained a certain level of development the con-
nection between it and science becomes exceedingly close. The
most important single manifestation of this in the role structure of
our present society is the place of the professions which require
scientific training, notably of course engineering and medicine. The
universities as the primary location of "pure" scientific investigation

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 417

are also the places for training of professional personnel who then
practice throughout the occupational system. Very broadly, then,
contribution to the maintenance and development of a cultural
tradition which can feed into the productive processes is one of
the main classes of functions fitting into the ascriptive-qualitative
value category. These functions rank high, but one may suspect it
would take a real shift of the major value system to displace the
"applied" functions from their position of priority.

The second context of application of universalism concerns the
allocation of performance-capacities and opportunities for produc-
tive achievement. The focus of it is the universalistic definition of
"equality of opportunity" as applied both to individuals and to col-
lectivities. The differences of hereditary capacity must of course be
accepted as "facts of nature." But within this framework there is a
strong predilection to universalize opportunity. This seems to be
the primary source of our high valuation of health and of education.
Without good health and without as much training as a person has
capacity to utilize, he cannot realize his potentialities for produc-
tive achievement. It is notable that these are two fields where there
is the strongest consensus that "competitive" forces should not be
permitted to operate unmodified, especially that access to health
and to education should not be a simple function of ability to pay
for them.

Two other particularly important fields of activity also fit into
this context. One is the whole field of the regulation of the subtler
balances of personality, both in respect to socialization and to
maintaining emotional balance. This is above all the field in which
our modern type of family, as distinguished from other kinship
systems, has come to be specialized; hence perhaps it is not too far
fetched to suggest that this is a main focus of evaluation of the
feminine role. Formally professionalized handling of similar prob-
lems is, it may be noted, assimilated to the same basic context, and
treated for the adult mainly as a problem of health through psy-
chiatry, for the child as formal education. The other field concerns
the regulation of the ecological processes of the distribution of
possessions and of communication, especially reputation. It is here
for example that a large part at least of the functions of the legal
profession should be placed,^^ but also certain of the regulatory
i5Cf. Chapter XVIII above.

418 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

functions of government, and of course, of informal "public
opinion."

Integration of the system as a whole may be regarded as next in
order in the scale of function-priorities. Generally speaking we ex-
pect this to work out to a large extent through spontaneous con-
sensus and through a process of relatively free adjustment of inter-
est groups to each other, through legislative negotiation, lobbying,
etc. In general of course this set of functions merges over into the
regulative aspects of the ascriptive-qualitative functions; the basic
standard is that of "fair" opportunity for all legitimate interests. The
doctrine of the separation of powers institutionalizes both our sus-
picion of commitment to overly specific national system-goals and
of overly definite measures of system-integration. With changing
conditions it would also seem that certain of the most severe strains
in the functioning of the system were likely to appear at these
points.

Finally, we have noted that functions of promoting system-goals
directly are low in the priority scale because of the lack of a specific
positive system-goal. Hence the positive position of government is
relatively weak, and also dependent on its articulation with other
functions. This also has to do with the wide variation between our
attitudes toward government in ordinary circumstances, and in
emergency conditions, where the goal of protecting the system from
disruption from without becomes urgent. It would seem that the
present position of high responsibility of the United States in the
world would imply the necessity for a shift in the direction of a
higher valuation of governmental function in this aspect; and, given
our background this involves difficult processes of adjustment. The
shading off of the ascriptive-qualitative into the system-goals aspects
should be kept clearly in mind. Thus a primary occasion for rela-
tively recent expansion in the functions of government was severe
economic depression, which may be regarded as an emergency
situation from the ascriptive-qualitative point of view, whereas the
other most important occasion has been the problem of national
defense and other closely related aspects of our position of inter-
national responsibility, i.e. an adaptive and system-goal problem.

It should be kept clearly in mind that the same order of prob-
lems of valuation-priority appear again when we shift from con-
sideration of the overall system as a whole to that of specific sub-
systems. But the incidence of these judgments must be changed as

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 419

a function of the place of the subsystem, especially if it is a collec-
tivity, in the structure of tlie superordinate system. The paradigm
must, that is, be apphed at least twice in order to place a specific
role of an individual in any kind of hierarchical order.

Thus the focus of the executive role as we ordinarily understand
it, is on responsibility for system goal-attainment, i.e. of the organi-
zation in which the executive is placed. Because this is a highly
strategic role for maximizing the contributions of the organization,
while we do not necessarily give top priority to responsibiUty for
overall societal goal-attainment, except in emergency, we do give
high status to the executive role in productive organizations, other
things equal probably higher than to that of technical roles. Fur-
thermore, while in the general value system instrumental functions
tend to be ranked higher than expressive, from the point of view
of functioning of the unit in the system in relation to the "internal
environment" of the superordinate system, capacity to influence
the action of others through expressive communication may be a
highly strategic factor. Therefore the good negotiator, or the good
"salesman" may have a highly strategic position because of the im-
portance of his functions for the unit, even though its function in
the larger system is of a totally different order. Because of this dis-
crepancy in the two orders relative to the two levels of system
reference, however, we might expect a good deal of ambivalence in
the evaluation of such capacities and their resultant performances.
In the extreme case the fact that they are practiced in the requisite
occupational groups may be treated as almost sub-rosa. Thus the
symbolic focus of competence in the legal profession centers on
knowledge of the law. But the actual functions of practicing lawyers
often involve a very large component of capacity to negotiate and
persuade which is only loosely connected with intellectual mastery
of the law.

We may now turn to a different order of analysis, looking at cer-
tain key features of our actual social structure in their bearing on
the problems of stratification. Very roughly, and for our specific
purposes, we may think of a society as composed of three major
types of collectivities. First the "specific function" collectivity or
organization of which the business firm, the school, the hospital may
be treated as prototypes. Here, except for the recipients of service
or the consumers of products, roles are organized in the occupa-
tional form, the collectivity is composed of executives, technicians,

420 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

workers, teachers, physicians, nurses, etc. The second type, of
which poHtical units and churches are prototypes, are diflEuse-func-
tion "associations" which represent their constituencies but which
in proportion to their size and extensiveness of interests also tend
to become organized in occupational-type roles for the more re-
sponsible and specialized functions, but with many limitations on
how far this mode of organization, i.e. their "bureaucratization"
can be carried. (There are of course innumerable specific-function
associations like labor unions, professional associations, trade asso-
ciations, etc., but these will be neglected here.) Finally, there are
what may be called the "diffuse solidarities" in which individuals
are embedded, of which local community, kinship and ethnic group
are the most important for our purposes.

The relations of these three types of collectivities to each other
are critically important to the system of stratification because the
normal individual is a member of at least two of them, and if he is
an adult male almost necessarily of a third, i.e. in the occupational
system. He may within limits, of course, be a member of more than
one such collectivity in a type which poses further problems of rela-
tionship and integration.

We have seen above that the field of most direct institutional-
ization of our paramount value system is that of occupational roles.
It is true that some of what are defined as occvipational roles are
not primarily in the adaptive subsystem, but in the cultural ascrip-
tive-qualitative subsystem as in the case of the scientist, the teacher
or the minister of religion, or in the system-goal-integrative systems
as in the case of officials of government. However, even though the
collectivities in these different subsystems may have different char-
acters related to their differences of function, they have what in the
narrower sense are occupational subsystems within which the roles
are of the same fundamental type as those in the primarily adaptive
subsystem. Furthermore of course a significant, though decreasing
class of occupational roles, like the completely independent "private
practitioner" of a profession, or completely independent craftsman,
are not imbedded in the context of organization at all. There is one
further type of role of which that of farmer is the type case where
the otherwise normal segregation between kinship unit and pro-
ductive fimction does not obtain; similar situations exist for small
stores and in some other fields.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 421

Nevertheless the massive fact is that the normal adult male is the
incumbent of a "full-time" occupational role and that in the increas-
ingly typical case this is part of an organization and is rather
strictly segregated in physical premises, property control and "man-
agement" from his kinship unit. Furthermore the great majority of
the unmarried female population have such roles, beyond the edu-
cational ages, and an increasing proportion of the married women.
Broadly we may say that in the occupational system thus defined
status is a function of the individual's productive "contribution" to
the functions of the organizations concerned, hence of his perform-
ance capacities and his achievements on behalf of the organization.

We have said that this is "broadly" true. Of course there are in-
numerable ways in which it fails to work out, for the kinds of reasons
mentioned above such as difficulty of implementing standards of
judgment, indefiniteness of such standards, and difficulty of com-
parison between qualitatively different performances and qualities.
Differences of power as a result of command of possessions, of
blocks in communication and the like can serve to protect and in-
crease such discrepancies. These factors are of the greatest impor-
tance for detailed empirical analysis, but are secondary from the
point of view of the broad characterization of our stratification
system.

The same individuals who are the incumbents of occupational
roles are of course members of kinship units. The most important
thing about the American kinship system from the present point of
view is how far the process of "isolation" of the conjugal family has
gone. In the first place this means of course that the standard or
"expected" unit is the "family" household consisting of the married
couple and their still dependent children. Though other relatives
do often live in the household it can pretty definitely be said that
this is structurally anomalous, particularly under urban middle class
conditions. Furthermore there is a very close approach to symmetry
in the relations between this family and the families of orientation
of the spouses, though one may perhaps speak of a slight "matri-
lineal" trend through a tendency to special solidarity of mother and
married daughter. Beyond this the conjugal family has, as is well
recognized, been very largely stripped of functions in the larger
society other than those in the ascriptive-qualitative sphere, above
all those in "production" which otherwise are so fundamental to

422 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

our type of society. This means essentially that its primary func-
tion significance is as a maintainer of certain "style patterns" of
life which are integral to the general cultural tradition, as a reg-
ulator of the personality equilibria of its members, and as a social-
izer of children into this cultural tradition.

This "whittling down" of the American kinship unit as compared
with those in other societies, both with regard to membership and
to function, is obviously intimately connected with the functional
requirements of our type of occupational system. But there is a
limit beyond which this process cannot go if the remaining func-
tions are to be effectively performed. There seems to be little doubt
first that these functions are vital to the society and second that
there is, in a broad sense, no alternative way of taking care of them
in sight.

The family is essentially a unit of diffuse solidarity. Its members
must, therefore, to a fundamental degree share a common status in
the larger system; which means that they must, in spite of their
differentiation by sex and age, be evaluated in certain respects as
equals. The family as a unit has a certain order of "reputation" in
the community. Its members share a common household and there-
fore the evaluation of this in terms of location, character, furnish-
ings, etc., in the system of prestige symbolism. They have a com-
mon style of life. If the position of the parents in the community is
relatively high, its advantages must to some extent be shared by
the children, whether they "deserve" it or not; similarly of course
the sharing of the disadvantages of low parental status. From these
considerations it follows that tlie preservation of a functioning
family system even of our type is incompatible with complete
"equality of opportunity." It is a basic limitation on the full imple-
mentation of our paramount value system, which is attributable to
its conflict with the functional exigencies of personality and cultural
stabilization and socialization.

Another aspect of the consequences of our family system con-
cerns its impact on sex role differentiation. Even though its typical
membership is so small, a conjugal family is an internally differen-
tiated system. The adaptive exigencies of its maintenance as a sys-
tem in our society focus above all on the reputation and income to
be earned through the husband-father's occupational role. This is
strategically so fundamental that by virtue of it alone he must be
accorded the "instrumental leadership" role. But we know that

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 423

groups of such size strongly tend to develop a differentiation be-
tween instrumental and expressive leadership. At the same time
the exigencies of the socialization process demand a certain type of
relation to children which it is exceedingly difficult for the father
to combine with his occupational responsibilities. Hence the mother
role in specific personal relation to the child, and tlie "expressive
leadership" role in the family, combined with primary internal in-
strumental responsibilities in the family (as "homemaker") tend to
form the center of gravity of the feminine role.

Inherent in this situation is a whole set of forces making for rela-
tive segregation of the sex roles, and in general to "shunt" the
feminine role out of primary status in the occupational system or
competition for occupational success or status. Probably the main
positive functional basis of this is the crucial functional significance
to the society of the mother role within the context of the family.
From this follows the importance of equality of status of husband
and wife, but occupational competition tends to disperse in status
rather than to equalize. Broadly married women in our society are
not in direct competition for occupational status and its primary
reward symbols with men of their own class. On the other hand it
may also be said that the segregation of sex roles serves to keep
men integrated in the family so that the extremely important social-
ization functions of the father role are preserved. Obviously the
whole situation, however, produces another fundamental limitation
on full "equality of opportunity," in that women, regardless of their
performance capacities, tend to be relegated to a narrower range of
functions than men, and excluded, at least relatively, from some of
the highest prestige statuses. ^^

A striking manifestation of this segregation of the sex roles is to
be found in the style-symbolism of dress and personal appearance
generally. Masculine dress in our society is virtually a uniform,
except for certain types of sports clothes. Feminine dress on the
other hand emphasizes considerable elaboration and individuality
of taste, supplemented by relatively elaborate embellishment of
the hair, the face, etc., which is strongly taboo for men. That this
order of differentiation is not to be regarded as "human nature"
may be brought out by two contrasting examples. Anyone familiar

i^The relevant aspects of the American kinship system and its relation to oc-
cupation and stratification are more fully discussed in Chapters V, IX and
XIV above. See also on the whole American system, Robin M. Williams, Jr.,
American Society, especially Chap. 5.

424 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

with conservative farm communities knows that there tends there
to be a much closer paralleHsm between the clothes of the two
sexes, work clothes for every day, and "Sunday best" with about
the same order of relative elaborateness for both sexes. At the other
extreme we may mention the aristocratic society of the European
eighteenth century where masculine dress approached feminine in
its elaborateness and scope for taste. Powdered wigs, lace ruffles
and cuflFs, varicolored coats and waistcoats, satin breeches and
silver buckles were not deemed in the least "effeminate" for a
gentleman whereas they would be unthinkable for a man in our
society.

Very broadly, again, the main lines of our system of stratification
seem to be understandable as a resultant of the tendencies of insti-
tutionalization on the one hand of the occupational system— includ-
ing of course roles in the ascriptive-qualitative and governmental
systems— and on the other hand of the kinship system. Local com-
munity might be an independent basis and to some extent is with
respect to rural-urban and regional differentiations. But compared
with other societies the notable thing about our patterns of resi-
dence is their high mobility, so that above all community of resi-
dence tends to be a function of occupational role rather than vice
versa. Similarly within a community neighborhood of residence
tends, within the limits of access to occupational premises, to be a
function of income and family taste rather than an independent
determinant.

Ethnic belongingness is another possible basis in diffuse soli-
darity for differentiation of status. It is probably, along with certain
aspects of religion, the most important basis which is independent
of occupation and kinship in the narrower senses, except perhaps
for the rural-urban and the regional aspects of community. The
case of the negro, even in the North, is the most conspicuous one.
But in spite of the dispersion of the members of given ethnic groups
through the different levels of the main class structure, ethnicity to
some degree tends to preserve relatively independent "pyramids"
in the more general system. Its importance would, in the normal
course of development of our type of society, be expected to de-
crease. How far this is actually happening is exceedingly difficult
to judge. On the one hand our system is, as noted, the kind which
allows a much greater degree of looseness than most others, and
this permits the preservation of ethnic distinctiveness. These tend-

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 425

encies are reinforced by ethnic traditionalism as a defense against
insecurity. On the other hand there are very powerful forces of
acculturation at work which tend to break down distinctive ethnic
traditions. Broadly we may regard the ethnic factor as a secondary
basis of modification of the stratification pattern but as by no means
unimportant.

The ethnic problem seems to modify the system of stratification
through two principal types of process. In the first place the value-
system of an ethnic group may vary from that paramount in the
dominant society. Then within certain limits of tolerance it may
tend to form a variant subsociety within the larger society, more
closely approximating implementation of its own values. In these
respects the actions of an ethnic group should be interpreted in
terms of its own distinctive culture, including its own internal stra-
tification and the ways in which it can, according to its values, ap-
propriately articulate with the main class system. ^'^

The second mode of modification derives from die fact that the
ethnic group, with regard both to its value-patterns and to many
other aspects of its status in the larger society, constitutes an entity
somewhat apart, to which non-members react in patterned ways
which in turn help to determine the reactions of the members of
the group. Discrimination, as in the non-acceptance of ethnic mem-
bers in certain statuses for which they are otherwise qualified, is a
type example. A reaction to discrimination is not understandable
only in terms of the value-patterns of the etimic group, but the
source and character of the discrimination must also be taken into
account.

In general it should be said that until fairly recently perhaps the
major modifying influence of ethnic groups in American society has
been in the lower reaches of the stratification scale. With upward
mobility on a large scale, however, this has come to be modified
and the place of Jews or of Catholic Irish in the upper middle
classes, for instance, present problem areas of considerable empiri-
cal importance.

Of the two major types of what above were called diffuse-func-
tion associations, the political may be treated as a relatively minor
factor except for the groups actively participating in political func-

I'^The case of the Negro in American society would be that where an independ-
ent ethnic culture was of minimal importance; those of Italians or East Euro-
pean Jews would be cases where this culture was of considerable significance.

426 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

tdon. The high level of horizontal mobility means that membership
in the local political unit is of secondary significance and easily
changed. Similarly party affiliation is for most of the "public" loose
and easily changed except at the numerically small extremes in-
volved in political activism of the protofascist or communist variety.
The question of where those actively engaged in political careers be-
long presents another order of problem. Perhaps the most important
point to note is that in sharp contrast to many societies, a "poli-
tical elite" or "ruling class" does not have a paramount position in
American society, but at best those most successful in making a
political career are only among the elite elements, not the distinc-
tively paramount one. Moreover, there is little continuity from gen-
eration to generation in this type of affiliation.

The case of religious organization and affiliation is different and
is of great sociological interest. The main structure is, we may say,
that of Protestant denominational pluralism with a great deal of
congregational autonomy of the local units, even in the Episcopal
and Methodist churches. This has tended to work out, in close cor-
relation with residential neighborhoods, in terms of an assimilation
of religious affiliation in a broad and rather loose way with social
stratification. Thus the main membership of certain churches is
drawn from the upper class groups, and there is from here down a
rough gradation of denominations corresponding to the class struc-
ture. If differentiation of parishes within the same denominations is
taken into account the relationship is even closer. The main excep-
tion to the pattern is the Roman Catholic Church with its close rela-
tionship to the ethnic origins of its constituents. Again by contrast
with other societies it is notable that a clergy does not occupy any
very distinctive position in the class structure. Though in many
respects a very special kind of occupational role, with the exception
of the celibate Catholic clergy, it tends to be assimilated to the
general occupational role system. The status of a clergyman is
roughly a function of the prestige of liis parishoners.

If we treat "politics" as at least partially an occupational role, ( as
indeed civil service and careers in the armed services certainly can
be) then we need broadly abstract only from the ethnic problem,
from the type of local community, and from the special position of
the Catholic Church, to justify the broad generalization that our
system of stratification revolves mainly about the integration be-
tween kinship and the occupational system. Obviously the most

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 427

important direct links between the two concern the fact that what
from the point of view of family status is the primary occupational
role, tliat of husband-father, is occupied by the same person who is
"instrumental leader" of the family, and that his occupational earn-
ings constitute the main— though decreasingly often perhaps the
only— source of family income, i.e. of facilities and symbolically sig-
nificant reward-objects.

Hence there has to be a broad correlation between direct evalu-
ation of occupational roles, income derived from those roles, and
status of the families of the incumbents as collectivities in the scale
of stratification. It is essentially tliis broad correlation to which we
would like to apply the term "class-status," so far as it describes
American conditions. Somewhat more broadly we may repeat the
definition of class status given in the earlier paper^^ as that com-
ponent of status shared by the members of the most effective kin-
ship unit. In this respect the distinctive features of the American
system are the constitution of the typical kinship unit, the isolated
conjugal family, and the fact that one of its members occupies a
status-determining occupational role. In classical China, for ex-
ample, the distinction between peasantry and gentry families—
which as kinship units were also differently constituted— rested on a
quite different basis; essentially whether or not they owned sufficient
land to make the "scholarly" pattern of life possible, without the
family members themselves engaging in manual labor.

As thus defined, class status is, it should be clear, not a rigid
entity, but a fairly loosely correlated complex. Family status rela-
tive to specific occupation and to income may be enhanced (or
depressed ) by canons of taste in the fields of expressive symbolism,
by connections with other families of certain orders of prestige,
through kinship or for example through memberships in voluntary
associations or purely informal mutual entertainment relations. It
may also be enhanced or depressed through choice of residential
location, through prestige of educational institutions which mem-
bers have attended or children are currently attending, and through
various other channels. To a considerable degree it is arbitrary
where the "constitutive" elements of class status are held to end,
and their "symbolic" penumbra to begin. All that is here contended
is that the family-occupation-income complex is by and large the
core of the wider complex. We have deliberately abstracted from

1 ^Chapter IV above.

428 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ethnic status which might be brought in. In a sense it is taken
account of by way of the family. Perhaps the best single case for
another element would be education. The most important reason for
not including it in the core, but placing it on the "periphery" here
is that in our society the primary meaning of education seems to be
that it serves as a path to future occupational ( and partly marital )
status. This differentiates American society from that of most Euro-
pean countries where the "quality" status of the educated man as
compared with "what he does" is relatively much more important.
This is, however, a difference of degree; thus attendance at an "ivy
league" college does indeed stamp a man to some extent independ-
ently of his future occupational status.

However this question may be treated, it is of the greatest im-
portance that it is only in the broadest sense that this class complex
can in American society be made to yield a single unequivocal scale
of classes. Some such broad classification as "upper"— carefully
defined— "middle" and "lower" makes sense. Furthermore it is often
useful to sub-divide these for specific purposes— as is done at a
number of points in this paper. But care should be taken not to
imply that the finer differentiations are even nearly uniform "across
the board" or that the lines between adjacent classes are very clear-
cut.

The main bases for such caution are three. First, as we have seen,
from the point of view of direct evaluation of occupational roles
themselves there has to be a complex process of "interlarding" of
the different qualitative role types, not only in terms of one appli-
cation of our qualitative classification, but of at least two. Thus
high business executives, people highly placed in government, and
people highly placed in the ascriptive-qualitative functions such as
scientists, writers, etc., are extremely difficult to rank relative to
each other in any unequivocal way. Certain "situses" as Hatt^^ calls
them, are easier to arrange in a relatively clear-cut rank order-
broadly within the same qualitative types. Secondly, the relation
between occupational and family status is relatively loose. It is
true that there is a tendency through the consolidation of advan-
tage, for the families of the successful to consolidate their position
and perpetuate it as hereditary "upper class," but this has not been
notably effective on a nationwide basis. It is most conspicuous in

i^Hatt, Paul K., "Occupation and Social Stratification," American Journal of
Sociology, 55, May 1950.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 429

smaller communities, not least because the occupationally more
ambitious tend to be drained off from these communities. Even
here there seems to be considerable change over time. In general
any expressive-symbolic scale of ranking of family— such as the
Chapin living room scale— will correlate, but only loosely, with one
of occupational status of father, the more narrow the range relative
to the total scale, the more loosely.

The third reason for looseness is the relative independence rela-
tive to the other components, of the factors involved in the pro-
cesses of allocation of possessions. Inherited wealth plays some
part, but compared to other systems a relatively minor one. (Its
place in the upper reaches of the system, including what is ordi-
narily called the upper middle class is, however, undoubtedly
worthy of more careful study than it has yet received ) . Earnings of
members of the family other than the husband-father are also by
no means negligible, but probably by far the most important factor
is that of difference in the mechanisms through which income is
allocated to occupational remuneration in different fields. Three
main types of such mechanisms may be distinguished. The first is
the "classical" distribution by free competition, whereby income of
the individual is a direct function of his own "entrepreneurial"
activity, through selling services or products on a free market. For-
mally this should include the independent craftsman, professional,
etc., as well as the proprietor of a business in the usual sense. This
has led to the greatest inequality, and is of course the source of the
fortunes which are so much less prominent now than in our past.
The second is payment by the firm on the basis of its earning in a
competitive— though not necessarily unregulated— market, e.g. sala-
ries, wages, bonuses, commissions, etc., (dividends on securities be-
long in another category). The third is the class of occupations
which have to be "subsidized" in the sense that funds have to be
"raised" through some mechanisms other than those of the free
market, e.g. through taxation or philanthropic contribution.-" Gov-
ernment employees and those of "non-profit" organizations like
hospitals, universities, etc., are the most important cases. The most
important broad generalization seems to be that the first two
mechanisms lead to a considerably wider range of differentiation,
and thus a considerably higher "top" than does the third. It is very

20The "sliding scale" which is a prominent feature of the market for profes-
sional services, is intermediate between these.

430 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

much an open question how far these discrepancies of occupational
income and hence of course of family standard of hving correspond
to clear-cut differentiations of direct evaluation of function,^^ It is
easy to cite cases where discrepancy is clear— as for instance that
between the salary of a high Federal Judge and what the incum-
bent could usually earn in the private practice of law.

The point of this relative "looseness" need not be labored. But
these kinds of discrepancies necessitate mechanisms of adjustment
so that they do not disturb the integration of the social system too
greatly. Two sets of such mechanisms may be briefly mentioned.
One, which is very conspicuous by comparison with European so-
cieties, especially a generation or more ago, is the relatively wide
range of facilities open to the "public" without specific status-
implications; thus travel facilities, hotels, restaurants, etc. Such
small things as the fact that "almost everybody" smokes standard
brands of cigarettes of about the same price, and even that many
very high status people drive Fords and Chevrolets, (and some
not-so-high drive Cadillacs) are undoubtedly significant. Related
to this broad "band" of objects with relatively little "invidious"
significance, is the degree of insulation which exists between these
different groups so that they do not come into much direct contact
in spheres where the comparison would lead to acute strain. Thus
the families of civil servants, officers, professors whose incomes are
lower than those of comparable occupational statuses in business,
have little to do with the families of the latter, so that strain is
minimized. There are of course standards below which serious
strain would be felt— a very important field is the education of
children. But the existence of these mechanisms is a very important
fact in a society where "keeping up with the Joneses" figures so
prominently in the folklore. It illustrates the importance of assay-
ing particular facts in the context of the social system as a whole,
not one isolated context.

In brief, particularly as seen in comparative perspective, one of
the most notable features of the American system of stratification is
its relative looseness, the absence of a clear-cut hierarchy of pres-

2iThe evidence of the North-Hatt study which places scientists and certain
professional groups above even rather high business personnel would indicate
that money income did not reflect rehitive evaluation across these types very
accurately. Cf. North, Cecil C, and Hatt, Paul K., "Jobs and Occupations; A
Popular Evaluation," Opinion News, Sept. 1, 1947, pp. 3-13; reprinted in
Sociological Analysis, Logan Wilson and WilHam L. Kolb, eds., New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949, pp. 464-473.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 431

tige except in a very broad sense, the absence of an unequivocal
top elite or ruling class; the fluidity of the shadings as well as
mobility between groups and, in spite of the prestige-implications
of the generalized goal of success, the relative tolerance for many
different paths to success. It is by no means a "classless society,"
but among class societies, it is a distinctive type.

Another notable fact, the broader significance of which will have
to be assessed in the light of the very long run trends of the develop-
ment of the society, is the amount of "compression" of the scale, so
far as the income aspect is concerned, which has occurred in about
the last generation. This has come from pressures on both "ends."
On the one hand, related of course very largely to the development
of the labor movement, with very considerable political support,
but also involving the slowing up of immigration, there has been a
very great rise in the relative incomes of most of the lower groups,
though it has been uneven, and the "White collar" groups have
not risen comparably. On the other hand high progressive taxation,
both of incomes and of estates, and changes in the structure of
the economy, have "lopped off" the previous top stratum, where
the symbols of conspicuous consumption were, in an earlier gen-
eration most lavishly displayed. A notable symbol of this is the
recent fate of the Long Island estate of the J. P. Morgan family,
which had to be sold at auction in default of payment of taxes.
One wonders what Veblen would say were he writing today in-
stead of at the height of the "gilded age."

We may sum up the main pattern from top to bottom very
broadly as follows: the "top" is a broad and diffuse one with
several loosely integrated components. Undoubtedly its main focus
is now on occupational status and occupational earnings. Seen in
historical as well as comparative perspective this is a notable fact,
for the entrepreneurial fortunes of the period of economic devel-
opment of the 19th century, especially after the Civil War, notably
failed to produce a set of ruling families on a national scale who as
family entities on a Japanese or even a French pattern have tended
to keep control of the basic corporate entities in the economy.
Members of these families have retained elite position but broadly
through their own occupational or occupation-like achievements
rather than on a purely ascriptive basis of family membership. This
is true in spite of the fact that mechanisms of safe investment have
made it possible to keep inheritances intact more effectively (not

432 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

of course allowing for voluntary dissipation through distribution to
heirs and through philanthropic gifts and bequests) than in most
other societies. The basic phenomenon seems to have been the
shift in control of enterprise from the property interests of founding
families to managerial and technical personnel who as such have
not had a comparable vested interest in ownership. This critical
fact underlies the interpretation that what we may call the "fam-
ily elite" elements of the class structure (the Warnerian "upper-
uppers") hold a secondary rather than a primary position in the
overall stratification system. On the whole their position is far
stronger locally than nationally, and on the whole in smaller than in
larger communities— least so in metropolitan centers— and in eco-
nomically less rather than more progressive communities. The
burden of proof certainly rests upon him who would allege that
we were well on the way to the development of a hereditary top
class in the precapitalistic European sense. The development of our
taxation system in the last generation would clearly not be under-
standable on the hypothesis of the increasing predominance of such
a group.

Only in a rather loose and insecure way can one speak of the
business managerial elite as the unequivocal top class in an occu-
pational sense. There is strong competition from the professional
elite groups, greatly reinforced by the increasing importance of
scientifically based technology, both in industry and in the military
field. Some groups of professionals are of course very close to
business, notably lawyers and engineers, but they shade off into
other groups, notable in the universities. With the kinds of quali-
fications already suggested we may speak of a rather open shifting
elite.

The next point to note is that there is no clear break between
elite groups in this sense and a broad band of what is usually called
the "upper middle class," of business and professional people and,
increasingly with the expansion of the functions of government, of
civil servants and professional military officers.

The lack of distinctness of this line, and the next one down, is
strongly accentuated by another circumstance. This is an implica-
tion of the independence of the conjugal family which in turn
means that young married couples who are destined by ability or
even birth for elite status often start off their married lives with a
standard of living which might well be characterized as 'lower

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 433

middle class." The fact that on the whole we have so much less
presumption than in European tradition that a son will follow in
his father's footsteps, in status if not exact occupation, and that he
will only marry when he can support his wife in "the style to which
she has been accustomed," means that the lines are much more
blurred by the circumstances of stages of career than is the case in
other types of stratification system.

Probably the best single index of the line between "upper middle"
class and the rest of the middle class is the expectation that children
will have a college education, as a matter that is of status-right not
of the exceptional ability of the individual. This also is blurred
above all by the wide qualitative and other variation of institutions
of higher education, but it seems to be a fairly clear-cut line.-^ It
is important to be clear about the meaning of this expectation. It
is, primarily, that the son of such a family will thereby be able to
qualify for an acceptably high-level occupational role rather than
that he should become a sufficiently educated man to have the
manners and humanistic interests appropriate to the cultural status
of the family.

Traditionally the line between "middle" and "lower" class status
in the Western world has of course been drawn in terms of the
distinction between "white collar" and "labor" occupations. Devel-
opment in this country has gone far to blur the distinctness of this
line. A major contribution to this blurring has been the high income
of the elite labor groups, largely though not wholly enforced by
strong union pressure, so that there is a very considerable overlap
in income. But along with that has gone the assimilation of styles
of life so that it is difficult to draw clear difiFerentiations. A most
important point, documented by Centers-"^ is that expectation of
advancement in status for children runs throughout these groups.
We have relatively little of the traditional "laboring class" of the
European background.

Another major aspect of this problem is the failure (contrary to
Marxian predictions) for the industrial labor force to grow in pro-
portion to the growth in productivity of the economy, and the cor-
responding relative increase in numbers in white-collar and "serv-

22As shown in the study of mobility referred to above, this expectation operates

relatively clearly in the top two of six occupational status-groups we have

distinguished.

23Centers, Richard, The Psychology of Social Classes, Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1949, p. 147 and 216.

434 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

ice" occupations, many of which have many of the characteristics
of semi-independent small business, as in the case of the gas-station
proprietor.

In any case the changing structure of the lower reaches of the
occupational system is of the greatest importance for the future.
The occupations consisting of almost sheer drudgery— "pick and
shovel work"— have of course been enormously diminished. Now
automatic machinery is eliminating whole ranges of the so-called
"semi-skilled" occupations. It looks very much as though the tradi-
tional "bottom" of the occupational pyramid was in course of
almost disappearing. If anything this will tend to make our class
structure even more predominantly "middle-class" than it already is.

In the lower reaches of the structure there are tendencies to
deviation from this "middle class" pattern which are in some re-
spects complementary to the tendencies near the top to form family
as distinguished from occupational elites. Essentially we might say
this consists in a shift from predominance of the "success" goal to
that of the "security" goal. More concretely it is a loss of interest in
achievement, whether for its own sake and for opportunity to do
more important things, or for advancement of family status through
more income and enhanced reputation. Occupational role then be-
comes not the main "field" for achievement, but a means for secur-
ing the necessities of a tolerable standard of living, a necessary
evil. The basic focus of interest is diverted from the occupational
field into the family, avocations, friendship relations and the like.
Undoubtedly this type of shift, found to some extent at all class
levels, increases toward the bottom of the scale in what some have
called the "common man" class.^^ It is probably most marked in
what Warner and his associates call the "lower-lower" group The
exact extent and distribution of these tendencies are uncertain, but
again perhaps the most important point to be made, one of which
we have direct evidence,— is the lack of definiteness of the line.
Evidence from the study of mobility shows clearly that we find
considerable "ambition" at all class levels; there is no sharp break.

A word also needs to be said about the place of the farm popu-
lation in the system of stratification. The first and notable fact is
the enormous decrease in the relative proportion of farmers among
the gainfully employed; it is now down to not much more than 15%
—the contrast with most other societies is striking. Secondly it is

24The term is used by Warner, but also by Dr. Joseph A. Kahl in unpublished
material.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 435

important that there is a very wide range in size of farm, income,
etc., SO really we can say that farmers go all the way from equiva-
lents of "upper middle" ( excluding "gentleman farmers" to whom it
is not really an occupational commitment) to the bottom of the
scale in the proverbial poverty-stricken share-croppers of certain
areas. Finally it may be suggested that the mechanization of agri-
culture is contributing to assimilation of farming to the "small
business" category of occupations, indeed in a good many cases not
very small. Furthermore the phenomena of "rurbinization" have
tended to assimilate the style of life of the farming groups greatly
to that of the urban population.

The kinds of considerations discussed in the last few pages sug-
gest that while in American politics the great "interest groups" are
above all business, labor and agriculture, they are not as blocks
nearly as tightly integrated as much ideological stereotyping sug-
gests; each contains a great range of types and status-levels (espe-
cially if we include labor-leaders, who often have business-level
incomes). These groups are not as loose coalitions as the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties, but are very far from being groups
whose members have interests which are identical on almost all
issues. Above all tliey interlard in the system of stratification with
each other and with other groups; they do not constitute clear cut
"strata" in the literal sense, one above another.

Finally, this sketch would not be complete without a brief dis-
cussion of the problem of mobility within our stratification system.
Though the interest of sociologists in this problem has tended to be
focussed on so-called "vertical" mobility, perhaps the first impor-
tant thing to emphasize is the great importance of "horizontal"
mobility. Of this in turn two interrelated types are both crucial,
namely residential mobility and shift from one occupational status
to another, whether within the same occupational type but from
one organization to another, or between occupational types. The
volume of residential mobility is very great indeed, and this is a
most important condition of vertical mobility, since it makes it pos-
sible to escape "tight" situations and try again where opportunity
seems more promising. The study of small, economically stagnant
communities without systematic accounting for what has hap-
pened to persons moving out of the community, has contributed to
the impression given by the Warner-group studies of the low level
of vertical mobility in the society.

Another extremely important fact about the American occupa-

436 ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

tional system is the large amount of "lateral" movement within the
occupational system. For example in Continental Europe, below
the highest political levels, it has been much less common than
here for people to move in and out of government service; there
civil service has had to be a life career. Similarly we "hire away"
from other organizations in the same or closely related fields a great
deal. There is of course even less continuity of specific occupa-
tional status from generation to generation, even on similar levels,
and much less than there has been in Europe. Both these types of
horizontal mobility have been most important in making it pos-
sible to "make end runs" on an upward course rather than having
to 'iDreak through the line" in the same situation in which one is
placed by origin or at a given career stage.

Though it is perhaps less commonly said now than a few years
ago, there have recently been a good many flat statements to the
effect that opportunities for upward mobility have been drastically
declining in American society in the last generation or so. These
statements should be regarded with great scepticism. There are to
be sure two factors in our past which are not likely to be repeated.
The settlement of a continent opens up opportunities for status,
particularly in new local communities, which cannot be repeated in
a fully settled country. Secondly, the opportunity for whole strata of
recent immigrants, coming in at the bottom of the scale, to rise in
status relative to their initial status in this country, naturally will
not be repeated unless immigration is resumed on a grand scale,
which seems unlikely. On the other side of course is the enormous
increase in productivity of the American economy which is the
big positive opportunity-producing factor. These factors are difiBcult
to balance against each other. The general question is very open
and the evidence fragmentary.

Undoubtedly there has been a shift by which mobility through
the education-system has been greatly increasing in importance.
The "self-made man" is less likely than before to have only a grade-
school education, and less likely to have established his own organi-
zation rather than to have risen tlirough existing organizations.
Evidence from the Boston metropolitan area, and taking going to
college as a prognosis of probable "high" status in the future, shows
that both relative to occupational status of father and education of
both parents there is considerable mobility.-'"' If this is true of the

25The study of mobility in collaboration with S. A. Stoufifer and Florence
Kluckhohn referred to in Note, p. 386 above.

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 437

Boston area, which is perhaps economically one of the more "stag-
nant" of the larger metropolitan areas of the country, the presump-
tion is that it is more rather than less true of metropolitan America
as a whole, though smaller towns are another matter.

On the question of how far sheer economic problems, the access
to facilities, play a part in the aspect of mobility we have studied,
the evidence is less definite, but an impression is fairly clear. This
is that, in a metropolitan area where it is possible to attend college
and live at home, the economic difficulties of going to college are
not the principal barriers even for those from relatively low income
families. Exactly how important this factor is we do not know— it is
presumably much more so in communities which do not have a
local college— but we feel that the available evidence suggests that
it is less important than is generally supposed. If this is correct,
then an unexpectedly heavy emphasis falls on the factor of moti-
vation to mobility, on the part both of a boy himself, and of his
parents on his behalf, as distinguished from objective opportunity
for mobility. This is a conclusion which runs contrary to much
"liberal" opinion, but is at least well enough validated by evidence
to warrant further sociological investigation.-*'

This raises certain problems about the type of sociological anal-
ysis which is needed in order to understand the processes of mobil-
ity under such conditions. Essentially we may say that, within this
framework, the focus is on the determinants of the "free choice" of
the individual. Therefore his motivation to "get ahead" and the
qualitative direction in which he wishes to do so, must be treated
as qualities of his personality, rather than placing the problem pri-
marily in the understanding of the exigencies of the situation in
which he must act.

If the problem focuses on qualities of the personality, then the
question is, how do these qualities develop? One factor of course is
constitutionally given ability, but this is outside the range of the
sociologist's competence to analyze. Within the range of variation
left open by constitutional abilities, however, qualities are acquired
through the processes of socialization. These processes, we feel,
operate first in the family as a sub-system of the society, then sec-
ondarily in the school and peer group. Essentially, then, we must be
concerned with those features of families as social systems, the roles

28There is, of course, no reason why this lack of motivation to mobiHty may
not be a function of continuing low family status and hence opportunity over
generations.

43S ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

played by the parents and siblings and their impact on the person-
ality of the child, which are significant for socialization in general
and in particular for determining the difference between "ambi-
tious" and "unambitious" boys and within the ambitious category,
different qualitative types of ambition. (Similarly of course for
schools and peer groups.)

From the point of view of American society as a social system
this problem leads us into the areas of "microscopic" variability of
the social structure, since we have good evidence that the differ-
ences in which we are interested are only partly a function of the
broad differences of class status of families. But in no way does this
circumstance make it any less a sociological problem area than if
we were attempting to explain only the broadest differences be-
tween mobility (or its lack) in the American system of stratifica-
tion and in the caste system of India.

In no sense is the above sketch a technically "operational" study
of the American system of social stratification. In the context of the
present paper its purpose is mainly illustrative; it is meant to give
the reader some sense of the empirical relevance of the abstract
analytical categories which were developed in the first part of the
paper. Essentially its purpose will have been served ff it helps to
do three things: first to give concrete empirical content to most of
the theoretical categories dealt with, second to show that by ap-
proaching even so complex and baffling an empirical area as the
analysis of the stratification of a very complex society in terms of
an articulated conceptual scheme, a firm "base of operations" for
such analysis can be gained and, third, to show that by use of such
a scheme specific insights about the dynamics of the system may be
gained which would either not be possible at all, or would be far
more vacillating and uncertain if the same empirical problems were
approached in a more ad hoc or common-sense way.

One final note may be sounded about the paper as a whole. It
is common by implication, if not quite explicitly, to suggest that
it is possible and fruitful to develop "theories" of certain types of
social phenomena which are essentially independent of each other
and of general sociological theory; tlius we might speak of a
"theory of juvenile delinquency," a "theory of the family," or a
"theory of political behavior" and of course a "theory of social strati-
fication." That any one of these constitutes a legitimate field of
specialization is beyond doubt. But unless the theoretical approach

REVISED APPROACH TO THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 439

taken in this paper is grossly mistaken, the theory of stratification
is not an independent body of concepts and generahzations which
are only loosely connected with other parts of general sociological
theory; it is general sociological theory pulled together with ref-
erence to a certain fundamental aspect of social systems. Such
merits as the present analysis may possess are therefore overwhelm-
ingly the product of advances in general theory which have made it
possible to state and treat the problems of stratification in such a
way as to bring to bear the major tools of general analysis upon
them. It is above all the fact that we have much better general
theory than a generation ago which makes a better understanding
of stratification on a theoretical level possible, though of course in
turn study of the problems of stratification has made a major con-
tribution to the development of general theory.

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Social Science 22:213-217. (Read at the Annual Convention
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
in Boston, December, 1946.)

Science Legislation and the Social Sciences.

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXII, No. 2, June 1947.
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January, 1947.

Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.
Parsons, Talcott, editor, and translator with Henderson, A. M.;
Oxford University Press, 1947.

1948
Sociology, 1941-46. (coauthor: Bernard Barber)

Amer. }. Sociology 53:245-257.
The Position of Sociological Theory.

Amer. Sociological Rev. 13:156-171. (Paper read before the

annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, New

York City, December, 1947.)

1949

Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied.
Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1949; xiii -|- 366 pp.

The Rise and Decline of Economic Man.
/. General Education 4:47-53.

Social Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Socio-
logical Theory.

Amer. Economic Rev. 39:16-26. (Read at meeting of the
American Economic Association in December, 1948.)

1950

The Prospects of Sociological Theory.

Amer. Sociological Rev. 15:3-16. (Presidential address read
before the meeting of the American Sociological Society in
New York City, December, 1949).

Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 19:371-384. (The substance of
this paper was presented at the meeting of the American
Psychoanalytic Association, Washington, D. C, May, 1948.)

444 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Social Environment of the Educational Process.

Centennial; Washington, D. C: American Association for the
Advancement of Science; pp. 36-40. (Read at the A.A.A.S.
Centennial Celebration, September, 1948.)

1951

The Social System.

Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1951; xii -{- 575 pp.
Toward a General Theory of Action

Editor and contributor with Shils, Edward A.; Cambridge,

Harvard University Press, 1951; viii + 506 pp.
Graduate Training in Social Relations at Harvard.

/. General Education 5:149-157.
Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective.

Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry 21:452-460. (Presented at the 1951

annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association

in Detroit.)

1952

The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems.

Psychiatry 15:15-25. (The substance of this paper was read
at the meeting of the Psychoanalytic Section of the American
Psychiatric Association, May, 1951, in Cincinnati. )

Religious Perspectives in College Teaching: Sociology and Social
Psychology.

Fairchild, Hoxie N., [ed.]. Religious Perspectives in College
Teaching; New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1952 (vii +
460) -pp. 286-337.

A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession.

(This paper was presented at the Conference on the Profes-
sion of Law and Legal Education on the occasion of the
Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration of the University of Chicago
Law School on December 4, 1952, and published in the pro-
ceedings of that occasion.)

The Father Symbol: An Appraisal in the Light of Psychoanalytic
and Sociological Theory.

(The substance of this paper was read at the meeting of the
American Psychological Association in September, 1952, at
Washington, D. C. It will be published in the Thirteenth
Symposium, 1952, of the Conference on Science, Philosophy
and Religion.)

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1953

Working Papers in the Theory of Action.

(In collaboration with Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils)
Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1953; 269 pp.

Psychoanalysis and Social Science with Special Reference to the
Oedipus Problem.

Twenty Years of Psychoanalysis (Franz Alexander and Helen
Ross, editors); New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.; 1953.
(Read at the Twentieth Anniversary Celebration of the Insti-
tute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago, in October 1952. )

A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratifica-
tion. Bendix, Reinhold, and Lipset, Seymour M. [eds.]. Class
Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification, Glencoe,
Illinois, The Free Press.

Illness, Therapy and the Modem Urban American Family.
(Coauthor with Renee Fox) /. of Social Issues 8:31-44.

Psychology and Sociology.

Gillin, John P. [ed.]. Toward a Science of Social Man; New
York, Macmillan Company (in press). Chapter IV.

Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process.

(Coauthor with Bales, Robert F.; Zelditch, Morris; Olds,
James; and Slater, Philip) Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press
(in press).

Some Comments on the State of the General Theory of Action.
American Sociological Review 18:618-631.

Index

Acceptance, 397, 404, 413, 414
Achievement (see also Performance)
and status, 44-5, 60, 65-6, 72-88,
92, 96, 99, 191-2, 295, 301,
306, 310-11, 389-90, 343-94 flF,
408-9
definition of, 75
Acquisitiveness, 35-6, 43, 66-7
Action

economic, 23-4, 29-31, 50-68, 221-2
rational, 22-3, 31, 33n, 37, 45, 152,

199, 201, 222, 243
theory of, the, 13-4, 19, 27, 29-32,
52, 70, 71, 72, 199-200, 208-9,
225-6, 228-9, 336-347, 357-60,
386-387 ff.
Action space, dimensions of, 395-6,

412-15
Actor, the, 21-2, 29-30, 56-7, 72-3,
149-50, 228-30, 241-2, 336
(see also Action, theory of, Indi-
vidual, Personality, Motivation)
Adaptive phase, 395, 397-415

in U. S. stratification, 415-16, 420
Administration (see Bureaucracy)
Afi^ectivity-Neutrality

and stratification, 397, 412-14
Aggression, 63n, 67, 137-8, 272, 290,
292, 294, 314
definition of, 298n
free floating, 117, 126
in Western World, 298-322
Alienation, 377n
Altruism, 35-6, 42, 45, 48, 54
Ambivalence, 345
Analysis (see also Theory)

fimctional, 152n, 186, 195, 322,
325
Anomie, 119, 125-31, 136-9

definition of, 125
Anthropology, 52, 172, 198, 219, 227
and sociology, 177, 351, 353, 356-7,
362, 369

Anxiety, 117, 126, 150, 171, 300-1,
304, 308, 310, 312, 315, 318, 382
Approval, 397, 404, 412, 413
Arensberg, C, 184n
Aristocracy, 62, 80, 81-2, 85, 100, 185
German, 106-8

Japanese, 279-80, 285, 287, 288,
294
Ascription, 408-9. (see also Qualities)
Ascriptive-Qualitative sphere (see also
Latent Pattern-Maintenance)
in U.S. stratification, 416-18, 420,
422
Associations, 420, 425 ff.
Attitudes

emotional, 45, 59, 70, 72, 93, 117-
123, 143-4, 149, 157, 161, 164-8,
174, 241, 244-6, 247, 250, 253n,
271, 301-2, 304, 306, 308-10,
317-19, 330, 338, 339, 340, 361,
382
moral, 60-1, 206, 384
structuring of, 131
Authoritarianism, 106, 109, 292, 294
Authority, 37, 90, 109, 128, 167, 195,
206, 232, 249-52, 327, 330, 343,

376
charismatic, 251
defined, 76, 392-3
differentiation of, 40, 55
legal, 373
legitimate, 56, 171
moral, 37, 206

political, 105, 374-5, 379, 381
professional, 38, 155-7, 160
and status, 76, 78, 81, 83-4, 139
and stratification, 409-12
traditional, 133
unjust, 133

Bales, R. F., 9, 386n, 390n, 400
Barnes, J. P., 380n
Bateson, G., 119n

INDEX

Beal, E. G., 275n
Behavior (see also Action, Motivation)
51, 99, 193-4, 233, 244-5, 309-
11, 336-47
economic, 53, 61
Japanese, 283
neurotic, 67, 150-1, 153, 157, 194,

301, 305, 315
social, 144-5, 148, 221, 234, 240,
242, 298
Behaviorism, 349
Bendlx, R., 11, 386n
Bennion, L. L., 26n
Berger, J., 387n
Biology (see Physiology)
Birth, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81-2, 89, 181,

191
Birth-rate, 275-6, 290, 291, 308, 331
BOGARDUS, E. S., 350
Bohemianism, 136
Brahmanism, 62
Britt, S. H., 317n
Bureaucracy, 39-40, 42, 47-8, 65, 85,
161, 170
German, 104-123, 254-6, 317
Japanese, 280, 284, 295

Calvinism, 121n, 207, 363, 406
Cannon, W. B., 218n, 337n
Capitalism (see also Society, Modem
Western, and Economy)

27ff., 64, 67, 83, 116, 132-4,
135, 137, 140, 207, 323, 325,
329, 330, 332, 334, 370
in Germany, 105, 119, 250-1,

266-7
symbol of, 133-4
Caste, 78, 81
Categories (see Theory)
Catholics, (see also Church, Roman

CathoUc), 425, 426-7
Centers, R., 433
Change, 146, 303, 315-16
cultural, 128-44, 148
economic 82, 333
institutional, 47-8, 140, 232, 238-

74
legal, 370-85

social, in Germany, 117-23
social, in Japan, 275-97
Chapin living-room scale, 429
Character (see Personality, Motiva-
tion, Psychology)
150, 173-4, 233-5

U7

German, 104-23, 238-74
Japanese, 275-97
Childhood (see also Socialization), 57,

74, 79, 87, 89-90
China, 16, 17, 27 ff, 208, 293, 343,

363, 408, 427
Christian Science, 146n, 154, 163
Christianity (see also Religion)
and Capitalism, 207-8
and science, 131
values of, 166-7, 273, 286
Church

Lutheran, 109, 121n
Protestant, 121, 166-8, 426
Roman Catiiohc, 110, 166-8, 376,

426-7
Universalist, 46
Clan, 183

Class (see also Stratification), 78-81,
91, 94, 317, 323-34
defined, 77, 328, 427
in Germany, 104-8, 110-14
in Japan, 275-97
lower, 185, 331
middle, 90, 94n, 95, 136, 186, 193,

278, 293, 320, 331, 342-3
upper (see also Aristocracy), 185,

279
in United States, 427-38
Clergy, 140, 166-8, 426
Collectivity (see also Group, Society,
Institution, Social System), 310
types of, 419-20
Common value system (see also

Values), 388, 390, 393-4
Communism (see also Marx, Social-
ism), 116, 125, 134, 289, 291,
293-4, 323-4, 333, 370, 376, 407
Community, 86-8, 91, 97, 103, 166,

187, 191, 192, 194
Competence (see also Functional
Specificity, Universalism)
technical, 38, 40, 42, 155, 174, 191
Competition, 63, 64n, 80, 85, 92,
94, 96, 101, 132, 191, 192, 221,
285-6, 301, 303-4, 307-8, 311-
13, 329-32, 344
Complexes (see also Motivation,
Psychology),
institutional, 191, 326
instrumental, 330-1
COMTE, A., 104
Conant, J. B., 354

448

Concreteness, fallacy, of misplaced,

132, 134
Configuration, 174
Conflict

class, 323-34

emotional, 45, 57, 61, 72, 74, 99,

136, 150, 171, 204, 244, 302
ideological, 370
of interests, 378, 380
legal, 383
social, 46, 54, 168-9, 232, 244,

246, 268, 318
value (see Values, conflict of)
Conformity (see also Control, De-
viance), 139
compulsive 342, 343, 345, 377n
Confucianism, Weber on, 28
Conservatism, 125

Prussian, 109-10, 268
Constitution, U. S., and laws, 373-6
Contracts, social (see also Relation,

contractual), 86-8
Contractualism, 129-30
Control, social, 142-76, 288, 296, 325,

373, 382, 393, 409, 411-12
CooLEY, C. H., 14, 349
Cost, 52-3

Culture (see also Tradition, the cul-
tural), 229, 357, 362
class, 330-1
ethnic, 134, 317
and social system, 84-5, 143, 148,

165-6, 229, 236-7
Western (see also Society, Modem
Western), 163-8, 193
CuRLEY, J. M., 170n

Davis, A. K., 94n., 185n

Davis, K., 77n, 148n, 177n

Death, 94, 204

Demerath, N. J., 190n

Democracy, 104, 168, 169, 260-1,
271, 290, 294, 296
in Pre-Nazi Germany, 104-23

Dependency, 79, 89, 101, 189-90,
193-5, 260, 310, 312, 344-5

Descent (see Kinship)

Deviance, 44, 47, 65, 73, 142-76,
185-6, 232, 325, 342, 343, 371,
382, 391-2
and legal profession, 377, 384

Dickson, W. J., 70n, 315n

Differentiation (see also Stratifica-
tion), 55, 72-3, 327, 328

INDEX

of individuals, 69-88, 386-439

of roles, 72-3, 89 ff., 323-34

in social system, 231-2, 236, 326-

33, 386-439
in stratification, 387, 401
Diffuse solidarities, 420, 421-5
Diffuseness, functional, 39-40, 160,
188n, 191, 360. (see also Par-
ticularism)
and stratification, 397, 413, 414,
419-20
Dimensions of action space, 395-6,

412-15
Discipline, 90, 92, 158, 306, 311,

313, 330.
Disease, 103, 153, 194
Disinterestedness (see Altruism), 35-6,

42, 57, 65, 155, 325
Disorganization (see Conflict, De-
viance, Integration of Social Sys-
tem)
Distortion, 151, 174 (cognitive), 268
Domesticity (see also Femininity), 97-
9, 193-4
in Germany, 113-4
DuRKHEiM, E., 15-6, 32-3, 52, 70n,
125-6, 147, 167n, 200, 205-7,
211, 223, 227, 324, 349, 350,
353, 355, 359
Duty (see Obligation)

concept of in Germany, 109
Ecology, and stratification, 393, 408-
9, 412n, 424

Economy (see also Capitalism)

business, 35, 60, 84

German, 104-6, 110, 115-16

instability of, 127

Japanese, 275-97

market, 51, 53, 129, 132, 133, 136,
234, 236, 313n, 329

money, 234, 236

the, 418
Education (see also Learning), 34,
89-91, 259-61, 428, 433, 436-7

in Japan, 281, 284
Efficiency, 22-3
Egalitarianism, 133
Egoism (see also Self-interest), 36,

48, 52-3, 59, 63n
Einstein, A., 224
Elite, the, 125, 139-40
"Emancipation," 135-8

cultural, 136

INDEX

449

intellectual, 135
moral, 136
Empiricism (see also Research), 219,

220, 223, 348-69
Endogamy (see Incest Tabu), 77
Ends (see also Goals, Motivation)
of economic action, 30, 50-68
justification of, 25, 29-30
rational adaptation of means to,
21-2, 25, 31, 33n, 37, 45, 52,
199-201, 222
Engels, F., 334

England, 119, 178, 276, 294, 295
Enterprise, free (see Capitalism,

Economy)
Environment (see also Situation)

the, 143, 217
Equilibrium (see Integration of So-
cial System, Stability of Social
System
physiological, 159
psychological, 59

of social system, 148, 154, 188,
289
Ericson, E. H., 248n, 321n
"Esteem," 397, 413, 414
Evaluation (see also Stratification,
Values, Norms), 37, 55, 83, 192
bases of, 60, 76
mechanisms of, 410-12
moral, 69, 70
and stratification, 386-415
Evolution, 198, 219, 333-4, 361
Exchange, 191, 326, 329
Executive, 39-41, 47, 55, 65n, 92,

176n, 419
Exogamy, 184
Expectations, 338
conflicting, 126
function of, 315
institutional, 126, 338
legitimate, 53-5, 73, 74, 90, 92,
97, 126, 143-4, 150, 188, 195,
230, 239, 301, 306, 337, 392
patterned, 337
stability of, 125
system, 359
uncertainty of, 202-3
Expressive action, 396, 398n, 405-6,
423

Facilities, 390, 402-3, 411, 427

Factionalism, 128

Factors, 81, 199, 203, 208, 225

causal, 289
defined, 26
material,' 23, 26-7
theories of, 220, 222-3
Fadism, 128, 136, 194
Family

American, 79, 177-96, 331, 342-5,

355, 363
conjugal, 101, 178-184, 245, 303,
328, 343, 400, 417, 421-2, 427-
8, 432-3
consanguine, 181n
German, 113-15, 250, 259-60, 263
Japanese, 277-9, 281-2, 285
middle-class, 95
rural, 94

as social system, 346-7
solidarity of, 46, 79-80, 101, 285,
302, 306, 331, 334
Farmers, 420, 424, 434-5
Fascism (see also National Socialism),

106, 124-41
Femininity, 80, 90, 92, 95-9, 136,
193-4, 305-8, 344-5, 417, 423
in Germany, 113-14, 122-3
Feudalism

in Germany, 106-9, 116, 249
in Japan, 275-297
Force, 232, 392
Formalism

in Germany, 110-12, 121-2, 249,

251, 271
in legal system, 377, 384
France, 80, 104n, 119, 138, 166, 321,

431
Frazer, J. G., 203
Frazier, E. F., 185n
Freud, S., 224, 305, 337n, 350, 353,

356
Friendship, 40, 46, 61, 151
Frustration, 28, 45, 73, 136, 138, 147,
203, 211, 228, 241, 300-1, 308,
311, 314n
Function (see Functional Analysis,
Functional Diffuseness, Functional
Specificity, Structure-Function), 50,
65, 83, 95, 191-2, 305, 311, 326
concept of, 217 ff
control, 142-176
of death ritual, 204
of institutions, 62, 145-7, 231, 234
latent, 152, 159, 173, 370
of law, 378-9
of legal procedure, 380

450

INDEX

of magic, 203-5

manifest, 170

of nonempirical ideas, 25

priorities, 415-18

of role difPerentiation, 80, 95, 191-

2, 323-34, 338
of youth culture, 101, 190
'Fundamentalist Reaction,' 119-123,
137-8, 316

Gallup, G., 366
Gardner, B., 94n, 185n
Germany (see also National Social-
ism), 101-2, 124, 138, 140-1,
142, 166, 238-74, 276, 291, 310n,
320, 332-3, 407
democracy and social structure in,
104-123
Gild, medieval, 35
Goal-Gratification phase, 395, 397-
415
in U. S. stratification, 416, 418-9,
420
Goals (see Ends, Motivation, Orien-
tation), 44-5, 55, 64n, 65, 72-4,
129, 191, 228, 232, 234, 299,
310, 312, 395-401
definition of, 126, 144-7 (by pat-
terns)
differentiation of, 72-3
empirical, 204
generalization of, 45, 57, 234-6,

338
meaning of, 209-10
prescriptive vs. permissive, 401
variation, 209
GoRER, G., 341

Government, 36, 43, 168, 236, 261,
418, 420
in Germany, 104-123
in Japan, 279-97
and law, 373-6
Graeber, I., 317n

Group (see also Organization, Insti-
tution, Social System)
etlinic, 332, 424-5
hereditary, 83
hostility, 314-9

individual stahis and, 283, 327
informal, 47, 187n
interest, 125
kinship, 42, 77, 87
national, 300
peer, 342-3

partisan, 168-9

play, 304

primary, 42

small, interaction in, 14, 400

solidaritv, 243, 258, 285-6, 295,

332
specialized, 43, 85-7
triadic, 187n
Guilt, 15, 56-7, 72, 171, 241, 243n,

273, 282
and innocence, legal, 382-4

Hartshorne, E. Y., lOln, 122n

Hatt, p. K., 428, 430n

Hedonism, 52-3, 59, 61

Hegel, F., 334

Heisenberg, 224

Henderson, L. J., 71n, 225n

Hierarchy (see Stratification, Aris-
tocracy, Authority), 79, 83, 249-
51, 312, 326-8
administrative, 47, 85

HiGGiNsoN, G., 337n

Hinduism, 28

History

of capitalism, 27, 74
evolutionary theory of, 334
philosophy of, 219
of population trends, 276

Hitler, A., 251, 264, 270, 333

HOKINSON, H., 98

HoMANs, G. C, 184n

Honesty, 310

Household, 90, 95, 182-3, 187, 191,

277, 285
Humanistic values, 91, 97, 98, 194

Idealization, 120

Ideology (see also Ideas), 23, 132,
134-5, 266-8, 274, 330, 331
German, 109 ff, 266-74

Ideas

and action, 19-33, 146-7, 165, 266-
274

Identification, 90, 268, 305-6

Implications, generality of, 352, 365

Income, 53-56, 60, 64, 84, 86, 94-5,
183, 187, 190, 303, 329, 431

Independence, compulsive, 345

India, 27 ff, 78, 208, 407

Individual (see also the Actor, Char-
acter, Personality, Socialization), in
sociid svstcm, 66, 70, 228, 234,
327, 387-9, 400

INDEX

451

status of, 69-88, 304, 386-439.
the, 28, 46-7, 54, 90, 99, 100, 189,
192, 193, 204, 229
Individualism, 110, 132, 285-6, 406,

416
Indology, 15

Industrialism (see Capitalism, Econ-
omy), 265, 313
in Germany, 104-5, 108, 110, 117,

250, 254-6, 259, 264-5
in Japan, 275-97
Industry, 22

Inferiority (see Authority, Stratifica-
tion)', 69-88, 310, 318-19, 325
Influence (see Propaganda, Control),

54, 170
Inheritance, 184-5

in Japan, 277-8, 291
Insecurity, 57, 61, 67, 72-3, 98-9,
101, 103, 117-19, 126-7, 136-9,
169, 189-90, 194, 202-3, 208-9,
243n, 245, 250, 257, 267, 283,
285, 286, 291, 300, 304, 307-8,
312, 316, 345
Instability

of business system, 83, 313n
marital, 185

social, 54, 117-123, 162, 289, 298
Instinct, 199, 223, 340
Institutions (see also Patterns, insti-
tutional), 36, 227, 334
change in, 117-123, 145
defined, 143, 231-233, 337
and economic action, 53, 225
integration of, 47, 60, 73, 133,

231, 232, 270
secondary, 189
sociology as science of, 235
structure of, 48, 54-6, 62, 143-4,
165, 171, 303
Instrumental action, 395, 402-3,

422-3
Integration (see also System-Integra-
tive phase), of culture and social
systems, 147, 148, 163
defined, 71n, 218
differential, 135
of personality, 56, 66, 72, 125,

149n
of a social system, 46, 60, 66, 71,
117, 135, 148-9, 151, 171, 222,
325, 329, 331, 387n, 390-1, 399-
400, 403, 406-8, 411-12.
of a society, 73, 143, 232, 282,

289, 295-6, 298n
of U. S. society, 86, 168, 169, 170,
174, 194
Integrity, moral, 174-5, 310
Intellectualism, 134-5
Interests, 28, 46, 125, 145, 147, 168-9,
241-6, 294, 323, 330, 390-1
conflict of, 378, 380
yested, 138-41, 315-18
Irrealism, 120
Italy, 124

Japan, 16, 142, 242n, 303n, 431
population and social structure in,

275-97
Jews, 119, 134, 166, 267, 272, 318,

425
Jones, F. E., 378n
Judea, 208

Judiciary, 169, 174, 374-6
Justice (see also Law), 301, 310-11,

314
social, 133

Kahl, J. A., 434n
Kant, I., 109
Kardiner, a., 189n, 233n
Kelly, W. H., 229n
Kimball, S. T., 184n
Kinship, 16-17, 39-41, 46, 75-9, 81,
89, 232, 331

in Japan, 277-9, 281-2, 285

in non-literate society, 178, 183

and stratification, 408-9, 417, 420,
421-4, 427-9

in U. S., 177-96

in western society, 185, 302-11,
327-8
Kluckhohn, C, 229n, 303n
Kluckhohn, F., 185n, 362, 386n,

436n
Knowledge

and action, 22-6, 29-30, 202

and social control, 299
KoLB, W. L., 430n
Kroeber, a., 369

Labor

division of 40, 132, 191, 331
national systems, 29, 119, 293, 295
organized, 140, 431
skilled vs. unskilled, 83-4

Laissez-faire (see Capitalism, Econ-
omy), 51

Language, of kinship, 178-184

Laplace, de, P. S., 224

452

INDEX

Latent Pattern-Maintenance phase,
396, 397-415

(see also Ascriptive-Qualitative

sphere).
Law, 370-385

biological, 221

Common, 37, 105, 184

Canon, 376

definition of, 372-3

in Germany, 105, 108

profession of, 370-385

Roman, 105, 108, 371

in science, 215 ff

in U. S., 165-6, 184, 417

in West, 37, 161, 165-66
Leadership, 40, 100, 171, 327
Learning, liberal, 34, 48, 163-6, 255n
Lederer, E., 285n
Lederer-Seidler, E., 285n
Legalism, German, 109
Legislation (see Law)
Legitimacy

of behavior, 162, 231

in law, 373

of office, 167

of ranking, 74-75

of a social order, 109, 139-40, 253-
4, 258n, 269-70, 288
LePlay, F., 185
Levy, M. J., 343n
Levy-Bruhl, L., 23, 203
Liberalism, 269
Lichtenberger, J. P., 350
Linton, R., 72, 76n, 180n, 229n,

230n, 360
Lipset, S. M., 11, 386n
Literalism, traditional, 119
Living

standard of, 80, 82, 85-7, 95, 127,
328-9
Lobbying, 374n
Locke, J., 222, 398n
Logic, 20, 24
Love

conditional vs. unconditional, 304

maternal, 300

romantic, 101, 114, 115, 120-2,
187-9, 308
Loyalty, 40, 46-7, 137, 187, 243,

280, 310
LuNT, P., 180n, 185n
Luther. M. (see Church, Lutheran),
271

Lynd, H., 185n

Malinowski, B., 24n, 200-11, 227,

234n
Mannheim, K., 12
Marriage, 39, 42, 78, 91, 94, 98,
151, 152n, 185-9, 192-5, 304,
307
in Germany, 113-115
Mai«, K., 11, 23-4, 26, 105, 119,
124, 132, 219, 220, 222, 433
theory of class conflict, 323-35
Masculinity, 90, 93, 98, 190-1, 305,
309, 345
in Germany, 113-15, 122-3
Mass movements, 124, 125, 138
Mathematics, 216, 224
Mayo, E., 67, 349
Mead, M., 14, 58, 189n, 233n, 254n,

272n, 304n, 343n, 349
Mechanics

analytical, 14, 214, 216, 219, 225,
347n
Mechanism

of compensation, 331

of control, 142-76, 290, 329, 338,

382, 393, 410-12
neurotic, 150
non-rational, 245
psychosomatic, 103
solidarity, 79-80

for stabilization, 83, 332, 378, 385
for tension release, 383
Merton, R., 352, 354
Middle Ages, 407
Militarism

German, 106-7, 122-3, 251-4, 259,

267, 322
Japanese, 281-97
Mobility

occupational, 78, 187, 284, 327
residential, 127, 187, 191, 276
of resources, 130

social, 85, 87, 187, 192, 405n, 425,
426, 435-8
Model

conceptual, 69n, 142-3, 148, 217-9,

224, 234
role, 90, 305
Money, 44, 51, 58, 64, 85, 416, 427
Monogamy, 181
Morgan, A., 219
Morgan, J. P., 431
Morgenthau, H., 264n

INDEX

453

Mortality-rate, 275-6, 290, 291
Motivation

economic, 50-68, 133, 325, 339,

353, 355
and institutional system, 142-76,

240-1, 325-6, 334
psychological aspects of, 336-47,

361
and social mobility, 437-8
and social structure, 298-322, 363
and social system, 36, 43, 45, 48,
72-4, 188-9, 225-6, 230-3, 336-
42
systems of, 359
MULLER, M., 205
MuRDocK, G. P., 362
Murray, H. A., 359
Myrual, G., 317n

Nation, 299, 318-19
National Socialism, 102, 105, 116-23,
141, 166, 238-74, 286, 310n, 321,
407
Nationalism, 138, 303n

German, 108-10, 117, 123, 251-2,

259, 270, 272, 319, 321-2
Japanese, 275-97
Nature

human, 53, 148, 231, 233, 245,
300
Navaho, the, 303n
Needs

biological, 143-4, 229-30
psychological, 101, 144, 188-9,

208-9, 298-322
of social system, 54-5, 144-5, 187-
9, 191-2, 228, 230-2, 234
Negro, 185, 425n
Neurosis, 67, 150-1, 153, 157, 194,

301, 305, 315

Neutrality (see Affectivity-Neutrality)

Newton, I., 224

Norms

and action, 21, 29-30, 37, 41, 45,
47, 53, 55, 58, 70, 206, 228-30,

302, 312, 315, 325
performance, 394-97, 402 ff, 412-

415
sanction, 396-7, 402 S, 412-15
scientific, 20-1, 37
for stratification, 391-2, 393-8 ff
North, C. C., 430n

Obligation

contractual vs. non-contractual, 39

in law, 373, 375

moral, 21, 53, 56, 147, 150, 158,
171, 188-9, 232, 281-3
Occupation (see also Role, occupa-
tional), 34 ff, 47, 58, 78-9, 80,
83-4, 89, 90, 185, 190-2, 311-14,
321, 323-35
Office, 64, 77, 85, 170

administrative, 39-40, 42, 47, 170
religious (see also Clergy), 67
Ogburn, W. F., 130
Old Age, 103, 194-5
Operationalism, 25n
Opinion, 99
Opportunity

equality of, 78, 191, 329, 331
differential access to, 83, 328, 329,
331
Organism, the

as analogy of social system, 143,
149, 217, 235
Organization (see also Bureaucracy),
administrative, 317
corporate, 64
informal, 47, 187n
large scale, 130, 136
in West, 161, 245, 330
Orientation, 37, 43, 135, 171, 209,
234, 236, 315
affectual, 228, 304
cognitive, 25-6, 28, 133, 200, 203,

228
cultural, 363
normative, 29, 37, 70, 74, 145,

228-37
patterns of, 129
stability of, 128, 131
systems of, 147
teleological, 29, 55, 225-6, 228,

231
value, 132
Ownership, 130
institution of, 327

Papacy, 376

Pareto, v., 25, 32n., 52, 71, 73n,

134, 200-1, 207-8, 211, 225, 226,

236, 324, 352
Park, R. E., 349
Parsons, T.

bibliography of, 440-445
Particularism, 16, 42, 46, 48, 135,

155, 160, 184, 187, 191, 258,

360, 363, 395-6, 413, 414

454

fiVDEX

Paternalism, 116
Patliology, social, 196
Pattern Variables, 359, 360, 363,
389n, 412-14. (see also Affec-
tivity— Neutrality, Difluseness,
Specificity, Quality, Performance,
Universalism, Particularism)
Patterns (see also Patent Pattern-
Maintenance),
behavioral, 128
cultural, 143-8, 229, 237
institutional, 36, 42, 45-7, 53, 59,
60, 62, 66, 125, 136, 143-7, 161,
171, 239-40, 246, 285, 287, 289,
291
institutionalized, 54, 71, 147, 149n,

150, 239, 244, 267, 271, 338
normative, 30, 37, 45, 53, 65, 71,

73, 99, 207-8, 228-9
of orientation, 129

rationalized (see rationalization)

system of, 217, 337, 391-2

traditional, 131-2, 135

Patterns (general), 38, 53, 82, 91-7,

99, 117-19, 160-2, 171, 185, 191-

3, 200, 211, 228, 231, 247, 258,

273, 293, 295, 298, 300, 316-17

Performances (see also Achievement)

in stratification theory, 389-90, 392,

393-415
in U. S. stratification, 415-16, 417-
18, 421, 428
Permissiveness, 382-4
Personality, 40, 47, 63n, 92, 95, 145,
149, 193, 234-5, 303-4, 308, 315,
336-47
as analogy to social system, 149
compulsive, 377
equilibrium of, 301
integration of, 56, 66, 72, 126,

149n
and social structure, 359
structure of, 57-8, 74, 142, 312,

338-9
theory of, 233, 336-45
types of, 338
Phase analysis, 412-15
Philosophy, 19, 165

of history, 219
Physiology, 218

theory in, 218, 219, 223, 235
Plato, 174

Politics, 168-70, 425-6
Population

history of in Western world, 276
structure in Japan, 275-97
Position

biological 75-77, 81-2, 89-103, 181,

187, 189, 192
social, 73, 143
Positivism, 134, 198-202, 210
Possessions, 390, 402-6, 411-12, 415-

16, 427, 429-30
Power, 22, 76, 172n, 252, 280, 298,
318, 330
definition of, 391, 392n
in stratification system, 390-3, 409-
12, 415, 421
Prestige (see also Stratification), 62,
83, 92-6, 99, 100, 132, 163, 167,
168, 193, 278, 312, 329
general continuum of, 407-8, 422
Prices, 51, 161, 224
Primogeniture, 185, 277, 291
Procedure, legal, function of, 380
Process

of deviance, 162
directions of, 395-6, 412-15
social, 235
technological, 22
Professions, the, 34-49, 62-3, 91, 166,
265, 281-2, 416-17
definition of, 372
in Germany, 108-112
legal, 370, 385
medical, 15, 381-3
Profane

concept of, 205-6
Profit, 43, 51, 63, 64, 133, 234, 324,

327
Profit-Motive (see also Motivation;
Action, economic; Hedonism),
50-68, 339
Prohibition, legal, 373
Projection, 120, 268, 310-11
Propaganda, 142-76, 247, 271, 273

types of, 170
Property, 56, 77, 105, 184-5, 190-3,
194, 326, 327, 329
rights of, 130, 377
Protestantism (see also Church, Pro-
testant) and capitalism, 28, 166,
207
Prussia, (see Germany)
Psychoanalysis (see also Freud, Mo-
tivation) 156-163, 298n, 355, 357,
359
and social structure, 336-47

INDEX

455

Psychology (see also Motivation,
Personality, Socialization)
of compulsion, 126, 137, 342, 343,

345, 377n
positivistic, 198
social, 361

and sociology, 142-4, 226-7, 233-

5, 299, 336-47, 351-69
and sociology of religion, 210-11
Psychosis, 305
Psychotherapy, 17, 152, 156-63, 166,

167n, 173, 382, 384, 393
Punishment, 56

Qualitative-Ascriptive sphere (see As-
criptive-Qualitative spliere)

Qualities (see also Ascription)
definition of, 389-90, 392n
personal, definition of, 75
and stratification theory, 393-415
in U. S. stratification, 428

Race, 267, 300

Radicalism, 117, 119-23, 125, 135,
140, 317

of tlie right, 125
Ranking (see Stratification)
Rationalism, 16, 135, 317
Rationality,

in action, 31, 33n, 37, 52, 199, 201,
222

critical, 130-1, 133, 134
Rationalization

process of, 118-23, 129, 131, 132,
134-40, 314-17, 322

psychological, 157-8, 161, 243n,
302
Reaction-formation, 345
Reciprocity, 38-9, 151, 155-7
Recognition, 44-5, 58-61, 65-7, 72-5
Redfield, R., 24n, 202n
Reference

frame of, 72, 228-30, 336-7, 340,

346, 347

(see Action, theory of)

invariant points of, 229, (see Posi-
tion, biological; Needs)
Reformation, the, 167
Relationship

business, 39, 41

contractual, 38-40, 129-30, 161

diffuse, 40, 47

doctor-patient, 154-63, 175, 383

group, 251, 310

informal, 47, 134, 315

lawyer-client, 371, 374-5, 377,

379-85
marital, 39, 78, 93-6, 99-100,

186-9
parent-child, 79, 89-90, 189-90,

250, 263, 300-1, 307n, 321
power, 298
primary group, 42
segmentary, total, 40
Religion, 125, 127, 134, 146, 154,
163, 167, 168, 197-211, 236,
406, 426
function of, 165-8
in Japan, 282-3, 286-7, 297
and science, 133

sociology of, 15, 26-9, 32, 197-
211, 363
Repression, 57, 242, 302, 305, 309
Research in sociology (see also Em-
piricism), 26-7, 46
techniques of, 17, 365-6
and theory, 12-18, 348-69
Residence (see Ecology)
'Response,' 59, 61, 73, 397, 404, 412,

413
Responsibility, 89, 99, 156, 158, 193,
195, 283, 286, 304, 306, 309,
312, 342-4
of lawyer, 377, 380, 381
of social scientist, 367
Revolution, 125, 148
French, 138
industrial, 127, 320
Russian, 293
Rewards, 390, 402, 403-5, 411, 416,
427
manipulation of, 384
Rights, 55-6, 65, 89-91, 130, 160-1,
190, 326
contractual, 327
legal, 373, 375, 377
of possession, 390
Ritual, 167, 203-4, 206, 382, 393
Rivalry (see Competition), 100, 221
ROETHLISBERGER, F. J., 70n, 315n,

349
Role

age, 89-103, 192-5, 328
allocation of, 403, 420
assimilation of, 190-1
conception of, 230, 233, 337, 338,

388-9, 393-4
definition of, 239, 244, 337
feminine (see Femininity)

456

INDEX

institutionalized, 54-5, 64, 66, 143,

145, 157, 171, 188, 231, 338
masculine (see Masculinity)
occupational, 55, 58, 78-9, 80, 83-
4, 94, 97, 100, 110-12, 129, 191,
244, 260, 295, 311-14, 323-34,
399, 410, 420-2, 424, 427-31
433
professional, 34-49, 84, 154-63,

166-7, 370-1, 372, 381-4
segregation of, 112-15 (in Ger-
many), 123, 190-4, 244, 311
sex, 80, 89-103, 113-15 (in Ger-
many), 122 (in Germany), 136,
190-4, 260, 304-11, 313, 328,
344, 345, 422-4
specializiition of, 99, 130, 259,

304-5
vs. status, 393-4
system of, 230, 337
technical, 396, 397, 403
Rockefeller Foundation, 387n
Romanticism

definition of, 120, 343

in Germany, 114-15, 120-3, 248-9,

251, 271-2
in United Stales, 101, 188, 342-3,
345
Rome, 34, 81-2, 303n, 327
Roosevelt, F. D., 169n, 170, 176n
Roper, E., 366
RuNuBLAD, B. G., 387n
Russell Sage Foundation, 387n
Russia, 293-4, 333, 407

Sacred, the, 203, 205-6
Salesman, 419
Samoa, 343

Sanctions, 149, 155-63, 186-8, 282-3,
286, 325, 337, 392-3, 396-7
and law, 373
rational, 133
'Scapegoats,' 245, 261, 302, 309, 313,

318, 372, 374n
ScHUMPETER, J. A., 323n
Science (see also Theory, in physical
science)
application of, 34-7, 48, 152-3, 161
devc-lopment of, 23, 33, 34-5, 197
primitive, 210

and soeio-cultural situation, 129-
34, 146, 164, 259, 316-7, 416-
17, 420
Security

psychological, 148, 189, 192, 193,
286, 307, 315, 434

Selection

theory of natural, 221, 223
Self-interest, 35, 50-68, 74, 139, 168n,

233-4, 240, 325, 355, 377, 381
Sentimentality, 377
Sentunents, 53, 56-7, 61, 70-3, 99,

126, 134, 138, 143, 144, 146,

147, 149, 165, 188-9, 200, 206-
7, 209, 239, 241, 247, 264, 273,
288, 302, 303, 325-6, 330, 382

'Fundamentalist,' 119
Sexuality, 80, 93, 97, 99-100, 113,

194, 307n, 308-9, 344-5
Shame, 45, 56, 72
Shils, E. a., 9, 356, 386n, 390n
Shinto, 282-3, 286, 287, 296
SiMMEL, G., 187n
Sinology, 15
Situation

conditions of, 28, 37, 143, 202,

222 259
definition of, 29, 43, 64, 74, 127-9,
131, 134-7, 145-51, 157, 161-7,
172-3, 175, 192, 208-9, 234,
241-2, 244, 247-8, 286, 330
experimental, 158
integration of, 44, 61, 64-5
occupational, 59, 313n
and social system, 143-4, 145-6,

148, 228, 231, 247
Situses, 428

Social System

changes in, 146, 162
and culture, 135, 146, 229
dimensions of, 394-5
equilibrium of, 80n, 187-8
functional needs of, 54-5, 144,

145, 187-9, 191-2, 228-9, 231,

325, 332, 338, 387n
integration of, 46, 60, 66, 148, 151,

171, 222, 244, 246, 325, 329,

338, 387-8, 390-1
and personality structure, 336-47
problems of total, 238, 245, 299,

324
structure of, 53, 70, 74, 77, 132,

142-3, 145, 229, 323-35
theory of, 224-237
units of, 387-9
variability of, 362
Socio/ Sy.ste/n.s, The, 9, 12, 375n,

377n, 382n, 386n, 390n
Socialism (see also National Social-
ism), 132, 135, 138, 269, 295,

323, 333-4, 370

INDEX

457

Socialization, 57, 73-4, 79, 87, 192,
230, 233, 303, 312, 338, 342-5,
359, 382, 396, 423
Society

modern Western (see also Ger-
many, U. S.)
anomie in, 129
aggression in, 251-77
birth-rate in, 276
capitalism in, 35, 43, 257
change in, 117 ff., 129-31
class in, 323-335
democracy in, 104
and Fascism, 124-141
and Germany, 117-123
kinship system in, 184
law in, 370 ff
morality of, 273
occupational system in, 245
professions in, 35, 43, 46, 160-1
rationalization in, 118 ff
social control in, 160-1, 173
values in, 129 ff

non-literate, 24, 178, 184, 192,
236-7

rural, 80, 94-5, 185, 276-9 (Japa-
nese), 320

urban, 117, 302-3
Sociology

American vs. European, 12

and anthropology, 177, 351, 353,
356, 357, 362, 369

and economic theory, 224-5, 236

of knowledge, 19

and psychoanalysis, 336-47

and psychology, 142-4, 226-7, 233-
5, 299, 336-47, 351-69

of reUgion, 15, 26-9, 32, 197-211,
363

research in (see Research)

theory in, 9-18, 212-37, 323-35,
348-69

verstehende, 27
Solidarity, 47, 78-80, 184, 188-89,
192, 204, 231, 243, 285-6, 302,
309, 317-18, 332, 380
SoMBABT, W., 269n
SoROKiN, p. A., 69n, 223n
Space

social, 69
Spain, 139
Sparticate, 82

Specialization (see Specificity, func-
tional), 79, 83, 99-100, 194
Specific-function collectivities, 419

Specificity

functional, 38-40, 42, 46-8, 160,

170, 173, 188n, 191, 326, 332,

360
and stratification, 397, 412, 413,

419-20
Spencer, H., 124, 129, 198-9, 205,

210, 220, 222n, 351-2
Stability,

economic, 265

of sociocultural situation, 163,

295-6, 315-6, 325
Standards (see Patterns, normative;

Evaluation, moral; Norms), 71,

147, 301, 304, 310
State (see also Government, Author-
ity, Nation),
modern, 46
Status

achieved vs. ascribed, 72, 76, 81-4,

189, 192, 311, 389-90, 393-4 ff,

408-9
class, 78, 81, 85-6, 91, 94, 323-34
concept of, 69-88
family, 77, 79, 94-5, 185-8, 191-3,

328
in Germany (pre-Nazi), 105-8, 110-

12, 121-2
interest in, 241, 243
in Japan, 277-83
occupational, 42, 56, 60, 83, 184,

190-3, 303, 313, 331
professional, 63, 160, 164, 330
Status-role complex, 388-9
Stouffer, S. a., 386n, 436n
Strain

institutional, 47, 79, 95, 100-2,

117, 136, 162, 177, 285, 377
psychological, 95, 98-102, 122, 127,

188, 193-5, 242, 283, 301, 309,

312, 339, 382, 383
Stratification, social, 55-7, 58, 69-88,

134, 232, 323-35
definition of, 388
in Germany, 104 ff
in Japan, 277 ff
theoretical analysis of, 386-415
in U. S., 416-38
in Western society, 139
Structure

definition of, 217
class, 78-9, 323-35

in Japan, 278-82
family, 94-5, 328, 331
kinship, 77, 79, 81, 177-96, 302-

458

11, 355, 362
institutional, 48, 54-6, 62, 143-4,
165-8, 231-2, 239-40, 303, 325-6
occupational, 46, 90, 103, 191, 260,

263, 311-14, 323-34
personality, 336-47
social, 53

analysis of, 15, 348-69
definition of, 230
differentiation of, 401
European, 184
German (pre-Nazi), 104-123
and individual action, 43
intetrration of, 66, 117, 136,
137, 148, 393, 403, 406-8,
411-12
Japanese, 275-97
and personality, 336-47, 459
and the professions, 34-49
and religion, 206
of U. S., 89-103
variability of, 53, 61-2, 144, 146,
161, 177-8, 183, 191-2, 195,
207, 360, 363-4
Structure of Social Action, The, 9,

19n, 22n, 25n, 26n, 32n, 52n,
70n, 143n, 213, 222n, 223n,
225n, 227n, 229n, 235n, 324n,
357, 359
Structure-function

analysis of, 144, 178, 399-400
system of, 218, 224-37, 337-8, 364
Subsystems

in stratification, 399-401, 404, 410,
418-19, 420, 425
Svibversion, 137-9
Suicide, 15, 16
Sumner, W. G., 349
Sung, A., 178n
Superego, 338, 340
Superiority (see Authority, Stratifica-
tion), 69-88, 99-100, 193-4, 310,
318-19, 325, 386-439
Supernatural, the, 202-4
Support, in psychotherapy, 383-4
Symbolism, 60, 62, 65, 80-1, 90,
93-5, 97, 99, 111-12, 113n, 115,
118-19, 126-7, 131, 137, 147,
167-70, 174-5, 206-7, 230, 242.
244, 247, 261, 267, 273, 286,
302, 312, 314, 315-17
and stratification, 405-6, 423-4, 427
System

INDEX

analytical vs. structural-functional,
218

class, 81, 323-34

concept of, 213-219

caste, 81

kinship, 79, 177-96, 302-11

occupational, 34, 78-9, 94, 190-2,
263, 311-14, 323-34, 344

symbolic, 315, 317

of values (see Values, systems of)
System-Goals (see Goal-Gratification

phase)
System-Integrative phase, 395-6, 397-
415

in U. S. stratification, 416, 418

Tabu, incest, 180, 189, 307n
Taeuber, I. B., 275n
Tawney, H. R., 67
Technology, 22-3, 34-6, 48, 129-30,
210, 222, 232, 245, 280, 284,
317, 416-7
Tenancy, 278

Tension, 93, 117, 136, 171, 190, 195,
203, 244, 246, 251, 283, 291-2,
302, 314n, 316, 333, 383
Theory

economic, 22, 31, 33n, 42, 50-68,

222, 224, 234-6, 323-4, 355
European social, 124
of factors, 220, 222-3
Marxian, 23, 26, 323-34
of natural selection, 221, 223
psychoanalytic, 336-47, 355, 359
psychological, 199-200, 219, 234-5,

336-47, 361
in science, 13-14, 50, 211n, 212,

348, 354
in physical science, 13-14, 69n,
152-3, 214, 216, 218, 219, 222,
224
of social action, 27, 29-30, 32, 52,
69, 72, 199-200, 208-9, 225-6,
228-9, 357-60, 386-7 ff
of social systems, 224-37, 336-42
in sociology, 9-18, 124, 212-37,
323-35, 348-69
Thomas, W. I., 29, 44, 58, 59, 145,

234, 349, 357
Thought (see Ideas, Theory)

economic, 36, 43, 45, 50-68, 323,

329, 334
German 'social,' 119
philosophical, 315
rational, 131, 315

INDEX

religious, 131, 165, 315

'social,' 131-4

utilitarian, 36
ToLMAN, E. C, 356, 357, 359
ToNNiEs, F., 14-15, 130, 360
Toward a General Theory of Action,

9, 386n
Tradition

cultural, 172n, 175

functions of, 126

in Japan, 275-97

legal, 373-6, 384

and social system, 143-8, 163-8,
207-8

in Western society, 129-141
Traditionalism, 15, 37, 46, 84, 118-
123, 132, 163, 258, 285, 316-
17, 425
Troeltsch, E., 269n
Tylor, E., 198-9, 210, 219
Type, ideal, 320-1

Unions

trade, 116, 257, 318
United States, 104, 138, 273, 333
age and sex in, 89-103
class in, 427-38

kinship system in, 16-17, 177-96
legal profession in, 370-85
occupational system in, 78-88
stratification in, 69-88, 415-438
youth in, 17, 91-3, 101-2, 190, 342-
5, 355
Universalism, 15, 41, 42, 46-8, 79,
113n, 160, 167, 170, 173, 188n,
258-9, 304, 332, 360, 363, 395,
399, 412, 413, 415-17
Universalism-achievement pattern,
397, 399, 400-1, 406, 407, 415-
38
Universalism-Quality pattern, 406
Urbanism, 135

Utilitarianism, 36, 42-3, 132, 135,
137, 198, 222, 225, 323, 324,
351, 355
Utility, 22, 52-3, 224
Utopianism, 120, 137, 324

Value-Standards

for stratification, 395-415
Values

in action, 357-8

conflict of, 47, 55, 93n, 117-123,
126, 141, 171, 283, 291, 317,
345

459

integration of, 406-8

'paramont,' patterns of, 398-9, 400,

401-2, 414, 420, 422
systems of, 27, 74-5, 76, 81, 83,

90-1, 166-7, 189-90, 281-3, 291-

3, 295-6, 317, 320, 388, 390,

393-4
variations in, 27 ff, 74, 166-7, 171,

175, 302, 317
Value-Standards

for stratification, 395-415
Variables (see also Theory)
in analysis of behavior, 142
ideas as, 19-33

isolution of, 26-7, 31, 46, 348
Marxian, 24, 324
quantitative, 216, 224
pattern (see Pattern Variables)
Variation
genetic, 300
institutional, 53, 61-2, 74, 144,

146-7, 161, 183, 191-2,' 195'

327
in Western society, 302, 320-1
Veblen, T., 80n, 130, 219, 222, 431

Waelder, R., 271n

Wants, 147

War, 148, 307

Warner, W. L., 77n, 177n, 180,

185n, 432, 434n, 435
Watson, T., 366
Wealth, 82-4, 280
Weber, A., 12
Weber, M., 11, 13, 15-16, 26-8,

31-2, 33, 52, 70n, 74n, 118, 129,

200, 207-9, 227, 314, 324, 342n,

349, 350, 353, 355, 357, 361,

363, 409
Whitehead, A., 222n
Williams, R. M., 423n
Wilson, L., 430n
Wilson, W., 270
Working Papers in the Theory of

Action, 9, 11, 386n, 390n, 394n,

397n, 400n, 412

Youth culture

American, 17, 91-3, 101-2 189-

90, 342-5, 355
German, 114-15, 120-2
situation of, 136

Znaniecki, f. 357

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